JUDGMENT ( 1. ) The petitioner by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailed the adverse ACR for the year ending March, 2005 communicated to him by Annexure P/2 dated 23-9-2005. Against the said ACR, the petitioner's representation was rejected by communication dated 13-9-2006. These two orders were called in question in W.P. No. 3149/2007(S). (b) Annual Confidential Report - Review - There are no statutory rules to deal with the ACRs but executive instructions hold the field which enable to interfere at the stage of review. The petitioner has specifically pleaded that there is no application of mind by the authorities while rejecting his representation. The department has not chosen to file and produce any document to show that reasons are recorded in other file or note-sheet. In absence thereof it cannot be held that there is any application of mind on the representation of the petitioner against ACR. In view of this, the ends of justice would be met if the rejection order dated 13-9-2006 and review order dated 31-5-2010 are quashed and set aside. It is directed that the higher authorities shall consider petitioner's representation against ACR in an objective, constructive, scientific and dispassionate manner without getting influenced by the earlier rejection orders quashed in this case. Accordingly, by quashing the order dated 13-9-2006 and 31-5-2010, the matter is remitted back to respondent No. 1 to decide the petitioner's representation against ACR. 1994 Suppl. (3) SCC 424, 2009 (17) SCC 770 , (1991) 3 SCC 38 , 2010 (3) SCC 732 , 2010 (9) SCC 496 and 2005 (3) MPLJ 313 , Re1. (Paras 19 to 25) ( 2. ) The petitioner preferred a review petition before the reviewing authority and during the pendency of W.P. No. 3149/2007(S), the said review petition was rejected by the competent authority by communication dated 31-5-2010. This rejection order dated 31-5-2010 Annexure P/1 is assailed by the petitioner by filing a separate petition W.P. No. 13221/2010. Thus both petitions are arising out of ACR communicated vide order dated 23-9-2005. Since the questions involved are common, with the consent of the parties, matters are analogously heard and decided by common judgment. ( 3. ) The petitioner/Sub Divisional Officer (Forest) was served with the impugned ACR Annexure P/2 vide order dated 23-9-2005. Thus both petitions are arising out of ACR communicated vide order dated 23-9-2005. Since the questions involved are common, with the consent of the parties, matters are analogously heard and decided by common judgment. ( 3. ) The petitioner/Sub Divisional Officer (Forest) was served with the impugned ACR Annexure P/2 vide order dated 23-9-2005. In W. P. No. 3149/2007(S), the petitioner assailed it and impleaded the Reporting Officer eo nomine. ( 4. ) Shri Ruprah submits that against Annexure P/2, the petitioner preferred a detailed representation pregnant with facts and grounds to say that Annexure P/2 is perverse, factually incorrect and legally improper. The petitioner's representation is rejected by a single stroke of pen without assigning any reasons vide Annexure P/7 dated 13-9-2006. To elaborate, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no reasons are assigned in Annexure P/7 while rejecting the representation. ( 5. ) Shri Ruprah further submits that anterior to and subsequent to, the impugned ACR the petitioner's grading was 'Very good outstanding'. A chart Annexure P/6 reflecting yearwise grading of ACRs is filed along with W. P. No. 13221/2010(S). The averments of this chart, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits, are not denied by the respondents. He submits that a bare perusal of chart shows that except the ACRs in question, all ACRS anterior to and subsequent to it are 'Very Good/outstanding'. He submits that a person cannot become incompetent for a particular year all of a sudden. ( 6. ) Shri Ruprah submits that in the impugned ACR, the reporting officer opined against him and graded him as . The Reviewing Officer upgraded him +'. However, to the petitioner's misfortune the accepting authority has again downgraded and agreed with the reporting officers and graded the petitioner as '. The petitioner's departmental representation could not yield any result and the review petition also met with the same fate. Shri Ruprah, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per G.A.D. Circular dated 31-5-1969, there exists a provision to prefer a review petition within a stipulated period of six months from the date of grievance and the said authority has power to condone the delay in fit cases. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned ACR is based on subjective opinion of respondent No. 5 and such an ACR cannot sustain as per settled legal position. ( 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned ACR is based on subjective opinion of respondent No. 5 and such an ACR cannot sustain as per settled legal position. ( 7. ) Shri Ruprah in this regard relied on Pawan S. Chauhan vs. State of Rajasthan, (2009)7 SCC 707 and submitted that an officer, who was 'Very good outstanding' anterior to and subsequent to, impugned ACR cannot be an average officer and such impugned ACR itself shows that it is written in subjective manner ( 8. ) The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in W. P. No. 13221/2010, the entire note sheets of the proceedings which led to issuance of Annexure P/1 dated 31st May, 2010 are filed. Drawing attention of this Court to the said document, Shri Ruprah submits that the petitioner submitted a detailed representation and the said representation is already filed in W. P. No. 3149/2007 (S) against the ACR which is Annexure P/6 dated 10-1-2006. In this representation he has specifically mentioned that Gawasen Depot was not under him and, therefore, various warning and notices were issued against the petitioner regarding improper functioning and seeking information with regard to that Depot were of no consequence. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that if the petitioner's entire representation is dealt with in a dispassionate manner, it will be clear that the ACR in question is outcome of a subjective reporting by the Reporting Officer, respondent No. 5 herein. ( 9. ) It is the case of the petitioner that respondent No. 5 even recommended to initiate disciplinary action against the petitioner. The matter with regard to the aforesaid recommendation and the ACRs in question were again examined by the subsequent officers of the State i.e. equivalent to reporting and the reviewing officer and they opined in Annexures P/10, P/11, P/12 and P/13 that the petitioner's report regarding availability of material with regard to Gawasen Depot tallies with the stock and material available with the Department. He further submits that the aforesaid annexures make it crystal clear that the subsequent competent authorities dealt with and did not agree with the finding of the reporting officer respondent No. 5 in the other petition. ( 10. He further submits that the aforesaid annexures make it crystal clear that the subsequent competent authorities dealt with and did not agree with the finding of the reporting officer respondent No. 5 in the other petition. ( 10. ) Shri Ruprah submits that the findings of the said authorities are in favour of the petitioner on each and every point and they not only examined it but also found suitable to hold that disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated against the petitioner. They opined in favour of reviewing officer's ACR grading. Shri Ruprah further submits that in the light of aforesaid, a heavy recommendation was made in favour of the petitioner and even the departmental authorities were of the opinion that delay in filing review be condoned and the Reviewing authority should deal with the case on merits of the matter but unfortunately the said authority has dismissed it on the ground that the matter is pending/subjudiced in W. P. No 3149/2007(S) and report of the subsequent authority cannot be taken into account to annul the ACR of the year ending 2005. ( 11. ) Shri Ruprah submits that the submission and averments of the review petition were not taken into account and on these reasons, the review petition is rejected which is bad in law. ( 12. ) Per contra, the learned Government Advocate supported the ACR, the rejection order and the review order. The learned Govt. Advocate submits that the petitioner's performance was not up to the mark and, therefore, the controlling officer wrote letter to the petitioner. He drew the attention of the Court to Annexures R/1, R/ 2, R/3 and R/7 and submits that in view of these documents, it is clear that the petitioner's performance was fit to be graded as and the said authority has not committed any error in grading the petitioner in such a fashion. More so, when that grading got a stamp of approval from the accepting authority. The learned counsel for the State submits that once the accepting authority upheld the grading against the petitioner, there was no question of any malice. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that respondent No. 5 in a malicious manner intended to spoil the record of the petitioner. The learned counsel for the State submits that once the accepting authority upheld the grading against the petitioner, there was no question of any malice. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that respondent No. 5 in a malicious manner intended to spoil the record of the petitioner. The learned Counsel further submits that because respondent No. 5 took disciplinary action against more than 53 employees, this cannot be a ground to interfere in the matter. The disciplinary action against a particular employee depends on the fact which led to taking of such a decision and no interference or conclusion can be drawn against the respondent No. 5 on this basis. In nut shell the learned counsel for the Govt. submits that as per executive instruction/ coupled with the provision contained in circular dated 31-5-1969, the petitioner should have preferred his review application within six months from the date of rejection order whereas the petitioner has preferred it admittedly after 3 years and, therefore, no interference is warranted in this petition. He submits that writing of ACR is the prerogative of the employer and this Court has limited jurisdiction to entertain the petition. This Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution as an appellate authority. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. ( 13. ) It is not in dispute between the parties that except the impugned ACR for the year ending 2005 anterior to and subsequent to this ACR, entire service record of the petitioner is either 'Very good/outstanding'. The petitioner has preferred a detailed representation dealing with each and every point, which were opined against him by Annexure P/2. IT is true that the ACR is not treated as a punishment in service jurisprudence but it has potential to spoil the career of an employee for all times to come. In this view, in catena of judgments, the Supreme Court has held that ACR should be written in a objective, scientific and dispassionate manner with a view to improve the officer. The ACR should be the mirror image of performance of the officer. IT is further opined by the Supreme Court that ACR cannot be permitted to be used as a weapon of colonial era in the hands of an officer. The ACR should be the mirror image of performance of the officer. IT is further opined by the Supreme Court that ACR cannot be permitted to be used as a weapon of colonial era in the hands of an officer. In the light of these pronouncements, it is required to be seen whether the impugned action can sustain. Pausing for a moment, it may be remembered that the Apex Court in 5. Ramachandra Raju vs. State of orissa, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 424 held as under: ".....When anterior to or subsequent to 1987-88, he was a man of ability and of integrity, the same would become below average only for the academic year 1987-88 without descernible reason. IT would speak volumes on the objectivity of assessment by the reporting officer i.e. the Principal. This conduct leaves much to be desired. This case would establish as a stark reality that writing confidential reports bears onerous responsibility on the reporting officer to eschew his subjectivity and personal prejudices or proclivity or predilections and to make objective assessment. He should adopt fair, objective, dispassionate and constructive commends/comments in estimating or assessing the character, ability, integrity and responsibility displaced by the officer/employee concerned during the relevant period." The same view is taken by Supreme Court in Pawan S. Chamdra vs. State of Rajasthan, 2009 (17) SCC 770 . ( 14. ) So far the argument of petitioner regarding non assigning of reasons in the rejection in review order is concerned, it cannot be doubted that executive instructions in hand does not provide any need for recording reasons while rejecting representation. This question about issuing of speaking order while dealing with representation against ACR came for consideration before the Apex Court in (1991) 3 SCC 38 , Union of India and others vs. E. G. Nambudiri. In para 10 of the said judgment, the Apex Court held that recording of reasons may not be requirement of the provision but the authority is required to act in a fair and just manner which is required to consider the questions raised by the Government servant and examine the same in the light of comments made by the officer who awarded the adverse entries. It is further held that this should not be taken in a manner that the administrative authority is at liberty to pass orders without there being any reasons for the same. It is further held that this should not be taken in a manner that the administrative authority is at liberty to pass orders without there being any reasons for the same. It does not give any licence to the authority to act in an arbitrary manner. It is further held that if such an order, which does not contain any reason, is challenged in a Court of law, it is always open to the competent authority to place reasons before the Court which may have led to the rejection of the representation. The petitioner has specifically pleaded that there is no application of mind by the authorities while rejecting his representation. The department has not chosen to file and produce any document to show that reasons are recorded in other file or note sheet. In absence thereof, I am unable to hold that there is any application of mind on the representation of the petitioner against ACR. This Court in 2005 (3) MPLJ 313 , Ramesh Kumar Rusia vs. State of M. P. and others held that mechanical rejection of representation against ACR is liable to be quashed and remitted the matter back for reconsideration in the light of aforesaid analysis, I have no hesitation to hold that rejection order dated 13-9-2005 is bad in law and therefore, it is quashed and set aside. It is held by the Apex Court that reasons are heart beat of conclusions in (2010) 3 SCC 732 , Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall vs. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and others, in a recent judgment in (2010) 9 SCC 496, Kranti Associates Private Limited and another vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, the Apex Court emphasised the principles and need for recording of reasons as under :- (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) it cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of judicial Candor) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija vs. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions ". See Ruiz Torija vs. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions ". (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process ". ( 15. ) So far as Annexures R/1, R/2, R/3 and R/7 are concerned, it appears that the petitioner was served with these letters. However, most of these letters were replied by the petitioner and the petitioner took a specific stand that there was allegation against the petitioner in Annexure P/2 with regard to Gawasan Depot. The petitioner has taken a stand that the said Depot was not under his charge and subsequently it was found that the reports which was given by the petitioner as per order of respondent No. 5 were matching with the reports of the Department and the competent authority should have applied his mind on this aspect as well. However, I find substance in the argument of the learned Government Counsel that this Court is not obliged to act as an appellate authority in the present matter. This Court is not concerned with the decision but is' examining the decision making process. If decision making process is vitiated or polluted, certainly this Court can exercise its jurisdiction and interfere in the matter. ( 16. ) On the basis of this litmus test validity of Annexure P/1 dated 31-5- 2010 and P/7 dated 13-9-2006 may be examined. It is true that circular dated 31-5-1969 Annexure P/8 provides a limitation of six months for preferring a representation. However, the competent authority dealt with the merits of the case. Although Annexure P/1 does not contain any reason as to why the petitioner's representation was rejected. The reasons are clear from the perusal of page 46. A bare perusal of this note sheet on the strength of which Annexure P/1 was passed clearly shows that the reviewing authority has not rejected the review petition on the ground of delay and laches. It has considered certain aspect of the matter and rejected the same. The reasons are clear from the perusal of page 46. A bare perusal of this note sheet on the strength of which Annexure P/1 was passed clearly shows that the reviewing authority has not rejected the review petition on the ground of delay and laches. It has considered certain aspect of the matter and rejected the same. Thus, delay appears to have been condoned by the said authority when it was dealing with merits of the matter. In other words, once the said authority wholly dealt with matter on merits, it can be presumed that the delay was not a hurdle in the matter to adjudicate upon the review petition of the petitioner. In that event, it was obligatory for this authority also to deal with the points raised by the petitioner in his review petition. However, the said authority has only dealt with the ground that W.P. No. 3149/2007(S) is pending before this Court. The Rules do not provide review and the subsequent officer's opinion cannot be a ground to interfere in the matter. In the opinion of this Court, all the three reasons assigned cannot sustain. There was no interim order in W.P. No. 3149/2007(S) preventing the reviewing authority to decide the review petition and, therefore, this reason is unsustainable. Admittedly, there are no statutory rules to deal with the ACRs and, therefore/reference to Rules is a misconceived notion on the part of the reviewing authority. In absence of rules, the executive instructions will hold the field and the executive instructions dated 31-5-1969 had an enabling provision to interfere at the stage of review. Thirdly, the Reviewing authority had picked up certain points and decided the same on merits. However, the points raised by the petitioner in his review petition were not dealt with on merits. The said authority was required to examine the contentions of the petitioner when he dealt with the matters partially. ( 17. ) In the aforesaid factual backdrop and on the basis of aforesaid legal position, the possibility of subjective recording of ACR in question against the petitioner cannot be ruled out. The judgment in S. Ramchandra Raju (supra) also supports the case of the petitioner. In this view of the matter, the end of justice would be met if the rejection order dated 13-9-2006 and review order dated 31-5-2010 are quashed and set aside. The judgment in S. Ramchandra Raju (supra) also supports the case of the petitioner. In this view of the matter, the end of justice would be met if the rejection order dated 13-9-2006 and review order dated 31-5-2010 are quashed and set aside. It is directed that the higher authorities shall consider petitioner's representation against ACR in an objective, constructive, scientific and dispassionate manner without getting influenced by the earlier rejection orders quashed in this case. Accordingly, by quashing the orders dated 13-9-2006 and 31-5-2010, the matter is remitted back to respondent No. 1 to decide the petitioner's representation against ACR within three months, the outcome of representation shall be communicated to the petitioner. The petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above. Petitions allowed.