Judgment : Heard Shri V.R. Tamba, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and Shri F.E. Noronha, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. Rule. Heard forthwith with the consent of the learned Counsel. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents waives service. 3. The above petition challenges the order passed by the learned Civil Judge Senior Division, Vasco da Gama dated 14/03/2012 whereby an application filed by the petitioners to recall the witness to produce documents as well as the application to lead secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Evidence Act, came to be dismissed. 4. Briefly, the facts which curl out from the records of the proceedings are that the suit filed by the petitioners was inter alia for declaration cum annulment and other consequential reliefs against the respondents in respect of Sale Deed dated 31/07/1990. The respondents no.1 & 2 filed written statement on 11/11/1991 and the respondents no.3 & 4 filed separate written statement on the same day along with the counter claim. The issues were framed by the learned Judge on 23/10/1996, but however on 8/09/1993, the petitioners filed an application to seek leave to produce documents and praying inter alia that the originals thereof would be produced at the stage of evidence. The documents sought to be produced are referred to at paras 2 and 4 of the said application. The particulars of the said documents have been referred to at para 2(f) of the petition. On perusal of the documents referred to therein such documents are essentially letter correspondence between the advocate of the petitioners and some other parties. The matter was thereafter adjourned sine die in the year 1996. The matter was thereafter taken on Board on 4/07/2003 and an affidavit in evidence was filed on behalf of the petitioners. The petitioners also examined PW2 and after such examination, the petitioners filed an application dated 7/03/2012 for leave to produce secondary evidence in respect of the said documents. Another application was also filed to recall PW1 to produce the aforesaid documents on the said date. The respondents filed their reply to the said application opposing the prayer of the petitioners in both the aforesaid applications. The learned Judge by the impugned order dated 14/03/2012 dismissed both the applications filed by the petitioners. 5. Another application was also filed to recall PW1 to produce the aforesaid documents on the said date. The respondents filed their reply to the said application opposing the prayer of the petitioners in both the aforesaid applications. The learned Judge by the impugned order dated 14/03/2012 dismissed both the applications filed by the petitioners. 5. Shri V.R. Tamba, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has assailed the impugned order on the ground that the petitioners had already filed an application way back in the year 1993 for leave to produce the same documents and such application had not been disposed by the learned Judge until the passing of the impugned order. The learned Counsel further points out that along with the application filed in the year 1993, the petitioners had produced notarized certified copies of all the aforesaid documents as according to the petitioners the originals of the said documents were to be produced at the time of evidence. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the originals of the said documents were produced before this Court in Appeal From Order no.39/1992 and whilst disposing of the application for temporary injunction some of the documents relied upon by the petitioners were even considered by the Court. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the learned Judge has dismissed the application filed by the petitioners on the ground that the petitioners are not entitled to lead secondary evidence and that the petitioners cannot recall PW1 in view of the provision of Order 18 of the Civil Procedure Code and that such powers are not available to the Court to permit the petitioners to recall such witness. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the fact that such documents were in existence at the time of the application filed by the petitioners in the year 1993 has not been disputed by the respondents and the question of claiming that such documents have been fabricated cannot arise. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the fact that such documents were in existence at the time of the application filed by the petitioners in the year 1993 has not been disputed by the respondents and the question of claiming that such documents have been fabricated cannot arise. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the learned Judge was not justified to come to the conclusion that no prejudice shall occasion to the petitioners in case the documents are not allowed to be produced, as according to him the said documents are very much relevant for the purpose of deciding the matter in controversy and it is not in dispute that the correspondence sought to be produced is referable to the dispute in the suit. The learned Counsel, as such, submits that the learned Judge has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him whilst passing the impugned order which calls for interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel further pointed out that considering that the original documents are before this Court in the said Appeal From Order No.39/1992, the petitioners shall not press for the application filed under Section 65 of the Evidence Act for secondary evidence. The learned Counsel, as such, submits that the impugned order refusing to recall PW1 to produce the said documents be quashed and set aside. 6. On the other hand, Shri F.E. Noronha, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has vehemently argued that the petitioners are delaying the disposal of the suit. The learned Counsel has pointed out that taking note of the conduct of the petitioners to the effect that they have chosen to lead their evidence without pressing for orders in the application filed in the year 1993 itself suggests that the petitioners were not pressing for any orders on the said application. The learned Counsel further pointed out that when the evidence of the petitioners was closed the question of allowing any recall of witness at this stage does not arise. The learned Counsel further pointed out that when the evidence of the petitioners was closed the question of allowing any recall of witness at this stage does not arise. The learned Counsel further pointed out that the Apex Court in the judgment reported in 2011 (11) SCC 275 in the case of K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy has clearly held that such powers to recall the evidence are to be exercised with caution only when some new evidence is found from the date the evidence is closed and the matter is posted for hearing. The learned Counsel further pointed out that according to the petitioners said documents were in fact in existence much before the closing of the evidence by the petitioner and hence the question of exercising any power to recall the witness does not arise at all. The learned Counsel further pointed out that there is no jurisdictional error committed by the learned Judge whilst passing the impugned order and, as such, the question of exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not arise at all. The learned Counsel further pointed out that grave prejudice shall occasion to the respondents in case the petitioners are permitted to produce the said documents as according to him this would lead to further delay of the proceedings as respondents would have to lead evidence in answer to the documents sought to be produced by the petitioners. The learned Counsel, as such, submits that the petition deserves to be rejected. 7. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties and perused the records. The records as pointed out herein above reveal that the petitioners had already filed an application way back in the year 1993, seeking leave to produce the said documents. It is also not in dispute that along with the application filed in the year 1993 notarized certified copies of the said documents were attached to said documents. Apart from that, it is also not disputed that the originals of the aforesaid documents were produced before this Court in Appeal From Order No.39/1992. It is also brought out from the records of the proceedings that some of the documents were considered by the Court whilst disposing of the application for temporary injunction. Apart from that, it is also not disputed that the originals of the aforesaid documents were produced before this Court in Appeal From Order No.39/1992. It is also brought out from the records of the proceedings that some of the documents were considered by the Court whilst disposing of the application for temporary injunction. Considering that during the pendency of the suit the documents sought to be produced by the petitioners were original documents which were before this Court the question of any suspicion or that the documents are fabricated does not arise. Shri F.E. Noronha, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents fairly does not dispute that the letters sought to be produced by the petitioners are otherwise referable to the dispute which is adjudicated before the learned Judge. The learned Counsel however pointed out that the contents made in the said letter are irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the matter in controversy. 8. Be that as it may, as it is not disputed that the documents sought to be relied upon by the petitioners are referable to the dispute pending before the learned Judge, I find that the learned Judge was not justified to pass the impugned order and refuse leave to produce the documents. It is well settled that the procedural law is hand made of justice and not to trip the litigants in such a manner when the documents are stated to be crucial for deciding the matter in controversy. The judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by Shri F.E. Noronha, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents in fact supports the case of the petitioners to the effect that the Court has power to recall the witness even after the evidence is concluded and posted for arguments. The Apex Court in the said judgment in the case of K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy (supra) has held at paras 11, 13, 14 & 19: "11. There is no specific provision in the Code enabling the parties to reopen the evidence for the purpose of further examination-in-chief or cross-examination. Section 151 of the Code provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. Section 151 of the Code provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. In the absence of any provision providing for reopening of evidence or recall of any witness for further examination or cross-examination, for purposes other than securing clarification required by the court, the inherent power under Section 151 of the Code, subject to its limitations, can be invoked in appropriate cases to reopen the evidence and/or recall witnesses for further examination. This inherent power of the court is not affected by the express power conferred upon the court under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code to recall any witness to enable the court to put such question to elicit any clarifications." "13. The Code earlier had a specific provision in Order 18 Rule 17-A for production of evidence not previously known or the evidence which could not be produced despite due diligence. It enabled the court to permit a party to produce any evidence even at a late stage, after the conclusion of his evidence if he satisfied the court that even after the exercise of due diligence, the evidence was not within his knowledge and could not be produced by him when he was leading the evidence. That provision was deleted with effect from 1-7-2002. The deletion of the said provision does not mean that no evidence can be received at all, after a party closes his evidence. It only means that the amended structure of the Code found no need for such a provision, as the amended Code contemplated little or no time gap between completion of evidence and commencement and conclusion of arguments. Another reason for its deletion was the misuse thereof by the parties to prolong the proceedings under the pretext of discovery of new evidence." "14. The amended provisions of the Code contemplate and expect a trial court to hear the arguments immediately after the completion of evidence and then proceed to judgment. Therefore, it was unnecessary to have an express provision for reopening the evidence to examine a fresh witness or for recalling any witness for further examination. The amended provisions of the Code contemplate and expect a trial court to hear the arguments immediately after the completion of evidence and then proceed to judgment. Therefore, it was unnecessary to have an express provision for reopening the evidence to examine a fresh witness or for recalling any witness for further examination. But if there is a time gap between the completion of evidence and hearing of the arguments, for whatsoever reason, and if in that interregnum, a party comes across some evidence which he could not lay his hands on earlier, or some evidence in regard to the conduct or action of the other party comes into existence, the court may in exercise of its inherent power under Section 151 of the Code, permit the production of such evidence if it is relevant and necessary in the interest of justice, subject to such terms as the court may deem fit to impose." "19. We may add a word of caution. The power under Section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not intended to be used routinely, merely for the asking. If so used, it will defeat the very purpose of various amendments to the Code to expedite trials. But where the application is found to be bona fide and where the additional evidence, oral or documentary, will assist the court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice, and the court is satisfied that non-production earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons, the court may exercise its discretion to recall the witnesses or permit the fresh evidence. But if it does so, it should ensure that the process does not become a protracting tactic. The court should firstly award appropriate costs to the other party to compensate for the delay. Secondly, the court should take up and complete the case within a fixed time schedule so that the delay is avoided. Thirdly, if the application is found to be mischievous, or frivolous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it should be rejected with heavy costs." 9. Secondly, the court should take up and complete the case within a fixed time schedule so that the delay is avoided. Thirdly, if the application is found to be mischievous, or frivolous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it should be rejected with heavy costs." 9. Considering the said judgment of the Apex Court, it is well settled that the Court has powers to recall witness even by exercising power under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code in case any material has come to the knowledge of the petitioners after the evidence has been closed and such evidence would assist the Court to decide the matter in controversy or for clarifying the situation. The petitioners have averred in their application that though the originals of the said documents were before this Court but however on account of some inadvertence such documents remained to be produced. There is no allegation of any malafides which can be curled out from the records of the proceedings which would disclose that the petitioners have deliberately failed to produce the documents at the appropriate stage. Prima facie it appears that the said documents help the Court to decide the dispute as some documents were considered at the time of the disposal of the temporary injunction application. There are no allegations of the lack of bonafides but no doubt the respondents have been put into inconvenience and the petitioners would be liable to compensate the respondents on such count which costs are quantified at Rs.10,000/-as condition precedent. It is made clear that merely because leave has been granted to produce the said documents, the petitioners will have to prove the contents of the said documents in accordance with law. The learned Judge, as such, was not justified to pass the impugned order refusing to recall PW1 to produce the said documents. 10. In view of the above, I pass the following order: ORDER (i) The impugned order dated 14/03/2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge Senior Division at Vasco da Gama dismissing the application filed by the petitioners dated 7/03/2012 to recall PW1 is quashed and set aside. (ii) The application filed by the petitioners for secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Evidence Act stands dismissed as not pressed. (ii) The application filed by the petitioners for secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Evidence Act stands dismissed as not pressed. The leave is granted to the petitioners to rely upon the said documents subject to payment of costs of Rs.10,000/-to the respondents as condition precedent. (iii) The learned Judge shall proceed to dispose the suit in accordance with law. (iv) Rule is made absolute in the above terms. (v) The petition stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. (vi) Issue authenticated copy.