ORAL ORDER Petitioner is a Doctor (General Physician) by profession. He superannuated from the post of Director, T.B. Demonstration & Training Centre, Darbhanga on 31.08.1993. Post retirement, he settled down at his home place, which is supposed to be in Mohalla – Kashipur in the town of Samastipur. Petitioner has a dwelling house, consisting of three floors, which he uses for his personal occupation and use. One floor, however, has been rented out to a tenant and two rooms of the ground floor is used by the petitioner as a “Consultation Chamber”, whenever a person in distress or otherwise is willing to consult him, relating to a medical problem. 2. Petitioner had an electricity connection, provided under the domestic service category. Bills were raised and paid by him regularly without any dispute of any kind between the parties. The problem arose when an inspection was carried out by the Electrical Executive Engineer on 12.12.2002 and a report for the said inspection generated in terms of Annexure- 6. The inspection report indicates that the consumer had 3 fans, consuming 60 watts each, adding up to 180 watts; 4 tubes, each of 40 watts, adding up to 160 watts; 3 numbers of bulbs, each consuming 100 watts, adding up to 300 watts and an energy saving tube of 14 watts, all adding up to 654 watts, which has been rounded up to 1 K.W. load. An opinion was expressed in the said report that the two rooms on the ground floor, where the above connection was also being utilized, is for providing consultation for patients and the rest of the portion of connection is being utilized for domestic purposes. Advice given to the consumer was that he should take a fresh connection under the 1993 tariff, which will be categorized under non-domestic load, fans and power service. The respondent-Electricity Board has treated the Doctor’s Consultation Chamber with 654 watts load factor to be a commercial venture on his part and, therefore, a different connection were required to be taken by the petitioner. 3. This is the background under which the dispute arose and the petitioner decided to file the Writ Application, when respondents stuck to their guns that the petitioner was not entitled to continue with the domestic connection for the Doctor’s Consultation Chamber. 4. 3. This is the background under which the dispute arose and the petitioner decided to file the Writ Application, when respondents stuck to their guns that the petitioner was not entitled to continue with the domestic connection for the Doctor’s Consultation Chamber. 4. The issue, therefore, to be decided in the present Writ Application is whether the demand or the insistence of the respondents to convert the Doctor’s Consultation Chamber into a non-domestic category is supported by law or the tariff notification in vogue at the relevant time. 5. Counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Electricity Board submits that the Board is bound by the gazette notification, wherein the tariff provisions have been duly notified. Changes were brought about in the 1993 tariff and a separate category has been created of non-domestic load, fans and power service and the applicability of such categorization has been indicated in the tariff, which has been annexed as Annexure- A to the counter affidavit. 6. Counsel for the Board submits that from a reading of the above provision, it is evident that Hospital (private or government), Clinic, Nursing Home etc. etc. are to be brought under this category and the advice or direction given to the petitioner for acquiring a separate connection for the Consultation Chamber was in light of the provision of the tariff, which is duly supported by law. 7. Wherever a liability is sought to be imposed upon a citizen, strict interpretation of the provisions have to be made. Since the respondent-authorities had issued a gazette notification, notifying the tariff, where specific words had been used and the establishments, which come under the new category of tariff had been indicated therein, then the Court will have to understand whether the word “Hospital”, “Clinic”, “Nursing Home” is to be read in such a fashion or given a wider meaning to bring even a Doctor’s Consultation Chamber within its purview. The notification or the tariff of 1993 has remained silent about a Doctor’s Consultation Chamber. The contention of the counsel for the Board that the case of the petitioner will come within the definition of a “Clinic”, if not a “Hospital” or a “Nursing Home” has to be tested. 8. The notification or the tariff of 1993 has remained silent about a Doctor’s Consultation Chamber. The contention of the counsel for the Board that the case of the petitioner will come within the definition of a “Clinic”, if not a “Hospital” or a “Nursing Home” has to be tested. 8. Counsel, representing the petitioner submits that the wide interpretation sought to be given by the respondents and including a category of people not included in the tariff provision would be doing injustice to the tariff in the sense that persons or establishments, who have not been notified to be covered by a particular categorization can never be included by expanding the meaning of the words in question. A Doctor’s Chamber will not come under the meaning of a “Clinic” or “Nursing Home”, because the inspection report itself shows that except for provisions of some fans and lights, nothing in terms of equipment or back-up facilities for in-house provision of medical facilities to a patient was found in the two rooms so inspected by the local authority. Therefore, the contention that a Consultation Chamber is only a place where advice to a patient is given can never be interpreted to mean a “Clinic”, which has a wider ambit or definition. Consulting Room or a Consultation Chamber is supposed to a room where a Doctor sees a patient or renders advice. There is no clinical intervention of any kind or medical help extended by any supporting equipment or man-power of certain scale. 9. The word “Clinic” has been defined in the Chambers Dictionary 10th Edition to mean:- “A private hospital or nursing-home; an institution, or a department of one, or a group of doctors, for treating patients or for diagnosis or giving advice; any group meeting for instruction, often remedial, in a particular field; the instruction of medicine or surgery at the bedside of hospital patients; a session of such instruction; a person confined to bed by sickness.” 10. Collins English Dictionary, Complete and Abridged Version, published in the year 2003, which has also been down loaded by the petitioner from the Internet also give specific definition to the word “Clinic”, which is quoted hereinbelow: “1. A facility, often associated with a hospital or medical school, that is devoted to the diagnosis and care of outpatients. 2. A medical establishment run by several specialists working in cooperation and sharing the same facilities. A facility, often associated with a hospital or medical school, that is devoted to the diagnosis and care of outpatients. 2. A medical establishment run by several specialists working in cooperation and sharing the same facilities. 3. A group session offering counsel or instruction in a particular field or activity. 4a. A seminar or meeting of physicians and medical students in which medial instruction is conducted in the presence of the patient, as at the bedside. b. A place where such instruction occurs. c. A class or lecture of medical instruction conducted in this manner. Clinic: - (Medicine) – a place in which outpatients are given medical treatment or advice, often connected to a hospital. Clinic: - First meant “teaching of medicine at the bedside” Noun 1. Clinic – a medical establishment run by a group of medical specialists. 2. Clinic – meeting for diagnosis of problems and instruction or remedial work in a particular activity. 3. Clinic – a healthcare facility for outpatient care. 11. The word “Consultation” or the meaning thereof also has a specific interpretation, which is also reproduced hereinbelow:- Consultation Noun 1. – the act of consulting; conference. 2. – a meeting for deliberation, discussion, or decision. 3. – a meeting of physicians to evaluate a patient’s case and treatment. Consultation (doctor) – a formal meeting with a medical doctor for discussion or the seeking of advice. 12. Counsel, representing the petitioner, further drew the attention of this Court to one of the earlier decisions, which have been rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Devendra M. Surti Versus State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1969 SC 63 , wherein the Court may be by dealing with the matter under Shops and Establishment Act viewed following in paragraph 6 and 7 of the said decision:- “6. Under Section 2 (8) of the Act an 'establishment' is defined as meaning 'a shop, commercial establishment, residential hotel, restaurant, eating house, theatre, or other place of public amusement or entertainment to which this Act applies'. Section 2 (24) again defines a "Residential hotel", Section 2 (25) a "Restaurant or eating house" and Section 2 (27) similarly defines a "Shop". Section 2 (29) defines a "Theatre". It is clear therefore that the legislature has taken care separately to define each one of the categories of the establishments mentioned in Section 2 (8) of the Act. Section 2 (24) again defines a "Residential hotel", Section 2 (25) a "Restaurant or eating house" and Section 2 (27) similarly defines a "Shop". Section 2 (29) defines a "Theatre". It is clear therefore that the legislature has taken care separately to define each one of the categories of the establishments mentioned in Section 2 (8) of the Act. It is true that Section 2 (4) of the Act has used words of very wide import and grammatically it may include even a Consulting room where a doctor examines his patients with the help of a solitary nurse or attendant. But, in our opinion, in the matter of construing the language of Section 2 (4) of the Act we must adopt the principle of noscitur a sociis. This rule means that when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. The words take as it were their colour from each other that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general. "Associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis the philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it; such doctrine is broader than the maxim Ejusdem Generis". (Words and Phrases, Vol. XIV, p. 207). For instance, in Reed v. Ingham, (1854) 3 E and B 889 it was held upon the principle of the maxim noscitur a sociis, that a steam tug of eighty-seven tons burden engaged in moving another vessel was not a craft within the meaning of the statute. Again, in Scales v. Pickering, (1828) 4 Bing 448 at pp. 452, 453 the question was what was the meaning of the word "footway" when used in a private Act which empowered a water company to break up the soil and pavement of roads, highways, footways, commons, streets, lanes, alleys, passages, and public places, provided they did not enter upon any private lands without the consent of the owner. It was contended that this authorised the company to break up the soil of a private field in which there was a public footway, but it was held otherwise. "Construing the word 'footway', " said Best, C. J. "from the company in which it is found...... It was contended that this authorised the company to break up the soil of a private field in which there was a public footway, but it was held otherwise. "Construing the word 'footway', " said Best, C. J. "from the company in which it is found...... the legislature appears to have meant those paved footways in large towns which are too narrow to admit of horses and carriages". And Park, J. added: "The word 'footway' here noscitur a sociis". In the present case, certain essential features or attributes are invariably associated with the words "business and trade" as understood in the popular and conventional, sense, and it is the colour of these attributes which is taken by the other words used in the definition of Section 2 (4) of the Act, though their normal import may be much wider. We are therefore of opinion that the professional establishment of a doctor cannot come within the definition of Sec. 2 (4) of the Act unless the activity carried on was also commercial in character. As to what exactly is meant by "Commerce" it may be difficult to define but in an early case-Mckay v. Rutherford, (1848) 6 Moo PC 413 at p. 425, Lord Campbell gave a useful definition: "Commerce is that activity where a capital is laid out on anywork and a risk run of profit or loss; it is a commercial venture". It is true that the definition of Lord Campbell is the conventional definition attributed to trade or commerce but it cannot be taken to be wholly valid for the purpose of construing industrial legislation in a modern welfare State. It is clear that the presence of the profit motive or the investment of capital tradition associated to the notion of trade and commerce cannot be given an undue importance in construing the definition of 'Commercial establishment' under Section 2 (4) of the Act. In our opinion, the correct test of finding whether a professional activity falls within Section 2 (4) of the Act is whether the activity is systematically and habitually undertaken for production or distribution of goods or for rendering material services to the community or any part of the community with the help of employees in the manner of a trade or business, in such an undertaking. It is also necessary in this connection to construe the word "profession" under Section 2 (4) of the Act. In Commrs. of Inland Revenue v. Maxse, 1919-1 KB 647 at p. 657, Scrutton, L. J. stated as follows:- "I am very reluctant finally to propound a comprehensive definition. A set of facts not present to the mind of the judicial propounder and not raised in the case before him, may immediately arise to confound his proposition. But it seems to me as at present advised that a 'profession' in the present use of language involves the idea of an occupation requiring either purely intellectual skill, or of manual skill controlled, as in painting and sculpture, or surgery, by the intellectual skill of the operator, as distinguished from an occupation which is substantially the production or sale or arrangements for the production of sale of commodities. The line of demarcation may vary from time to time. The word 'profession' used to be confined to the three learned professions, the Church, Medicine and Law. It has now, I think, a wider meaning." The matter was again considered in another case where the question was whether a company doing the work of naval architect could be said to be carrying on a profession in a naval architecture. The case was William Esplen, Son and Swainston, Ld. v. Inland Revenue Commrs., 1919-2 KB 731 where Rowlatt, J. observed as follows:- "….but in my opinion the company is not carrying on the profession of navul architects within the meaning of the section, because for this purpose it is of the essence of a profession that the profits should be dependent mainly upon the personal qualifications of the person by whom it is carried on, and that can only be an individual." 7. It is therefore clear that a professional activity must be an activity carried on by an individual by his personal skill and intelligence. There is a fundamental distinction therefore between a professional activity and an activity of a commercial character and unless the profession carried on by the appellant also partakes of the character of a commercial nature, the appellant cannot fall within the ambit of Section 2 (4) of the Act. There is a fundamental distinction therefore between a professional activity and an activity of a commercial character and unless the profession carried on by the appellant also partakes of the character of a commercial nature, the appellant cannot fall within the ambit of Section 2 (4) of the Act. In National Union of Commercial Employees v. M. R. Meher, Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 157 = ( AIR 1962 SC 1080 ) it was held by this Court that the work of solicitors is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore any dispute raised by the employees of the solicitors against them cannot be made the subject of reference to the Industrial Tribunal. In dealing with this question, Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows at p. 163 of the Report (SCR Supp) = (at p. 1083 of AIR): "When in the Hospital case, (1960) 2 SCR 866 = ( AIR 1960 SC 610 ) this Court referred to the organisation of the undertaking involving the co-operation of capital and labour or the employer and his employees, it obviously meant the cooperation essential and necessary for the purpose of rendering material service or for the purpose of production. It would be realised that the concept of industry postulates partnership between capital and labour or between the employer and his employees. It is under this partnership that the employer contributes his capital and the employees their labour and the joint contribution of capital and labour leads directly to the production which the industry has in view. In other words, the co-operation between capital and labour or between the employer and his employees which is treated as a working test in determining whether any activity amounts to an industry, is the co-operation which is directly involved in the production of goods or in the rendering of service. It cannot be suggested that every form or aspect of human activity in which capital and labour co-operate or employer and employees assist each other is an industry. It cannot be suggested that every form or aspect of human activity in which capital and labour co-operate or employer and employees assist each other is an industry. The distinguishing feature of an industry is that for the production of goods or for the rendering of service, co-operation between capital and labour or between the employer and his employees must be direct and must be essential." Again, at p. 166 of the Report (SCR Supp) = (at p. 1084 of AIR) Gajendragadkar, J. proceeds to state: "Does a solicitors' firm satisfy that test? Superficially considered, the solicitors' firm is no doubt organised as an industrial concern would be organised. There are different categories of servants employed by a firm, each category being assigned separate duties and functions. But it must be remembered that the service rendered by a solicitor functioning either individually or working together with partners is service which is essentially individual; it depends upon the professional equipment, knowledge and efficiency of the solicitor concerned. Subsidiary work which is purely of an incidental type and which is intended to assist the solicitor in doing his job has no direct relation to the professional service ultimately rendered by the solicitor. For his own convenience, a solicitor may employ a clerk because a clerk would type his opinion; for his convenience, a solicitor may employ menial servant to keep his chamber clean and in order; and it is likely that the number of clerks may be large if the concern is prosperous and so would be the number of menial servants. But the work done either by the typist or the stenographer or by the menial servant or other employees in a solicitors' firm is not directly concerned with the service which the solicitor renders to his client and cannot, therefore, be said to satisfy the test of co-operation between the employer and the employees which is relevant to the purpose. There can he no doubt that for carrying on the work of a solicitor efficiently, accounts have to be kept and correspondence carried on and this work would need the employment of clerks and accountants. But has the work of the clerk who types correspondence or that of the accountant who keeps accounts any direct or essential nexus or connection with the advice which it is the duty of the solicitor to give to his client? But has the work of the clerk who types correspondence or that of the accountant who keeps accounts any direct or essential nexus or connection with the advice which it is the duty of the solicitor to give to his client? The answer to this question must in our opinion, be in the negative. There is, no doubt, a kind of co-operation between the solicitor and his employees, but that co-operation has no direct or immediate relation to the professional service which the solicitor renders to his client. .... .... .... .... .... .... Looking at this question in a broad and general way, it is not easy to conceive that a liberal profession like that of an attorney could have been intended by the Legislature to fall within the definition of 'industry' under Section 2 (j). The very concept of the liberal professions has its own special and distinctive features which do not readily permit the inclusion of the liberal professions into the four corners of industrial law. The essential basis of an industrial dispute is that it is a dispute arising between capital and labour in enterprises where capital and labour combine to produce commodities or to render service. This essential basis would be absent in the case of liberal professions. A person following a liberal profession does not carry on his profession in any intelligible sense with the active co-operation of his employees and the principal, if not the sole, capital which he brings into his profession is his special or peculiar intellectual and educational equipment. That is why on broad and general considerations which cannot be ignored, a liberal profession like that of an attorney must, we think, be deemed to be outside the definition of 'industry' under Section 2 (j)." Applying a similar line of reasoning, we are of opinion that the dispensary of the appellant would fall within the definition of S. 2 (4) of the Act if the activity of the appellant is organised in the manner in which a trade or business is generally organised or arranged and if the activity is systematically or habitually undertaken for rendering material services to the community at large or a part of such community with the help of the employees and if such an activity generally involves co-operation of the employer and the employees. To put it differently, the manner in which the activity in question is organised or arranged, the condition of the co-operation between the employer and the employees being necessary for its success and its object being to render material service to the community can be regarded as some of the features which render the carrying on of a professional activity to fall within the ambit of Section 2 (4) of the Act. Tested in the light of these principles, we hold that the case of the appellant does not fall within the purview of the Act and the conviction of the appellant of the offence under Section 52 (c) of the Act read with Section 62 of the Act and Rule 23 (1) of the Rules is illegal. 13. Counsel, representing the Electricity Board tries to distinguish the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, saying that such an interpretation was not being given with regard to an issue raised in matter of applicability of a tariff provision under the Electricity Act, therefore, the ambit of the said decision will have to be understood in the context in which it was given. 14. With due respect to the learned counsel representing the Board, the decision or the reasonings given by the Hon'ble Apex Court for reaching a conclusion that a Doctor’s Consultation Chamber is not a commercial activity will have application even to the present case on the rates and rationale of the said decision. Insistence of the Board upon the petitioner to take a non-domestic connection, which saddles him with higher liability can only be created, provided the law authorized it. 15. In none of the definition, the word “Doctor’s Consultation Chamber”, which has been duly recorded in the inspection report of the respondent, can come within the ambit of “Clinic” or a “Nursing Home”. 16. If that be so, then including a customer and brining them within the ambit of 1993 tariff by giving a wider interpretation to the word “Clinic”, “Nursing Home” or “Hospital” is not permissible in law. 17. The demand, therefore, being made upon the petitioner for taking a fresh connection for the Consultation Chamber is not authorized by law or the 1993 tariff. Any demand raised on the basis of the said tariff upon the petitioner is arbitrary and illegal and not payable by the petitioner. 17. The demand, therefore, being made upon the petitioner for taking a fresh connection for the Consultation Chamber is not authorized by law or the 1993 tariff. Any demand raised on the basis of the said tariff upon the petitioner is arbitrary and illegal and not payable by the petitioner. The demands raised by the petitioner in terms of Annexure- 4 series stands quashed. Respondents are directed to raise fresh bill on the basis of domestic connection, which the petitioner used to earlier pay, even for the two rooms, which is admittedly Consultation Chamber. If the petitioner has already deposited money on the basis of demand, raised under the new category, it will be adjusted in future bills or the amount refunded to him within a reasonable time-frame of three months. 18. Writ Application is allowed. Annexure- 1, dated 27.06.2005 stands quashed.