Judgment V.K. Ahuja, J. This is a Regular Second Appeal field by the appellant, as against the judgment and decree dated 15.1.2000, passed by the learned District Judge, Chamba, affirming the judgment and decree dated 26.12.1996 passed by the learned Senior Sub Judge, Chamba, dismissing the suit of the appellant/ plaintiff for dissolution of the partnership, rendition of accounts and for possession. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellant now represented by his legal heirs, hereinafter referred to as ‘the plaintiff’, filed a suit for dissolution of partnership, rendition of accounts and for possession of the disputed premises. It was alleged by the plaintiff that he was in possession of the suit premises as a tenant and in the year 1984, he entered into a partnership with Ram Murti, deceased, predecessor-in-interest of defendants No. 1 to 4 and with other defendants for running the business of purchase and sale of Dalda ghee, biscuits etc. It was alleged that a partnership deed was got drafted on 7.4.1984 by an advocate, was typed on 8.4.1984 and it was duly signed by the parties. It was alleged that the plaintiff invested the amount and had 1/4th share in the partnership and remaining 3/4th share was of the other partners. It was alleged that the partnership deed was destroyed in the fire. By filing the present suit, the plaintiff has sought the rendition of accounts, dissolution of partnership and for possession of the suit premises. 3. The defendants pleaded that the plaintiff never remained in possession for the last 21-22 years. They also denied of having entered into any partnership with the plaintiff or investment of any amount by the plaintiff and as such, have prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled by the learned trial Court:- “1. Whether there was any partnership between the plaintiff and Ram Murti deceased? If so, on what terms and conditions? … OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is a tenant in possession of the suit premises as alleged? … OPP 3. Whether the suit is within time ? … OPP 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the premises in suit? … OPP 5. Whether the suit is correctly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? … OPP 6. Whether the plaintiff is a tenant in possession of the suit premises as alleged? … OPP 3. Whether the suit is within time ? … OPP 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the premises in suit? … OPP 5. Whether the suit is correctly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? … OPP 6. Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form? … OPP 7. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder? … OPD 8. Relief.” 5. Parties led their evidence and the learned trial Court vide its impugned judgment held that there was no partnership between the plaintiff and Ram Murti, deceased. The plaintiff was not in possession of the suit premises as a tenant and suit for rendition of accounts dissolution and possession of the suit premises was not sustainable and as such, the suit was dismissed. 6. On appeal, those findings were affirmed by the learned Appellate Court. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 8. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant were that the shop in question was vacated by the plaintiff and it was rented out to the defendants’ predecessor, in which a partnership deed was entered into in between the parties. It was also submitted that the learned trial Court had not considered the revenue entries showing the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land and has wrongly given its findings to the contrary. It was also submitted that there is nothing on record to show that as to whether any eviction proceedings were initiated by the owners as against the plaintiff. It was also submitted that there is nothing to suggest that in whose presence the premises were handed over by the plaintiff in pursuance of the decrees passed against him. Thus, it was submitted that the findings to the contrary, as recorded by both the Courts below, are liable to be set aside. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents had supported the impugned judgments of both the Courts below for the reasons recorded therein. He has also supplemented the same by submitting that there was no proof on record to prove the partnership deed, which was not registered and as such, the suit was not maintainable. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents had supported the impugned judgments of both the Courts below for the reasons recorded therein. He has also supplemented the same by submitting that there was no proof on record to prove the partnership deed, which was not registered and as such, the suit was not maintainable. It was also submitted that court fee was not made good by the plaintiff and both the Courts below had considered the revenue record and as such, there is no merit in the appeal filed by the appellant, which is liable to be dismissed accordingly. 10. Insofar as the plea of partnership is concerned, the plaintiff has led some evidence to show that the partnership deed was written, stamp papers were also purchased and the deed is alleged to have been written, which was destroyed in fire, as alleged by the plaintiff himself. However, the plaintiff did not apply for any permission to lead secondary evidence, did not prove the contents of the said partnership deed and only led some evidence to show that a partnership deed was written, stamp papers were purchased, but this is no proof of the partnership deed having been entered into in between the parties. The learned trial Court has discussed the evidence in quite detail under Issue No. 1 and there is no need for this Court for reappraisal of the evidence in this regard. The said findings were duly considered by the learned Appellate Court also, who also observed that the partnership deed was required to be registered, but there is no evidence led by the plaintiff to show that the said deed was registered. 11. The learned counsel for the respondents during the course of arguments had submitted that since the partnership deed was not registered, no suit could have been instituted by the plaintiff. In support, he had placed reliance upon the decision of this High Court in Vinod Kumar and another Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, 1991(1) Shim. L.C. 110, wherein it was observed that admittedly, the firm was not registered and as such, the suit was hit by Section 69 (2) of the Partnership Act, as it was not maintainable. 12. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appeal was admitted on two substantial questions of law Nos. L.C. 110, wherein it was observed that admittedly, the firm was not registered and as such, the suit was hit by Section 69 (2) of the Partnership Act, as it was not maintainable. 12. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appeal was admitted on two substantial questions of law Nos. 1 and 2, which reads as under:- “1. Whether learned courts below have erred in relying inadmissible evidence on record that plaintiff in pursuance of ejectment order Ext. D1 had vacated the premises which has materially affected the decision of the learned courts below and similarly whether learned courts below have erred in relying Ext. DW4/A which is also inadmissible for want of registration to support the alleged tenancy of the premises in question in favour of Ram Murti? 2. Whether alleged vacation of the premises in question in pursuance of Ext. D1 by plaintiff without recording satisfaction of ejectment order Ext.D1 by the executing court is invalid in law and plaintiff continues to be a tenant in the premises in question, more particularly, when he has paid rent of the premises which has been accepted by the landlord (s) after alleged vacation?” 13. It is clear that the appeal was not admitted insofar as the findings under Issue No. 1 are concerned and as such, there can be no reappraisal of the evidence led by the parties under Issue No. 1 and those findings are liable to be affirmed. Insofar as the other substantial point is concerned, there is evidence on record to show that the plaintiff was earlier a tenant of the premises in question and ejectment proceedings were initiated against the plaintiff. The plaintiff had admitted in his statement as PW-1 that a petition for ejectemnt of the demised premises was moved by the landlord against him. He however, deposed that it was dismissed and denied that the appeal was also dismissed by this Court. However, a perusal of Ext. D-2, a copy of the judgment of the Court of learned Rent Controller dated 18.8.1965 shows that the petition was filed for eviction of Gurcharan Dass, the present plaintiff and the case was remanded to the learned Rent Controller for giving its findings on one of the issues. Ext. However, a perusal of Ext. D-2, a copy of the judgment of the Court of learned Rent Controller dated 18.8.1965 shows that the petition was filed for eviction of Gurcharan Dass, the present plaintiff and the case was remanded to the learned Rent Controller for giving its findings on one of the issues. Ext. D-3 is a copy of the judgment passed by the learned District Judge against the order of learned Rent Controller dated 14.10.1963 and an appeal was preferred by Gurcharan Dass, who was directed by the learned Rent Controller to vacate the premises comprised in Khasra Nos. 1352 and 1353. Therefore, the appeal filed by the tenant was dismissed, who was directed to put the landlords in possession of the premises in dispute by 1.9.1966. There is no substance in the plea raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that no execution petition was filed or there is no proof as to when the possession was handed over to the landlord by the plaintiff and in whose presence. It is not necessary that there should have been execution proceedings or persons must have been present when the possession was given since the order of learned District Judge reproduced above “Appellate Authority” clearly shows that the direction was to hand over the possession by a fixed date 1.9.1966 and there is no bar for the tenant to hand over the possession without any execution proceedings. Denial of these facts by the plaintiff clearly shows that he has not testified truthfully and his statement cannot be relied upon. 14. Coming to the question that copy of the jamabandi Ext. PW2/A was not considered by the Court. It only makes a reference that in the said jamabandi, the plaintiff was shown to be a tenant and the entry continued as before and once the evidence led shows that the tenant stood evicted, no reliance can be placed upon this entry, which continued to show the tenant as in possession. Both the Courts below had made a reference to the copy of jamabandi and it cannot be said that this copy was not considered or ignored and the evidence led by the plaintiff failed to show that he entered into any partnership with the respondents or that he is entitled to possession on any of the grounds. 15. Both the Courts below had made a reference to the copy of jamabandi and it cannot be said that this copy was not considered or ignored and the evidence led by the plaintiff failed to show that he entered into any partnership with the respondents or that he is entitled to possession on any of the grounds. 15. Insofar as the contention putforth by the learned counsel for the respondents qua court fee is concerned, no cross-objections were filed and no substantial question of law was framed in this regard. Therefore, the contention putforth is repelled being devoid of any force. 16. Both the Courts below have clearly appreciated the evidence in detail and in right perspective and there is no merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and as such, the appeal is devoid of any merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. However, the parties are liable to bear their own costs. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.