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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 910 (HP)

Jawahar Singh v. Kishan Singh

2012-12-01

SANJAY KAROL

body2012
Judgment Sanjay Karol, J. This is plaintiffs’ Regular Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs-appellants Shri Jawahar Singh and Shri Diwan Singh (herein after referred to as the plaintiffs) filed Civil Suit No.71/90, titled Jawahar Singh and another versus Kishan Singh and others, for declaration and injunction as a consequential relief, against defendants-respondents Shri Kishan Singh and others (hereinafter referred to as the defendants, which expression also includes their legal heirs). The same was dismissed by the Court of Sub Judge 1st Class, Court No.2, Mandi, in terms of judgment and decree dated 20th November, 1993. In the plaintiffs’ Civil Appeal No.53 of 1996/94, titled Jawahar Singh and another versus Kishan Singh and others, learned Additional District Judge, Mandi, has affirmed the judgment and decree, in terms of its judgment and decree dated 27th November, 2000. 2. The present appeal stands admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned courts below are right in holding the will to be validly executed ignoring the pleadings as well as the evidence brought 2. Whether in the absence of necessary ingredients, required as per section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act being on record, the ld. Courts below are right in holding the will to be validly executed? 3. I have heard Mr. Harish Behl, learned counsel for appellants, Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned counsel for respondents and perused the record. Learned counsel have relied upon various decisions rendered by various Courts, including the Apex Court. 4. In support of his contentions, Mr. Behl has referred to and relied upon the decision of the apex Court rendered in Shankarsan Parida (dead) and his legal heirs Ramphamani Dei and others versus Laxmindhar Nayak, AIR 1991 Orissa 23; Ramchandra Rambux versus Champabai and others, AIR 1965 SC 354; Gorantla Thataiah versus Thotakura Venkata Subbaiah and others, AIR 1968 SC 1332 ; and Smt. Indu Bala Bose and others versus Manindra Chandra Bose and another, (1982) 1 SCC 20 . He has specifically invited my attention to the evidence led by the plaintiffs, i.e. statement of plaintiff Shri Jawahar Singh (PW-1), Shri Brij Lal (PW-2) and Shri Thopa (PW-3). 5. In rebuttal, apart from taking me through the record, Mr. He has specifically invited my attention to the evidence led by the plaintiffs, i.e. statement of plaintiff Shri Jawahar Singh (PW-1), Shri Brij Lal (PW-2) and Shri Thopa (PW-3). 5. In rebuttal, apart from taking me through the record, Mr. Kuthiala, learned counsel for the beneficiaries, has referred to and relied upon the decision rendered by this Court in ShriIshwarDa versusSmt.LeelaDeviandothers,1997 (1) SLJ 684, and the apex Court in Pentakota Satyanarayana and others versus Pentakota Seetharatnam and others,(2005) 8 SCC 67, Adivekka and others versus Hanamavva Kom Venkatesh (Dead) by LRs. and another, (2007) 7 SCC 91 ; Gopal Swaroop versus Krishna Murari Mangal and others, (2010) 14 SCC 266 ; and Saroja versus Santhilkumar and others, (2011) 11 SCC 483 . 6. Plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration to the effect that the Will dated 21.9.1981 allegedly executed by Smt. Kanchnu in favour of Shri Kishan Singh (defendant No.1) and Shri Manjit Singh (defendant No.2) is forged, fictitious, null and void. Defendants No.3 to 7 are the legal heirs of deceased Kanchnu. 7. Undisputed facts, which emerge from the record, are as follows. Smt. Kanchnu owned approximately 40 bighas of land in the State of Himachal Pradesh. She had six children (two sons Shri Inder Singh and Shri Lalman, and four daughters). In the year 1971, she gifted the said land in favour of her two sons, in equal shares. Sometimes in the year 1975, Shri Lalman died intestate. Thus, by virtue of succession, Smt. Kanchnu inherited the estate of Shri Lalman alongwith his other legal heirs, including plaintiffs Shri Jawahar Singh and Shri Diwan Singh, sons of Shri Lalman. With respect to the share which she thus inherited (which is approximately 5 bighas), Smt. Kanchnu executed registered Will dated 21.9.1981 in favour of on record with regard to the will being shrouded in suspicious and unnatural circumstances? defendants No.1 and 2 (Shri Kishan Singh and Shri Manjit Singh, sons of defendant No.3 Shri Inder Singh). On 18.12.1988, Smt. Kanchnu expired and on the basis of the said Will, entries pertaining to the mutation of inheritance were attested by the revenue authorities. Aggrieved thereof, plaintiffs filed the instant suit for declaration on 11.6.1990. 8. defendants No.1 and 2 (Shri Kishan Singh and Shri Manjit Singh, sons of defendant No.3 Shri Inder Singh). On 18.12.1988, Smt. Kanchnu expired and on the basis of the said Will, entries pertaining to the mutation of inheritance were attested by the revenue authorities. Aggrieved thereof, plaintiffs filed the instant suit for declaration on 11.6.1990. 8. It has also come on record that after the death of her first husband, Smt. Kanchnu again got married to Shri Pat, who also executed a Will dated 8.9.1978 in favour of the present defendants No.1 and 2. It may be only noticed that valid execution of the said Will is subject matter of separate proceedings. 9. The instant suit was filed by the plaintiffs, inter alia taking the plea that after the death of their father Shri Lalman, they were thrown out of their ancestral house by their uncle Shri Inder Singh and since then they have been residing in the house of their maternal grandfather. Despite the same, plaintiffs continued to be on visiting terms with the defendants. Smt. Kanchnu was weak and not enjoying good health. Since she was staying with Shri Inder Singh and she being a rustic and illiterate woman, Shri Inder Singh managed to get the Will executed in favour of his sons. A plea of fraud, undue influence, coercion, misrepresentation and deception played by Shri Inder Singh and his sons was taken. Significantly, plaintiffs also pleaded that the Will was forged, false and fictitious and was not executed by Smt. Kanchnu at all. 10. Contesting defendants resisted the suit, clearly denying the averments made in the plaint. 11. Based on the pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the will dated 21.9.81 No.128 was executed by Smt. Kanchanu in favour of the defendants no.1 and 2, is valid one? OPD 1 and 2 2. If issue no.1 is not proved in affirmative whether the will no.128 dated 21.9.81 is forged, false and fictitious and procured by misrepresentation of facts, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief as prayed for? OPP 4. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 1,2. 5. Whether there is no enforceable cause of action against the defendants? OPD 6. Relief. 12. OPP 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief as prayed for? OPP 4. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 1,2. 5. Whether there is no enforceable cause of action against the defendants? OPD 6. Relief. 12. Appreciating the evidence led by the parties, trial Court dismissed the suit, holding the Will to have been validly executed by Smt. Kanchnu in favour of defendants No.1 and 2. The first Appellate Court upheld such findings of fact. 13. The concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that there is material irregularity, perversity or illegality with regard to the same cannot be interfered with. 14. The ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. versus Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 , even post amendment of the provisions of Section 100 CPC, stands reiterated by the Apex Court, and in its various judicial pronouncements it is held that it would be open for the High Court to interfere with the findings of facts recorded by the Court below only where such findings are vitiated by; (i) non-consideration of relevant evidence, {Jagdish Singh vs. Nathu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647 & Ram Das vs. Gandia Bai, (1997) 1 SCC 74 }; (ii) conclusion is based on no evidence, {Ramanuja Naidu vs V. Kanniah Naidu and another, (1996) 3 SCC 392 , Neelkantan vs. Mallika Begum, (2002) 2 SCC 440 }. (iii) Conclusions are biased and evidence is not sufficient to support the same; {Ramanuja Naidu (supra)}; (iv) material evidence having a direct impact on the decision of the case was ignored; {Ram Das (supra) & Bharatha Matha vs. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010) 11 SCC 483 }; (v) misread evidence which led to miscarriage of justice, {Rohini Prasad vs. Kasturchand (2000) 3 SCC 668 }; (vi) Rejected the witness accepted by the trial Court, {Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 }; (vii) Findings are erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable/settled by the Apex Court, {Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)}; (viii) assumed jurisdiction not vested in the Court {Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)}; (ix) not properly appreciating oral and documentary evidence which materially prejudices the case of the parties rendering the findings to be perverse, {Kulwant Kaur vs. Gurdial Singh Mann, (2001) 4 SCC 262 , Neelkantan (supra), Ramlal vs. Phagua (2006) 1 SCC 168 & Municipal Committee Hoshiarpur (supra)}; (x) misinterpretation of documents which goes to the root of title of a party, {Dinesh Kumar vs. Yusuf Ali, (2010) 12 SCC 740 }. (xi) where the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof, {Narendra Gopal Vidyarthi vs. Rajat Vidyarthi, (2009) 3 SCC 287 }; 15. The Apex Court has held that the High Court cannot set aside findings of the first Appellate Court in the following circumstances; (i) No point of law pleaded before the Courts below {V.Pechimuthu vs. Gowrammal, (2001) 7 SCC 617 , Hero Vinoth (Minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 }; (ii) to arrive at a different conclusion on reappraisal of evidence, to adjudge the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence to sustain the conclusion of facts, {Ramanuja Naidu (supra)}, (iii) mere equitable consideration, {Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)}; (iv) the first Appellate Court did not advert to all the reasons given by the trial Court, {Arumugham (dead) by LRs & Ors. vs. Sundarambal & Anr. (1999) 4 SCC 350 }; (v) where two inferences are possible, the one drawn by the lower Appellate Court is binding on the High Court, {Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra), Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Anjuman-E-Esmail Madris-Un-Niswan, (1999) 6 SCC 343 and Hero Vinoth (supra)}; (vi) Another view is possible on re-appreciation of the same evidence, {Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty (1996) 6 SCC 166 )}. 16. 16. Further in Municipal Committee, Hoshiapur vs. Punjab State Electricity Board and others, (2010) 13 SCC 216 , the Apex Court held as under:- “19. In Jai Singh vs. Shakuntala, (2002) 3 SCC 634 ¸this Court held as under: (SCC pp.637-38, para 6) “6. …it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine the same in extensor stands permissible-it is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection.” 17. Having carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties, appreciating the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in its various judicial pronouncements and the evidence led by the parties (oral and documentary), I am of the considered view, that no case for interference is made out in the present appeal. There is no illegality, irregularity or perversity in the findings recorded in the impugned judgment and decree. The appeal was admitted on a limited substantial questions of law, yet I have considered all the contentions raised by the parties. 18. In H.Venkatachala Iyengar versus B.N.Thimmajamma and others, AIR 1959 SC 443 , a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court has held that unlike other documents, “Will”, which is distinguishable speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a Court, the testator has already departed from the world. While dealing with the proof of wills the Court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents but the propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that Will was signed by the testator, who was in sound and disposing state of mind, who not only understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. The onus to dispel the suspicious circumstance is on the propounder. 19. A five Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee versus Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529 , after relying H.Venkatachala Iyengar (supra), has held as under:- “23. There is no doubt that if a will has been registered, that is a circumstance which may, having regard to the circumstances, prove its genuineness. 19. A five Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee versus Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529 , after relying H.Venkatachala Iyengar (supra), has held as under:- “23. There is no doubt that if a will has been registered, that is a circumstance which may, having regard to the circumstances, prove its genuineness. But the mere fact that a will is registered will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all suspicion regarding it where suspicion exists, without submitting the evidence of registration to a close examination. If the evidence as to registration on a close examination reveals that the registration was made in such a manner that it was brought home to the testator that the document of which he was admitting execution was a Will disposing of his property and thereafter he admitted its execution and signed it in token thereof, the registration Will dispel the doubt as to the genuineness of the will. But if the evidence as to registration shows that it was done in a perfunctory manner, that the officer registering the will did not read it over to the testator or did not bring home to him that he was admitting the execution of a will or did not satisfy himself in some other way (as, for example, by seeing the testator reading the Will) that the testator knew that it was a Will the execution of which he was admitting, the fact that the Will was registered would not be of much value. It is not unknown that registration may take place without the executant really knowing what he was registering. Law reports are full of cases in which registered Wills have not been acted upon : (see, for example, Vellaswamy Servai v. Sivaraman Servai, ILR 8 Rang 179: (AIR 1930 PC 24), Surendra Nath v. Jnanendra Nath, AIR 1932 Cal 574 and Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh, (S) AIR 1955 SC 346 . Law reports are full of cases in which registered Wills have not been acted upon : (see, for example, Vellaswamy Servai v. Sivaraman Servai, ILR 8 Rang 179: (AIR 1930 PC 24), Surendra Nath v. Jnanendra Nath, AIR 1932 Cal 574 and Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh, (S) AIR 1955 SC 346 . Therefore, the mere fact of registration may not by itself be enough to dispel all suspicion that may attach to the execution and attestation of a Will; though the fact that there has been registration would be an important circumstance in favour of the will being genuine if the evidence as to registration establishes that the testator admitted the execution of the will after knowing that it was a Will the execution of which he was admitting.” 20. The Apex Court in Bhagat Ram v. Suresh 2003(12) SCC 35 , has held that endorsement made by the Registrar of the deeds in discharge of their duties by themselves cannot be taken to be proof of execution of a document required to be attested by law. Also the Registrar cannot be taken to be an attesting witness, unless there are justifiable and explainable reasons. The requirement of proving the Will by examining the attesting witness is absolutely necessary. The existence of animo attestandii.e. putting the signatures on the Will, for the purpose of attesting the same is absolutely necessary. The Court had an occasion to separately deal with and construe the provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act and Sections 68 and 114 of the Evidence Act. 21. The Apex Court in Benga Behera v. Braja Kishore Nanda, (2007) 9 SCC 728 , has further held that it is not necessary for the propounder to examine both the attesting witnesses. The principle that the authority registering the Will cannot be an attesting witness was reiterated. 22. Further in Anil Kak vs. Kumari Sharada Raje and another, (2008) 7 SCC 695 , the Court has held that proving of execution of the Will does not mean proving the signatures of the executant and the attesting witnesses. It means something more. The Will is not an ordinary document and compliance of statutory conditions imposed under Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act cannot be ignored. 23. It means something more. The Will is not an ordinary document and compliance of statutory conditions imposed under Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act cannot be ignored. 23. The aforesaid decision was reiterated in Yumnam Ongbi Tampha Ibema Devi vs. Yumnam Joykumar Singh and others, (2009) 4 SCC 780 , wherein the apex Court held as under:- “11. As per provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act, for the due execution of a Will: (1) the testator should sign or affix his mark to the Will; (2) the signature or the mark of the testator should be so placed that it should appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a Will; (3) the Will should be attested by two ormore witnesses, and (4) each of the said witnesses must have seen the testator signing or affixing his mark to the Will and each of them should sign the Will in presence of the testator. 12. The attestation of the Will in the manner stated above is not an empty formality. It means signing a document for the purpose of testifying of the signatures of the executant. The attested witness should put his signature on the Will animo attestandi. It is not necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time and no particular form of attestation is necessary. Since a Will is required by law to be attested, execution has to be proved in the manner laid down in section and the Evidence Act which requires that at least one attesting witness has to be examined for the purpose of proving the execution of such a document. 13. Therefore, having regards to the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act and Section 63 of the Succession Act, a Will to be valid should be attested by two or more witnesses in the manner provided therein and the propounder thereof should examine one attesting witness to prove the will. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator's signature or affixing his mark to the will but also that each of the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator.” 24. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator's signature or affixing his mark to the will but also that each of the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator.” 24. Prior thereto, the Apex Court in Surendra Pal vs. Dr.Saraswati Arora, (1974)2 SCC 600 has held that the propounder has to show that the will was signed by the testator; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions, that he put his signature to the testament of his own free will and that he has signed it in the presence of the two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But there may be cases in which the execution of the will itself is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, such as, where the signature is doubtful, the testator is of feeble mind or is overawed by powerful minds interested in getting his property, or where in the light of the relevant circumstances the dispositions appear to be unnatural, improbable and unfair, or where there are other reasons for doubting that the dispositions of the will are not the result of the testator's free will and mind. In all such cases where there may be legitimate suspicious circumstances those must be reviewed and satisfactorily explained before the will is accepted. Again in cases where the propounder has himself taken a prominent part in the execution of the will which confers on him substantial benefit that is itself one of the suspicious circumstances which he must remove by clear and satisfactory evidence. After all, ultimately it is the conscience of the court that has to be satisfied, as such the nature and quality of proof must be commensurate with the need to satisfy that conscience and remove any suspicion which a reasonable man may, in the relevant circumstances of the case, entertain. 25. After all, ultimately it is the conscience of the court that has to be satisfied, as such the nature and quality of proof must be commensurate with the need to satisfy that conscience and remove any suspicion which a reasonable man may, in the relevant circumstances of the case, entertain. 25. Further in Daulat Ram vs. Sodha, (2005) 1 SCC 40 , has held that in order to assess as to whether the will has been validly executed and is a genuine document, the propounder has to show that the will was signed by the testator and that he had put his signatures to the testament of his own free will; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind and understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and that the testator had signed it in the presence of two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to remove the suspicion by leading appropriate evidence. The burden to prove that the will was forged or that it was obtained under undue influence or coercion or by playing a fraud is on the person who alleges it to be so. 26. The aforesaid principles have been reiterated in Gopal Swaroop versus Krishna Murari Mangal and others, (2010) 14 SCC 266 and also in Saroja versus Santhil kumar and others, (2011) 11 SCC 483 }. 27. Apex Court in Uma Devi Nambiar and others versus T.C. Sidhan (Dead), (2004) 2 SCC 321 , has held that mere exclusion of the legal heirs by itself does not amount to a suspicious circumstance. 28. The Apex Court in Adivekka (supra) has clearly held that once the propounder of the Will discharges the burden by proving the statutory compliance under the provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act and has given a reasonable explanation about the genuineness of the execution of the Will, dispelling the suspicious circumstances, then onus to prove fraud, coercion and undue influence is on the caveator, who in fact challenges the Will. {Also: Sridevi and others versus Jayaraja Shetty and others, (2005) 2 SCC 784 ; S.R. Srinivasa and others versus S. Padmavathamma, (2010) 5 SCC 274 ; Pentakota Satyanarayana (supra), and Mahesh Kumar (Dead) (supra)}. 29. The Apex Court in Smt. Indu Bala Bose (supra) has held that any and every circumstance cannot be said to be suspicious. A circumstance would be suspicious when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person. 30. In Harmes and another versus Hinkson,AIR 1946 PC 156, the Court has held as under: “........Where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable skepticism, not as obdurate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the Judge, even in circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth.” 31. In Bank of India Ltd. Versus Jamsetji A.H. Chinoy and Messrs. Chinoy and Co.,AIR 1950 PC 90, the Court held as under: “The appellate Court would be reluctant to differ from the conclusion of the trial Judge if his conclusion is based ion the impression made by a person in the witness box. If, however, the trial Judge based his finding and his opinion of the person on a theory derived from documents and a series of inferences and assumptions founded on a variety of facts and circumstances which, in themselves, offer no direct or positive support for the conclusion reached, the right of the appellate Court to review this inferential process cannot be denied.” 32. The Apex Court in Crystal Developers versus Asha Lata Ghosh (Smt.)(Dead) through LRs. and others, (2005) 9 SCC 375 , has held that findings with regard to suspicious circumstances are necessarily required to be based on the evidence led by the parties and not on the basis of conjectures and suspicion. 33. Document (Ex.PA) is the Will dated 21.9.1981. It was registered on the same day with the Sub Registrar, Mandi. and others, (2005) 9 SCC 375 , has held that findings with regard to suspicious circumstances are necessarily required to be based on the evidence led by the parties and not on the basis of conjectures and suspicion. 33. Document (Ex.PA) is the Will dated 21.9.1981. It was registered on the same day with the Sub Registrar, Mandi. A perusal of the document indicates that (i) the family lineage and history has been fully disclosed; (ii) the executant was residing and was being looked after by her son Shri Inder Singh; (iii) the Will was executed out of love and affection for her grand-children, i.e. defendants No.1 and 2 with whom she was residing; and (iv) there is a specific reference to the children of her pre-deceased son and the factum of her daughters having been married and settled. 34. The document has been scribed by Shri Dina Nath (DW-5). Executant had put her thumb impression on the document, which is running into two pages. Thumb impression is on both the leaves of the document. Shri Gopal Singh (DW-1), who is an Advocate, has identified the executant. Execution of the document has been attested by the witnesses Shri Nandu (DW-3) and Shri Chetna Nand (DW4). Shri Dina Nath (DW-5) has scribed the Will. A perusal of testimonies of these defendants’ witnesses undoubtedly establishes the fact that the beneficiaries had taken active role in the execution of the Will, but then this fact by itself cannot be a ground to disbelieve valid execution/attestation of the document, though it is a ground for suspicion, which burden is upon the propounder to dispel. 35. In order to discharge the burden, which, inter alia, is required to be so done by the propounder, Shri Kishan Singh, in addition to other witnesses, has examined the scribe, the identifier and the attesting witnesses in Court. A careful and critical scrutiny of the statements of these witnesses clearly establish the fact that the Will was in fact voluntarily executed by Smt. Kanchnu, in a sound disposing state of mind, fully understanding its implication, out of her free volition, love and affection for her grand-children. In my considered view, the beneficiaries have discharged their burden of establishing that the Will was validly executed, attested and registered on the asking of Smt. Kanchnu. I need not narrate, in detail, statements of the witnesses. In my considered view, the beneficiaries have discharged their burden of establishing that the Will was validly executed, attested and registered on the asking of Smt. Kanchnu. I need not narrate, in detail, statements of the witnesses. Suffice it to say that each of these witnesses, in one voice, has deposed that the executant had desired to execute the Will with respect to the suit land, which was in fact in possession of the defendants, in favour of her grand-children. On her asking, she was taken to the Office of the Sub Registrar by Shri Kishan Singh. Shri Dina Nath, on the asking of the executant, scribed the Will, which was read over and explained to her. She admitted the contents thereof to be true and correct. Shri Gopal Singh (DW-1) identified her. Thereafter, she affixed her thumb impression and Shri Nandu (DW-3) and Shri Chetna Nand (DW-4) put their signatures as attesting witnesses. The witnesses and the testator signed/ appended thumb impression in the presence of each other. The Will was also got entered in the register before the Sub Registrar, who read over the contents of the Will and explained the same to the executant and the executant put her thumb impression on the Will as proof of its voluntary execution. Thereafter, the Registrar registered the Will. I find that these witnesses have deposed truthfully and their testimony is not impaired or shattered by the plaintiffs in the cross-examination. 36. The Will is not executed by an act of fraud, coercion, undue influence. It be only pointed out, as has rightly been submitted by Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned counsel for the beneficiaries, the plaint is conspicuously silent in that regard. Provisions of Order 6 Rules 3,4,7 and 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been highlighted by the learned counsel in this regard. Also, pleadings are absolutely vague and unspecific with regard to the same. 37. The plea taken by the plaintiffs that the Will is forged, fabricated and fictitious, in my considered view, has rightly been rejected by the Courts below. Thus, I see no reason to interfere with the findings of the Courts below with regard to the valid execution and attestation of the Will (Ex. PA) by Smt. Kanchnu. 38. Also Mr. 37. The plea taken by the plaintiffs that the Will is forged, fabricated and fictitious, in my considered view, has rightly been rejected by the Courts below. Thus, I see no reason to interfere with the findings of the Courts below with regard to the valid execution and attestation of the Will (Ex. PA) by Smt. Kanchnu. 38. Also Mr. Harish Behl, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, has invited my attention to the following circumstances, which being suspicious would render the Will to be null and void; (i) in the Will there is no recital about the description of the property; (ii) since the executant during their life time had already expressed her intention of dividing her property between her two sons by way of a gift deed, there was no reason for her to have diverted from such intention and bequeathed her inherited share in favour of the beneficiaries; (iii) there was no reason to have divested her other grand-children of the said share inherited by her; (iv) Shri Inder Singh had thrown out the plaintiffs out of the ancestral home, leaving them to be defended and looked after by their maternal grand-parents; (v) as the executant was residing with Shri Inder Singh, she was dominated and influenced by the beneficiaries, who took active part in execution of the Will; and (vi) executant was an illiterate rustic lady and not capable of understanding the consequences of execution of the document. 39. Since I have already come to the conclusion that the propounder of the Will has been able to establish valid execution of the Will by Smt. Kanchnu, out of her free Will and volition, in my considered view, the beneficiaries have proved the essential ingredients, as required under the provisions of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. 40. Having perused the testimonies of all the witnesses, I am of the considered view that the circumstances, referred to above, cannot be said to be suspicious or unnatural in any manner. 41. Undoubtedly, Shri Lalman died in the year 1975 and since then the plaintiffs have been residing with their maternal uncle. 40. Having perused the testimonies of all the witnesses, I am of the considered view that the circumstances, referred to above, cannot be said to be suspicious or unnatural in any manner. 41. Undoubtedly, Shri Lalman died in the year 1975 and since then the plaintiffs have been residing with their maternal uncle. Even though there is no conclusive proof to establish that the plaintiffs were thrown out of the ancestral house by their uncle Shri Inder Singh, but assuming this fact to be true, except for bald assertion there is nothing on record to establish that plaintiffs or their mother was on visiting terms either with the deceased Kanchnu or their uncle Shri Inder Singh. In fact it has come on record that the plaintiffs, at the time of cremation of the deceased, were brought from the house of their maternal uncle. Plaintiffs’ witnesses in Court have made, if not contradictory, then uninspiring statements with regard to the age, health and condition of the deceased. According to the plaintiffs, the suit land was in their possession, which plea has been held to be false. There is no documentary evidence to show their possession over the suit land. 42. Smt. Kanchnu executed the Will seven years prior to her death. The Will was executed on 21.9.1981 and she died on 18.12.1988. Significantly, her daughters have not come forward to claim any share by virtue of succession and inheritance. They have also not contested the Will. Smt. Kanchnu, at the time of her death, as has come on record, was 77 years of age. There is nothing on record to establish that she was not enjoying good state of health or was not living happily with Shri Inder Singh or his children. In fact these facts stand proved in the affirmative. Her daughters have not been examined in Court. Testimonies Shri Brij Lal (PW-3) and Shri Thopa (PW-3) do not narrate the suspicious circumstances. 43. Now, plaintiff Shri Jawahar Singh (PW-1) has stepped into the witness-box and deposed that his father was not mentally fit, but in the very same breath he admits that his father was thrown out of the police on account of his mental illness. I find the testimony of this witness not to be worthy of much credence. 43. Now, plaintiff Shri Jawahar Singh (PW-1) has stepped into the witness-box and deposed that his father was not mentally fit, but in the very same breath he admits that his father was thrown out of the police on account of his mental illness. I find the testimony of this witness not to be worthy of much credence. Though in his examination-in-chief he states that his grandmother never came in possession or demanded her share after the death of his father, but however his statement that he is in possession of the suit land is not only not substantiated by any documentary evidence but instead stands falsified from the version of Shri Thopa (PW-3). 44. Further the version of Shri Jawahar Singh (PW-1) is that it was after the death of his grandmother that the uncle drove the family out of the ancestral home. For some strange reason a suggestion was put to this witness by the defendants with regard to the correctness of this fact, but the witness admits that he does not remember the year, the month or the weather at the time when he was driven out of the ancestral home. He states that he was 13-14 years of age at that time. He admits that his grandmother, who was in her senses, was alive at that time. Now, the witness does not state that the grandmother objected to the same. The witness also does not state that either his mother, who had died at the time of recording of the statements of the plaintiffs in the present case, or any of the relatives had taken any action against this act of the uncle. 45. In fact, Shri Brij Lal (PW-2) admits it to be correct that the plaintiffs had been residing in the house of their maternal grandfather for the last 16-17 years. In this regard, more significantly, Shri Thopa (PW-3), who in fact harbours animosity against the defendants (beneficiaries), has in no uncertain terms deposed that the mental condition of the father of the plaintiffs was not sound and it was for this reason that the plaintiffs’ mother had started residing in the house of her parents. At that time, the plaintiffs were also taken away by her. At that time, the plaintiffs were also taken away by her. He admits it to be correct, in his unrebutted testimony that Shri Lalman, father of the plaintiffs, had died in his home and the mother of the plaintiffs was called from her parents’ house. The witness further admits it to be correct that the defendants had been cultivating the land which was in the ownership of Smt. Kanchnu and that at the time of her death, plaintiffs had to be called from the house of their maternal grandfather for cremation. This witness also admits that the defendants who had performed the last rites of Smt. Kanchnu. In fact, she was being looked after by the defendants. 46. Since Smt. Kanchnu was living with her son and grand-children and was being looked after by them, there is nothing suspicious about her bequeathing her share in favour of her grand-children with whom she had been staying over a long period of time. Significantly, Smt. Kanchnu inherited only 1/4th share of the estate of deceased Shri Lalman and it is not that the plaintiffs were divested of the entire 20 bighas of land, which was initially gifted by her to Shri Lalman. It has nowhere come on record that between the time of execution of the Will and her death, Smt. Kanchnu was not being looked after properly by the beneficiaries or their father. 47. Also, there is nothing on record to show that wife of Shri Lalman or her children had taken care of the executant. True it may be that relations between them may not be strained but then this by itself cannot be a ground of suspicion and belief that the Will is shrouded by unnatural or suspicious circumstances. Trial Court rightly disbelieved the testimony of Shri Jawahar Singh (PW-1) in that regard. 48. Trial Court, in my considered view, rightly held that the plaintiffs did not even contest the thumb impression of Smt. Kanchnu. 49. In my considered view, plaintiffs seriously did not take up the plea of the Will being shrouded by suspicious circumstances before the trial Court and also did not lead any material evidence in that regard. Their whole challenge was focused on the fact that the Will was fictitious or forged. 50. Absence of description of property in the Will is of no consequence. Their whole challenge was focused on the fact that the Will was fictitious or forged. 50. Absence of description of property in the Will is of no consequence. As already noticed, earlier there is a specific reference about the children and the grandchildren in the Will. The executant may be an illiterate and rustic lady but then that fact by itself would not mean that she was not intelligent enough to understand the consequences of her actions. After all she was hail and hearty. 51. Reliance upon the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Ramchandra Rambux (supra)is only on the point that the credibility of the witness can be judged from the attending circumstances. This decision, in my considered view, is inapplicable to the given facts and circumstances. 52. Reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Gorantla Thataiah (supra) is also of not much help to the plaintiffs. A careful reading of the Will would only show that the Will has been executed by the executant in a sound disposing state of mind, reflecting the status and the position of the family members as on the day of execution of the Will. 53. In view of the settled position with regard to the principles, as noticed hereinabove, there is no need to specifically deal with each and every decision cited by the learned counsel for the parties. 54. Thus, it cannot be said that the Will is shrouded by suspicious and unnatural circumstances. Trial Court has rightly dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit and I see no reason to interfere with the findings rendered by the Courts below. It cannot be said that the judgments are perverse or result of incomplete or improper appreciation of the evidence led by the parties. 55. It would be pertinent to record that Shri Pat, husband of Smt. Kanchnu, had also executed a Will dated 8.9.1978 in favour of the present defendants. The validity and execution of the said Will was subject matter of challenge in RSA No.438 of 2003, titled as Kishan Singh and others versus Jawahar Singh and another. In the judgment of the even date rendered in the said appeal, this Court has held the Will propounded by the beneficiaries not to have been validly executed/attested. Also, it is held that the Will is shrouded by suspicious circumstances. In the judgment of the even date rendered in the said appeal, this Court has held the Will propounded by the beneficiaries not to have been validly executed/attested. Also, it is held that the Will is shrouded by suspicious circumstances. Significantly, such findings have been arrived at on the basis of evidence so led by the parties in those proceedings. The plaintiffs did not bother to place and prove on record such material or testimonies so recorded in those proceedings on the record of the present case. In the instant case, plaintiffs’ own witnesses have in fact gone to the extent of removing the suspicious circumstances. Each case has to be decided on the given facts and the material placed and proved on record. The suit land is not identical. The executant of the Will, the scribe, the identifier, the attesting witnesses and the time of the execution of the Will are also different. Hence, findings with regard to both the Wills being shrouded by suspicious circumstances are distinct, different, and bound to be, in the given facts and circumstances of each case. 56. Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. Appeal is dismissed. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.