Judgment This appeal is by the appellants which was initially admitted on the following substantial questions of law : "(i) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court below was justified in holding that the lease period was extended upto 31-12-1986 and was the Court justified in not considering that even if the lease period is extended or renewed up to a particular period, the said period has come to an end during the pendency of the suit ? (ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the right allegedly vested in the respondent for renewal of the lease could be exercised after 9 years of the expiry of the lease? (iii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the provisions of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act are applicable and if yes, could a suit during subsistence of extended lease be filed for eviction of tenancy? (iv) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree on the ground of bona fide need " Thereafter this Court vide separate order passed today, has framed the following additional substantial question of law : "Whether in view of the failure of the defendant to tender the arrears of rent despite the demand notice dated 20-9-1986 (Exhibit P-9) the plaintiff is entitled to a decree under section 12(1)(a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961?" 2. The facts giving rise to filing of the appeal, briefly stated, are that the plaintiffs filed a suit on the ground that the plaintiffs father had leased out the land admeasuring 7800 square feet on 1-1-1957 initially to Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company Ltd. for installation of the petrol pump and construction of depot for storing the petroleum products. The lease deed was executed on 23-2-1959 with effect from 1-1-1957 for a period of twenty years with a renewal clause of ten years at the option of the lessee. The period of lease expired on 31-12-1976. The defendant did not exercise the option of renewal and, therefore, the possession of the defendant had become unauthorised w.e.f. 1-1-1977. The defendant despite notice did not vacate the land in question. The plaintiffs therefore claimed a sum of, Rs. 21,766/- on account of arrears of rent. The period of lease expired on 31-12-1976. The defendant did not exercise the option of renewal and, therefore, the possession of the defendant had become unauthorised w.e.f. 1-1-1977. The defendant despite notice did not vacate the land in question. The plaintiffs therefore claimed a sum of, Rs. 21,766/- on account of arrears of rent. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff No. 4 bona fide requires the suit accommodation for his business and that he has no alternative accommodation for the aforesaid purpose. Accordingly, the decree under section 12(1)(a) and (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') was sought. The defendant in the written statement, admitted the execution of the lease deed. However, it was stated that the lease did not come to end on 31-12-1976 but continued beyond 31-12-1976 as the option of renewal was duly exercised by the defendant vide letter dated 6-4-1986. The bona fide need of the plaintiffs was denied on the ground that the plaintiffs have suitable alternative accommodation. It was admitted that the defendant is in arrears of rent however, it was stated that the claim for arrears of rent beyond the period of three years has become time barred. In the additional pleadings, it was pointed out that the provisions of the Act are applicable to the accommodation in question and, therefore, the suit for eviction can be filed only under the grounds enumerated under section 12 of the Act. 3. The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 27-4-1991 inter alia held that the defendant did not submit any application for renewal of the lease prior to expiry of the period of lease. Even the extended period of lease expired on 31-12-1986. The defendant thereafter remained in possession but the plaintiffs did not receive the rent. The trial Court further held that the plaintiffs have not disclosed the nature of business which would be carried on by the plaintiff No. 4 as well as the fact whether the plaintiff No. 4 has sufficient fund to carry on the business and whether he has the requisite experience to run the business. Accordingly, the trial Court held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the bona fide need. The trial Court further held that the provisions of the Act do not apply to an open land. Accordingly, the trial Court held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the bona fide need. The trial Court further held that the provisions of the Act do not apply to an open land. However, it was held that the defendant is in arrears of rent to the tune of Rs. 12,600/-. Accordingly, the decree for possession and arrears of rent was granted. 4. The Lower Appellate Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 26-8-1995 inter alia held that the terms of the lease have not been specifically proved. The defendant had expressed the desire for renewal of the lease vide letter dated 6-4-1986 and there is no evidence on record to show that the defendant's request was turned down. It was further held that since after expiry of the lease the defendant was allowed to remain in possession therefore, the defendant became the tenant of the plaintiff under the Act and that the defendant is the tenant holding over. It was further found that in view of request made by the defendant vide Exhibit P-2 for renewal of the lease, the plaintiffs were bound to renew the lease. It was also held that the suit filed by the plaintiff was premature. Accordingly, the decree for possession was set aside but the decree with regard to arrears of rent was maintained. 5. Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that under Clause 10 of the lease deed dated 23-2-1959 (Exhibit P-17) the defendant was required to give three months' notice before expiry of the period of lease expressing its desire for renewal of the lease. However, till 31-12-1976, the defendant did not give any notice for renewal of the lease. It was further submitted that admittedly, the defendant did not make payment of rent and, therefore, the defendant could not be treated as tenant holding over. Learned senior counsel for the appellants fairly stated that the provisions of the Act apply to the accommodation in question. While inviting the attention of this Court to the pleadings made in paragraphs 10, 11 and 15 as well as paragraph 14 of the plaint, it is argued that the plaintiffs have pleaded the grounds enumerated under section 12(1)(a) and (f) of the Act respectively. While inviting the attention of this Court to the pleadings made in paragraphs 10, 11 and 15 as well as paragraph 14 of the plaint, it is argued that the plaintiffs have pleaded the grounds enumerated under section 12(1)(a) and (f) of the Act respectively. It was urged that the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court that the defendant is entitled to renewal of the lease and the plaintiffs were bound to renew the lease are perverse. It was also submitted that the finding recorded by the Courts below that the plaintiffs do not bona fide need the suit accommodation is perverse. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the decisions in Raj Kumar Khaitan and others vs. Bibi Zubaida Khatun and another, (1997) 11 SCC 411 , Raghunath G. Panhale vs. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co., (1999) 8 SCC 1 , Shanti Devi Agrawal and others vs. Punjab National Bank, Raigarh, 1999(1) MPLJ 615 and Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 315 . 6. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted that the provisions of the Act apply to the accommodation in question. While referring to the cause-title of the plaint, it was submitted that the plaintiffs had not brought the suit for eviction on the grounds mentioned under section 12(1) of the Act. It was further submitted that expression 'accommodation' defined under section 2(a) of the Act includes an open land. It was further submitted that the accommodation in question is an open land and, therefore, the eviction of the defendant could have been sought only on the ground enumerated under section 12(1)(n) of the Act, namely, construction of a house. It is also submitted that decree for possession was sought by the plaintiffs on the ground that the period of lease had expired. The finding of the trial Court that the plaintiffs do not need the accommodation bona fide is based on evidence on record. 7. I have considered the respective submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. It is also submitted that decree for possession was sought by the plaintiffs on the ground that the period of lease had expired. The finding of the trial Court that the plaintiffs do not need the accommodation bona fide is based on evidence on record. 7. I have considered the respective submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. In Caltex (India) vs. Bhagwan Devi, AIR 1969 SC 405 it has been held that stipulation as to time in a contract giving an option for renewal of a lease of land was considered to be of the essence of the contract therefore, if the tenant wishes to claim the privilege he must do so strictly within the time limited for the purpose. A lessee not having exercised the option of renewal within the time limited by the clause is not entitled to a renewal. This Court in Manohar vs. Central Bank of India, 2012 (2) MPLJ 705 has held that if the lease deed contains renewal clause, the renewal of the lease has to be sought in the manner as provided in the clause. In the case of Shri Lakshmi Venkateshwara Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. Syeda Vajhiunnissa Begum (Smt.) and others, (1994) 2 SCC 671 the Supreme Court has held that Rent Control Act would apply notwithstanding any contract. Therefore, even during subsistence of contractual tenancy it is open to landlord to resort to proceedings under the Rent Control Act. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the first and second substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 8. From perusal of the lease deed it is clear that the suit accommodation is situate inside municipal limits of Shahdol city therefore in view of Entry 39 of the First Schedule to the Act, the accpmmodation in question is governed by the Act. Accordingly, the first part of the third substantial question of law is answered. In view of the answer given with regard to first and second substantial questions of law, the second part of the third substantial question of law loses its' significance in the facts of the case. 9. It is well settled in law that even if the pleadings are loosely drafted the Court should not scrutinise the pleadings with such meticulous care so as to result in genuine claim being defeated on trivial grounds. [See: Madan vs. Mamraj, AIR 1976 SC 461 ]. 9. It is well settled in law that even if the pleadings are loosely drafted the Court should not scrutinise the pleadings with such meticulous care so as to result in genuine claim being defeated on trivial grounds. [See: Madan vs. Mamraj, AIR 1976 SC 461 ]. It is .well settled in law that the Court has to look into the pleadings with a view to do essential justice in the case and to read the pleadings as a whole to ascertain its true import. The substance of the pleadings has to be seen and the intention of the parties is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and the terms of the pleadings taken as a whole. In Syed Dastagir vs. T. R. Gopalakrishna Setty, (1999) 6 SCC 337 it has been held by the Apex Court in construing a plea in any pleading Courts must keep in mind that a plea is not an expression of art and science but an expression through words to place fact and law of one's case for a relief. To gather true spirit behind a plea it should be read as a whole. In Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by L.Rs. vs. Bishnu Narain Inter College and others, AIR 1987 SC 1242 it has been held that whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the, enquiry should not be so much about the form of pleadings, instead the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceed to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal. [See also: Ram Bhual vs. Ambika Singh, (2005) 12 SCC 121 and State of M. P. vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan and another, (2011) 7 SCC 639 ] 10. In the light of the aforesaid well settled legal position, if the averments made in paragraphs 10, 11 and 15 of the plaint are seen, it is apparent that the plaintiffs have pleaded the ground enumerated under section 12(1)(a) of the Act. Similarly in paragraph 14 of the plaintiffs have pleaded the grounds for eviction enumerated under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. Similarly in paragraph 14 of the plaintiffs have pleaded the grounds for eviction enumerated under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. From perusal of paragraph 16 of the written statement, it is clear that the defendant has admitted that the rent for last three years i.e. the date preceding three years from the institution of the suit is due and payable to the plaintiffs and the defendant is ready and willing to pay the rent. In view of the aforesaid unequivocal admission made in the written statement, it is clear that the defendant was in arrears of rent. The notice (Exhibit P-9) dated 20-9-1986 was sent to the defendant demanding the arrears of rent. However, the defendant did not tender the arrears of rent. The suit was filed on 24-3-1987. Thus, the defendant was in arrears of rent and clearly the ground for eviction under section 12(1)(a) of the Act was made out. 11. Section 12(1) of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds enumerated therein. Thus, the object of section 12(1) is to curtail the right of the landlord to evict his tenant under general law of contract. Relevant extract of section 12 of the Act reads as under : "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. Thus, the object of section 12(1) is to curtail the right of the landlord to evict his tenant under general law of contract. Relevant extract of section 12 of the Act reads as under : "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or-more of the following grounds only, namely :- xxx xxx xxx xxx (f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned;' xxx xxx xxx xxx (n) in case of accommodation which is open land, that the landlord also taken possession of such portion or portions of accommodation which is not included in the accommodation let to him and which the tenant has not vacated in spite of a written notice of the landlord in that behalf." The grounds of eviction mentioned in section 12(1) are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, the contention of learned senior counsel for the respondent that since the accommodation in question is an open land therefore decree for eviction can be granted only under section 12(1)(n) and not under section 12(1)(f) of the Act, cannot be accepted. From the statement of Purushottam Das (plaintiff witness No. 2) the statutory requirements to make out a ground under section 12(1)(f) of the Act are made out. 12. However, the trial Court has negatived the bona fide need of the plaintiffs on three grounds, namely: (1) the nature of business has not been pleaded; (2) the availability of the funds to carry on the business has not been disclosed; and (3) the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the plaintiff No. 4 has experience to run the business. It is well settled in law that if the Court fails to apply the statutory mandate to the question of bona fide need, the same ceases to be a finding of fact. It is well settled in law that if the Court fails to apply the statutory mandate to the question of bona fide need, the same ceases to be a finding of fact. [See: Deenanath vs. Pooranlal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 ] 13. The Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Khaitan and others (supra) has held that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead the nature of business. Similarly in Raghunath G. Panhale (supra) it has been held that it is not necessary to landlord to prove that he had money to invest in the business or that he has experience to run the business. Thus, in view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the finding recorded by the trial Court that the plaintiffs do not require the suit accommodation for bona fide need cannot but be termed as perverse as the same has been reached in ignorance of the statutory mandate. The lower appellate Court failed to record any finding on the issue of bona fide need. For the aforementioned reasons, the fourth and the additional substantial questions of law framed by this Court are answered in favour of the appellants. 14. In the result, the claim of the plaintiffs for eviction under sections 12(1)(a) and (f) of the Act is decreed. To the aforesaid extent, the decree of the Courts below is modified. The respondent-company is running a petrol pump on the land in question. Therefore, time to vacate the accommodation in question on or before 31-1-2013 is granted subject to following conditions : (i) The defendant shall furnish an undertaking within a period of one month from today before the trial Court that it shall vacate the suit accommodation on or before 31-1-2013 and shall handover the peaceful possession to the plaintiffs and that it shall neither create any third party interest in respect of the accommodation in question nor shall sublet the same. (ii) The defendant shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as well as costs within one month from today and shall continue to comply with the provisions of section 13(1) of the Act during the period for which it remains in occupation of the accommodation in question. (iii) In case of violation of any of the aforementioned conditions, the decree for eviction shall become executable forthwith. 15. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.