JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sunil Hali, J.—While working as clerk in the bank, the respondent No. 2 committed misconduct, as a result of which, three charges were framed against him. In this behalf, it was alleged that he has misbehaved and pressurized the Manager to mark his presence on the attendance register despite the fact that he had come to the office at 12.30 p.m. The second charge against him was that he has misbehaved with the Manager by hurling abuses on him and the third charge against him was that he has assaulted the Branch Manager with paper weight. The inquiry was conducted by the bank and after conclusion of the inquiry, the respondent No. 2 was awarded punishment of withholding of three increments. This order was challenged by respondent No. 2 before the Labour Court. The Labour Court after entering into reference and after hearing the parties allowed the reference of the workman. 2. The reasons recorded by the Labour Court while exonerating the workman of all the three charges is that on the basis of the evidence recorded a correct finding has not been recorded by the inquiry officer. While rejecting the conclusions of the inquiry officer, it has substituted its own view and has held inquiry to be bad. It was also found that on account of deficient evidence, wrong conclusions have been drawn by the enquiry officer. This order is subject-matter of challenge before this Court. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the Labour Court has no power to re-appreciate the evidence by assuming the power of appellate Court while dealing with the punishment, which is neither dismissal or discharge. It has a limited power to examine the enquiry report only to find out if there has been violation of principles of natural justice or enquiry was initiated by adopting unfair labour practice. In the present case, the labour Court has assumed the jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence and in correcting the findings of the enquiry officer, which power it did not have since the punishment imposed was neither dismissal or discharge. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents states that the Labour Court will not be powerless in case it is found that the inquiry was fair and proper by re-appreciating the evidence even in cases where neither discharge nor order of dismissal has been passed. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents states that the Labour Court will not be powerless in case it is found that the inquiry was fair and proper by re-appreciating the evidence even in cases where neither discharge nor order of dismissal has been passed. I have examined the rival contention of the parties. 5. I have heard Shri Sunil Tripathi holding brief of Shri M.B. Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Rahul Jain, learned counsel appearing for respondents. 6. Section 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act has been enacted to empower the Labour Court to interfere with the management’s decision to dismiss, discharge or terminate the services of a workman in such cases. In respect of other punishments, it has been observed and consistently held by the Courts that the tribunal does not have power to substitute its own judgment for that of the management and will only interfere when there is want of good faith, victimization, unfair labour practice on the part of the management. 7. This view has been clearly illustrated in the case of Dy. General Manager, Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. Sheikh Ismail Mohamed, Civil Appeal No. 1996 of 1972, decided on 6.3.1972, by making the following observations. “The International Labour Organisation, in its recommendation (No. 119) concerning termination of employment at the initiative to the employer, adopted in June 1963, has recommended that a worker aggrieved by the termination of his employment should be entitled to appeal against the termination among others, to a neutral body such as an arbitrator, a Court, an arbitration committee or a similar body and that the neutral body concerned should be empowered to examine the reasons given in the termination of employment and that other circumstances relating to the case and to render a decision on the justification of the termination. The International Labour Organisation has further recommended that the neutral body should be empowered (if it finds that the termination of employment was unjustified) to order that the worker concerned, unless reinstated with unpaid wages, should be paid adequate compensation or afforded some other relief. The International Labour Organisation has further recommended that the neutral body should be empowered (if it finds that the termination of employment was unjustified) to order that the worker concerned, unless reinstated with unpaid wages, should be paid adequate compensation or afforded some other relief. In accordance with these recommendations, it is considered that the Tribunal’s power in an adjudication proceeding relating to discharge or dismissal of a workman should not be limited and that the Tribunal should have the power in cases whereever necessary to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit or give such other reliefs to the workman including the award of any letter punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. For this purpose, a new Section 11-A is proposed to be inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947....” 8. While dealing with the issue whether similar power can be exercised by the Labour Court where the punishment award is neither dismissal, punishment or retrenchment, the Supreme Court in South Indian Cashew Factories Workers’ Union v. Kerala State Cashew Development Corpn. Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 201 , made the following observations : “The Labour Court had earlier held that the enquiry was properly held and there was no violation of the principles of natural justice and that the findings were not perverse. The vitiating facts found by the Labour Court against the enquiry are erroneous and are liable to be set aside. If enquiry is fair and proper, in the absence of any allegations of victimization or unfair labour practice, the Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed. Section 11A of the Act gives ample power to the Labour Court to re-appraise the evidence adduced in the enquiry and also sit in appeal over the decision of the employer in imposing punishment. Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act is only applicable in the case of dismissal or discharge of a workman as clearly mentioned in the Section itself. Before the introduction of Section 11A in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act is only applicable in the case of dismissal or discharge of a workman as clearly mentioned in the Section itself. Before the introduction of Section 11A in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen [(1958) SCR 667] this Court held that the Tribunal does not act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the Management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. on the part of the management. There is no allegation of unfair labour practice, victimisation etc. in this case. The powers of the Labour Court in the absence of Section 11A is illustrated by this Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management, (1973) 1 SCC 813 . When enquiry was conducted fairly and properly, in the absence of any of the allegations of victimisation or mala fides or unfair labour practice, Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. Since Section 11-A is not applicable, Labour Court has no power to re-appraise the evidence to find out whether the findings of the enquiry officer are correct or not or whether the punishment imposed is adequate or not. Of course, Labour Court can interfere with the findings if the findings are perverse. But, here there is a clear finding that the findings are not perverse and principles of natural justice were complied with while conducting enquiry.” 9. Import of the aforementioned two judgments is clear demarcation of power exercised by the Labour Court in case where the punishment of dismissal and removal has been imposed. Section 11-A empowers the Labour Court to re-appreciate the evidence and correct the judgment, while in case of other punishments, no such power is vested with the Labour Court. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in (2008) 12 SCC 726 , in which he emphasizes that the power to re-appreciate the evidence or correct a decision is not only found in the case where order of dismissal, removal or retrenchment has been passed but in other cases also. The tribunal will not be powerless to re-appreciate the evidence even if it is found that inquiry is fair and proper. The tribunal will not be powerless to re-appreciate the evidence even if it is found that inquiry is fair and proper. I am afraid that the judgment has been misread by the learned counsel for the respondents. 11. The issue involved in the case (herein supra) was what is the extended power and scope of Section 11-A. The question involved in thisýÿ petition is that once it is found that the inquiry is fair and proper, would it be appropriate for the tribunal to re-appreciate the evidence and correct the judgment. 12. The Apex Court in Mavji C Lakum v. Central Bank of India, (2008) 12 SCC 726 in paragraph 23 has held as follows : “23. In this backdrop when we see unusually long judgment of the learned Single Judge, it comes out that the learned Single Judge held firstly that the Tribunal had exceeded its powers vested in it under the provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Judge, as regards, Section 11-A, after quoting the same, observed: “Though the Tribunal was equipped with the power to come to its own conclusion whether in a given case the imposition of punishment of discharge or dismissal from the service is justified. It is for that purpose that the Tribunal is authorized to go into the evidence that has been adduced before the Inquiry Officer in details and find out whether the punishment of discharge or dismissal is commensurate with the nature of charges proved against the delinquent.” 13. The Supreme Court rightly held that Labour Court can still correct the findings. This was the issue in respect of the power under Section 11-A of the Act which admittedly does not apply to the case of the respondent No. 2 as he has neither been removed nor terminated from the service. 14. Coming to the merits of this case, it is to be seen that the Labour Court was required only to find out as to whether an inquiry was initiated against the rules of natural justice or motivated by using unfair labour practice or was an Act of victimization. In case the Labour Court found any of the three deficiencies in the inquiry, it could quash the same. It could not correct the decision making process of the inquiry officer. 15. In case the Labour Court found any of the three deficiencies in the inquiry, it could quash the same. It could not correct the decision making process of the inquiry officer. 15. The Labour Court has not recorded any finding to show that the inquiry was not conducted in accordance with the rules or that rules of natural justice were not followed or there is any violation of unfair labour practice. Once it concluded that the inquiry was held in accordance with law, there was no occasion for him to set aside the finding on the ground that the finding recorded was based upon the deficient evidence or wrong appreciation of evidence. The case of the workman was not covered by Section 11A of the Act as such the Labour Court lacks jurisdictionýÿ to set aside the order on merits. 16. In view of this, I allow this writ petition and set aside the impugned order passed by respondent No. 1 dated 12.11.1997 published on 24.12.1997 of the Labour Court. ——————