JUDGMENT 1. - The State and the complainant are aggrieved by the judgment dated 18.04.2009 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1 Bhilwara whereby the learned Judge has acquitted the accused-respondent, Kanhaiyalal, for offences under Sections 286, 304A IPC and Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substance Act, 1908 (the Act, for short). 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 24.12.2005, Ajeet Singh (P.W.4) registered a written report (Ex.P/7) at Police Station Banera. He claimed that his younger brother, Kan Singh and his sister-in-law, Pinky Kanwar, were travelling in a jeep to Musadevji. On the way, there was an explosion in the jeep, due to which, his brother died on the spot, and Smt. Pinky was gravely injured. He further alleged that Kanhaiyalal, the owner of the jeep, had placed the explosive substances in the jeep. On the basis of the said report, a formal FIR, FIR No.225/2005 was chalked out for offences under Sections 286, 304-A IPC and for offences under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. 3. In order to buttress its case, the prosecution examined thirty-four witness and submitted number of documents. In defence two witnesses were examined. 4. After going through the oral and documents evidence, the learned Judge acquitted the accused respondent. Hence, this criminal leave to appeal by the State and the revision petition by the complainant before this Court. Since both the Criminal Leave to Appeal and the Revision Petition arise out of the same impugned judgment, they are being decided by this common judgment. 5. Mr. Mahipal Bishnoi, the learned Public Prosecutor, has vehemently contended that the learned Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence in proper perspective. According to Momin Khan (P.W.2), Ganga Singh (P.W.5), Kamlesh (P.W.8), Laxman (P.W.9), Bheru Bharti (P.W.10), Vijay singh (P.W.11), Kailash Bharti (P.W.12), Smt. Nosar (P.W.13), Sher Singh rathore (P.W.14), and Smt. Chand Kanwar (P.W.18), the said jeep had suffered an explosive. Due to the said explosion, three persons had expired. Their testimonies are further corroborated by the Inspection Report (Ex.P/32) and by the testimony of Satyendra Singh (P.W.29). Despite these overwhelming evidence, the learned Judge has erroneously acquitted the accused-respondent. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the accused-respondent have vehemently contended that undoubtedly Kanhaiyalal is the owner of the concerned Jeep. Their testimonies are further corroborated by the Inspection Report (Ex.P/32) and by the testimony of Satyendra Singh (P.W.29). Despite these overwhelming evidence, the learned Judge has erroneously acquitted the accused-respondent. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the accused-respondent have vehemently contended that undoubtedly Kanhaiyalal is the owner of the concerned Jeep. However, the prosecution has not been able to place an iota of evidence to show that Kanhaiyalal had placed the explosive substance inside the tool box of the said jeep and had given the permission to his driver to drive the jeep. Merely because few of the witnesses claimed that Kanhaiyalal was engaged in the business of transporting explosive substance, their testimonies are not sufficient to prove the fact that the explosive substance was, indeed, placed by Kanhaiyalal in the tool-box of the said jeep. In absence of cogent evidence, it cannot be Floating Frame presumed either under Indian Penal Code or under the Act, that Kanhaiyalal is responsible for the explosive. Secondly, conviction cannot be based on suspicion. For, the prosecution has to travel the long distance from 'nat be true' to 'must be true'. Suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot take the place of proof. suspicion may take a long distance to travel to reach the place of proof. Lastly, the learned Judge has meticulously examined the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and has legally acquitted the accused-respondent. Therefore, the learned Judge has supported the impugned judgment. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment. 8. It is, indeed, trite to state that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if the prosecution were to create sufficient suspicion, it cannot take the place of proof. Moreover, conviction cannot be based on suspicion. But it must be proved on cogent evidence proving the guilt of the accused to the hilt. 9. In the present case, it is true that Momin Khan (P.W.2), Ganga Singh (P.W.5), Kamlesh (P.W.8), Laxman (P.W.9), Bheru Bharti (P.W.10), Vijay singh (P.W.11), Kailash Bharti (P.W.12), Smt. Nosar (P.W.13), Sher Singh Rathoere (P.W.14), and Smt. Chand Kanwar (P.W.18) have deposed that the jeep had suffered an explosion. Their testimonies were further corroborated by Satyendra Singh (P.W.29) and the Report of the FSL. Their testimonies were further corroborated by Satyendra Singh (P.W.29) and the Report of the FSL. According to Satyebdra Singh (P.W.29) he took the metal box and pieces of the detonator and explosive substance from the site of the explosion. The said testimony merely proved that the jeep had suffered an explosion. However, there is no evidence to show that Kanhaiyalal had placed the explosive substance inside the tool box of the jeep. Moreover, there is nothing to show that a rash negligent act was committed by Kanhaiyalal. Merely because, some of the witnesses claimed that he was engaged in the business of transporting explosive substances, it would not prove the fact that he was, indeed, engaged in the said business. For, their testimonies are based on hearsay evidence. The learned Judge has clearly noted that the prosecution has not been able to produce any evidence to show such business transaction were made by him. Moreover, when the house of accused-respondent was searched, no incriminating evidence was discovered to connect him for such a business transaction. In fact, when his house was searched, no explosive substance was found. 10. Further, there is neither any presumption under Section 286 of IPC, nor under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act that in case explosion were to take place in a vehicle, a presumption shall be drawn against the owner of the vehicle. 11. Since the prosecution has not produced any cogent evidence, the learned Judge was certainly justified in giving the benefit of doubt to Kanhaiyalal. Since the learned Judge has given legal and cogent reasons for acquitting Kanhaiyalal, the accused-respondent, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment. 12. Hence, the criminal leave to appeal filed by the State and the revision petition filed by the complainant are devoid of any merit; they are, hereby, dismissed.Appeal Dismissed. *******