Judgment Sanjay Karol, J. Plaintiffs’ Civil Suit stands decreed in terms of judgment and decree dated 29.9.1997 passed by Senior Sub Judge, Mandi, H.P. in Civil Suit No. 136/84(83)/151/97, titled as Jawahar Singh and another vs Kishan Singh and others, which stands affirmed by Additional District Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, in terms of judgment and decree dated 29.8.2003 passed in Civil Appeal No. 18 of 1998, titled as Kishan Singh and another vs Jawahar Singh and another. 2. This is the contesting defendants’ Regular Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below, in terms of judgment and decree referred to hereinabove. 3. The instant appeal was admitted on 23.10.2003 on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether findings of the learned trial Court and the first appellate Court arevitiated on account of misreading and misinterpretation of the oral and documentary evidence? 2. Whether the findings of the learned trial Court and the first appellateCourt are against the settled position of law? 3. Whether the learned first appellateCourt erred in rejecting the application of the appellants for additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 and Order 18 Rule 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure? 4. I have heard Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Anand Sharma, learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 and perused the record. 3. Whether the learned first appellateCourt erred in rejecting the application of the appellants for additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 and Order 18 Rule 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure? 4. I have heard Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Anand Sharma, learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 and perused the record. Learned counsel for the parties have relied upon the following decisions rendered by various Courts including the Apex Court:- (i) Vimal Chand Ghevarchan Jain and others vs. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, (2009) 5 SCC713, (ii) Shyam Gopal Bindal and others vs. Land Acquisition Officer and another, (2010) 2 SCC 316 , (iii) Malayalam Plantations Limited vs. State of Kerala and another, (2010) 13 SCC487, (iv) Jabalpur Development Authority vs. V.V. Shrivastava and another, (2010) 13 SC84, (v) Sanjay Kumar vs. Narendra Devi, 2012(1) Him.L.R.16, (vi) Ram Lal and another vs. Mohinder Singh and others, AIR 2005 P&H 49 , (vii) Labh Singh and others vs. Piara Singh (deceased by L.Rs.) and another, AIR 1984 P&H 270 , (viii) Moonga Devi and others vs. Radha Ballabh, AIR 1972 SC 1471 , (ix) M.L.Abdul Jabbar Sahib v. H. Venkata Sastri and Sons and others, AIR 1969 SC 1147 , (x) Vishnu Ramkrishna and others vs. Nathu Vithal and others, AIR 1949 Bombay 266, (xi) M.Venkatasubbaiah vs. M.Subbamma and others, AIR 1956 Andhra 195, (xii) K.M.Varghese and others vs. K.M.Oommen and others, AIR 1994 Kerala 85,(xiii) Beni Chand (since dead) now by L.Rs. vs. Smt. Kamla Kunwar and others, AIR 1977 SC 63 , (xiv) Rani Purnima Debi and another vs. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb and another, AIR 1962 SC 567 , (xv) Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and another vs. Panchanan Banerjee (dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1995 SC 1684 , (xvi) Shri Kripa Ram and others vs. Smt. Maina, 2002(2) Shim.L.C. 213 , (xvii) Lalitaben Jayantilal Popat vs. Pragnaben Jamnadas Kataria and others, (2008) 15 SCC 365 , and (xviii) Ashok Bansal vs. Anju Goel, 2011(3) Him.L.R. 1286. 5. Plaintiffs Jawahar Singh and Diwan Singh filed Civil suit on 25.5.1983, seeking declaration to the effect that they are owners to the extent of half share in the suit land and that the Will dated 8.9.1978 allegedly executed by their grand-father Shri Pat is illegal, null and void. Plaintiffs also claimed possession of the suit land. 5. Plaintiffs Jawahar Singh and Diwan Singh filed Civil suit on 25.5.1983, seeking declaration to the effect that they are owners to the extent of half share in the suit land and that the Will dated 8.9.1978 allegedly executed by their grand-father Shri Pat is illegal, null and void. Plaintiffs also claimed possession of the suit land. The suit was initially filed against Shri Kishan Singh and Shri Manjit Singh, defendants No.1 and 2 – the only beneficiaries under the Will. 6. Shorn of other details and relevant facts, it would be suffice for adjudication of the present appeal, to mention here that earlier judgment(s) and decree(s) passed by the Courts below in the very same suit were set aside by this Court vide judgment and decree dated 20.9.1996 passed in RSA No.292 of 1990, titled as Jawahar Singh and another vs. Krishan Singh and another, and the matter was remanded to the trial Court after all the legal heirs of Shri Pat were impleaded as parties. At this juncture, it be only noticed that prior to the suit being remanded back to the trial Court, plaintiffs and defendants had already examined four witnesses each. After remand, the defendants examined two more witnesses. 7. As per averments made in the plaint, the plaintiffs’ grandmother Smt. Kanchanu got married to Sh. Pat after the death of her first husband. Shri Pat owned immovable property in District Mandi, State of H.P. Plaintiffs’ father Shri Lalman, pre-deceased Shri Pat and Smt. Kanchanu. Plaintiffs’ uncle Shri Inder Singh (defendant No.7) exercised undue influence over Shri Pat and managed to get the plaintiffs and their mother ousted from the ancestral house, as a result of which the family started residing with their maternal grand-father. Also in order to deprive the plaintiffs’ right of inheritance, defendant No.7 by exercising undue influence, collusion, misrepresentation and fraud managed to get the Will executed in favour of his two sons, i.e. Krishan Singh and Manjit Singh (defendants No.1 and 2) to the ouster of other legal heirs of Shri Pat, including the plaintiffs and other defendants. The Will in any event was shrouded by suspicious circumstances. 8. The Will in any event was shrouded by suspicious circumstances. 8. The contesting defendants No.1, 2 and 7, while specifically denying the allegations of exercise of undue influence and ousting the plaintiffs’ family from the ancestral home, alleged that a valid Will was executed by Shri Pat, voluntarily without any undue influence, out of love and affection for the beneficiaries. Plaintiffs’ additional plea that the property being ancestral could not have been willed was specifically denied by the contesting defendants. 9. Based on the pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD. 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties? OPD. 3. Whether the suit is within limitation? OPP 4. Whether the Will No. 96 dated 8.9.1978 is the result of fraud, undue influence misrepresentation, as alleged? OPP 5. Whether the Will as mentioned above is shrouded by suspicious circumstances? OPP 6. Whether the land in suit is ancestral property, if so, its effect? OPP 7. Whether there was partition between the parties, as alleged? If so, its effect? OPD 8. Whether Sh. Pat executed valid Will dated 8.9.1978 in favour of defendants No.1 and 2? OPD 9. Relief. 10. Trial Court decreed the plaintiffs’ suit for the reason that the contesting defendants, who were the propounders of the Will failed to prove the essential ingredients stipulated under the provisions of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as Succession Act) and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to Evidence Act). As such, the Will could not be said to have been validly executed/ attested by Shri pat. Also trial Court found that propounders had failed to dispel the doubt and discharge the burden of the Will not being shrouded by suspicious circumstances. Such findings of fact, judgment and decree dated 29.9.2007 passed by the trial Court stands affirmed by the lower appellate Court. 11. The concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that there is material irregularity, perversity or illegality with regard to the same cannot be interfered with. 12. The ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. versus Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. 11. The concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that there is material irregularity, perversity or illegality with regard to the same cannot be interfered with. 12. The ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. versus Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 , even post amendment of the provisions of Section 100 CPC, stands reiterated by the Apex Court, and in its various judicial pronouncements it is held that it would be open for the High Court to interfere with the findings of facts recorded by the Court below only where such findings are vitiated by; (i) non-consideration of relevant evidence, {Jagdish Singh vs. Nathu Singh, (1992) 1SCC 647 & Ram Das vs. Gandia Bai, (1997)1 SCC 74 }; (ii) conclusion is based on no evidence, {Ramanuja Naidu vs V. Kanniah Naidu and another, (1996) 3 SCC 392 , Neelkantan vs.Mallika Begum, (2002) 2 SCC 440 }. (iii) Conclusions are biased and evidence is not sufficient to support the same; {Ramanuja Naidu (supra)}; (iv) material evidence having a direct impact on the decision of the case was ignored; {Ram Das (supra) & Bharatha Matha vs. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010)11 SCC 483 }; (v) misread evidence which led to miscarriage of justice, {Rohini Prasad vs. Kasturchand (2000) 3 SCC 668 }; (vi) Rejected the witness accepted by the trial Court, {Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 }; (vii) Findings are erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable/settled by the Apex Court, {Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)}; (viii) assumed jurisdiction not vested in the Court {Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)}; (ix) not properly appreciating oral and documentary evidence which materially prejudices the case of the parties rendering the findings to be perverse, {Kulwant Kaur vs. Gurdial Singh Mann, (2001) 4 SCC 262 , Neelkantan (supra), Ramlal vs. Phagua (2006) 1 SCC 168 &Municipal Committee Hoshiarpur (supra)}; (x) misinterpretation of documents which goes to the root of title of a party, {Dinesh Kumar vs. Yusuf Ali, (2010) 12 SCC 740 }. (xi) where the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof, {Narendra Gopal Vidyarthi vs. Rajat Vidyarthi, (2009) 3SCC 287}; 13. (xi) where the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof, {Narendra Gopal Vidyarthi vs. Rajat Vidyarthi, (2009) 3SCC 287}; 13. The Apex Court has held that the High Court cannot set aside findings of the first Appellate Court in the following circumstances; (i) No point of law pleaded before the Courts below {V.Pechimuthu vs. Gowrammal, (2001)7 SCC 617 , Hero Vinoth (Minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 }; (ii) to arrive at a different conclusion on reappraisal of evidence, to adjudge the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence to sustain the conclusion of facts, {Ramanuja Naidu (supra)}, (iii) mere equitable consideration, {Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)}; (iv) the first Appellate Court did not advert to all the reasons given by the trial Court, {Arumugham (dead) by LRs & Ors. vs. Sundarambal & Anr. (1999) 4 SCC 350 }; (v) where two inferences are possible, the one drawn by the lower Appellate Court is binding on the High Court, {Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra), Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Anjuman-E-Esmail Madris-Un-Niswan, (1999) 6 SCC 343 and Hero Vinoth (supra)}; (vi) Another view is possible on re-appreciation of the same evidence, {Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty (1996)6 SCC 166 )}. 14. Further in Municipal Committee, Hoshiapur vs. Punjab State Electricity Board and others, (2010) 13 SCC 216 , the Apex Court held as under:- “19. In Jai Singh vs. Shakuntala, (2002) 3 SCC 634 ¸this Court held as under: (SCC pp.637-38, para 6) “6. …it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine the same in extensor stands permissible-it is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection.” 15. Having carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties, appreciating the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in its various judicial pronouncements and the evidence led by the parties (oral and documentary), I am of the considered view, that no case for interference is made out in the present appeal. There is no illegality, irregularity or perversity in the findings recorded in the impugned judgment and decree. The appeal was admitted on a limited substantial question of law, yet I have considered all the contentions raised by the parties. 16. There is no illegality, irregularity or perversity in the findings recorded in the impugned judgment and decree. The appeal was admitted on a limited substantial question of law, yet I have considered all the contentions raised by the parties. 16. At this juncture, it be clarified that the Courts below have held the property not to be ancestral. Also there is nothing on record to prove and establish the said fact. As such the suit property is taken to be self acquired property of Shri Pat. 17. Will Ext.DW-1/A is a registered document. The execution and registration of the Will is of the same day i.e. 8.9.1978. Undisputedly as on the said date, Shri Pat was 76 years of age and after three years he died on 17.10.1981. As on the date of execution of the Will Shri Pat was residing with Shri Inder Singh (defendant No.7) and the beneficiaries (defendants No.1 and 2). 18. From the testimony of Smt. Purbu (PW-1) wife of Shri Lalman and mother of the plaintiffs, Shri Mangatu (PW-2) and Shri Brij Lal (PW-3) and Shri Hari Ram (PW-4), one fact is evident that the plaintiffs were residing alongwith their mother in the house of their maternal grand-father. It is also evident that as on the date of execution of the Will, the other legal heirs of Shri Pat i.e. his wife Smt. Kanchanu, his daughters and son and grand children were alive. 19. Before I deal with substantial questions of law No.1 and 2, I shall first deal with the substantial question of law No. 3 as decision thereupon would have a bearing on the other two questions. 20. Shri Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned counsel for the contesting defendants has vehemently argued that the lower appellate Court erred in rejecting the contesting defendants’ application filed under Order 41 Rule 27, read with Order 18 Rule 2(4), CPC for leading additional evidence. 21. The suit was instituted by the plaintiffs on 25.5.1983. During trial the contesting defendants had all opportunities of leading their evidence. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants had already taken up all pleas which were available to them after accounting for attending circumstances and facts which were in their personal knowledge. Accordingly, trial Court framed the issues and in order to prove the same, parties led their respective evidence. During trial the contesting defendants had all opportunities of leading their evidence. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants had already taken up all pleas which were available to them after accounting for attending circumstances and facts which were in their personal knowledge. Accordingly, trial Court framed the issues and in order to prove the same, parties led their respective evidence. In support of their claim, plaintiffs examined four witnesses and in support of their evidence, contesting defendants i.e. appellants examined defendant Shri Kishan Singh (DW-1) and Shri Baldev (DW-2), Shri Badri Dass (DW-3), Shri Prema (DW-4). After this Court remanded the matter to the trial Court in terms of the judgment dated 20.9.1996, contesting defendants further examined two more witnesses i.e. Shri Hukam Chand (DW-5), Advocate, who identified the signatures of the executant and Shri Gopal Singh Thakur (DW-6), another Advocate, who also supported the version of DW-5. Statements of these witnesses were recorded on 12.9.1997 and 19.9.1997, respectively. The matter was, thereafter, heard by the trial Court and based on the evidence led by the parties, the trial Court decided the suit on merits, in terms of the judgment dated 29.9.1997. 22. Assailing the same, contesting defendants filed an appeal on 19.2.1998 and it was only on 21.5.2001 appellants filed the application in question, seeking permission of the appellate Court to examine another attesting witness, namely, Shri Gulamhusain as also the Sub Registrar, Mandi, in support of their plea to prove the Will of Shri Pat. Importantly, it is here for the first time, they took the plea that the attesting witness already examined i.e. Shri Baldev (DW-2) had been won over by the plaintiffs. Even in the grounds of appeal before the lower appellate Court, this fact was not pleaded. In the application, defendants have mentioned that Shri Gulamhusain, was not available at his house. Significantly, this plea, to say the least, is contrary to the record. No proper attempt was made to summon Shri Gulamhusain as a witness. The contesting defendants even after the matter was remanded back by this Court had sufficient time to examine this witness. 23. Perhaps they were advised that testimonies of the scribe and the identifier of the executant, in the face of the testimony of the attesting witness, which may or may not inspire confidence, would be sufficient enough for establishing their case of execution of a valid Will. 23. Perhaps they were advised that testimonies of the scribe and the identifier of the executant, in the face of the testimony of the attesting witness, which may or may not inspire confidence, would be sufficient enough for establishing their case of execution of a valid Will. It is not that defendants were ill-advised, did not have access to complete and proper legal advice or were being advised by a single Advocate. Different sets of Advocates, at various stages of the proceedings right upto the level of this Court, were handling their cases over a considerable long period of time. Despite proper legal assistance, the contesting defendants, in my view, in order to procrastinate the proceedings, after a gap of six years woke up to get another attesting witness examined. I am of the considered view that the lower appellate Court rightly rejected the application on 29.8.2003 by not exercising the discretion in the given facts and circumstances for all these reasons. 24. Reliance upon the decisions of the Apex Court by Mr. Kuthiala, learned counsel for the appellants in Vimal Chand Ghevarchan Jain (supra), Shyam Gopal Bindal (supra), Jabalpur Development (supra) and Malayalam Plantations Limited (supra), is misplaced as the ratio of law laid down therein is inapplicable to the instant facts of the case. On the contrary, reliance upon the decisions rendered by this Court by Shri Anand Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs, is in place. 25. The decision in Vimal Chand Ghevarchan Jain (supra), is inapplicable to the given facts. In the said case, the Court was dealing with the matter where the amendment of the pleadings was allowed and evidence led thereafter was not properly considered by the Court before taking the decision. 26. Shyam Gopal Bindal (supra), is clearly distinguishable on facts. In the said case, the documents were not in the knowledge of the successors-in-interest of the plaintiff, who had expired during trial. The legal heirs were only trying to place on record the decisions rendered by the Civil Court, which had attained finality, in support of their claim. 27. Malayalam Plantations Limited (supra), is inapplicable to the given facts of the case as the parties were seeking to place on record the decision rendered by the Civil Court, which had not only attained finality but was likely to have effect upon the outcome of the matter before the Court. 28. 27. Malayalam Plantations Limited (supra), is inapplicable to the given facts of the case as the parties were seeking to place on record the decision rendered by the Civil Court, which had not only attained finality but was likely to have effect upon the outcome of the matter before the Court. 28. Jabalpur Development Authority (supra), is also not applicable and distinguishable on the facts of the instant case. 29. Further Mr. Kuthiala has referred to the provisions of Section 71 of the Evidence Act to contend that examination of second attesting witness was absolutely necessary in view of the shaky testimony of the attesting witness examined in Court and that the evidence of the other witness including that of the Sub-Registrar was necessary. It is also contended that evidence of the scribe and the identifier was sufficient enough for the purpose of establishing due execution and attestation of the Will. 30. It may be only noticed that the attesting witness examined in the Court has neither denied having put his signatures on the document nor has he said that he does not recollect execution of the document. The contention only needs to be rejected in view of the decision rendered by the apex Court in Janki Narayan Bhoir vs. Narayan Namdeo Kadam, (2003) 2 SCC 91 , wherein it is held that when the document is not proved as is mandatorily required, under the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act, provisions of Section 71 of the said Act which is permissible and an enabling section cannot be pressed, moreso, in view of the provisions of Section 114 [Illustration (g)] of the Evidence Act. 31. In H.Venkatachala Iyengar versus B.N.Thimmajamma and others, AIR 1959 SC 443 , a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court has held that unlike other documents, “Will”, which is distinguishable speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a Court, the testator has already departed from the world. 31. In H.Venkatachala Iyengar versus B.N.Thimmajamma and others, AIR 1959 SC 443 , a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court has held that unlike other documents, “Will”, which is distinguishable speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a Court, the testator has already departed from the world. While dealing with the proof of wills the Court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents but the propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that Will was signed by the testator, who was in a sound and disposing state of mind, who not only understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. The onus to dispel the suspicious circumstance is on the propounder. 32. A five Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee versus Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529 , after relying upon H.Venkatachala Iyengar (supra), has held as under:- “23. There is no doubt that if a will has been registered, that is a circumstance which may, having regard to the circumstances, prove its genuineness. But the mere fact that a will is registered will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all suspicion regarding it where suspicion exists, without submitting the evidence of registration to a close examination. If the evidence as to registration on a close examination reveals that the registration was made in such a manner that it was brought home to the testator that the document of which he was admitting execution was a Will disposing of his property and thereafter he admitted its execution and signed it in token thereof, the registration Will dispel the doubt as to the genuineness of the will. But if the evidence as to registration shows that it was done in a perfunctory manner, that the officer registering the will did not read it over to the testator or did not bring home to him that he was admitting the execution of a will or did not satisfy himself in some other way (as, for example, by seeing the testator reading the Will) that the testator knew that it was a Will the execution of which he was admitting, the fact that the Will was registered would not be of much value. It is not unknown that registration may take place without the executant really knowing what he was registering. Law reports are full of cases in which registered Wills have not been acted upon : (see, for example, Vellaswamy Servai v. Sivaraman Servai, ILR 8 Rang 179: (AIR 1930 PC 24), Surendra Nath v. Jnanendra Nath, AIR 1932Cal 574 and Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh, (S) AIR 1955 SC 346 . Therefore, the mere fact of registration may not by itself be enough to dispel all suspicion that may attach to the execution and attestation of a Will; though the fact that there has been registration would be an important circumstance in favour of the will being genuine if the evidence as to registration establishes that the testator admitted the execution of the will after knowing that it was a Will the execution of which he was admitting.” 33. The Apex Court in Bhagat Ram v. Suresh 2003(12) SCC 35 , has held that endorsement made by the Registrar of the deeds in discharge of their duties by themselves cannot be taken to be proof of execution of a document required to be attested by law. Also the Registrar cannot be taken to be an attesting witness, unless there are justifiable and explainable reasons. The requirement of proving the Will by examining the attesting witness is absolutely necessary. The existence of animo attestandi i.e. putting the signatures on the Will, for the purpose of attesting the same is absolutely necessary. The Court had an occasion to separately deal with and construe the provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act and Sections 68 and 114 of the Evidence Act. 34. The Apex Court in Benga Behera v. Braja Kishore Nanda, (2007) 9 SCC 728 , has further held that it is not necessary for the propounder to examine both the attesting witnesses. The principle that the authority registering the Will cannot be an attesting witness was reiterated. 35. Further in Anil Kak vs. Kumari Sharada Raje and another, (2008) 7 SCC 695 , the Court has held that proving of execution of the Will does not mean proving the signatures of the executant and the attesting witnesses. It means something more. The principle that the authority registering the Will cannot be an attesting witness was reiterated. 35. Further in Anil Kak vs. Kumari Sharada Raje and another, (2008) 7 SCC 695 , the Court has held that proving of execution of the Will does not mean proving the signatures of the executant and the attesting witnesses. It means something more. The Will is not an ordinary document and compliance of statutory conditions imposed under Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act cannot be ignored. 36. The aforesaid decision was reiterated in Yumnam Ongbi Tampha Ibema Devi vs. Yumnam Joykumar Singh and others, (2009) 4 SCC 780 , wherein the apex Court held as under:- “11. As per provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act, for the due execution of a Will: (1) the testator should sign or affix his mark to the Will; (2) the signature or the mark of the testator should be so placed that it should appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a Will; (3) the Will should be attested by two or more witnesses, and (4) each of the said witnesses must have seen the testator signing or affixing his mark to the Will and eachof them should sign the Will in presence of the testator. 12. The attestation of the Will in the manner stated above is not an empty formality. It means signing a document for the purpose of testifying of the signatures of the executant. The attested witness should put his signature on the Will animoattestandi. It is not necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time and no particular form of attestation is necessary. Since a Will is required by law to be attested, execution has to be proved in the manner laid down in section and the Evidence Act which requires that at least one attesting witness has to be examined for the purpose of proving the execution of such a document. 13. Therefore, having regards to the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act and Section 63 of the Succession Act, a Will to be valid should be attested by two or more witnesses in the manner provided therein and the propounder thereof should examine one attesting witness to prove the will. 13. Therefore, having regards to the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act and Section 63 of the Succession Act, a Will to be valid should be attested by two or more witnesses in the manner provided therein and the propounder thereof should examine one attesting witness to prove the will. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator's signature or affixing his mark to the will but also that each of the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator.” 37. Prior thereto, the Apex Court in Surendra Pal vs. Dr.Saraswati Arora, (1974)2 SCC 600 has held that the propounder has to show that the will was signed by the testator; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions, that he put his signature to the testament of his own free will and that he has signed it in the presence of the two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But there may be cases in which the execution of the will itself is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, such as, where the signature is doubtful, the testator is of feeble mind or is overawed by powerful minds interested in getting his property, or where in the light of the relevant circumstances the dispositions appear to be unnatural, improbable and unfair, or where there are other reasons for doubting that the dispositions of the will are not the result of the testator's free will and mind. In all such cases where there may be legitimate suspicious circumstances those must be reviewed and satisfactorily explained before the will is accepted. Again in cases where the propounder has himself taken a prominent part in the execution of the will which confers on him substantial benefit that is itself one of the suspicious circumstances which he must remove by clear and satisfactory evidence. After all, ultimately it is the conscience of the court that has to be satisfied, as such the nature and quality of proof must be commensurate with the need to satisfy that conscience and remove any suspicion which a reasonable man may, in the relevant circumstances of the case, entertain. 38. After all, ultimately it is the conscience of the court that has to be satisfied, as such the nature and quality of proof must be commensurate with the need to satisfy that conscience and remove any suspicion which a reasonable man may, in the relevant circumstances of the case, entertain. 38. Further in Daulat Ram vs. Sodha, (2005) 1 SCC 40 , has held that in order to assess as to whether the will has been validly executed and is a genuine document, the propounder has to show that the will was signed by the testator and that he had put his signatures to the testament of his own free will; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind and understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and that the testator had signed it in the presence of two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to remove the suspicion by leading appropriate evidence. The burden to prove that the will was forged or that it was obtained under undue influence or coercion or by playing a fraud is on the person who alleges it to be so. 44. The aforesaid principles have been reiterated in Gopal Swaroop versus Krishna Murari Mangal and others, (2010) 14 SCC 266 and also in Saroja versus Santhil Kumar and others, (2011) 11 SCC 483 }. 39. Apex Court in Uma Devi Nambiar and others versus T.C. Sidhan (Dead), (2004) 2 SCC 321 , has held that mere exclusion of the legal heirs by itself does not amount to a suspicious circumstance. 40. Now significantly, beneficiary Shri Kishan Singh (DW-1) admits that he had brought his grandfather to Mandi for execution of the Will on 8.1.1978. He also admits that the Will was not only got written but also produced before the Tehsildar by his father. Now, father of this witness has not been examined in Court. Thus, it is quite evident that the propounder and his father have taken an active part in the execution and attestation of the Will. He also admits that the Will was not only got written but also produced before the Tehsildar by his father. Now, father of this witness has not been examined in Court. Thus, it is quite evident that the propounder and his father have taken an active part in the execution and attestation of the Will. Significantly, this witness admits it to be correct that Shri Lalman, father of the plaintiffs, was not having any source of income and was working as a “coolie”. He in no uncertain terms, in his cross-examination has deposed that he does not know whether his grandfather had told that the land should be given to both his sons, i.e. Shri Inder Singh and Shri Lalman. 41. From the testimony of the star witness Shri Baldev (DW-2), it is evident that due execution and attestation of the Will has not been proved by the propounder. DW-2 in no uncertain terms has stated that he does not know whether the Will was read over and explained to the testator or not. In cross-examination, he states that he was called by Shri Inder Singh (father of the beneficiaries) from the Bazaar. He does not remember who called the other attesting witness Shri Gulam Hussain. He admits that prior to his reaching the Courts the Will had already been prepared and after he signed the same he immediately left and no other person signed. He admits not to have visited the Tehsil (office where Will is registered) and does not remember as to whether Shri Gulam Hussain had gone there or not. He admits that the Will was neither signed nor registered by the Tehsildar in his presence. He states that he does not know as to whether in the year 1997, Shri Pat was of sound disposing state of mind or not. 42. Shri Badri Dass (DW-3) is the scribe. He states that the Will was scribed on the asking of Shri Pat and the contents thereof were explained to him. But, in my considered view, testimony of this witness does not inspire confidence. In cross-examination, he admits that entry No.578, being the serial number against which the Will is stated to have been entered in the Register is not signed by him. But, in my considered view, testimony of this witness does not inspire confidence. In cross-examination, he admits that entry No.578, being the serial number against which the Will is stated to have been entered in the Register is not signed by him. He admits that the Register is not only not paginated but also some of the entries are not in his hand but in the hand of his colleague who is not a licence holder. 43. Shri Prema (DW-4) through whom the beneficiaries have tried to prove the health of the executant, in no uncertain terms, admits that though Shri Pat was keeping good health but had earlier fallen ill and was admitted in the hospital at Chatrokhari and he had never expressed his desire to disinherit the children of Shri Lalman, i.e. the present plaintiffs. 44. Shri Hukam Chand (DW-5) is an Advocate practicing in the District Courts at Mandi. He identified the thumb impression of the executant. In cross-examination, he admits that he did not know the witness and also does not remember that the witness had signed in his presence or not. 45. A careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the witnesses of the contesting defendants would only reveal and establish the fact that the beneficiaries and their father had participated in the execution of the Will. Thus, it was incumbent upon the propounders to have established the fact that the Will was scribed, executed and attested in accordance with law. In my considered view, the testimony of the scribe of the Will Shri Brij Lal (DW-3), identifier Shri Hukam Chand (DW-5) and Shri Gopal Singh Thakur (DW-6), does not prove and establish due execution and attestation of a valid Will (Ext.DW-1/A). Mere registration is not sufficient and as such the contention needs to be rejected. 45. Also, I am of the considered view, in the instant case, based on the evidence led by the parties, the Courts below have rightly held that the Will is shrouded by suspicious circumstances. The beneficiaries have failed to even prima facie discharge the onus. 46. The Apex Court in Adivekka and others versus Hanamavva Kom Venkatesh (Dead) by LRs. 45. Also, I am of the considered view, in the instant case, based on the evidence led by the parties, the Courts below have rightly held that the Will is shrouded by suspicious circumstances. The beneficiaries have failed to even prima facie discharge the onus. 46. The Apex Court in Adivekka and others versus Hanamavva Kom Venkatesh (Dead) by LRs. and another, (2007) 7 SCC 91 , has clearly held that once the propounder of the Will discharges the burden by proving the statutory compliance under the provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act and has given a reasonable explanation about the genuineness of the execution of the Will, dispelling the suspicious circumstances, then onus to prove fraud, coercion and undue influence is on the caveator, who in fact challenges the Will. (Also: Sridevi and others versus Jayaraja Shetty and others, (2005) 2 SCC 784 ; S.R. Srinivasa and others versus S. Padmavathamma, (2010) 5 SCC 274 ; Pentakota Satyanarayana and others vs. Pentakota Seetharatnam and others, (2005)8 SCC 67, and Mahesh Kumar (Dead) by LRs. Versus Vinod Kumar and others, (2012) 4 SCC 387 ). 47. The Apex Court in Smt. Indu Bala Bose and others versus Manindra Chandra Bose and another, (1982) 1 SCC 20 , has held that any and every circumstance cannot be said to be a suspicious. A circumstance would be suspicious when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person. 48. In Harmes and another versus Hinkson, AIR 1946 PC 156, the Court has held as under: “........Where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable skepticism, not as obdurate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the Judge, even in circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth.” 49. In Bank of India Ltd. Versus Jamsetji A.H. Chinoy and Messrs. Chinoy and Co., AIR 1950 PC 90, the Court held as under: “The appellate Court would be reluctant to differ from the conclusion of the trial Judge if his conclusion is based ion the impression made by a person in the witness box. In Bank of India Ltd. Versus Jamsetji A.H. Chinoy and Messrs. Chinoy and Co., AIR 1950 PC 90, the Court held as under: “The appellate Court would be reluctant to differ from the conclusion of the trial Judge if his conclusion is based ion the impression made by a person in the witness box. If, however, the trial Judge based his finding and his opinion of the person on a theory derived from documents and a series of inferences and assumptions founded on a variety of facts and circumstances which, in them selves, offer no direct or positive support for the conclusion reached, the right of the appellate Court to review this inferential process cannot be denied.” 50. The Apex Court in Crystal Developers versus Asha Lata Ghosh (Smt.) (Dead) through LRs. and others, (2005) 9 SCC 375 , has held that findings with regard to suspicious circumstances are necessarily required to be based on the evidence led by the parties and not on the basis of conjectures and suspicion. 51. In view of the settled position with regard to the principles, as noticed hereinabove, there is no need to specifically deal with each and every decision cited by the learned counsel for the parties. 52. The factum that the Will is shrouded by suspicious circumstances and undue influence is fortified from the testimony of Smt. Purbu (PW-1), mother of the present plaintiffs, who in no uncertain terms has deposed that her brother-in-law, i.e. the father of the beneficiaries, was not having good relations with her. After the death of her husband, he never took care of them but to the contrary harassed them, as a result of which she left for her parental house. The executant was under the influence of her brother-in-law and with an endeavour to grab the property he got the Will executed to the exclusion of the other legal heirs of Shri Pat. According to her, Shri Pat was an old man and totally helpless. The witness in her unrebutted testimony has deposed that her father-in-law was hard of hearing. Her testimony is worthy of credence. In fact on the question of health of the executant it is corroborated. It has not come on record that Shri Pat was harbouring any animosity or ill-will towards his grandchildren, i.e. the present plaintiffs or the other legal heirs, including his wife. Her testimony is worthy of credence. In fact on the question of health of the executant it is corroborated. It has not come on record that Shri Pat was harbouring any animosity or ill-will towards his grandchildren, i.e. the present plaintiffs or the other legal heirs, including his wife. He had no reason or basis to do so. It is an admitted case of the parties, as has come out in the evidence of the witness that father of the plaintiffs was mentally deranged and had no independent source of income. Under these circumstances, there was all the more reason for the grandfather to have willed the property in favour of all his grand-children and more so in favour of the plaintiffs, whose father was actually working as a “coolie”. 53. The beneficiaries have not been able to furnish a valid explanation with regard to the exclusion of the legal heirs or a special reason justifying bequeathing of the property in their favour. The suspicion is based on legal evidence and sound principles of law. 54. From the perusal of the entire material on record, it cannot be said that the findings rendered by the Courts below are either vitiated on account of misreading and misappreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record or the same are contrary to the settled position of law. 55. Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is dismissed being without any merit. No costs.