Judgment The 1st petitioner is the owner of land in Sy.No.711/AA of Edulla Bayyaram Village, Pinapaka Mandal, Khammam District. The village is within the scheduled area. The Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, the 4th respondent herein, issued notification, inviting applications for selection of a retail dealer of petroleum products at Edulla Bayyaram Village, on a highway. The petitioners herein submitted a joint application. They were found to have fulfilled the criteria and came to be selected provisionally for the dealer. A letter of intent was also issued on 04-05-2011. While the 1st petitioner retained complete ownership of the land with him, the 2nd petitioner agreed to provide the necessary finances, and that was to result in 75% of share for the 1st petitioner and 25%, for the 2nd petitioner. One of the conditions to be complied by the petitioners was that they must obtain a ‘No Objection Certificate’ from the revenue authorities, for installation of the outlet in the concerned land. An application was submitted to the District Collector, Khammam, the 2nd respondent herein. He, in turn, forwarded the same to the authorities of the Panchayat Raj, A.P. Transco, Fire Services, Police Department, etc. All the departments gave their ‘No objection Certificate’. The 2nd respondent invited the comments from the 4th respondent, as to whether any transfer of ownership of land is involved in the process, be it, on account of partnership or grant of dealership. The 4th respondent clarified through letter dated 11-09-2011, that no process of transfer of the land would take place, and that the ownership of the land would remain with the 1st petitioner, even after the dealership is granted. As per the distribution of the work, the 2nd respondent referred the matter to the Joint Collector, the 1st respondent, to verify whether the proposed transfer would attract the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation Act 1 of 1959, read with Regulation 1 of 1970 (for short ‘the Regulation’) In the meanwhile, the 4th respondent has forwarded a circular dated 16-10-2008, issued by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, which is to the effect that, a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe dealer shall be entitled to induct a minority partner from outside that category, up to the limit of 25%. The 1st respondent passed an order dated 05-01-2012, rejecting the application of the petitioners on the ground that the transaction is hit by the provisions of the Regulation. The petitioners filed W.P.No.3494 of 2012, challenging the said order. The writ petition was allowed, setting aside the order passed by the 1st respondent, taking the view that the Regulation is not attracted. The respondents 1 to 3 filed Writ Appeal No.793 of 2012. A Division Bench of this Court allowed the Writ Appeal, through order dated 04-07-2012, taking the view that the question as to whether the proposed transaction contravened Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation, needs to be examined by the 1st respondent, afresh, and accordingly directed him to reconsider the matter. The finding recorded by this Court that the transaction does not attract the prohibition, contained under Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation was set aside, obviously leaving it open to the 1st respondent to express his view, on that very question. After remand, the 1st respondent passed an order dated 24-07-2012, rejecting the application. He did not bestow his attention to Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation, as directed by the Division Bench of this Court. Since it was an order passed after remand, this Court passed a detailed order dated 17-08-2012, requiring the 1st respondent to supplement the reasons in accordance with the directions issued by the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.793 of 2012 Thereafter, the 1st respondent passed an order dated 18-09-2012, supplementing the reasons. Sri P. Vishnuvardhan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the view taken by the 1st respondent that the establishment of dealership with the partnership of the petitioners 1 and 2 over the land in question is prohibited under Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation, is untenable and contrary to the Regulation. Learned Government Pleader for Revenue, on the other hand, submits that the 1st respondent has examined the matter in detail, particularly after this Court required him to furnish reasons, and that no interference is warranted. He submits that the definition of ‘transfer’ under Section 2(g) of the Regulation is wide enough, and any agreement, in relation to the land is prone to be treated as ‘transfer’, and thereby would attract the prohibition contained under Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation. Sri B. Mayur Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the 4th respondent-Corporation has advanced arguments on the basis of the relevant circulars. Sri B. Mayur Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the 4th respondent-Corporation has advanced arguments on the basis of the relevant circulars. This is the second round of litigation, in the context of obtaining ‘No Objection Certificate’, for establishment of a petroleum outlet. Authorities of various departments, such as Panchayat Raj, A.P. Transco, Fire Services, Police Department, have already issued their ‘No Objection Certificates’. The occasion for the 2nd respondent to refer the matter to the 1st respondent arose, on account of the fact that the petroleum outlet is proposed to be established in the scheduled area. Therefore, the matter was required to be examined, with reference to the Regulation. It has already been mentioned that the petitioners have constituted partnership, under which, the 2nd petitioner would arrange finances, and would be entitled to 25% share in the dealership. The principal question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is, as to whether there exists any element of transfer, as regards the land in question, whether in favour of the 2nd petitioner, or the 4th respondent. Since the land is in scheduled area, the issue needs to be examined with reference to the provisions of the Regulation. Section 3(1)(a) of the Regulation prohibits transfer of any immovable property, situated in the scheduled area, in favour of a non-tribal. It reads, “Notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment, rule or law in force in the Agency tracts and transfer of immovable property situated in the Agency tracts by a person, whether or not such person is a member of Scheduled Tribe, shall be absolutely null and void, unless such transfer is made in favour of a person, who is a member of a scheduled Tribe or a society registered or deemed to be registered under Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (Act 7 of 1964) which is composed solely of members of the Scheduled Tribes”. The 1st petitioner is a scheduled tribe, and he owns the land in Sy. No. 711/AA of Edulla Bayyaram Village. The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas provided for reservation of dealership in petroleum products in favour of SCs and STs. The 1st petitioner is a scheduled tribe, and he owns the land in Sy. No. 711/AA of Edulla Bayyaram Village. The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas provided for reservation of dealership in petroleum products in favour of SCs and STs. Realizing that the social and economic conditions of the candidates belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, even if selected as dealers, may not permit them to do the business effectively, the Ministry issued a circular, through which, the SC & ST candidates selected as dealers were permitted to admit a partner outside their social group, to the extent of 25%. Obviously, guided by this policy, the 1st petitioner took the 2nd petitioner as a partner, since the latter agreed to arrange for finances. The arrangement is such that the ownership of the land would continue to be with the 1st petitioner. The doubt expressed by the 2nd respondent, as to whether the 4th 1st petitioner has to part with the title in favour of the Oil Company, i.e., the respondent, was dispelled through letter dated 11-09-2011. The relevant portion reads, “It may be noted here that the partnership deed does not have any relation to the land ownership and is purely for operating the business. Mr. Banoth Ramesh is one the beneficiaries in the proposed business. It may also be noted here that there is no transaction of land, transfer against the prevailing land rules of the agency area, in the proposed partnership business...” The next question was, as to whether there would be any element of transfer of land from the 1st petitioner to the 2nd petitioner. Since the 2nd petitioner happens to be a non-tribal, any transfer is prohibited under Regulation 3(1)(a). It is no doubt true that no transfer as such, provided for under the Transfer of Property Act (for short ‘the T.P. Act’), viz., through sale, mortgage, lease, gift or exchange, has taken place between the petitioners inter se. However, the parameters, with reference to which, the issue must be examined, are different. The definition of ‘transfer’, adopted under Regulation is far wider. It takes in its fold, not only the categories of transfers, dealt with under the T.P. Act, but also any contracts relating thereto. However, the parameters, with reference to which, the issue must be examined, are different. The definition of ‘transfer’, adopted under Regulation is far wider. It takes in its fold, not only the categories of transfers, dealt with under the T.P. Act, but also any contracts relating thereto. Section 2(g) of the Regulation defines “transfer”, as under: “‘Transfer’ means mortgage with or without possession, lease, sale, gift, exchange or any other dealing with immovable property, not being a testamentary disposition and includes a charge on such property or a contract relating to such property in respect of such mortgage, lease, sale, gift, exchange or other dealing”. From a perusal of this, it is evident that not only the conventional transfers, but also any transaction through which, a charge is created, or a contract relating to the sale, mortgage, lease, gift or exchange is treated as transfer. Agreements for sale, mortgage, lease are in the realm of the contract. It is only when a deed as provided for under the relevant sections of the T.P. Act is executed, that a transfer as such would take place. When it comes to the question of transaction, pertaining to an immovable property in the scheduled area, even such agreements or contracts are prone to be treated as transfers. What, however, one has to see is, as to whether there existed any contract pertaining to the transfer, viz., sale, mortgage, lease, gift, exchange in the matter. If one applies the rule of ejusdem generis, the word ‘contract’ employed in Section 2(g) of the Regulation, the inescapable conclusion would be that the contract mentioned therein must be such that, if enforced, must lead to a full-fledged transfer of the property. The expression “any other dealing” also must be understood in the same context. In the instant case, it was not even alleged that there exists any contract or any other dealing between the 1st petitioner and the 2nd petitioner, providing for transfer of the land, through mortgage, lease, sale gift or exchange. Therefore, Section 3 of the Regulation does not get attracted. Take for instance, a tribal owns a piece of agricultural land in scheduled area and enters into an agreement with one contractor, a non-tribal, for ploughing his land. The contract can certainly be said to be in relation to the land, inasmuch as it is that very land which is going to be ploughed. Take for instance, a tribal owns a piece of agricultural land in scheduled area and enters into an agreement with one contractor, a non-tribal, for ploughing his land. The contract can certainly be said to be in relation to the land, inasmuch as it is that very land which is going to be ploughed. However, if it is brought within the purview of Section 2(g) of the Regulation, and thereby section 3(1)(a), the whole of it is prone to be declared as void. So is the case with any arrangement, ranging from purchase of seeds for the land, to the one of engaging any machinery for harvesting, etc. What one has to see is, as to whether the contract in question, if carried to the logical conclusion, would bring about a ‘transfer’. The expansion of the definition of ‘transfer’ is to the extent of bringing in its fold, the steps that lead to ‘transfer, as defined under the T.P. Act and not beyond that. Since it is not even an allegation that any such contract exists between petitioners 1 and 2, the view taken by the 1st respondent cannot be countenanced. The objective underlying the requirement is to protect the interests of the tribals. In addition to that, the Oil Companies have also extended their helping hands. If a hyper-technical view, as taken by the 1st respondent, is adopted, the result would be that the 1st petitioner, who is a scheduled tribe, cannot dream of becoming a dealer, though he owns the land, which is suitable for establishment of the dealership and his fate, in this regard would be sealed. The reason is that he cannot even approach a Bank for loan since the transaction of mortgage of the land as security would be involved. A step further, would be that even a contract to establish outlet aver the land, would be hit by Sections 2 and 3 of the Regulation. Hence, the ,writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 24-07-2012, supplemented through another order dated 18-09-2012, passed by the 1st respondent is set aside. The 1st respondent shall consider the matter once again, without proceeding on the assumption that there exists any element of transfer between the 1st petitioner and the 2nd petitioner, or between the 1st petitioner and the 4th respondent. The 1st respondent shall consider the matter once again, without proceeding on the assumption that there exists any element of transfer between the 1st petitioner and the 2nd petitioner, or between the 1st petitioner and the 4th respondent. Since the matter has already been delayed, the process shall be completed within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The miscellaneous petition filed in this writ petition shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.