JUDGMENT S. Talapatra, J. 1. Both the writ petitions are tied up for disposal by a common judgment and order as those writ petitions are set up in the same factual backdrop as well as against the order dated 21.12.2011, Annexure-6 to the writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 359/2012 (as communicated by the letter dated 27.12.2011) and against the order dated 30.11.2011, Annexure-7 to the writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 580/2012 (as communicated by the letter dated 30.12.2011) by the Competition Commission of India in the same proceeding No. 41/2011. The petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 359/2012 are the Association of Drug Dealers namely, Barpeta District Drug Dealers Association and its Secretary, and the petitioners in W.P. (C) No. 580/2012 are the registered society of the Drug Dealers namely, Assam Drug Dealers Association and its Secretary, hereinafter referred as the petitioners' in short. 2. The petitioner No. 1 in W.P. (C) No. 580/2012 namely, Assam Drug Dealers Association has been arraigned as respondent No. 1 and the petitioner No. 1 in W.P. (C) No. 359/2012 has been arraigned as the respondent No. 2 in the said proceeding being No. 41/2011, in the Competition Commission of India. 3. One M/s. Sandhya Drug Agency, a Drug Licensee under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, filed the information under Section 19(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 for institution of an inquiry alleging abuse against the petitioners of their dominant position, they occupy. The said information has been registered as Case No. 41/2011 in the Competition Commission of India, hereinafter referred as 'the Commission' in short. In the said information at Annexure-3 to the writ petitions, the informant alleged that the petitioners had unilaterally and without asking the informant about the veracity of the claims, directly indulged and ensured, by abuse of their dominant position, that no drugs and life saving medicines were supplied to the informant and the same was done with active support of the respondent No. 3 in the said proceeding namely, All India Organization of Chemists and Druggists. No reason was provided to the informant and there can not be any reason for such directions. Basing on the letter dated 26.05.2011, the respondent No. 4 in the said proceeding namely, Alkem Laboratories Ltd. had stopped supply of all drugs and life saving medicines to the informant Thus the informant was unfairly and arbitrarily denied the market access. No reason was provided to the informant and there can not be any reason for such directions. Basing on the letter dated 26.05.2011, the respondent No. 4 in the said proceeding namely, Alkem Laboratories Ltd. had stopped supply of all drugs and life saving medicines to the informant Thus the informant was unfairly and arbitrarily denied the market access. It has been further alleged that despite the legal notice dated 02.06.2011 as issued by the informant (Annexure-1 to the writ petitions), the respondent No. 4 did not resume the supply. The informant even wrote a letter in this regard to the Addl. Director General of the Commission. Again on 06.06.2011, the informant made a request to the respondent No. 4 in the said proceeding to supply various drugs and had placed indents for them by the purchase orders, but the respondent No. 4 in compliance with the unilateral and discriminatory directions of the respondent No. 1 had refused to supply the drugs as indented for from the said Company. On 16.06.2011, the informant made a representation to the respondent No. 3, stating that the direction to stop supply to the informant had led to serious difficulties and was affecting the livelihood of the partners of the informant firm, but no action had surfaced from the respondent No. 3. In the similar line, an appeal was made to the Drug Controller of Assam, the licensing authority, but he had also not taken any action and as such the violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 has been alleged in the said information. The informant stated that the abusive conduct emanates from the collusive designs of directly imposing unfair and discriminatory conditions, thereby completely denying the market access to the informant by using their dominant position in the drug distribution market in the State of Assam. The respondent No. 4 has also been alleged to have committed violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. 4. The said information was supported by various documents as referred. On receipt of the said information, the Assistant Director, Competition Commission of India, passed an order on 10.08.2011, holding that the act and conduct of the respondent Nos. The respondent No. 4 has also been alleged to have committed violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. 4. The said information was supported by various documents as referred. On receipt of the said information, the Assistant Director, Competition Commission of India, passed an order on 10.08.2011, holding that the act and conduct of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (petitioner No. 1 in the respective writ petitions) prima facie appear to be limiting and control-ling the supply of the drugs in terms of the provisions of Section 3(3)(b) read with Section 3(3)(1) of the Act. It was further observed that the business guidelines and rules framed by the respondent No. 1 by resolution No. 7, dated 17.05.2009 prima facie appear to be anti-competitive in terms of the provisions of Section 3(3)(b) of the said Act. Accordingly, the Director General (D.G.) was directed to conduct an investigation into the matter under Section 26(1) of the Act and to submit his report within a period of 45 days from the communication of the said order. Accordingly, the said matter was placed to the Commission on 30.11.2011 after registering the Case No. 41/2011 and the following order was passed: The Commission on 10.8.2011 decided to refer the matter to DG for investigation and the matter is currently under investigation with DG In the meeting held today, the Commission considered the application dated 22.11.2011 and affidavit dated 25.11.2011 filed on behalf of opposite party No. 1, Assam Drug Dealers Association praying for recalling of the notice dated 16.9.2011 issued by the DG and for staying further proceeding in the matter. The Commission did not find any merit in the said application and decided not to accept the prayer of the applicant. 5. It is pertinent to point out that prior to the said decision of the Commission as adopted on 30.11.2011, the petitioners received the notice from the Secretary to the Commission on 18.01.2011, directing them to submit their comments/objections as per the CCI (General) Regulations, 2009 within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. It was also warned that in case the comments/objections were not received within the specified time, it shall be presumed that the petitioners had nothing to say in the matter and the Commission shall proceed in the matter as provided under the law. 6. It was also warned that in case the comments/objections were not received within the specified time, it shall be presumed that the petitioners had nothing to say in the matter and the Commission shall proceed in the matter as provided under the law. 6. The petitioners of W.P. (C) No. 359/2012 filed an application for extension of time for submission of the documents and necessary comments, but the said prayer for extension of time having been denied by the Commission, the said petitioners filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being W.P. (C) No. 5407/2011 on demonstrating the difficulties in complying the direction and prayed for interference of this Court. The said writ petition being W.P. (C) 54 of 2011 was allowed by this Court by the order dated 28.10.2011 by extending time for filing of such documents till 04.11.2011 and it was further extended to 09.11.2011 by the order dated 03.11.2011 as passed in Misc. Case No. 3031/2011, related to the said writ petition. After filing the necessary documents and comments before the D.G. of the Commission, the petitioners filed a joint application dated 22.11.2011 before the Secretary to the Commission (Annexure-X to the W.P. (C) No. 580/2012), for recalling the notice dated 16.09.2011 as issued by the D.G. of the Commission, contending, inter alia, that: It is submitted that the investigations have since commenced on the basis of misleading information furnished by the informant. It is categorically submitted that the informant has approached this Hon'ble Commission with unclean hands and has deliberately mislead this Commission into believing that he has actually incurred some losses owing to the non supply of drugs and other essential medicines at the instance of the applicant/respondent No. 1. This is not true as would be evident from the averments and annexure annexed to the miscellaneous application. It is submitted that till now the respondents have fully co-operated with the ongoing investigation. The petitioners prayed for immediate stay of the further proceedings including the pending investigation. It was further prayed that, considering the extreme urgency in the matter all the papers of the miscellaneous application be laid before the Commission at the earliest for their consideration with an opportunity to the petition for appearing before the Commission. The petitioners prayed for immediate stay of the further proceedings including the pending investigation. It was further prayed that, considering the extreme urgency in the matter all the papers of the miscellaneous application be laid before the Commission at the earliest for their consideration with an opportunity to the petition for appearing before the Commission. But, the impugned decision dated 30.11.2011 (Annexure-7 to the W.P. (C) No. 580/2012) was taken, admittedly, without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. 7. Mr. D. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the principles of audi alteram partem has been brazenly scuttled by the Commission. At no point of time the petitioners were heard. When the impugned order dated 30.11.2011 was passed the petitions were not heard as well as when the impugned order dated 21.12.2011 was passed, that was also passed without affording opportunity to the petitioners. Profitably, the order passed by the Commission on 21.12.2011 is extracted hereunder: The above case was referred to DG on 26.8.2011 for investigation and submission of report within 45 days. Extension of time of 60 days was allowed by the Commission vide order dated 19.10.2011. The DG vide his letter dated 8.12.2011 has requested for further extension of time by 15 days for submission of the investigation report. The Commission after considering the above application and reasons explained by the DG agreed to grant 15 days extension of time for submission of the investigation report. The extension is agreed from 12.12.2011. In the meeting held today, the Commission also considered the application/affidavits dated 20.12.2011 filed on behalf of opposite party No. 2, Barpeta Drug Dealers Association praying for recalling of the notice dated 16.9.2011 issued by the DG and for staying further proceedings in the matter. The Commission did not find any merit in the said applications and decided not to accept the prayer of the applicant. 8. Being aggrieved by the order 21.12.2011 and the order dated 30.11.2011 in the proceeding being No. 41 of 2011, the petitioners have filed these writ petitions. 9. At the time of issuing the notice in the writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 359/2012, an interim order dated 27.01.2012 was passed in the following terms: Heard Mr. D. Das, learned senior counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. JMA Choudhury, learned C.G.C., appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 5. 9. At the time of issuing the notice in the writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 359/2012, an interim order dated 27.01.2012 was passed in the following terms: Heard Mr. D. Das, learned senior counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. JMA Choudhury, learned C.G.C., appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 5. It is submitted by Mr. Das, learned senior counsel that the Misc. application filed by the petitioners on 22.10.2011, praying for recalling the notice dated 16.9.2001 and for staying the further proceeding in the matter had been disposed of without hearing the petitioners and that too, without recording any reasons as to why such application lacks merit. Mr. JMA Choudhury, learned C.G.C. prays for time till 7.2.2012. Prayer is allowed. List the case for motion hearing on 13.2.2012. Till then, proceeding in case No. 41/2011, pending before Competition Commissioner of India, New Delhi, shall remain suspended. 10. Both the writ petitions have been taken up for final hearing at the Admission stage, as Mr. H. Baruah, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 6 submitted that the respondent No. 6 is intensely desirous of getting the writ petitions disposed of on merit. 11. Mr. D. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that without affording any opportunity to the petitioners, the impugned orders as passed by the Commission are outcome of unfair and unconscionable action of the Commission. The audi alteram partem is the foundation of justice. He submitted that even no appeal can be filed against such orders as Section 53A of the Competition Act, 2002 provides that the Competition Appellate Tribunal shall have to hear and dispose of the appeals against any direction issued or the decision made or the order passed by the Commission under sub-sections (2) and (6) of Section 26, Section 27, Section 28, Section 31, Section 32, Section 33, Section 38, Section 39, Section 43, Section 43A, Section 44, Section 45 or Section 46 of the Act. 12. 12. The notice as issued to the petitioners was admittedly issued in pursuance to the order passed under Section 26(1), which provides that- On receipt of a reference from the Central Government or a State Government or a statutory authority or on its own knowledge or information received under Section 19, if the Commission is of the opinion that there exists a prima facie case, it shall direct the Director General to cause an investigation to be made into the matter: Provided that if the subject matter of an information received is, on the opinion of the Commission, substantially the same as or has been covered by any previous information received, then the new information may be clubbed with the previous information. In Section 26(2), it has been provided that- Where on receipt of a reference from the Central Government or a State Government or a statutory authority or information received under Section 19, the Commission is of the opinion that there exists no prima facie case, it shall close the matter forthwith and pass such orders as it deems fit and send a copy of its order to the Central Government or the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties concerned, as the case may be. 13. Mr. D. Das, learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that before holding a prima facie view on the information, the petitioners ought to have been afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard. In support of his contention, he referred a decision of the Apex Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of India, as reported in (1981) 1 SCC 664 . The general principle as laid down by the Apex Court is as under: 44. In short, the general principle - as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application-seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely, if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, Courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features, at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative progress or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play "must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands". The Court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, to recall the words of Bhagwati, J., the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise. Mr. Das, learned senior counsel also referred a decision of the Apex Court as rendered in Assistant Excise Commissioner & Ors. Vs. Issac Peter & Ors., as reported in (1994) 4 SCC 104 , wherein the Apex Court reiterated the procedure to act fairly and reasonably in the administrative action. 14. In a recent case, the Apex Court has reconsidered the scope of the rule of hearing. In Darshan Lal Nagpal Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, as reported in (2012) 2 SCC 327 , the Apex Court held as follows: 30. The scope of the rule of hearing i.e. audi alteram partem was highlighted by the three-Judge Bench in Sayeedur Rehman Vs. State of Bihar in the following words: 11....This unwritten right of hearing is fundamental to a just decision by any authority which decides a controversial issue affecting the rights of the rival contestants. This right has its roots in the notion of fair procedure. It draws the attention of the party concerned to the imperative necessity of not overlooking the other side of the case before coming to its decision, for nothing is more likely to conduce to just and right decision than the practice of giving hearing to the affected parties. 15. Mr. It draws the attention of the party concerned to the imperative necessity of not overlooking the other side of the case before coming to its decision, for nothing is more likely to conduce to just and right decision than the practice of giving hearing to the affected parties. 15. Mr. Das, learned senior counsel further contended that by the impugned orders, the Commission rejected the prayer for staying the further investigation or for staying the notice dated 16.09.2011 as issued by the D.G. on merit, but without assigning any reason and without hearing the petitioners while disposing it on merit Mr. Das finally referred a decision of the Apex Court as rendered in Competition Commission of India Vs. Steel Authority of India Limited & Anr., as reported in (2010) 10 SCC 744, where the Apex Court recorded the stand of the Commission. According to the Commission, the direction passed in the order dated 08.12.2009 under Section 26(1) of the Act was not appealable and further that there was no requirement in law to afford an opportunity of hearing to the parties at the stage of formulating an opinion as to the existence of a prima facie case. It was also the contention of the Commission that in an appeal before the Tribunal it is the necessary party and that the Commission is not expected to state reasons for forming an opinion at the prima facie stage. On the contrary, according to the SAIL the principles of natural justice had been violated by the Commission while declining to grant extension of time to file its reply and at the time issuing the direction to the Director General for investigation. The informant placed reliance upon the Regulation 30(2) of the Regulations which empowers the Commission to pass such orders as it may deem fit on appreciation of the facts available and where the party refuses to assist or otherwise does not provide necessary information within the stipulated time. Further, according to the informant there was no valid reason assigned by the SAIL which would justify grant of extension and as such the order passed by the Commission on merit was not liable to be interfered. 16. In para-30 of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court in order to examine this controversy on merit, formulated on few points. Profitably, para-30 is extracted as under: 30. 16. In para-30 of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court in order to examine this controversy on merit, formulated on few points. Profitably, para-30 is extracted as under: 30. In order to examine the merit or otherwise of the contentions raised by the respective parties, it will be appropriate for us to formulate the following points for determination: (1) Whether the directions passed by the Commission in exercise of its powers under Section 26(1) of the Act forming a prima facie opinion would be appealable in terms of Section 53A(1) of the Act? (2) What is the ambit and scope of power vested with the Commission under Section 26(1) of the Act and whether the parties, including the informant or the affected party, are entitled to notice or hearing, as a matter of right, at the preliminary stage of formulating an opinion as to the existence of the prima facie case? (3) Whether the Commission would be a necessary, or at least a proper, party in the proceedings before the Tribunal in an appeal preferred by any party? (4) At what stage and in what manner the Commission can exercise powers vested in it under Section 33 of the Act to pass temporary restraint orders? (5) Whether it is obligatory for the Commission to record reasons for formation of a prima facie opinion in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act? (6) What directions, if any, need to be issued by the Court to ensure proper compliance in regard to procedural requirements while keeping in mind the scheme of the Act and the legislative intent? Also to ensure that the procedural intricacies do not hamper in achieving the object of the Act, i.e., free market and competition. 17. The Supreme Court has culled out the law in para-71 of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra), wherein it is held: 71. The intimation received by the Commission from any specific person complaining of violation of Section 3(4) read with Section 19 of the Act, sets into the motion, the mechanism stated under Section 26 of the Act. Section 26(1), as already noticed, requires the Commission to form an opinion whether or not there exists a prima facie case for issuance of direction to the Director General to conduct an investigation. Section 26(1), as already noticed, requires the Commission to form an opinion whether or not there exists a prima facie case for issuance of direction to the Director General to conduct an investigation. This section does not mention about issuance of any notice to any party before or at the time of formation of an opinion by the Commission on the basis of a reference or information received by it. Language of Sections 3(4) and 19 and for that matter, any other provision of the Act does not suggest that notice to the informant or any other person is required to be issued at this stage. In contradistinction to this, when the Commission receives the report from the Director General and if it has not already taken a decision to close the case under Section 26(2), the Commission is not only expected to forward the copy of the report, issue notice, invite objections or suggestions from the informant, Central Government, State Government, Statutory Authorities or the parties concerned, but also to provide an opportunity of hearing to the parties before arriving at any final conclusion under Section 26(7) or 26(8) of the Act, as the case may be. This obviously means that wherever the legislature has intended that notice is to be served upon the other party, it has specifically so stated and we see no compelling reason to read into the provisions of Section 26(1) the requirement of notice, when it is conspicuous by its very absence. Once the proceedings before the Commission are completed, the parties have a right to appeal under Section 53A(1)(a) in regard to the orders termed as appealable under that provision. Section 53B requires that the Tribunal should give, parties to the appeal, notice and an opportunity of being heard before passing orders, as it may deem fit and proper, confirming, modifying or setting aside the direction, decision or order appealed against. 18. Mr. Das, learned senior counsel fairly submitted that in view of the said decision, no notice is required from the Commission. But the Commission, at the same time cannot decide the grounds of objection against the information on merit, pending the investigation report from the Director General. 18. Mr. Das, learned senior counsel fairly submitted that in view of the said decision, no notice is required from the Commission. But the Commission, at the same time cannot decide the grounds of objection against the information on merit, pending the investigation report from the Director General. By the impugned orders, the application filed by the petitioners, raising the jurisprudential objection as to the maintainability of the information in view of fraud, suppression and misleading information, have been discharged holding that; the Commission did not find any merit in the said application and decided not to accept the prayer of the applicant. Mr. D. Das, learned, senior counsel quite emphatically submits that the said order should be interfered with. 19. Mr. H. Baruah, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 6, at the outset raised another jurisprudential objection in regard to the jurisdiction of this Court in entertaining the petitions against the order passed by the Commission at New Delhi. He submitted that the cause of action implies the place to sue and it is imperative for the petitioners to demonstrate the cause of action for invoking the jurisdiction of the Court. The dispute involved in this case, according to Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the respondent No. 6, is the validity or illegality of the impugned orders of the Commission and as such the said dispute does not give rise to cause of action for instituting the petitions under Article 226(1) of the Constitution of India in this Court in as much as the jurisdiction of the High Courts has been provided by the Constitution in the manner that every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. 20. Unless the cause of action arises within the said territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the High Court would be divested of any authority to adjudicate such lis. In support of his contention he referred a decision of the Apex Court in Alchemist Ltd. & Anr. Vs. 20. Unless the cause of action arises within the said territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the High Court would be divested of any authority to adjudicate such lis. In support of his contention he referred a decision of the Apex Court in Alchemist Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State Bank of Sikkim & Ors., as reported in (2007) 11 SCC 335 , wherein the Apex Court held as under: 13. In Election Commission Vs. Saka Venkata Rao AIR 1953 SC 210 , the petitioner applied to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of prohibition restraining the Election Commission (a statutory authority constituted by the president), having its office permanently located at New Delhi, from inquiring into the alleged disqualification of the petitioner form membership of the Madras Legislative Assembly. The High Court of Madras issued a writ. The aggrieved petitioner approached this Court. Allowing the appeal and reversing the decision of the High Court, this Court held that the High Court of Madras had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Speaking for the Court, Patanjali Sastri, C.J. made the following observations: 6.........the makers of the Constitution, having decided to provide certain basic safeguards for the people in the new set up, which they called fundamental rights, evidently though it necessary to provide also a quick and inexpensive remedy for the enforcement of such rights and, finding that the prerogative writs, which the Courts in England and developed used whenever urgent necessity demanded immediate and decisive interposition, were peculiarly suited for the purpose, they conferred, in the States' sphere, new and wide powers on the High Courts of issuing directions orders, or writs primarily for the reinforcement of fundamental rights, the power to issue such directions, etc. 'for any other purpose' being also included with a view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in somewhat the same position as the Court of King's Bench in England. But wide as were the powers thus conferred, a twofold limitation was placed upon their exercise. In the first place, the power is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction. But wide as were the powers thus conferred, a twofold limitation was placed upon their exercise. In the first place, the power is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction. Secondly, the powers or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be within those territories, which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories. As to the cause of action, the Court stated: (Saka Venkata Rao case, AIR 1953 SC 210 ) 8.....The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is bases on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Article 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the persons or authority 'within the territories' in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. 14. Again, a question arose in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh Vs. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 532 . A Bench of seven Judges was called upon to consider the correctness or otherwise of Saka Venkata Reo. The majority (Sinha, C.J., Kapoor, Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Shah, JJ.) reaffirmed and approved the view taken by this Court earlier in Saka Ventaka Rao that the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir was right in not entertaining the writ petition filed by the petitioner on the ground that it had no territorial jurisdiction. Speaking for the majority, Sinha, C.J., stated: (Khajoor Singh case AIR 1961 SC 532 ) 13....It seems to us therefore that it is not permissible to read in Article 226 the residence or location of the person affected by the order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on the person or authority passing the order being within those territories and the residence or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction. 21. That jurisdiction depends on the person or authority passing the order being within those territories and the residence or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction. 21. Finally, the Supreme Court in Alchemist Ltd. (supra) further held that the legislative history of the constitutional provisions, therefore, makes it clear that after 1963, cause of action is relevant and germane and a writ petition can only be instituted in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which cause of action in whole or in part arises. 22. Mr. H. Baruah, learned counsel for the respondent No. 6, the informant, further refers to the decision as rendered in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Kalyan Banerjee, as reported in (2008) 3 SCC 456 , where the Apex Court having reference to Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India, as reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 , which was followed by the Apex Court in Mosaraf Hossain Khan Vs. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd., as reported in (2006) 3 SCC 658 , reiterated the principles of Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra). In para 26 of Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra), it has been held: 26. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court clearly held that with a view to determine the jurisdiction of one High Court vis-a-vis the other the facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be made and the facts which have nothing to do therewith cannot give rise to a cause of action to invoke the jurisdiction of a Court. In that case it was clearly held that only because the High Court within whose jurisdiction at legislation is passed, it would not have the sole territorial jurisdiction but all the High Courts where cause of action arises, will have jurisdiction. 23. Apart that, Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the respondent No. 6 referred to the celebrated decision of the Apex Court in Nasiruddin Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, as reported in (1975) 2 SCC 671 , where the Apex Court interpreted the meaning and expression of "in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh" used in first proviso to Article 14 of the High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, as reported in (1975) 2 SCC 671 , where the Apex Court interpreted the meaning and expression of "in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh" used in first proviso to Article 14 of the High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. Has this expression referred to the place where the case originated from or to the place of the sitting of the last Court or authority whose decree or order is being challenged in the proceedings before the High Court? The answer by the Apex Court was very specific in the following terms as culled out by the majority view: The Expression "in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh" used in the first proviso to Article 14 of the High Court (Amalgamation) cases, petitions under Articles 226, 227 and 228 of the Constitution and petitions under Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the Constitution instituted before the Judges sitting at Lucknow and having their origin, in the sense explained in the majority judgment in such areas in Oudh as the Chief Justice may direct. The expression "arising in such areas in Oudh" refers to the place where the case originated in the sense explained in the majority judgment and not to the place of sitting of the last Court or authority whose decree or order is being challenged in the proceeding before the High Court. 24. In Nasiruddin (supra), it has been further held: ...The expression "cause of action" is well known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen part within specified areas in Oudh and part outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action. 25. Mr. H. Baruah, in reply to the contentions in the writ petitions, categorically submitted that the Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Limited (supra), has made the position of law very clear and without leaving anything to be answered by way of further interpretation. For this purpose, he refers to the paragraph Nos. 81, 82, 83, 84, 85 and 86 of Steel Authority of India Limited (supra) and finally submits that the Supreme Court has culled out the law in the plain language as regards the Section 26 of the Competition Act. Natural justice is a term, which may have different connotation and dimension depending upon the facts of the case. Natural justice is not a codified concept, but are well-defined principles enunciated by the Courts. The authority concerned is to act in conformity with these principles as well as to ensure that the legislative object is achieved. Exercise of power should be fair and free of arbitrariness. In para-91 of Steel Authority of India Limited (supra), the Apex Court held as under: 91. The Commission is not expected to give notice to the parties i.e. the informant or the affected parties and hear them at length, before forming its opinion. The function is of a very preliminary nature and in fact, in common parlance, it is a departmental function. At that stage, it does not condemn any person and therefore, application of audi alteram partem is not called for. The function is of a very preliminary nature and in fact, in common parlance, it is a departmental function. At that stage, it does not condemn any person and therefore, application of audi alteram partem is not called for. Formation of a prima facie opinion departmentally (Director General, being appointed by the Central Government to assist the Commission, is one of the wings of the Commission itself) does not amount to an adjudicatory function but is merely of administrative nature. At best, it can direct the investigation to be conducted and report to be submitted to the Commission itself or close the case in terms of Section 26(2) of the Act, which order itself is appealable before the Tribunal and only after this stage, there is a specific right of notice and hearing available to the aggrieved/affected party. Thus, keeping in mind the nature of the functions required to be performed by the Commission in terms of Section 26(1), we are of the considered view that the right of notice or hearing is not contemplated under the provisions of Section 26(1) of the Act. 26. In view of the Apex Courts decision, this Court is reluctant to make a deeper scrutiny into the decisions of the Bombay High Court in (i) Aamir Khan Productions (P) Limited &. Anr. Vs. Union of India &. Ors. Etc, as reported in (2010) 4 Comp LJ 580 (Bom) and (ii) Kingfisher Airlines Limited & Ors. Vs. Competition Commission of India & Ors., reported in (2010) 4 Comp LJ 557 (Bom.) and the decisions of the Delhi High Court in (i) Gujarat Guardian Limited Vs. The Competition Commission of India &. Ors. (in W.P. (C) No. 7766/2010) and (ii) DLF Limited & Anr. Vs. Additional Director General, Competition Commission of India & Ors. (in W.P. (C) No. 22/2011) as relied on by Mr. H. Baruah, learned counsel for the respondent No. 6. 27. On scrutiny of the records as made available before this Court and on appreciation of the rival contentions as advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, this Court discards the contention of Mr. (in W.P. (C) No. 22/2011) as relied on by Mr. H. Baruah, learned counsel for the respondent No. 6. 27. On scrutiny of the records as made available before this Court and on appreciation of the rival contentions as advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, this Court discards the contention of Mr. D. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that before issuance of the notice under Section 26 of the Competition Act, the adverse parties are to be afforded with opportunity of being heard in view of the Apex Court's decisions that "the right of notice or hearing is not contemplated under the provisions of Section 26(1) of the Act" [in Steel Authority of India Limited(supra)]. At the same time, this Court also discards the jurisprudential objection as raised by Mr. H. Baruah, learned counsel for the respondent No. 6 that this Court has got no territorial jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the lis as placed. Though the question of having the territorial jurisdiction vis-a-vis the cause of action is germane to the adjudication, but in view of Nasiruddin (supra), it is well settled that the "cause of action" is inextricably related the place where the dispute originated from not the place of sitting of the last Court or the authority whose action is being challenged in the proceeding before the High Court. 28. There cannot be any dispute that the action of the petitioners, which has affected the respondent No. 6, arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Assam and this High Court has within its jurisdiction to adjudicate the impugned order as the dispute has originated out of the territory over which this Court has the territorial jurisdiction. As such, even if the last authority was the Competition Commission of India, which passed the impugned orders having its seat at New Delhi, that cannot be the relevant fact for determining the cause of action for purpose of determining the proper territorial jurisdiction. 29. Nasiruddin (supra) has culled out the law that even if one part of the cause of action arises in a place and the other part of the cause of action arises in another place, the option lies with the person to choose the forum. As such, the said jurisprudential objection fails. But, this Court, before parting with the records should respond to the submission as made by Mr. As such, the said jurisprudential objection fails. But, this Court, before parting with the records should respond to the submission as made by Mr. D. Das, learned senior counsel for the petitioners that by disposing the applications for staying further investigation and the notice dated 16.09.2011 on merit, the Commission has caused prejudice. To dispel all sorts of ambiguities as regards the consequence of the said order, this Court observes that the disposal on merit shall not mean that the Commission has decided the objections by the petitioners on merit so far it relates sustainability of the information for "fraud or providing misleading facts and suppressing the relevant fact" or for the other materials and contention as have been pressed by the petitioners. The Commission shall not be influenced by its decisions as reflected in the impugned orders in future while scrutinizing the investigation report and shall not take any consequential decisions thereof. 30. With these observations, both the writ petitions stand disposed of. However, there shall no order as to cost in the fact and circumstance of the case. The interim order as passed earlier shall stand vacated forthwith. This Court records appreciation for both Mr. D. Das, learned senior counsel and Mr. H. Baruah, learned counsel for extending commendable assistance.