JUDGMENT Dev Darshan Sud, J. All these revision petitions are being disposed of on the preliminary point urged for interpretation by this Court which is as to whether the amendments carried out in the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act of 1987’) by the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act No.8 of 2012) (hereinafter referred to as the `Act of 2012’) are retrospective or prospective. 2. Learned counsel for the tenants has submitted that these amendments are retrospective and in this view of the matter, order of eviction of the tenants passed under Section 14 of the Act of 1987 by the learned Rent Controller cannot be sustained. 3. It is undisputed before me that the Act of 1987 was amended by substitution of Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and in Section 8 subsection-(1) for the words “fair rent” the words “standard rent” were substituted. The important amendments were carried out in Section 14, which is noticed herein, and which was the subject matter of the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the parties. Amended sections of the Act provide:- Section The Himachal Pradesh Urban The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. The important amendments were carried out in Section 14, which is noticed herein, and which was the subject matter of the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the parties. Amended sections of the Act provide:- Section The Himachal Pradesh Urban The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act No.8 of 2012) 2(j) “tenant” means any person by 2(j) “tenant” means any whom or on whose account person by whom or on whose rent is payable for a account rent is payable for building or rented land and a residential or non- includes a tenant continuing residential building or in possession after rented land and includes a termination of the tenancy tenant continuing in and in the event of the possession after termination death of such person such of of the tenancy, a deserted his heirs as are mentioned wife of a tenant who has in Schedule-I to this Act been or is entitled to be in and who were ordinarily occupation of the residing with him at the matrimonial home or tenanted time of his death, subject premises of husband, a to the order of succession divorced wife of a tenant and conditions specified, who has a decree of divorce respectively in Explanation- in which the right of I and Explanation-II to this residence in the matrimonial clause, but does not include home or tenanted premises a person placed in has been incorporated as one occupation of a building or of the conditions of the rented land by its tenant, decree of divorce and in the except with the written event of the death of such consent of the landlord, or person such of his heirs as a person to whom the are mentioned in Schedule-I collection of rent or fees to this Act and who were in a public market, cart-stand ordinarily residing with him or slaughter house or or carrying on business in of rents for shops has been the premises at the time of farmed out or leased by a his death, subject to the municipal corporation or a order of succession and municipal committee or a conditions specified, notified area committee or a respectively in Explanation- cantonment board; I and Explanation-II to this clause, but does not include Explanation I-The order of a person placed in succession in the event of occupation of a building or the death of the person rented land by its tenant, continuing in possession except with the written after the termination of his consent of the landlord, or tenancy shall be as a person to whom the follows:- collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart- (a) firstly, his surviving stand or slaughter house or spouse; of rents for shops has been (b) secondly, his son or farmed out or leased by a daughter, or both, if Municipal Corporation or a there is no surviving Municipal Council or a Nagar spouse, or if the Panchayat or a Cantonment surviving spouse did Board; not ordinarily live with the deceased Explanation I.-The order of person as a member of succession in the event of his family upto the the death of the person date of his death; continuing in possession (c) thirdly, his after the termination of his parent(s), if there is tenancy shall be as no surviving spouse, follows:- son of daughter of the deceased person, or if (a) firstly, his surviving such surviving spouse, spouse; son, daughter or any of them, did not (b) secondly, his son or ordinarily live in the daughter, or both, if premises as a member there is no surviving of the family of the spouse, or if the deceased person upto surviving spouse did the date of his death; not ordinarily live and with the deceased d) fourthly, his persons as a member of daughter-in-law, being his family upto the the widow of his predeceased date of his death; son, if there is no surviving (c) thirdly, his parent(s), spouse, son, daughter, if there is no or parent(s) of the surviving spouse, son deceased person or if or daughter of the such surviving spouse, deceased person, or if son, daughter of such surviving spouse, parent(s), or any of son, daughter or any of them, did not them, did not ordinarily live in the ordinarily live in the premises as a member premises as a member of of the family of the the family of the deceased person upto deceased person upto the date of his death; the date of his death; and Explanation-II.- The right of every successor, referred (d) fourthly, his daughter-in- to in Explanation-I, to law, being the widow continue in possession after of his pre-deceased the termination of the son, if there is no tenancy, shall be personal surviving spouse, son, to him and shall not, on the daughter or parent(s) death of such successor, of the deceased person devolve on any of his heirs; or if such surviving and. spouse, son, daughter or parent(s), or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death: Provided that the successor has ordinarily been living or carrying on business in the premises with the deceased tenant as a member of his family upto the date of his death and was dependent on the deceased tenant: Provided further that a right to tenancy shall not devolve upon a successor in case he or his spouse or any of his dependent son or daughter is owning or occupying a premises in the urban area in relation to the premises let. Explanation-II.- The right of every successor, referred to in Explanation-I, to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such successor, devolve on any of his heirs; and” 4. Substitution of Section 4. Determination of fair rent Determination of standard rent.- (1) The Controller shall on (1) The Controller shall, on application by the application by the tenant or tenant or the landlord the landlord of a building of a building or rented or rented land, and after land, and after holding holding such enquiry as he such enquiry as he may may think fit, fix the think fit, fix the fair standard rent for such a rent for such a building or rented land on building or rented the basis of 10% of the land. aggregate cost of construction and the market (2) The fair rent under price of the land comprised sub-section (1) shall in the premises on the date be,- of commencement of the construction. The standard (a) in respect of the rent so derived shall be building, the increased by 10% from the construction whereof year of construction to the was completed on or present year to arrive at before the 25th day standard rent for the given of January, 1971 or year. The standard (a) in respect of the rent so derived shall be building, the increased by 10% from the construction whereof year of construction to the was completed on or present year to arrive at before the 25th day standard rent for the given of January, 1971 or year. However, in case of in respect of land non-residential building, let out before the the standard rent shall be said date, the rent fixed on the basis of 15% of prevailing in the the aggregate cost of locality for similar construction and the market building or rented price of the land comprised land let out to a in the premises on the date new tenant during of the construction. the year 1971; and Explanation.-For the purpose (b) in respect of the of fixation of standard building, the rent, the maintenance construction whereof charges, municipal taxes in completed after including water and the 25th day of electricity charges shall be January, 1971 or in taken into account: respect of land let out after the said Provided that- date, the rent (i) the maintenance agreed upon between charges shall not the landlord and the exceed 5% of the tenant preceding the standard rent; date of the (ii) the taxes shall application, or be as per actual where no rent has tax payable on been agreed upon, prorate basis; the rent shall be and determined on the (iii) the other basis of the rent amenities like prevailing in the water and locality for similar electricity shall building or rented be as agreed land on the date of between the application. landlord and the tenant. 2. The standard rent fixed under sub-section (1) shall become payable from the date on which the application is filed under this section. 5. Revision of fair rent in Revision of standard rent in certain cases. certain cases. (1) Save as provided in sub- (1) Save as provided in section (2), when the section 4 when the standard fair rent of a building rent of a land or rented or rented land has been building has been fixed fixed under section 4, under section 4, no further no further increase or increase or decrease in decrease in such fair such a standard rent shall rent shall be be permissible for a period permissible for a period of three years. of five years: Provided that the decrease may be allowed in (2) Notwithstanding anything cases where there is contained in any law for decrease or diminution in the time being in force the accommodation or or in any contract, a amenities provided. landlord shall, in addition to the increase (2) Notwithstanding anything in rent provided in this contained in any law for Act, be entitled to the time being in force increase the rent of a or in any contract, a building or land at the landlord shall, in rate of ten per cent of addition to the increase the standard rent or the in rent provided in this agreed rent, as the case Act, be entitled to may be, after every increase the rent of a three years from such building or land at the commencement. rate of 10% (per cent) of the fair rent or the (3) The increase in standard agreed rent, as the case rent shall be automatic may be, after every five and if there is any years and such increase dispute between the shall be,- landlord and the tenant in regard to any (a) in a case where increase or decrease in such a building or rent under this section, land has been let such dispute shall be out for a period of decided by the five years or more Controller. immediately preceding the commencement of this Act- (i) first with effect from the date of such commencement; and (ii) again with effect from the expiry of the period of every five years from such commencement; and (b) where such a building or land has been let out before such commencement for a period shorter than five years and the maximum period within which such building or land remains let out extends beyond five years from the date of the commencement of such a tenancy- (i) first with effect from the date of expiry of five years from the commencement of such tenancy; (ii) again with effect from date of expiry of the period of every five years from the date on which revision made under clause (i) takes effect. (3) Any dispute between the landlord and the tenant in regard to any increase or decrease in rent under this section shall be decided by the Controller. 6. Increase in fair rent in Increase in standard rent in what cases admissible. what cases admissible. (3) Any dispute between the landlord and the tenant in regard to any increase or decrease in rent under this section shall be decided by the Controller. 6. Increase in fair rent in Increase in standard rent in what cases admissible. what cases admissible. Save as provided under (1) Save as provided under section 5, when the fair section 5, when the standard rent of a building or rented rent of a building or rented land has been fixed under land has been fixed under section 4, no further section 4, no further increase in such fair rent increase in such standard shall be permissible except rent shall be permissible, in cases where some except in cases where some addition, improvement or addition, improvement or alteration has been carried alteration or special out in the building or repairs has been carried out rented land at the in the building or rented landlord’s expense and if land by the landlord at the the building or rented land request of in writing of the is then in the occupation of tenant: a tenant, at his request: Provided that the Provided that the fair standard rent increased rent as increased under this under this sub-section shall section shall not exceeded not exceed ten percent of the fair rent payable under the cost of addition, this Act for a similar improvement, alteration or building or rented land in special repairs. the same locality with such addition, improvement or (2) If the tenant fails to alteration and it shall not pay the revised standard be chargeable until such rent, he shall be liable for addition, improvement or eviction under section 14 of alteration has been the Act. completed. 7. Landlord not to claim Landlord not to claim anything in excess of fair anything in excess of rent. standard rent. completed. 7. Landlord not to claim Landlord not to claim anything in excess of fair anything in excess of rent. standard rent. Save as provided in this Save as provided in this Act, when the Controller has Act, when the Controller has fixed this fair rent of a fixed the standard rent of a building or rented land building or rented land under section 4- under section 4, the landlord shall not claim or (a) the landlord shall receive any premium or other not claim or receive like sum in addition to any premium or other standard rent or any rent in like sum in addition excess of such standard to fair rent or any rent, but the landlord may rent in excess of stipulate for and receive in such fair rent, but advance an amount not the landlord may exceeding three month’s rent stipulate for and in lump sum. receive in advance an amount not Provided that any exceeding one agreement for the payment month’s rent; of any sum in addition to rent, or of rent in excess (b) any agreement for of such standard rent, the payment of any shall be null and void. sum in addition to rent, or of rent in excess of such fair rent, shall be null and void. 8. Fine or premium not to be Fine or premium not to be charged for grant, renewal charged for grant, renewal or continuance of tenancy. or continuance of tenancy. (1) Subject to the Subject to the provisions provisions of this Act, of this Act, no landlord no landlord shall claim shall claim or receive any or receive any rent in rent in excess of the excess of the fair standard rent, not with rent, not with standing standing any agreement to any agreement to the the contrary. contrary. No landlord shall, in consideration of the grant, renewal of continuance of a tenancy or sub-tenancy of any building or rented land, claim or receive payment of any premium, pugree, fine, advance or any other like sum in addition to the rent. 14(2) Eviction of tenants. Eviction of tenants. (i) 1. … … … … … … … 1. … … … … … … … 2. … … … … … … … 2. 14(2) Eviction of tenants. Eviction of tenants. (i) 1. … … … … … … … 1. … … … … … … … 2. … … … … … … … 2. … (i) that the tenant has (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the not paid or tendered the rent due from him in respect rent due from him in respect of the building or rented of the building or rented land within fifteen days land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of agreement by the last day of the month next following the month next following that for which the rent is that for which the rent is payable: payable: Provided that if the Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing tenant on the first hearing of the application for of the application for ejectment after due service ejectment after due service pays or tenders the arrears pays or tenders the arrears or rent and interest at the or rent and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum rate of 12 per cent per on such arrears together annum on such arrears with the cost of application together with the cost of assessed by the Controller, application assessed by the the tenant shall be deemed Controller, the tenant shall to have duly paid or be deemed to have duly paid tendered the rent within the or tendered the rent within time aforesaid; the time aforesaid; Provided further that Provided further that if the arrears pertain to if the arrears pertain to the period prior to the the period prior to the appointed day, the rate of appointed day, the rate of interest shall be calculated interest shall be calculated at the rate of 6 percent per at the rate of 12 percent annum. per annum. 14 (3) 3. A landlord may apply 3. per annum. 14 (3) 3. A landlord may apply 3. A landlord may apply to the Controller for an to the Controller for an order directing the tenant order directing the tenant to put the landlord in to put the landlord in possession- possession- (a) in the case of (a) in the case of residential building, residential and non- if- residential building, if- (i) he requires it for his own occupation: (i) he requires it for his own occupation: Provided that he is not occupying another Provided that he is residential building owned not occupying another by him, in the urban area residential and non- concerned: residential building owned by him, in the urban area concerned: (c) … … … … … (c) … … … … … Provided that the tenant evicted under this clause (d) … … … … … … … … … shall have the right to reentry on new terms of tenancy on the basis of mutual agreement between the landlord and the tenant, to the premises in the re-built building equivalent in area to the original premises for which he was a tenant. Provided further that in case of nonresidential premises, the landlord shall not compel the tenant for a change of business under the new terms of tenancy; and 14 (5) 5. Where a landlord who 5. Provided further that in case of nonresidential premises, the landlord shall not compel the tenant for a change of business under the new terms of tenancy; and 14 (5) 5. Where a landlord who 5. Where a landlord who has obtained possession of has obtained possession of the building or rented land the building or rented land in pursuance of an order in pursuance of an order under sub-section (3) does under sub-section (3) does not occupy it himself or if not occupy it himself or if possession was obtained by possession was obtained by him for his family in him for his family in pursuance of an order under pursuance of an order under sub-clause (iii) of clause sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (3), his (a) of sub-section (3), his family does not occupy the family does not occupy the residential building, or if residential building, or if possession was obtained by possession was obtained by him on behalf of his son in him on behalf of his son or pursuance of an order under daughter in pursuance of an clause (d) of sub-section order under clause (d) of (3) his son does not occupy sub-section (3) his son or it for the purpose for which daughter does not occupy it the possession was obtained, for the purpose for which for a continuous period of the possession was obtained, twelve months from the date for a continuous period of of obtaining possession or twelve months from the date if possession was obtained of obtaining possession or under sub-section (2) of if possession was obtained section 15 he does not under sub-section (2) of occupy it for personal use section 15 he does not for a continuous period of 3 occupy it for personal use months from the date of for a continuous period of 3 obtaining possession or months from the date of where a landlord who has obtaining possession or obtained possession of a where a landlord who has building under clause (c) of obtained possession of a sub-section (3) puts that building under clause (c) of building to any use other sub-section (3) puts that than that for which it was building to any use other obtained or lets it out to than that for which it was any tenant other than the obtained or lets it out to tenant evicted from it, the any tenant other than the tenant who has been evicted tenant evicted from it, the may apply to the Controller tenant who has been evicted for an order directing that may apply to the Controller he shall be restored to for an order directing that possession of such building he shall be restored to or rented land and the possession of such building Controller shall make an or rented land and the order accordingly.” Controller shall make an order accordingly.” 4. Learned counsel have laid emphasis on the proviso to clause (c) and its applicability to pending proceedings or to proceedings instituted after the amendment was notified. 5. The Act of 2012 received the assent of the President of India on 28th February, 2012 and was notified by the Government of Himachal Pradesh vide Notification No.LLR-D (6)-32/2009–Leg. Dated 16th March, 2012 and published in H.P. Rajpatra dated 16th March, 2012 at pages 6653 to 6660. 6. Learned counsel for the tenants submits that the provisions are retrospective and in this eventuality, no eviction of the tenants can be ordered under Section 14 of the Act unless the conditions therein are complied with, which are mandatory. On the other hand, learned counsel for the landlord submits that retrospectivity shall not be assumed in any Legislation unless such applicability either intended or clearly specified. 7. There is no repeal and saving clause nor any clause which provides for the commencement of the concerned provisions. At this juncture, it would be fruitful to advert to Section-8 of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1968 which provides:- “8. Commencement and termination of time.- In any Himachal Pradesh Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from” and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”. 9. Section-3 of the Act provides:- “3. Coming into operation of enactments.- Where any Himachal Pradesh Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which the assent thereto of the Governor or the President of India, as the case may require, is first published in the Official Gazette.” The Act of 2012 does not provide any date from which it is to come into force. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the tenants submits that Section 34 of the Act of 1987 is a pointer to the fact that the amendment made is retrospective. This submission requires to be rejected outright for the reasons that the words used in this Section refer expressly to the Act of 1971, it reads:- “34. Repeal and Savings.- (1) The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971, (23 of 1971) is hereby repealed. This submission requires to be rejected outright for the reasons that the words used in this Section refer expressly to the Act of 1971, it reads:- “34. Repeal and Savings.- (1) The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971, (23 of 1971) is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, but subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (3), all suits, appeals and other proceedings, including execution proceedings, under the said Act, pending before any court of appellate or revisional authority, on the appointed day shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act, as if the provisions contained in this Act were, at the relevant time, in force. (3) Nothing contained herein shall authorize any court or authority or tribunal to re-open any suit or proceedings in which the orders passed have already become final and executed.” What it provides for is that the Act of 1971 stands repealed and two sub-sections follow which enact that notwithstanding such repeal, but subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), all suits, appeals and other proceedings, including execution proceedings, under the said Act, pending before any appellate court or revisional authority, on the appointed day shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act (amended Act of 1987), as if the provisions contained in this Act (amended Act of 1987) were applicable at the relevant time and were in force. Sub-section (3) provides that such applicability will not authorize any court or authority or tribunal to reopen any suit or proceedings in which orders passed have already become final and executed. The provision is well thought out according finality to the proceedings already having concluded and prohibiting their reopening only to give effect to the amended Act. Submission made though attractive, but cannot be accepted for the reason that the Section specifically deals with the provisions of the Act of 1971. If it was the intention of the Legislature that this very provision was applicable for the amended Act of 2009, Section 34 would itself have been amended to include the amending Act of 2009 which in fact has not been done. 9. The rule with respect to the retrospectivity is by now well settled. If it was the intention of the Legislature that this very provision was applicable for the amended Act of 2009, Section 34 would itself have been amended to include the amending Act of 2009 which in fact has not been done. 9. The rule with respect to the retrospectivity is by now well settled. In a catena of decisions, the Supreme Court holds that it is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is specially or by necessary implementation made retrospective. 10. In C. Gupta vs. Glaxo-Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2007)7 SCC 171 , the Supreme Court holds:- “21. In the present case, we find that for determining the nature of amendment, the question is whether it affects the legal rights of individual workers in the context that if they fall within the definition then they would be entitled to claim several benefits conferred by the Act. The amendment should be also one which would touch upon their substantive rights. Unless there is a clear provision to the effect that it is retrospective or such retrospectively can be implied by necessary implication or intendment, it must be held to be prospective. We find no such clear provision or anything to suggest by necessary implication or intendment either in the amending Act or in the amendment itself. The amendment cannot be said to be one which affects procedure. In so far as the amendment substantially changes the scope of the definition of the term "workman" it cannot be said to be merely declaratory or clarificatory. In this regard we find that entirely new category of persons who are doing "operational" work was introduced first time in the definition and the words "skilled" and "unskilled" were made independent categories unlinked to the word "manual". It can be seen that the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984 was enacted by Parliament on 31.8.1982. However, the amendment itself was not brought into force immediately and in sub-section (1) of Section 1 of the Amending Act, it was provided that it would come into force on such day as the Central Government may be Notification in the official Gazette, appoint. Ultimately, by a Notification the said amendment was brought into force on 21.8.1984. However, the amendment itself was not brought into force immediately and in sub-section (1) of Section 1 of the Amending Act, it was provided that it would come into force on such day as the Central Government may be Notification in the official Gazette, appoint. Ultimately, by a Notification the said amendment was brought into force on 21.8.1984. Although this Court has held that the amendment would be prospective if it is deemed to have come with effect on a particular day, a provision in the amendment Act to the effect that amendment would become operative in the future, would have similar effect. 22. Therefore, by the application of the tests mentioned above, it is clear that the definition of workman as amended must, therefore, presumed to be prospective.” (pp.179-180) 11. In Meghal Homes (P) Ltd. vs. Shree Niwas Girni K.K. Samiti and Others, (2007)7 SCC 753 , the Court reiterates the principle and holds:- “50. It is a well settled rule of interpretation that provisions in an enactment must be read as a whole before ascertaining the scope of any particular provision. This Court has held that it is a rule now firmly established that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, it is stated: "The rule is referred to as an "elementary rule" by Viscount Simonds; a "compelling rule" by Lord Somervell of Harrow; and a "settled rule" by B.K. Mukherjee, J." (See pp.31 and 32 of the Tenth Edn.) When we accept this principle, what we have to do is to read Sections 391 to 394A not in isolation as canvassed for by learned counsel for the respondents, but with reference to the other relevant provisions of the Act.” (p.776) 12. In G. Seekar vs. Geetha and Others, (2009)6 SCC 99 , the Court while dealing with the fact of amendment of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, holds:- “30. Neither the 1956 Act nor the 2005 Act seeks to reopen vesting of a right where succession had already been taken place. The operation of the said statute is no doubt prospective in nature. Neither the 1956 Act nor the 2005 Act seeks to reopen vesting of a right where succession had already been taken place. The operation of the said statute is no doubt prospective in nature. The High Court might have committed a mistake in opining that the operation of Section 3 of the 2005 Act is retrospective in character, but, for the reasons aforementioned, it does not make any difference. What should have been held was that although it is not retrospective in nature, its application is prospective. 31. It is now a well settled principle of law that the question as to whether a statute having prospective operation will affect the pending proceeding would depend upon the nature as also text and context of the statute. Whether a litigant has obtained a vested right as on the date of institution of the suit which is sought to be taken away by operation of a subsequent statute will be a question which must be posed and answered. 32. It is trite that although omission of a provision operates as an amendment to the statute but then Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr. Viswanathan, could have been applied provided it takes away somebody's vested right. Restrictive right contained in Section 23 of the Act, in view of our aforementioned discussions, cannot be held to remain continuing despite the 2005 Act. 39. Indisputably, the question as to whether an amendment is prospective or retrospective in nature, will depend upon its construction. 40. It is merely a disabling provision. Such a right could be enforced if a cause of action therefor arose subsequently. A right of the son to keep the right of the daughters of the last male owner to seek for partition of a dwelling house being a right of the male owner to keep the same in abeyance till the division takes place is not a right of enduring in nature. It cannot be said to be an accrued right or a vested right. Such a right indisputably can be taken away by operation of the statute and/or by removing the disablement clause.” (pp.110-113) 13. In Purbanchal Cables and Conductors Private Limited vs. Assam State Electricity Board and Another, (2012)7 SCC 462 , the Court, considering the entire law on the point, holds:- “Retrospective operation of the Act 32. Such a right indisputably can be taken away by operation of the statute and/or by removing the disablement clause.” (pp.110-113) 13. In Purbanchal Cables and Conductors Private Limited vs. Assam State Electricity Board and Another, (2012)7 SCC 462 , the Court, considering the entire law on the point, holds:- “Retrospective operation of the Act 32. The fundamental rule of construction is the same for all statutes whether fiscal or otherwise. The under-lying principle is that the meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expression used therein rather from any notion. To arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception, scope and object of the whole Act. 33. In Zile Singh v. State of Haryana, (2004)8 SCC 1 , this Court observed that there were four relevant factors which needed to be considered while considering whether a statute applied prospectively or retrospectively: (SCC p.9 para 15) “15.…Four factors are suggested as relevant:(i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated….” 39. With the commencement of the Act, a new vested right exists with the supplier, that being, if there is delay in payment after the acceptance of the goods by the buyer, the supplier can file a suit for claiming interest at a higher rate, as prescribed by the Act. This position has been approved by this Court in the case of Modern Industries (supra). If a suit for interest simpliciter is maintainable as held by this Court in Modern Industries (supra), then a new liability qua the buyer is created with the commencement of the Act giving a vested right to the supplier in case of delayed payment. In other words, if there is a delayed payment by the buyer, then a right to claim a higher rate of interest as prescribed by the Act accrues to the supplier. 40. The phrase 'vested right' has been defined by this Court in Bibi Sayeeda v. State of Bihar, (1996)9 SCC 516 as: (SCC p.527, para 17) “17. The word 'vested' is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563 as: “Vested; fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. 40. The phrase 'vested right' has been defined by this Court in Bibi Sayeeda v. State of Bihar, (1996)9 SCC 516 as: (SCC p.527, para 17) “17. The word 'vested' is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563 as: “Vested; fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent.” Rights are 'vested' when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute vested rights. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edn.) at p.1397 'vested' is defined as: “[L]aw held by a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right; vested interests.” 41. A statute creating vested rights is a substantive statute. This Court, in Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division v. N.C. Budharaj, (2001)2 SCC 721 , opined: (SCC p.742, para 23) “23. … “Substantive law”, is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights in contrast to what is called adjective or remedial law which provides the method of enforcing rights. Decisions, including the one in Jena case while adverting to the question of substantive law has chosen to indicate by way of illustration laws such as Sale of Goods Act, 1930 [Section 61(2)], Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Section 80), etc. The provisions of the Interest Act, 1839, which prescribe the general law of interest and become applicable in the absence of any contractual or other statutory provisions specially dealing with the subject, would also answer the description of substantive law…” 42. In Thirumalai Chemicals Limited Vs. Union of India, (2011)6 SCC 739 , this Court comparing substantial law with procedural law, stated: (SCC pp.748- 749, paras 23-24) “23. Substantive law refers to a body of rules that creates, defines and regulates rights and liabilities. Right conferred on a party to prefer an appeal against an order is a substantive right conferred by a statute which remains unaffected by subsequent changes in law, unless modified expressly or by necessary implication. Procedural law establishes a mechanism for determining those rights and liabilities and a machinery for enforcing them. Right of appeal being a substantive right always acts prospectively. Procedural law establishes a mechanism for determining those rights and liabilities and a machinery for enforcing them. Right of appeal being a substantive right always acts prospectively. It is trite law that every statute is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. 24. Right of appeal may be a substantive right but the procedure for filing the appeal including the period of limitation cannot be called a substantive right, and an aggrieved person cannot claim any vested right claiming that he should be governed by the old provision pertaining to period of limitation. Procedural law is retrospective meaning thereby that it will apply even to acts or transactions under the repealed Act.” 43. In Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001)8 SCC 24 , a Constitution Bench of this Court discussing the scope and ambit of a declaratory law has observed: (SCC p.49, para 39) “39. Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the amending Act whereby new Section 15 of the Act has been substituted is declaratory and, therefore, has retroactive operation. Ordinarily when an enactment declares the previous law, it requires to be given retroactive effect. The function of a declaratory statute is to supply an omission or to explain a previous statute and when such an Act is passed, it comes into effect when the previous enactment was passed. The legislative power to enact law includes the power to declare what was the previous law and when such a declaratory Act is passed, invariably it has been held to be retrospective. Mere absence of use of the word “declaration” in an Act explaining what was the law before may not appear to be a declaratory Act but if the court finds an Act as declaratory or explanatory, it has to be construed as retrospective. Conversely where a statute uses the word “declaratory”, the words so used may not be sufficient to hold that the statute is a declaratory Act as words may be used in order to bring into effect new law.” 44. In Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guntreddi Annamanaidu, (1974)1 SCC 567 , this Court held: (SCC p.582, para 50) “50. Conversely where a statute uses the word “declaratory”, the words so used may not be sufficient to hold that the statute is a declaratory Act as words may be used in order to bring into effect new law.” 44. In Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guntreddi Annamanaidu, (1974)1 SCC 567 , this Court held: (SCC p.582, para 50) “50. It is well settled that ordinarily, when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, rights of the parties are decided according to law, as it existed when the action was begun unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. 220). That is to say, `in the absence of anything in the Act, to say that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act is passed’.” 45. In Govind Das v. ITO, (1976)1 SCC 906 , this Court speaking through P.N. Bhagwati. J., (as he then was) held: (SCC p.914, para 11) “11. Now it is a well settled rule of interpretation hallowed by time and sanctified by judicial decisions that, unless the terms of a statute expressly so provide or necessarily require it, retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to take away or impair an existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new liability otherwise than as regards matters of procedure. The general rule as stated by Halsbury in Vol. 36 of the Laws of England (3rd Edn.) and reiterated in several decisions of this Court as well as English courts is that all statutes other than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure or of evidence are prima facie prospective and retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to affect, alter or destroy an existing right or create a new liability or obligation unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.” 46. In Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornium, (1976)2 SCC 917 , this Court held: (SCC p.925, para 31) “31. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.” 46. In Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornium, (1976)2 SCC 917 , this Court held: (SCC p.925, para 31) “31. Before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid passed by the Central Legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would be appropriate to bear in mind two well- established principles. The first is that “while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment” (See Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1926-27) 54 IA 42, IA p.425.) The second is that a right of appeal being a substantive right the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest of the career of the suit. There are two exceptions to the application of this rule viz. (1) when by competent enactment such right of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly with retrospective effect and (2) when the court to which appeal lay at the commencement of the suit stands abolished (see Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, AIR 1957 SC 540 and Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369).” 47. In K. Kapen Chako v. Provident Investment Co. (P) Ltd, (1977) 1 SCC 593 , this Court discussing the dicta of the English Courts on the aspect of retrospectivity observed: (SCC pp. 602-03, paras 37-39) “37. A statute has to be looked into for the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied. In that connection the former state of the law is to be considered and also the legislative changes contemplated by the statute. Words not requiring retrospective operation so as to affect an existing statutory provision prejudicially ought not be so construed. It is a well recognised rule that statute should be interpreted if possible so as to respect vested rights. In that connection the former state of the law is to be considered and also the legislative changes contemplated by the statute. Words not requiring retrospective operation so as to affect an existing statutory provision prejudicially ought not be so construed. It is a well recognised rule that statute should be interpreted if possible so as to respect vested rights. Where the effect would be to alter a transaction already entered into, where it would be to make that valid which was previously invalid, to make an instrument which had no effect at all, and from which the party was at liberty to depart as long as he pleased, binding, the prima facie construction of the Act is that it is not to be retrospective. (See Gardner v. Lucas (1878)3 AC 582 (HL)). 38. In Moon v. Durden a question arose as to whether Section 18 of the Gaming Act, 1845 which came into effect in August 1845 was retrospective so as to defeat an action which had been commenced in June 1845. The relevant section provided that no suit shall be brought or maintained for recovering any such sum of money alleged to have been won upon a wager. It was held that it was not retrospective. Parke, B. said: (ER p.398) “It seems a strong thing to hold, that the legislature could have meant that a party, who, under a contract made prior to the Act, had as perfect a title to recover a sum of money, as he had to any of his personal property, should be totally deprived of it without compensation.” 39. Again in Smithies v. National Assn. of Operative Plasterers (1909)1 KV 310, Section 4 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 which enacted that an action for tort against a trade union shall not be entertained by any court was held not to prevent the courts from hearing and giving judgment in actions of that kind begun before the passing of the Act. It is a general rule that when the legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them. But there is an exception to this rule, namely, where enactments merely affect procedure and do not extend to rights of action. See Suche (Joseph) & Co. Ltd. in Re (1875)1 ChD 48. But there is an exception to this rule, namely, where enactments merely affect procedure and do not extend to rights of action. See Suche (Joseph) & Co. Ltd. in Re (1875)1 ChD 48. If the legislature forms a new procedure alterations in the form of procedure are retrospective unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be. In other words, if a statute deals merely with the procedure in an action, and does not affect the rights of the parties it will be held to apply prima facie to all actions, pending as well as future.” 48. In Dahiben v. Vasanji Kevalbhai, 1995 Supp.(2) SCC 295, this Court held: (SCC pp.299-300, para 12) “12. As the amendment in question is not to a procedural law, it may be stated that the settled principle of interpretation, where substantive law is amended, is that the same does not operate retrospectively unless it is either expressly provided or the same follows by necessary implication. Lest it be thought that a vested right cannot be taken away at all by retrospective legislation, reference may be made to Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri, AIR 1964 SC 1511 where it was stated that even where vested rights are affected, legislature is competent to take away the same by means of retrospective legislation; and retrospectivity can be inferred even by necessary implication.” 49. In Zile Singh Vs. State of Haryana - (2004)8 SCC 1 , this Court examined the various authorities on statutory interpretation and concluded: (SCC pp. 8-9, paras 13-14) “13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only -`nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis’ a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only -`nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis’ a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 9th Edn., 2004 at p. 438.) It is not necessary that an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the presumption against retrospectivity may be rebutted by necessary implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole (ibid., p. 440). 14. The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes…. In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is `to explain’ an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospectively. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended…. An amending Act may be purely declaratory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect (ibid., pp. 468-69).” 50. In State of Punjab Vs. Bhajan Kaur, (2008)12 SCC 112 , this Court held: (SCC p.116, para 9) “9. A statute is presumed to be prospective unless held to be retrospective, either expressly or by necessary implication. A substantive law is presumed to be prospective. It is one of the facets of the rule of law.” 51. There is no doubt about the fact that the Act is a substantive law as vested rights of entitlement to a higher rate of interest in case of delayed payment accrues in favour of the supplier and a corresponding liability is imposed on the buyer. This Court, time and again, has observed that any substantive law shall operate prospectively unless retrospective operation is clearly made out in the language of the statute. Only a procedural or declaratory law operates retrospectively as there is no vested right in procedure. 52. This Court, time and again, has observed that any substantive law shall operate prospectively unless retrospective operation is clearly made out in the language of the statute. Only a procedural or declaratory law operates retrospectively as there is no vested right in procedure. 52. In the absence of any express legislative intendment of the retrospective application of the Act, and by virtue of the fact that the Act creates a new liability of a high rate of interest against the buyer, the Act cannot be construed to have retrospective effect. Since the Act envisages that the supplier has an accrued right to claim a higher rate of interest in terms of the Act, the same can only said to accrue for sale agreements after the date of commencement of the Act, i.e. 23rd September 1992 and not any time prior.” (pp.478-484) 14. I will now advert to the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1968. Section 2(8) defines commencement to mean:- “2(8) “commencement” used with reference to a Himachal Pradesh Act shall mean the day on which the Act comes into force.” Section 3 provides:- “3. Coming into operation of enactments.- Where any Himachal Pradesh Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which the assent thereto of the Governor or the President of India, as the case may require, is first published in the Official Gazette.” Section 4 provides:- “4. Coming into operation of enactments.- Where any Himachal Pradesh Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which the assent thereto of the Governor or the President of India, as the case may require, is first published in the Official Gazette.” Section 4 provides:- “4. Effect of repeal.-Where this Act or any Himachal Pradesh Act repeals any enactment then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act has not been passed.” 15. These definitions are in perimateria with Section 2(13) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 16. Section 3 of the Himachal Act is in Section 2(13) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. perimateria with Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. A reading of the statutory provisions is absolutely plain and does not call for any further explanation. 17. In R. Kapilanath (dead) through L.Rs. vs. Krishna, AIR 2003 SC 565 , the Supreme Court holds:- “4. The above submission of the learned counsel has been stated only to be rejected. It is pertinent to note that the proceedings in the court of munsif had already stood concluded by the time the amendment came into force. It is not disputed that Amendment Act no. 32 of 1994 has not been given a retrospective operation and there is nothing in the Act to infer retrospectivity by necessary implication. The Act has been specifically brought into force w.e.f. the 18th day of May, 1994. It is not disputed that Amendment Act no. 32 of 1994 has not been given a retrospective operation and there is nothing in the Act to infer retrospectivity by necessary implication. The Act has been specifically brought into force w.e.f. the 18th day of May, 1994. The learned counsel for the appellant cited a number of decisions laying down the law as to how an amendment in legislation brought into force during the pendency of legal proceedings has to be given effect to. Without stating the decisions so cited, suffice it to observe that all those decisions deal with substantive rights having been created or abolished during the pendency of legal proceedings and depending on the legislative intent and the language employed by the legislature in the relevant enactment, this Court has determined the impact of the legislation on pending proceedings and the power of the court to take note of change in law and suitably mould the relief consistently with the legislative changes. So far as the present case is concerned, the only submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the effect of the amendment is to deprive the court of munsif of its jurisdiction to hear and decide proceedings for eviction over such premises as the suit premises are. In other words, it is a change in forum brought during the pendency of the proceedings. The correct approach to be adopted in such cases is that a new law bringing about a change in forum does not affect pending actions, unless a provision is made in it for change over of proceedings or there is some other clear indication that pending actions are affected. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.P. Singh, 8th edition, 2001, p. 442). We have already indicated that the Act does not bring about a change in forum so far as the pending actions are concerned. Moreover by the time the amendment came into force, the proceedings before the munsif had already stood concluded and the case was pending at the stage of revision before the Additional District Judge. Further we find that an objection laying challenge to forum's competence was not raised before the learned Additional District Judge nor the objection was taken before the High Court in the civil revision preferred by the appellant. It was not taken as a ground in the special leave petition. Further we find that an objection laying challenge to forum's competence was not raised before the learned Additional District Judge nor the objection was taken before the High Court in the civil revision preferred by the appellant. It was not taken as a ground in the special leave petition. It has been taken only by way of a separate petition filed subsequently and seeking leave to urge additional grounds. Such an objection cannot be allowed to be urged so belatedly. However, we have already held the argument based on 1994 amendment as of no merit. (p.567) 18. In M/s. Punjab tin Supply Co., Chandigarh etc. etc. vs. Central Government and others, AIR 1984 SC 87 , the Supreme Court holds:- “17. All laws which affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive. Such retrospective effect may be given where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation is intended. Hence the question whether a statutory provision has retrospective effect or not depends primarily on the language in which it is couched. If the language is clear and unambiguous effect will have to be given to the provision in question in accordance with its tenor. If the language is not clear then the Court has to decide whether in the light of the surrounding circumstances retrospective effect should be given to it or not.” (pp.93-94) 19. I find from the amending Act of 2009 incorporated in the Act of 2012 that there is no date of its commencement. It also does not provide any `Repeal and Savings’ clause. I am not persuaded to hold that Section 34 of the 1987 Act can be used as an interpretive aid for the amending provisions of the Act of 2012 for the reasons that in Section 34 of the 1987 Act there is a direct reference to the Rent Act of 1971. I also cannot loose sight of the fact that with the amendment of the provisions in the Act of 2012, new rights are vested in the tenant as also the landlord. I also cannot loose sight of the fact that with the amendment of the provisions in the Act of 2012, new rights are vested in the tenant as also the landlord. But at the same time, I am not persuaded to hold that the amended provisions of Section 14 providing a right to the tenants for new premises on new terms of tenancy on the basis of mutual agreement between the landlord and the tenants deprive the landlord of a decree/order for eviction. The provisions to be made workable can only mean this that order of eviction can be passed keeping intact the right of the tenant for re-entry on “new terms of tenancy on mutual agreement”. I also find from the second proviso that in case of nonresidential premises, the landlord cannot compel a tenant to change his business under the new terms of tenancy. These are obviously beneficent provisions saving the rights of the tenants, but, at the same time not vesting an absolute mandatory right on the tenant to deprive the landlord of the use of the premises. 20. In Kailash Chand and Another vs. Dharam Dass, (2005)5 SCC 375 , the Supreme Court, while interpreting the provisions of the Himachal Act, holds:- “12. We find it difficult to accept the construction placed on the third proviso, in para 14 of the judgment in Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. (2000)4 SCC 285 . In Rakesh Wadhawan and Ors v. Jagdamba Industrial Corpn., (2002)5 SCC 440 , this Court has held that a statute can never be exhaustive. Legislature is incapable of contemplating all possible situations which may arise in future litigation and in myriad circumstances. The scope is always there for the Court to interpret the law with pragmatism and consistently with the demands of varying situations. The construction placed by the Court on statutory provisions has to be meaningful. The legislative intent has to be found out and effectuated. "Law is part of the social reality." (See Law in the Scientific Era by Justice Markandey Katju, 2000 Ed., p.33) "Though Law and Justice are not synonymous terms they have a close relationship, as pointed out by the American jurist Rawls. The legislative intent has to be found out and effectuated. "Law is part of the social reality." (See Law in the Scientific Era by Justice Markandey Katju, 2000 Ed., p.33) "Though Law and Justice are not synonymous terms they have a close relationship, as pointed out by the American jurist Rawls. Since one of the aims of the law is to provide order and peace in society, and since order and peace cannot last long if it is based on injustice, it follows that a legal system that can not meet the demands of justice will not survive long. As Rawls says "Laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well arranged, must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust" (ibid, p.72). Clearly law cannot be so interpreted as would cause oppression or be unjust.” (ibid.,p.72) Clearly, law cannot be so interpreted as would cause oppression or be unjust. 13. Life is not static and so the law cannot afford to be static. The third proviso cannot be so interpreted as to restrict the right conferred by sub- Section (3)(a)(i) on the landlord to be exercisable only "once in a life time". The proviso has to be read as providing a statutory expression of a situation which would otherwise have been held to be mala fides of a requirement. A landlord, having obtained possession of any building to satisfy a requirement, cannot again and again plead the same set of circumstances or similar circumstances for evicting tenants one after other. That is what the third proviso aims at providing. The proviso cannot be interpreted to mean that in spite of the requirement having undergone a change or a new requirement unrelated to the previous one having come into existence, the landlord would yet be denied relief under sub-Section (3)(a)(i) merely because at some point of time in the past he had resorted to this provision for seeking an eviction. Such an interpretation is too rigid an interpretation and would cause such hardship to the landlord as the Legislature cannot be said to have intended. The examples are available in decided cases and two such are: Jagir Singh v. Jagdish Pal Sagar, 1980(1) Ren CR 494 (P&H) and Brij Lal Puri v. Smt. Muni Tandon, AIR 1979 P&H 132 . 25. The examples are available in decided cases and two such are: Jagir Singh v. Jagdish Pal Sagar, 1980(1) Ren CR 494 (P&H) and Brij Lal Puri v. Smt. Muni Tandon, AIR 1979 P&H 132 . 25. Undoubtedly, the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 has been enacted for the purpose of providing for the control of rents and evictions because of paucity of accommodation in urban areas. The Rent Control Legislations, generally aim at preventing rack- renting and resorting to evictions by unscrupulous and greedy landlords, who take advantage of the shortage in availability of accommodations in cities and dictate their terms to the tenants and if they do not follow the dictates, subject them to eviction. The Rent Control Legislations are generally heavily loaded in favour of the tenants and the provision dealing with which the courts at times lean in favour of the landlords is the one which permits the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement for his own occupation, residential or nonresidential. There are weak amongst the tenants as also amongst the landlords. (See Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002)5 SCC 397 , SCC paras 9 and 32.) Take the case of a landlord knocking the doors of the court seeking its assistance for a roof over his head or for a reasonably comfortable living, when he is himself either in a rented accommodation or squeezing himself and his family members in a limited space, while the tenant protected by the Rent Control Law is comfortably occupying the premises of the landlord or a part thereof. Provisions like Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Act should be so interpreted as to advance the cause of justice instructed by the realties of life and practical wisdom. While the tenant needs to be protected, the courts would not ordinarily deny the relief to the landlord, who genuinely and bona fide requires the premises in occupation of the tenant for occupation by himself or for the members of his family, unless they feel convinced that the so-called requirement of the landlord was a ruse for getting rid of an inconvenient tenant or was otherwise mala fide and did not fall within the four corners of the ground for eviction provided by the law.” (pp.384-385 & 388) 21. I am not persuaded to hold that the interpretation of the law should and ought to be in a manner which is heavily loaded either against the landlord or the tenant. It is the purposive interpretation which has to be adopted. I also note that Section 34, which is `Repeal and Savings’ clause, has been left untouched and I cannot read into that provisions “Repeal and Saving of the 1987 Act”. Of course, once a particular provision is repealed or modified, it ceases to exist in its original form and is to be applied in the modified/substituted form have held that (a) there is no date of commencement provided in the Act of 2012, (b) there is no `Repeal or Savings’ clause. In this event, Section 5 of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act would be applicable from the date of its publication in the Rajpatra, as such, the Act of 2009 cannot be retrospective. 22. It would come into operation from the date of its publication in the Rajpatra which is 16th March, 2012 and would apply from that date. The landlord is not deprived of his right for seeking an order of eviction, but in execution of such an order under Section 14, ordering eviction of the tenant, he will be entitled to premises equivalent in area to the original premises on the conditions as provided in the proviso to clause (c) of sub-section 3 of Section 14. This would not be a pre-condition for passing an order of eviction, but a ground which can be taken up at the time of execution. I am fortified in taking this view from Section 14 which provides that no tenant can be evicted from the premises in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise, whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The protection of tenancy by inheritance, as provided in Section 2(j), would be available to all those tenants within the ambit of the amended provisions where cases are pending and same would be the position for determination of the standard rent as provided for under Sections 4 and 5. In the other provisions, namely, Section 7, the substitution is only of the word ‘standard rent’ in place of `fair rent’. In the other provisions, namely, Section 7, the substitution is only of the word ‘standard rent’ in place of `fair rent’. In this view of the matter, the point of law for interpretation urged is disposed of. Each individual petition shall be disposed of on what I hold on the interpretation of the provisions. The cases of tenants/landlords which have already been decided cannot invoke the provisions of the Act of 2012.