JUDGMENT Tarun Kumar Gupta, J.:- This second appeal is directed against judgment and decree dated 23rd December, 1994 passed by learned Additional District Judge, First Court, Hooghly in Title Appeal No.297 of 1987 affirming the judgment and decree dated 29th July, 1987 passed by learned Assistant District Judge, Second Court, Hooghly, in Title Suit No.9 of 1981. 2. Learned Courts below noted the facts of the parties in details and so I record just the gist of the case of the respective parties. 3. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 as plaintiffs filed said suit for partition alleging that Charu Chandra Sarkar was the owner of ‘B’ schedule property (suit property) and also purchased ‘A’ schedule property on 13th of March, 1957. Charu Charan Sarkar died intestate on 20th March, 1957 leaving behind his only son Sailendranath (predecessor-in-interest of defendant Nos. 1 and 2) and the plaintiffs as four daughters each having 1/5th share in the suit property. The suit property was never partitioned among the co-sharers and the plaintiffs used to get amounts and usufracts from the suit property. Sailendra died in 1963 but during his life time he has sold some of the suit properties to the defendant Nos. 3 to 5 (defendant No.3 Padmarani Karmakar is the sole appellant and defendant Nos. 4 and 5 are respondent Nos. 7 and 8). Sailendra had no authority to sell more than his share (1/5th share) and the plaintiffs were not bound by any such sale in excess of Sailendra’s share. As plaintiffs were finding inconvenience in the joint possession and defendant No.1 refused to effect partition on 21st January, 1981, the plaintiffs were compelled to file said suit for partition. 4. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 (respondent Nos. 5 and 6) filed a joint written statement alleging that the plaintiffs being sisters relinquished their share in favour of their brother Sailendra and plaintiffs never exercised any manner of possession in the suit property and that plaintiffs had no right, title and interest over the suit property and the suit was liable to be dismissed. 5. Initially defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 5 filed a joint written statement being affirmed on 4th May, 1981 (defendant No.3 is the appellant and defendant Nos. 4 and 5 are respondent Nos. 7 and 8). 5. Initially defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 5 filed a joint written statement being affirmed on 4th May, 1981 (defendant No.3 is the appellant and defendant Nos. 4 and 5 are respondent Nos. 7 and 8). In said earlier written statement the defendants did not deny purchase of ‘A’ schedule property by Charu Chandra on 13.03.1957. Their only claim was that plaintiffs never enjoyed any usufracts from the suit property (‘B’ schedule property) and that they were in possession of the same openly for long and that accordingly they acquired a good title to the suit property by way of adverse possession. 6. Defendant Nos. 3 and 5 (appellant and respondent No.8) subsequently filed a joint written statement dated 7th December, 1984 alleging that Charu Chandra died on 1st January, 1956 i.e., before coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act on 17th June, 1956 and hence plaintiffs being daughters did not inherit any title to the suit property on the death of Charu Chandra. Those defendants purchased the suit properties under different kobalas from Sailendra Sarkar executed in 1957 and 1958 and since then they were in possession of the same openly and their names were also recorded in the record of right and hence plaintiffs’ title, if any, was extinguished by adverse possession. The suit was also barred by limitation and under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 7. However, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 (respondent No.5 and 6) did not contest the suit in any forum. 8. Though defendant No.4 (respondent No.7) filed a solenama on 19th August, 1981 but it was not acted upon. 9. Learned Trial Court passed a decree of partition in the preliminary forum by declaring plaintiffs’ 4/5th share in the suit property (‘B’ schedule property) on contest against defendant Nos. 3 and 5 and ex parte against the rest. 10. Defendant Nos. 3 and 5 filed Title Appeal being Title Appeal No.297 of 1987 which was dismissed on contest. However, now only one of the appellants namely defendant No.3 Padma Rani Karmakar has filed this second appeal. 11. At the prayer of learned counsel for the appellant (defendant No.3) the following substantial questions of law were formulated upon which learned counsel of the parties argued. (1) Whether learned courts below substantially erred in law by permitting the plaintiffs to impeach the kobalas standing over 20 years without applying correct legal test. 11. At the prayer of learned counsel for the appellant (defendant No.3) the following substantial questions of law were formulated upon which learned counsel of the parties argued. (1) Whether learned courts below substantially erred in law by permitting the plaintiffs to impeach the kobalas standing over 20 years without applying correct legal test. (2) Whether learned courts below substantially erred in law by holding that there was no ouster of the plaintiff without applying correct legal test. (3) Whether learned courts below substantially erred in law by not holding that defendants acquired good title to their purchased property by way of adverse possession by not applying correct legal test. 12. Mr. Bagchi, learned counsel for the appellant (defendant No.3) is fair enough to admit that the findings of learned courts below that Charu Chandra Sarkar, the original owner of the suit property (‘B’ schedule property), died after promulgation of Hindu Succession Act of 1956 cannot be impeached at this stage as the same were based on substantive evidence, both oral and documentary and that on the death of Charu Chandra the suit property devolved upon his son Sailendra and four daughters (plaintiffs) each having 1/5th share thereupon. 13. However, Mr. Bagchi submits that Sailendra Sarkar posing himself as 16 annas share of the suit property sold the same to defendant No.3 (present appellant), defendant No.4 and 5 (respondent No.7 and 8) on execution of several deeds in 1957 and 1958. According to him since then this appellant (defendant No.3) and respondent No.7 and 8 (defendant No.4 and 5) were in uninterrupted and exclusive possession of the suit property and that in the process they obtained a good title to suit property by way of adverse possession. In support of his contention he refers case laws reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court page 1003 (Meethiyan Sidhiqu vs. Muhammed Kunju Pareeth Kutty and others). In this connection he has referred to evidence of P.W.1 (plaintiff No.3) wherein she stated that the contesting defendants have raised construction in the suit land in the year 1957 and residing in their house forcibly. In this connection he has referred to evidence of P.W.1 (plaintiff No.3) wherein she stated that the contesting defendants have raised construction in the suit land in the year 1957 and residing in their house forcibly. According to him, this shows that the plaintiffs had knowledge to the forcible possession of the suit property by this appellant and other contesting defendants since 1957 i.e., more than 20 years before filing of the suit in 1981 and hence the plaintiff’s title, if any, stood extinguished by said adverse possession of the contesting defendants and that it was a clear case of ouster. His next leg of submission is that the plaintiffs in substance prayed for declaring kobalas executed by Sailendra in favour of contesting defendants in excess of Saildenra’s share were not binding on them. According to him, the same was barred by limitation under Section 59 of the Limitation Act as the said declaration should have sought for within three years from the cause of action. In this connection he refers a case law reported in AIR 1973 Supreme Court page 2384 (Shamsher Singh vs. Rajinder Prashad and Ors.). He next submits that the suit was filed without any prayer for declaring several deeds executed by Sailendra in favour of defendant No.3 and other defendants as not binding upon them and that the suit was hit by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. In this connection he refers a case law reported in 2008(3) CHN page 639 (Hamida Begum vs. Umran Bibi). 14. Mr D. P. Mukherjee, learned counsel for the respondent plaintiffs, on the other hand, submits that admittedly original owner of the suit property namely Charu Chandra died in 1957 i.e. after promulgation of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and accordingly the suit property devolved upon his four daughters (plaintiffs) and only son Sailendra (predecessor in title of defendant Nos. 1 and 2) in equal shares i.e., each having 1/5 share therein. He further submits that admittedly the plaintiffs being married sisters used to reside in their respective matrimonial home and that their only brother Sailendra was in possession of the suit property. He further submits that as the possession of one co-sharer is the possession of all the co-sharers, Sailendra’s possession amounted to possession of his co-sharer sisters namely plaintiffs. He further submits that admittedly the plaintiffs being married sisters used to reside in their respective matrimonial home and that their only brother Sailendra was in possession of the suit property. He further submits that as the possession of one co-sharer is the possession of all the co-sharers, Sailendra’s possession amounted to possession of his co-sharer sisters namely plaintiffs. He further submits that though later on it is found that Sailendra sold the entire suit property claiming him to be 16 annas share thereof, to defendants No.3 to 5 by different sale deeds of 1957 and 1958 but admittedly Sailendra’s 1/5th share only passed on to those purchasers through said sales. He further submits that those purchasers (defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 5) stepped into the shoes of Saildenra and became automatic co-sharers of the plaintiffs in the suit premises. He next submits that no declaration was needed under the facts and circumstances of the case and as such section 59 of the Limitation Act had no application. His further submission is that a person claiming lawful title cannot at the same time claim adverse possession. According to him, as the present appellant and other contesting defendants claimed 16 annas share in the suit property through purchase from Sailendra and they did not recognize plaintiffs’ co-ownership right in the suit property, they cannot claim at the same time adverse possession against the plaintiffs. In this connection he refers a case law reported in 2011 (3) CLJ (Cal) page 11 (Trinath Chandra Das and others vs. Debaprasad Bhattacharya & another). He next submits that in order to assert right of adverse possession one has to plead and prove by cogent evidence the starting point of the possession of the defendant becoming adverse to the plaintiff, and also of continuation of the same openly and uninterruptedly denying the title of the lawful owners. According to him, those ingredients are missing in this case. Accordingly, he submits that the learned courts below rightly held that the claim of title of the appellant / defendant No.3 and other defendants, through adverse possession, was not established. In support of his contention he refers case laws reported in (2004) 1 SCC page 271 (Md. According to him, those ingredients are missing in this case. Accordingly, he submits that the learned courts below rightly held that the claim of title of the appellant / defendant No.3 and other defendants, through adverse possession, was not established. In support of his contention he refers case laws reported in (2004) 1 SCC page 271 (Md. Mohammad Ali vs. Jagadish Kalta and others), (2206) 77 SCC page 570 (T. Anjanappa and others vs. Somalingappa and another), (2007) 6 Supreme Court cases 59 (P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy and others vs. Revamma and others) and (2011) 10 Supreme Court Cases 404). His last but not the least important submission is that concurrent findings of fact of learned courts below should not be interfered during hearing of the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure unless it can be shown that the judgment was perverse and that in the instant case no perversity is found to exist. In support of his contention he refers a case law reported in (2010) 11 SCC page 483 (Bharatha Matha and another vs. R. Vijaya Renganathan and others). 15. I have considered the submission made by learned counsels of the parties in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as evidence on record, both oral and documentary. It was well established that the original owner of the suit property namely Charu Chandra Sarkar died after promulgation of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and hence the suit property devolved upon his four daughters (plaintiffs) and only son Saildendra (predecessor of defendant No.1 and 2) in equal shares. In other words, on death of Charu Chandra the suit property devolved upon plaintiffs and their brother Sailendra each having 1/5th share therein. It is true that Sailendra sold out the entire suit property to defendant Nos. 3 to 5 by different kobalas executed in 1957 and 1958 representing him as 16 annas owner thereof. But it is a well settled law that a purchaser cannot get a title better than that of his vendor. As Sailendra had only 1/5th share in the suit property the purchasers (appellant / defendant No.3, defendant Nos. 4 and 5) acquired title to the suit property only to that extent (1/5th share) through said purchases. But it is a well settled law that a purchaser cannot get a title better than that of his vendor. As Sailendra had only 1/5th share in the suit property the purchasers (appellant / defendant No.3, defendant Nos. 4 and 5) acquired title to the suit property only to that extent (1/5th share) through said purchases. It came out from the evidence on record that the plaintiffs being married sisters used to reside in their matrimonial home and that their brother used to possess the suit property on behalf of all the co-sharers. Admittedly, one co-sharer’s possession is possession of all the co-sharers so long the same is not amounting to ouster of the possession of the other co-sharers being not in possession. By the purchase of the kobalas of 1957 and 1958 the appellant (defendant No.3) and other defendant purchasers stepped into the shoes of Sailendra and became co-sharers of the suit property along with the plaintiffs. 16. In the case of M. Sidhiqu (supra) it was specifically held that in order to constitute adverse possession the other co-owners out of possession must be proved to have had notice of the assertion of hostile title and exclusive possession ousting them with the requisite animus for the statutory period and that it must be pleaded and proved. 17. In the case of Md. Mohammad Ali (supra) it was specifically held that possession of property by a co-sharer deemed to be the possession on behalf of other co-sharers unless there is a clear ouster of denying title of the other co-sharers. It was further held therein that mutation in the revenue records in the name of one co-sharer for recording the name in the record of right would not amount to ouster unless there is a clear pleading as well as evidence whereby the title of the other co-sharers was denied and disputed. 18. In T. Anjanappa’s case (supra) it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e., a possession which is exclusively or impliedly a denial of the title of the true owner. The same view was expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy’s case (supra) as well as in the case of State of Haryana (supra). 19. The same view was expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy’s case (supra) as well as in the case of State of Haryana (supra). 19. It is a settled principle of law that that an evidence of witness should be read as a whole and not by taking one sentence from here and another sentence from there. It appears that the learned courts below marshalled the entire evidence on record, both oral and documentary, adduced by the parties and came to a finding of fact that respondent plaintfifs had 4/5th share in the suit property and that contesting defendant purchasers failed to establish that they ousted the plaintiff co-sharers from the suit property and in the process acquired a title thereupon by adverse possession. As those findings are based on evidence it cannot be said to be perverse. The case laws of Shamsher Singh (supra) and Hamida Begam (supra) have no application as it is not a case for declaring the kobalas executed by Sailendra in favour of purchaser defendants were void, as admittedly Sailendra had 1/5th share in the suit property and through those kobalas Sailendra’s share certainly passed to those purchasers. As such, plaintiff co-sharers were not required to pray for cancellation of said deeds. In this connection it is also pertinent to note that the present appellant (defendant No.3) and other purchaser defendants initially pressed their claim of title by way of purchase of suit property from Sailendra through different kobalas. As such, they did not recognize the plaintiffs as co-sharers of the suit property. It is true that they made out an alternative case of acquiring title by way of adverse possession. But in that case they should have pleaded and proved the exact date when from they were aware of the title of the plaintiffs in the suit property as well as denial of the same by them. Though there was some oral evidence to that effect but the same was not found to be convincing one. 20. I am of opinion that concurrent findings of learned courts below on this score should not be set aside during hearing of the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the same cannot be branded to be perverse being based on no evidence, or based on extraneous matters or was passed disregarding settled principles of law. 21. 21. As a result, the appeal fails. 22. The appeal is hereby dismissed on contest. 23. However, I pass no order as to costs. 24. Send down Lower Court records along with a copy of this judgment to the Lower Court at the earliest. 25. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgement be supplied to the learned counsels of the parties, if applied for.