Mihir Kumar Jha, J. – Heard Mr. Shahnawaz Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ashok Kumar Keshri, learned AAG-XI, for respondents no. 2, 3, 4 and 8. 2. In this writ application the prayer of the petitioner reads as follows: – (i) A writ order and direction in the nature of mandamus directing and commanding the respondents authorities to release forthwith the son of the petitioner, namely, Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil aged about 25 years from the illegal custody and detention from the respondent authorities who was take into custody by the Karnataka Cops, be issued. (ii) In any other a writ order and direction as the petitioner entitled to. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the aforementioned prayer has submitted that the very arrest of the son of the petitioner, namely, Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil by Bangalore Police at his village Barah Samaila in Darbhanga District was without any authority of law and in particular in breach of Section 41(g), (h) and (i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and as such, even if he had been subsequently taken on transit remand by the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi and ultimately remanded in judicial custody by the order of the 1st Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Bangalore City, in connection with Bangalore City Cubbonpark Police Station Crime No. 92/ 2010, this Court may issue a writ of Habeas Corpus to the Bangalore Police because the initial arrest of the petitioner at his village in Darbhanga District was in violation of the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this regard he has placed his reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Deepak Bajaj vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in AIR 2009 S.C. 628 , in the case of Bhavesh Jayanti Lakhani vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in AIR 2009 S.C. (Supp.) 2432 as also on a High Court judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of Smt. Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., reported in AIR 2009 (NOC) 687 (Kar.). 4. Per contra, Mr. Keshri, appearing on behalf of the respondents officials of the State of Bihar, has submitted that once this fact is admitted by the petitioner himself in paragraph 8 of the writ application that his son Md. 4. Per contra, Mr. Keshri, appearing on behalf of the respondents officials of the State of Bihar, has submitted that once this fact is admitted by the petitioner himself in paragraph 8 of the writ application that his son Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil has been ultimately remanded in judicial custody by the competent court at Bangalore by an order dated 8.5.2012 followed by another order dated 16.5.2012, the question of initial irregularity during arrest of the petitioner at his village home in no manner would ultimately vitiate his order of judicial remand by the competent court and consequently would also render this writ application seeking issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus to become infructuous. In this regard he has placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of A. Lakshmanrao vs. Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Parvatippuram & Ors., reported in AIR 1971 SC 186 . 5. In the considered opinion of this Court three facts are admitted, namely, firstly, the son of the petitioner Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Md. Kafil was arrested by Bangalore Police on 6.5.2012 from his village home at Barah Samaila situated in Keioty Police Station of Darbhanga District. The second admitted fact is that he was subsequently produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi on 7.5.2012 where a transit remand was obtained for his being taken to Bangalore and the third and final fact is that the aforesaid Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil was produced on 8.5.2012 before the 1st Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Bangalore City, on 8.5.2012 who had remanded Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil in connection with Bangalore City Cubbonpark Police Station Crime No. 92/ 2010 initially till 22.5.2012 and subsequently by yet another order dated 16.5.2012 till 29.5.2012 in accordance with Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and has been lodged at Bangalore Central Jail for the present. 6. In the background of the aforementioned admitted facts the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner of violation of Section 41(g), (h) and (i) Cr.P.C. seems to be wholly misconceived. 6. In the background of the aforementioned admitted facts the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner of violation of Section 41(g), (h) and (i) Cr.P.C. seems to be wholly misconceived. Section 41(g), (h) and (i) Cr.P.C. reads as follows: – “41(g) Who has been concerned in, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been concerned in, any act committed at any place out of India which, if committed in India, would have been punishable as an offence, and for which he is, under any law relating to extradition, or otherwise, liable to be apprehended or detained in custody in India; or (h) who, being a released convict, commits a breach of any Rule made under sub-section (5) of Section 356; or (i) for whose arrest any requisition, whether written or oral, has been received from another police officer, provided that the requisition specifies the person to be arrested and the offence or other cause for which the arrest is to be made and it appears therefrom that the person might lawfully be arrested without a warrant by the officer who issued the requisition.” 7. The admitted facts would itself make it clear that Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil is wanted in respect of Bangalore City Cubbonpark Police Station Crime No. 92/ 2010 which is not in relation to an offence committed out side India as is requirement of Section 41(g) Cr.P.C. Similarly, the application of Section 41(h) Cr.P.C. is automatically ruled out, inasmuch as the petitioner’s son Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil was not a convict. Section 41(h) Cr.P.C. is specifically confined to a released convict. Finally as with regard to the application of Section 41(i) Cr.P.C. it has to be only noted that no requisition for arrest of Md. Kafil Akhtar whether written or oral was received by Darbhanga Police so as to make the provision of Section 41(i) applicable. Admittedly in this case Darbhanga Police has not arrested Md. Kafil Akhtar and therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the provision of Section 41(g), (h) and (i) Cr.P.C. and its alleged breach by Bangalore Police seems to be wholly misplaced. 8. Admittedly in this case Darbhanga Police has not arrested Md. Kafil Akhtar and therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the provision of Section 41(g), (h) and (i) Cr.P.C. and its alleged breach by Bangalore Police seems to be wholly misplaced. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that if there was no warrant of arrest issued for arrest of Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil to Darbhanga Police the very action of the Police Officers of Bangalore was unauthorized and that by itself would vitiate the arrest of the son of the petitioner as well as his subsequent remand by the courts at Ranchi and Bangalore. 9. In the considered opinion of this Court this part of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has also to be only noted for its being rejected. Firstly, we are not aware as to whether any warrant of arrest was issued for arrest of Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil by the competent court of Bangalore. At least that has not been pleaded in the writ application nor such fact is contained in the intimation of Bangalore Police dated 16th May, 2012 which reads as follows: – “Office of the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Halasurgate Sub-division, Bangalore City, dated 16th May 2012 Phone No. 09480801106 INTIMATION I, the undersigned wish to inform you that on 6.5.2012 around 1.30 p.m. the absconding accused of Bangalore City, Cubbonpark Police Station Crime No. 92/2010 i.e. A-17 Mohammed Kafil Akthar @ Kafil, son of Abdus Salam, aged 26 years, R/o Barah Samaila Village, Lalganj Post, Keioty Police Station, Darbhanga District, Bihar has secured at Barah Samaila village. On 7.5.2012, he produced before the Hon’ble Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Ranchi and obtained him to transit custody. On 8.5.2012 the above said accused produced before the Hon’ble 1st Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Bangalore City and got him remanded to police custody till 22.5.2012. Today i.e. on 16.5.2012 the Hon’ble Court, remanded the accused to judicial custody till 29.5.2012. At present the said Mohamed Kafil Akthar @ Kafil is lodged at Bangalore Central Jail. This is for your information. (B.N.NYMAGOWDA) Assistant Commissioner of Police, and Investigation Officer, Halasurgate Sub-division, Bangalore City. 10. Today i.e. on 16.5.2012 the Hon’ble Court, remanded the accused to judicial custody till 29.5.2012. At present the said Mohamed Kafil Akthar @ Kafil is lodged at Bangalore Central Jail. This is for your information. (B.N.NYMAGOWDA) Assistant Commissioner of Police, and Investigation Officer, Halasurgate Sub-division, Bangalore City. 10. Section 41 Cr.P.C. authorizes a Police Officer to arrest a person without a warrant under certain circumstances and Section 48 vests power in such Police Officer to pursue such person into any place in India for the purposes of arresting without warrant any person who is authorized to arrest. Section 48 in other words clearly empowers a Police Officer to pursue a person at any place in India for the purpose of arrest without warrant and any Police Officer of one Police Station can go to another Police Station or to another State for arresting an accused. In that view of the matter, we are not impressed with the submission that the arrest of Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil, the son of the petitioner, by Bangalore Police without warrant of arrest was unauthorized. 11. The matter may be viewed even from another angle and for the sake of argument this Court will presume that a warrant of arrest had been issued by Bangalore Police to arrest Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil in connection with Bangalore City Cubbonpark Police Station Crime No. 92/ 2010. Section 70 Cr.P.C. authorizes the competent court to issue a warrant of arrest in writing which is to remain in force until it is cancelled by the court which had issued it or excluded until it is executed. Section 79 Cr.P.C. authorizes a Police Officer to execute the warrant beyond local jurisdiction of the court issueing the same. There is of course a safeguard and a requirement laid down under Section 79(1) Cr.P.C. that if such warrant is to be executed beyond local jurisdiction of the court issuing such warrant, the Police Officer ordinarily has to take it for endorsement either to an Executive Magistrate or to a Police Officer not below the rank of an Officer In-charge of the Police Station within local limits of whose jurisdiction the warrant is to be executed. Such provision under Section 79(1) Cr.P.C. however having itself used the expression “ordinarily”, cannot be held to be mandatory and in fact the Legislature itself has provided under Section 79(3) Cr.P.C. that whenever there is a reason to believe that the delay occasioned by obtaining the endorsement of the Magistrate or Police Officer within whose local jurisdiction the warrant is to be executed will prevent such execution, the Police Officer may execute the warrant without such endorsement in any place beyond local jurisdiction of the court which issued it. 12. In the given situation the arrest of Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil by Bangalore Police having a warrant of arrest from the competent court at Bangalore without endorsement of such warrant from the Executive Magistrate or Police Officer not below the rank of Officer In-charge of the Police Station of Darbhanga or Keioty Police Station in which village Barah Samaila falls cannot be held to be illegal. 13. As noted above, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of Habeas Corpus by filing this writ application on 3.7.2012, a date on which his son Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil had already stood remanded by the order of the competent court at Bangalore as is admitted from the aforementioned intimation enclosed with the writ application as Annexure-6. A question would arise as to whether a writ application of Habeas Corpus after valid order of remand can still be maintainable. The direct answer to this question was given by the Apex Court in the case of A. Lakshmanrao (supra) wherein it had been held that: – “Detention pursuant to an order of remand which appropriately falls within the terms of S. 344 is accordingly not open to challenge in habeas corpus.” 14. The matter can be viewed yet even from another angle, inasmuch as the material date for deciding legality of an order of detention can either be the date on which the application is made to the court as was held in the case of A.K.Gopalan vs. the Govt. of India, reported in AIR 1966 S.C. 816 . The Supreme Court in other cases has held that the material date for deciding the legality of detention is a date of return and not date of filing of the petition. of India, reported in AIR 1966 S.C. 816 . The Supreme Court in other cases has held that the material date for deciding the legality of detention is a date of return and not date of filing of the petition. Reference in this connection may be made to the judgment of Ram Narayan Singh vs. the State of Delhi & ors., reported in AIR 1953 S.C. 277 , wherein it was held that in Habeas Corpus proceeding the court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of return and not with reference to institution of the proceedings. The third view has also been taken by the Apex Court in the case of Talib Hussain vs. State of J & K, reported in AIR 1971 S.C. 62 , that the relevant date is the date of hearing of the writ petition. Subsequently the Apex Court in the case of Kanu Sanyal vs. District Magistrate, Darjeeling & Ors., reported in AIR 1974 S.C. 510 , without expressing any final opinion on the three dates, namely, date of filing of the writ petition or the date of filing of return in the writ petition or the date of hearing the writ petition, had held that the date of filing of the return was more preferable though the date of hearing can also not be said to be erroneous. In this regard it was, however, categorically held by the Apex Court in the case of Kanu Sanyal (supra) that the court is not concerned with the date prior to institution of the proceeding for a writ of Habeas Corpus. The Apex Court had held that it is immaterial which of three view is accepted to be as correct, for it is clear that, whichever be the correct view, the earliest date with reference to which the legality of detention may be examined, is the date of filing of the application for Habeas Corpus. The Apex Court had held that it is immaterial which of three view is accepted to be as correct, for it is clear that, whichever be the correct view, the earliest date with reference to which the legality of detention may be examined, is the date of filing of the application for Habeas Corpus. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar Rai vs. the State of Bihar, reported in 1987 PLJR 650 , wherein it has been held that the court has to consider detention on the date of hearing of the writ petition and a defect in the earlier order of remand of an accused is not incurable and an accused cannot claim a writ of Habeas Corpus on that score alone if on the date of hearing of the writ petition he is in custody under a valid order of remand. 15. Thus, in the light of the settled view when this writ application was filed on 3rd July, 2012, much after the valid order of remand had already been passed by the competent court at Bangalore i.e. on 8.5.2012, there would be no difficulty for us in holding that the prayer of the petitioner for a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus was altogether misconceived right from the inception. 16. Having recorded our aforementioned view we must also advert to the judgments relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the first case of Bhavesh Jayanti Lakhani (supra) the question that has been answered by the court was related to extradition of an accused who was wanted in connection with C.B.I. case relating to some proceeding in U.S.A. and also in India and thus whatever was said about extradition of the accused in no way would be applicable to the facts of the present case. The second case of Deepak Bajaj (supra) was a case of preventive detention wherein no substantive criminal case was made the ground for his arrest. The present case definitely is not a preventive detention, inasmuch as the son of the petitioner Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil is wanted in connection with aforementioned Bangalore City Cubbonpark Police Station Crime No. 92/ 2010. The present case definitely is not a preventive detention, inasmuch as the son of the petitioner Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil is wanted in connection with aforementioned Bangalore City Cubbonpark Police Station Crime No. 92/ 2010. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the Division Bench judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of Smt. Jayamma (supra) also seems to be wholly misplaced, inasmuch as from the placitum portion of notes of cases all that can be gathered is that it was a case where an individual was taken into an unlawful custody by a private person who had to be recovered by the police. The petitioner in the present case has not been taken into custody by a private person but in fact only by Karnataka Police. 17. We, therefore, have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that this writ application is wholly misconceived and must be dismissed. 18. Before parting with we must, however, record a very disturbing trend in this case. The son of the petitioner Md. Akfil Akhtar @ Kafil was made an accused in relation to an offence allegedly committed at Bangalore and for which a substantive case being Bangalore City Cubbonpark Police Station Crime No. 92/ 2010 had been instituted. Md. Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil is said to be absconding accused who was sought to be arrested and therefore, if Bangalore Police had arrested him at hs village Barah Samaila in Keioty Police Station of Darbhanga district on the basis of a warrant of arrest issued by the competent court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate court of Bangalore City, it was incumbent for them to comply the provisions of Sections 80 and 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which for the sake of clarity is quoted hereinbelow: – “80. Procedure on arrest of person against whom warrant issued. – When a warrant of arrest is executed outside the district in which it was issued, the person arrested shall, unless the Court which issued the warrant is within thirty kilometers of the place of arrest or is nearer than the Executive Magistrate or District Superintendent of Police or Commissioner of Police within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the arrest was made, or unless security is taken under Section 71, be taken before such Magistrate or District Superintendent or Commissioner. 81. 81. Procedure by Magistrate before whom such person arrested is brought. – (1) the Executive Magistrate or District Superintendent of Police or Commissioner of Police shall, if the person arrested appears to be the person intended by the Court which issued the warrant, direct his removal in custody to such court: Provided that, if the offence is bailable, and such person is ready and willing to give bail to the satisfaction of such Magistrate, District Superintendent or Commissioner, or a direction has been endorsed under Section 71 on the warrant and such person is ready and willing to give the security required by such direction, the Magistrate, District Superintendent or Commissioner shall take such bail or security, as the case may be, and forward the bond, to the Court which issued the warrant: Provided further that if the offence is a non-bailable one, it shall be lawful for the Chief Judicial Magistrate (subject to the provisions of Section 437), or the Sessions Judge, of the district in which the arrest is made on consideration of the information and the documents referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 78 to release such person on bail. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a police officer from taking security under Section 71.” 19. As would be evident from the reading of Section 80 Cr.P.C. it is the requirement of law that the person arrested beyond 30 K.Ms. of the place of arrest has to be taken before the Executive Magistrate or District Superintendent of Police or the Commissioner of Police within local limits of whose jurisdiction the arrest was made. Section 81 Cr.P.C. in fact provides the procedure after such a person is taken before the Magistrate or District Superintendent of Police or the Commissioner of Police and also vests power in non-bailable offence to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Sessions Judge of the district in which arrest is made to release such person on bail after taking into consideration the substance of information against the person to be arrested. Mr. Mr. Keshri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the officials respondents of the State of Bihar, had however made an attempt to justify the action of the Police Officers of Bangalore by submitting that Section 80 Cr.P.C. does not envisage production of arrested person before the Executive Magistrate or District Superintendent of Police or Commissioner of Police at the place of arrest and he has sought to interpret Section 80 Cr.P.C. that once the accused was arrested beyond 30 K.Ms. of the court issuing such warrant of arrest, he could be also directly produced before that very court issuing such warrant of arrest. In other words, he has sought to justify the action of Bangalore Police in arresting and taking the son of the petitioner to Bangalore on the basis of an order of transit remand passed by the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi. 20. We are unable to accept such interpretation of Section 80 Cr.P.C., inasmuch as the expression “taken before such Magistrate or District Superintendent or Commissioner” in Section 80 Cr.P.C. being wholly unambiguous leaves nothing for speculation that if a person is arrested within 30 K.Ms. of the place of arrest, he has to be produced before that very court which had issued such warrant of arrest but if such arrest is made beyond 30 K.Ms. he has to be produced before the concerned Executive Magistrate or District Superintendent of police or Commissioner of Police within local limits of whose jurisdiction such arrest was made. 21. In absence of any explanation from respondents no. 5, 6 and 7, the officials of the State of Karnataka, and/or Karnataka Police we would however refrain from saying anything more but then we fail to understand that if the son of the petitioner could be produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi in the State of Jharkhand for obtaining his transit remand in order to take him to Bangalore, nothing had prevented them to comply the provisions of Sections 80 and 81 Cr.P.C. by producing the son of the petitioner Md Kafil Akhtar @ Kafil before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Darbhanga after his being taken to Executive Magistrate, Darbhanga or the District Superintendent of Police, Darbhanga. The Karnataka Police was thus expected to follow the mandate of law even in respect of an absconding accused. The Karnataka Police was thus expected to follow the mandate of law even in respect of an absconding accused. This much we are recording on the basis of intimation admittedly issued by Karnataka Police, as quoted earlier, contained in Annexure-6 to the writ application and hope that in future the provisions of Sections 80 and 81 Cr.P.C. will be respected by the concerned Police Officers in the event of arresting an accused beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court issuing warrant of arrest to ensure the mandatory compliance of Section 167 Cr.P.C. requiring an accused to be produced before nearest Judicial Magistrate within twenty four hours of his arrest. 22. With the aforementioned observations this writ application is dismissed. 23. Let a copy of this order be sent to respondent no.1, respondent no.2 and respondent no.5.