JUDGMENT Huluvadi G. Ramesh , J.—These two appeals have been filed by one G.N. Srinivasa who is defendant in OS 213/1996 (RSA 3345/2006), a suit for specific performance and plaintiff in OS 207/1997 (RSA 339/2006), a suit for permanent injunction. The subject matter of the suit properties is garden land in Sy. No. 87/1A measuring about 19 guntas and Sy. No. 74/1 measuring about 25 guntas situate at Mustur Village of Chikkaballapura Taluk. According to the plaintiff Gurappa who is the agreement holder, he has entered into a sale transaction of the immovable property for a consideration of Rs. 30,000/- with the defendant and has paid an advance of Rs. 20,000/-. The defendant-Srinivasa has agreed to execute the registered sale deed within three months free from all encumbrances, by receiving the balance consideration. In part performance, according to the plaintiff, defendant parted with possession and as such, plaintiff is in possession. Accordingly, the suit for specific performance was filed. The suit was resisted by the defendant. Based on the pleadings, as many as six issues were raised by the trial court. While holding all the relevant issues in favour of the plaintiff, trial court decreed the suit. 2. In the suit filed by the defendant i.e., for permanent injunction against the plaintiff who filed a suit for specific performance, after contest, holding that the plaintiff Gurappa in OS 213/1996 is in possession, the trial court dismissed the suit. Against these two orders, appeals in RA 57/2012 and RA 58/2012 were filed. The lower appellate court dismissed the appeals and confirmed the order of the trial court. Hence, these two second appeals. 3. At the time of admission on 7.7.2010, the following substantial questions of law were raised :: Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the courts below were justified in dismissing the suit of the appellant for injunction; Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the courts below were justified in decreeing the suit for specific performance ignoring that the sale consideration amount was less than the value of the crop agreed to be given by the respondent to the appellant, in terms of the agreement dated 1.12.1988? 4. Heard the counsel representing the parties. 5. 4. Heard the counsel representing the parties. 5. According to the appellant's counsel, as per the admission of the plaintiff in OS 213/1996, these properties were let out by way of lease as a grape garden which is within the vicinity of Chikkaballapur Taluk Headquarters and as per the agreement, these lands were leased for a period of six years. As per the terms of the agreement, the crop share was to be parted for the first year for Rs. 10,000/-; in the second year for Rs. 20,000/-; in the third year for Rs. 30,000/- and Rs. 35,000/- for the fourth year. Thus, it is stated, the property originally was let out on crop share basis. The value of the property was more than Rs. 2 lacs even at that relevant point of time and the plaintiff, to knock of the valuable property has created a sham and fraudulent agreement to sell and the very terms of the agreement and the consideration depict that such an agreement was never in existence nor the appellant intended to dispose of the property. Even in the written statement, while denying the entire agreement itself, all statements made by the plaintiff have been specifically denied. The trial court as also the lower appellate court, failed to visualize the clear admission on the part of the plaintiff as to the existence of the agreement/lease, a copy of which is available with the appellant, which clearly goes to show that when the crop share goes up to the extent of Rs. 30,000-35,000/- in one or two years, selling the property for a paltry sum of Rs. 40,000/- is unimaginable. Thus, referring to the admission made by the plaintiff himself regarding existence of the lease-the original copy being retained by the plaintiff and xerox copy is made available to the defendant/appellant, learned counsel argued, deliberately plaintiff has failed to produce the original lease agreement which depicts the fact that plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands. It is also argued, the trial court as also the lower appellate court failed to consider the readiness and willingness of the defendant and nonexistence of the agreement as per S. 16(c) and S.20 of the Specific Relief Act and thus, there is an error committed by both the courts below which needs interference for non-consideration of the material evidence on record. In support of his argument, counsel has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Manjunath Anandappa Urf. Shivappa Hanasi Vs. Tammanasa and Others, AIR 2003 SC 1391 and in the case of Gobind Ram Vs. Gian Chand, AIR 2000 SC 3106 to contend that there was neither an agreement to sell nor it was agreed to be sold for a paltry sum of Rs. 40,000/- and prayed for allowing his appeal. 6. Per contra, counsel representing the respondent submitted, appellant has not got marked the so called xerox copy of the original agreement of lease before the trial court as such, the same cannot be relied upon and further, as a matter of fact finding, both the courts below in a concurrent finding, held there exists an agreement to sell and having parted Rs. 20,000/- out of the grape crop harvested, only Rs. 10,000/- remained to be paid and rightly the trial court as also the lower appellate court have decreed the suit for specific performance which does not call for interference. 7. In the light of the arguments advanced, let me proceed to consider the substantial questions of law raised. 8. So far as the injunction suit filed by the appellant herein is concerned, of course the plaintiff is shown to have continued in possession by virtue of the agreement, which he has also not denied and as per the admission of the plaintiff himself in the cross-examination, there was an agreement for crop share, a copy of which is very much available with this appellant and the original of which is said to be retained by the plaintiff himself which he failed to produce deliberately. This fact shows the very existence of the lease agreement for the purpose of crop share between the plaintiff and the appellant herein. As such, both the courts below are justified in rejecting the suit for bare injunction. 9. This fact shows the very existence of the lease agreement for the purpose of crop share between the plaintiff and the appellant herein. As such, both the courts below are justified in rejecting the suit for bare injunction. 9. In so far as specific performance of the contract is concerned, in the light of the agreement that was said to be in existence as per the plaintiff himself regarding crop share between himself and the appellant herein, a xerox copy of which is available with the appellant herein, the contents therein appears to be genuine and speaks to the fact that nearly 11/2 acre of land was agreed to be sold, as per the finding of the trial court. 10. Be that as it may. As per the contention of the defendant/appellant, he never agreed to sell these properties rather the plaintiff had made use of the lease transaction to create an agreement to sell by defrauding the appellant herein. It appears, according to the plaintiff, there was an agreement and accordingly, he paid Rs. 20,000/- and another Rs. 10,000/- remained to be paid. But, looking into the nature of agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the appellant herein with regard to lease which of course is admitted by the plaintiff himself and the existence of which was not disputed, then necessarily the court can take note of the same even if it is a xerox copy. The very terms of the lease agreement depict that as a crop share plaintiff has to pay amount ranging from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 35,000/- for a period of three years i.e., Rs. 10,000/- for the first year; Rs. 20,000/- for the second year, Rs. 30,000/- for the third year and thereafter, Rs. 35,000/-. The plaintiff was also to pay Rs. 35,000/- as earnest money, in advance to the appellant herein towards crop share. In the circumstance, even the sale agreement created appears to be sham and not a genuine transaction. 11. So far as readiness and willingness is concerned, of course it becomes inconsequential when the agreement is said to be created as an afterthought by the plaintiff. 35,000/- as earnest money, in advance to the appellant herein towards crop share. In the circumstance, even the sale agreement created appears to be sham and not a genuine transaction. 11. So far as readiness and willingness is concerned, of course it becomes inconsequential when the agreement is said to be created as an afterthought by the plaintiff. Even otherwise, so far as exercise of discretion under S.20 of the Specific Relief Act is concerned, when the plaintiff himself had admitted the crop share agreement the original of which is retained by him and he failed to produce it and on the other hand, appellant herein has retained a xerox copy which he has produced, it specifically speaks about the crop share to be paid by the plaintiff himself every year which is a substantial amount which is equivalent or more than the amount agreed to sell the property itself. The conduct of the plaintiff himself goes to show that he has not come to the court with clean hands. Likewise, while exercising discretion, the trial court as also the lower appellate court failed to take note of the nature of transaction, the sale consideration and the geographical situation of the property which fetches market value. In the circumstances, there appears to be no consensus ad idem between the parties which should have desisted the trial court from decreeing the suit for specific performance. Even go to by S.20 of the Specific Relief Act and the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the decisions cited above, while decreeing specific performance the Court has to exercise discretion and has to be guided by principle of justice, equity and good conscience. The trial court and the lower appellate court have failed to exercise discretion in a proper perspective. Accordingly, while answering the substantial questions of law raised, both the appeals are allowed and the judgment of the trial court as well as the lower appellate court are reversed. The suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance is rejected. It is hereby ordered to the plaintiff to part with the properties in favour of the appellant herein within three months, if not already parted. It is for the appellant defendant herein to part with Rs. 20,000/- to the plaintiff which amount shall not carry any interest. No costs.