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2012 DIGILAW 942 (PAT)

Abhishek Kumar v. State Of Bihar

2012-07-06

PRAKASH CHANDRA VERMA, VIKASH JAIN

body2012
ORDER This writ application and L.P.A. have been filed in which challenge has been made to the Land Acquisition Proceedings initiated vide L.A. No.19 of 2007-08 whereby the State Government has acquired 96.71 acres of land to set up an industrial area at village- Kopakala, Naubatpur, District- Patna and also for quashing the allotment letter dated 03.06.2011 contained under Ref: No.2815/D issued by the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as „BIADA?) annexed as Annexure-4 by which BIADA has allotted 42 acres of land out of aforesaid 96.71 acres to United Breweries Limited for establishment of a beer industry and also for quashing the entire process of land acquisition under notification dated 10.12.2007 issued by the Land Acquisition Directorate under the Revenue and Land Reforms Department contained in Annexure-1. 2. The writ petition as well as the L.P.A. was disposed on 31.03.2012 on the concession granted to Mr. Ambuj Nayan Chaubey learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and the appellant in L.P.A. that he moved the application for review/recall of the order withdrawing his concession accordingly, the order so was recalled on 16.05.2012. Parties were heard on merit on the writ petition and L.P.A. and were also required to give their written argument. The written arguments filed by the respective parties are taken on record. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the allotment letter is illegal and it frustrates the very public purpose in the garb of which the acquisition was made. The government has played fraud upon the citizens of the State by allotting the land to establish a beer factory. The land acquired for Sugar Mill cannot be allotted for establishment of a beer factory. The Government cannot do business over the lands of its citizens. The action and omission on the part of the Government is violative of the right of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 14, 21 & 300A of the Constitution of India. For the acquisition purpose Land Acquisition Case No.19 of 2007-08 was instituted before the District Land Acquisition Officer, Patna. Although after preparation of award notices were issued for payment of 80% amount on the fixed dates under Section 17A of the Act but nothing has been paid so far to any of the petitioner. It is worth mentioning here that the notices were also not served upon all the petitioners. 4. Although after preparation of award notices were issued for payment of 80% amount on the fixed dates under Section 17A of the Act but nothing has been paid so far to any of the petitioner. It is worth mentioning here that the notices were also not served upon all the petitioners. 4. It is pertinent to mention here that one Rajan Sharma being one of the victims of the aforesaid irregular acquisition proceeding, preferred CWJC No.921 of 2008 challenging the acquisition. The aforesaid writ application was dismissed vide order dated 09.05.2008 against which LPA No.580 of 2008 is connected with the present writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the acquisition was made for establishment of a sugar factory which might be in public interest keeping in view the production of sugarcane and employment but nonetheless no one turned up before the Government showing its interest in establishment of Sugar Mill. The BIADA time and again advertised the availability of the acquired land for establishment of the Sugar Mill inviting interest from the interested entrepreneur but of no avail. Suddenly the BIADA for the reasons best known to the concerned authorities, issued an allotment letter dated 03.06.2011 contained in reference No.2815/D in favour of one M/S. United Breweries Ltd. Allotting thereby 42 acres of land out of aforesaid acquired land on lease of 90 years for the purpose of establishment of a Beer Industry. The BIADA charged Rs.46934748/- from M/S United Breweries Ltd., at the rate of more than Rs.11 lakhs per acre which is more than twice the compensation amount of about Rs.5.5 lakhs per acre as per the aforesaid notice. 6. It is further submitted that respondent No.7 has started changing the nature of the land. It will be very difficult for the petitioners and others to regain the nature of the land, if it would be changed in the manner by the respondent No.7 for establishing beer factory. For the purpose of establishment of either Sugar Mill or Beer Factory, there are various waste lands at nearby location but the Government deliberately choose the fertile lands of the petitioners to suit industrialist without there being any cogent public purpose. The Government ought to have returned the lands of the petitioners and others, if it did not succeed in establishing any sugar mill as was shown as the sole purpose of the public interest. The Government ought to have returned the lands of the petitioners and others, if it did not succeed in establishing any sugar mill as was shown as the sole purpose of the public interest. Moreover, the whole acquisition process itself vitiated by virtue of non-existence of the public interest and non-payment of the compensation amount to the petitioners and others. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that it is well settled by the Apex Court that Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers power upon the State to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even a few weeks or months. Therefore, before excluding the application of Section 5A, the authority concerned must be fully satisfied that time of few weeks or months is likely to be taken in conducting inquiry under Section 5A which will frustrate the public purpose for which and is proposed to be acquired. The exercise of Power by the Govt. under Section 17(1) does not necessarily result in exclusion of Section 5A of the Act in terms of which any person interested in land can file objection and is entitled to be heard in support of this objection. The use of word “May” in Sub-section (4) of Section 17 makes it clear that it merely enables the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5A would not apply to the cases covered under Sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17. In other words, invoking of Section 17(4) is not a necessary concomitant of the exercise of power under Section 17(1). The acquisition of land for residential, commercial, industrial or institutional purposes can be treated as an acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of Section 4 but that by itself does not justify the exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(1) and/or 17(4). The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution and implementation of the schemes relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial and institutional areas usually take few years. Therefore, the private property cannot be required for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). In this case exclusion of the rule of audi alteram partem embodied in Section 5A (1) & (2) is not at all warranted in such matters. Therefore, the private property cannot be required for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). In this case exclusion of the rule of audi alteram partem embodied in Section 5A (1) & (2) is not at all warranted in such matters. The Government has miserably failed in even finding out a proposer for establishment of Sugar Mill in last four years. So, it was not warranted on the part of the Government to notify the acquisition under Section 17(1) or (4) of the Act. The Government cannot run a business with the valuable lands of the Citizens and the Government/BIADA had no right to allot the lands for establishment of beer factory. The establishment of Sugar Mill would not come under the purview of public purpose. 8. In reply learned Additional Advocate General-I appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority submitted that the land in question was acquired for the purpose of industrialization of the State for setting up an industry including sugar industry, in furtherance of the object of industrialization of the State, the acquisition of the land was for industrialization and the present allotment of land is also for industrialization which would lead to increase in agriculture based raw material for the brewery, it would lead to increase employment opportunities for local farmers and people and would bring in revenue to the State. Thus, the petitioners cannot contend that the acquisition and the present allotment are not for public purpose. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 to 6 further contended that the authority under the Bihar Industrial Area Development Act, 1974 allots lands for setting up industries which is a public purpose and once the land has been acquired and its possession taken, it is not necessary that the land should be utilized only for the purpose for which it had been acquired and not for any other public purpose later on. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that as the Sugar Mill was not established the lands which have been acquired for it should be returned to them as it could be utilized only for putting up a sugar mill is not sustainable. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that as the Sugar Mill was not established the lands which have been acquired for it should be returned to them as it could be utilized only for putting up a sugar mill is not sustainable. The process of acquisition of the above land was undertaken by the Government through the Collector, Patna for the purpose of Land Bank Scheme for the Industrial Development Authority for industrialization, Sugar Mill and for important development schemes granted as is evident from the administrative approval granted by the Industries Department, Bihar vide letter bearing Memo No.1397 dated 16.03.2007. Thus, the land was to be acquired for public purpose. 10. It is further stated on behalf of the respondents that the notification under Section 4 of the Act on 10.12.2007 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 13.12.2007, out of 105 acres of land, 6.83 acres of land were released from acquisition proceeding as the land owners of these lands were not willing to give their lands for acquisition and acquisition proceeding was initiated only with respect to the remaining 98.17 acres of land for which the land owners had expressed their consent as it clear from letter dated 04.05.2007 (Annexure-C) and Agreement (Annexure-E) with 60 farmers were also entered with recital that they have agreed to sell the land to Government. Thus, in view of the above consent of the land owners and the agreement with their consent to sell the land, it appears that the land acquisition proceeding vide Notification dated 10.12.2007 and Declaration dated 13.12.2007 was initiated by the Government under the Emergency Provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as after the said consents there remained no occasion for the land owners to raise any objection to the acquisition and thus purpose of Section 5A of the Act was no longer in existence. Therefore, the grievance of the petitioners is that there was no occasion to resort to emergency provisions under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act is not sustainable and both these applications are devoid of any merit is fit to be dismissed. 11. Mr. Therefore, the grievance of the petitioners is that there was no occasion to resort to emergency provisions under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act is not sustainable and both these applications are devoid of any merit is fit to be dismissed. 11. Mr. Satyabir Bharti, learned counsel for the respondent No.7 submitted that for the purpose of planned development of industrial areas and promotion of industries, the Bihar Industrial Areas Development Authority Act, 1974 has been enacted by the State Legislature under which BIADA has been constituted as an Authority for fulfillment of the aforesaid object. Section 9(1) of the aforesaid Act enables the State Government to acquire any land required for the purpose of the Authority, which shall be deemed to be “public purpose” under the land Acquisition Act, 1894. He further submitted that on 16.03.2007 (Annexure-A), the Industries Department, Government of Bihar gave an administrative approval for acquisition of 105 acres of land at Vill. Kopakalan for the purpose of Land Bank Scheme of Infrastructure Development Authority for Industrialization, setting up a sugar mill and for important development schemes. Thereafter, the Industries Department vide letter dated 17.03.2007 (Annexure-B) sent requisition to the Collector, Patna to acquire lands at Mauza Kopakalan, Block- Naubatpur measuring an area of 105 acres which was subsequently reduced to 96.71 acres of land invoking the emergent provisions as contained in Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. 12. Learned counsel for respondent No.7 submitted that a proposal to BIADA for setting up of a brewery was made. The proposed investment was to the tune of more than 200 crores and would be a State of Art brewery with zero discharge of trade effluent, thus causing absolutely no pollution. Besides the expected revenue collection to the State Government would be at least Rs. 250 crores per annum and at the same time will create employment opportunity to more than 250 people. Since, it is an agriculture based industry and barley is the major raw material which is an agricultural produce, as such it will provide opportunity for the agriculturists of the area for cultivation of barley and sale to the industry. The project upon approval by the BIADA by the impugned allotment letter dated 03.06.2011 allotted 41.97 acres of land at Industrial Plot No.A-1 in Industrial Area, Kopakala which was acquired by the impugned land acquisition proceedings. The project upon approval by the BIADA by the impugned allotment letter dated 03.06.2011 allotted 41.97 acres of land at Industrial Plot No.A-1 in Industrial Area, Kopakala which was acquired by the impugned land acquisition proceedings. The Respondent No.7 for allotment of the aforesaid land paid a sum of Rs.4,69,34,748.00 to BIADA and possession was handed over on 06.09.2011. The Respondent No.7 additionally paid compensation to the land owners @ Rs.10.40 lacs per acre and has made payment to the tune of Rs.2.50 crores to the land owners and Rs.15 crores have already been invested in the project till date. 13. He further submitted that a delay of three years in preferring the writ application inasmuch as admittedly the acquisition proceedings was initiated in the year 2007 whereas the writ application came to be filed in the fag end of 2011 and in the meantime after acquisition, the lands was handed over to BIADA and thereafter a portion of the land to the Respondent No.7 to set up an industry in the industrial area so created by BIADA upon possession being handed over to BIADA. The writ petitioners admittedly had no objection to the acquisition proceedings and had in fact consented to the acquisition of the lands and after three years they have turned around and challenged the acquisition proceedings. Law is well settled that in matters involving challenge to the acquisition of land for “public purpose”, delay in filing the writ petition should be viewed seriously and relief denied to the petitioners if he fails to offer plausible explanation for the delay in preferring the writ petition. The Courts have also held that the delay of even few years would be fatal to the cause of the petitioner, if the acquired land has been partly or wholly utilized for the public purpose. In the case of Girdharan Prasad Missir V. State of Bihar reported in (1980) 2 SCC 445 and (2002)7 SCC 712 , the delay of 17 months & two years respectively were considered as a good ground for declining reliefs to the petitioner. 14. He further submitted that the lands in question were acquired upon express consent of the land owners and only after the consent had been granted by the land owners, notification under Section 4 r/w Section 17(4) was issued on 10.12.2007. 14. He further submitted that the lands in question were acquired upon express consent of the land owners and only after the consent had been granted by the land owners, notification under Section 4 r/w Section 17(4) was issued on 10.12.2007. It is relevant to mention here that the records as disclosed in the supplementary counter affidavit filed by Respondent No.7 in the pending writ petition and by the State respondent in the L.P.A. that except for the writ petitioner Nos.22 & 23, none of the writ petitioners as well as the sole appellant in the appeal are awardees in pursuance to the land acquisition proceedings and the awardees/owners of the lands so claimed by the writ petitioners and the appellant are persons different from the writ petitioners and appellant. In the light of the recent decision of the Hon?ble Apex Court in the case of Radhey Shyam Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, as reported in (2011) 5 SCC 553 , it has been sought to be contended that the acquisition for lands for industrial purpose does not justify the exercise of powers by the Government under Section 17(1) and/or 17(4). At the outset, it is stated that the facts and circumstances of the said case are absolutely different from the facts and circumstances of the present case as in the present case the acquisition have been made with consent of land owners. 15. Learned counsel for respondent No.7 submitted that law is well settled as enunciated in the celebrated judgment in the case of Kesavananda Bharti Vrs. State of Kerela (1973) 4 SCC 225 that legislation designed to secure public good and to implement the Directives under Article 39(b) and (c) should have priority over individual rights and that the Fundamental Rights were to be subordinate to Directive Principles of State Policy. It was further held that Directive Principles under Article 39(b) and (c) are not limited to agrarian reforms. Directives Principles are necessary for the uplift and growth of industry in the country. Industrial democracy is the necessary complement to political democracy. The State has to serve its members by organizing an avenue of consumption. This can be done by socializing of those elements in the common welfare which are integral to the well being of the community. Directives Principles are necessary for the uplift and growth of industry in the country. Industrial democracy is the necessary complement to political democracy. The State has to serve its members by organizing an avenue of consumption. This can be done by socializing of those elements in the common welfare which are integral to the well being of the community. Thus, the acquisition for upliftment and growth of industry is in terms of the Directives contained in Article 39(b) and (c) and individual rights should give way to secure public goods. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this writ petition and the appeal are fit to be dismissed. 16. We proceed to examine the points raised by Shri Chaubey and the reply thereon. 17. First and important point raised by Shri Chaubey is that transfer of acquired land by the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority vide letter dated 03.06.2011 contained under Ref: No. 2815/D deserves to be quashed on the ground that the public purpose for which the land in dispute was acquired became non-existent as after advertisement no company came to establish the sugar factory for the purpose of which the land was acquired. He emphatically argued that the establishment of alcohol factory cannot be said to be a public purpose as every State are making endeavour to prohibit the consumption of intoxicating drinks or alcohol as it does not improve the public health as enshrined under Article 47 of the Constitution of India. In Chapter-4 the larger public interests in the various articles have been enumerated for which the policy of the State should be directed or endeavour has to be made by the State to achieve that policy in the larger public interest. 18. In reply to this learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that land was acquired by BIADA for growth in State of Bihar and in the wake of non-coming up of any company to establish sugar mill, the other auctions were considered for industrial growth in the State and the land was allotted to respondent No.7 for establishment of beer factory. 19. Regulation of production, supply and sale of alcohol fit for human consumption including the beer have become very good source of revenue of the States and every State has enacted enactment in this regard. 19. Regulation of production, supply and sale of alcohol fit for human consumption including the beer have become very good source of revenue of the States and every State has enacted enactment in this regard. Thus, the reason of the Government to establish the Beer Factory is for the industrial growth in the State and for the more augmentation of revenue which is in the largest interest. Article-31C of the Constitution was inserted by 1971 3 of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 with effect from 28th April, 1972. The validity of 25th Amendment Act was challenged in Supreme Court which was decided in celebrated case well famous in the name of Fundamental Rights Case. Kesavananda Bharti Sripadagalvaru and others V. The State of Kerala and Another reported in AIR 1973 SC 1461 . The majority in the aforesaid judgment upheld the constitutional validity of Article 31C by which the provisions of Clause B and Clause-C of Article-39 have given primacy over the fundamental right contained in Articles-14 & 19 of the Constitution, if the Act really seeks to achieve the objectives contained therein. 20. By 42nd Amendment Act an amendment was made in Article-31C by Clause 4 of the Constitution 42 Amendment Act, 1976 land was inserted as under: “4. Amendment of article 31C.- In article 31C of the Constitution, for the words, brackets, letters and figures “the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39”, the words and figures “all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV” shall be substituted.” Validity of this Act came to be considered in 42nd Amendment Act especially it was considered in Minerva Mills case and in Waman Rao?s case quoted respectively by the same Constitution Bench by majority in both the judgments (supra). It has been held that insertion of Article-31C as it stood prior to 42nd Amendment Act made was valid and 4 of the 42nd Amendment was unconstitutional. Thus, violation of fundamental rights under Articles-14 & 19 will not be a ground to challenge the Act which really seeks to achieve the objectives contained in Clause-B or Clause-C of Article-39. In respect of other articles or clauses of the article of Chapter 4. The Violation of Articles-14 & 19 can be claimed. Thus, violation of fundamental rights under Articles-14 & 19 will not be a ground to challenge the Act which really seeks to achieve the objectives contained in Clause-B or Clause-C of Article-39. In respect of other articles or clauses of the article of Chapter 4. The Violation of Articles-14 & 19 can be claimed. Thus, the larger interest contained under Clauses-B & C of Article-39 have been given supremacy over the other directive principles contained in Chapter-4. It has been held in Kesavananda Bharti Sripadagalvaru and others V. The State of Kerala and Another reported in AIR 1973 SC 1461 that directive principles contained under Article 39B & C is not grant refused. Thus, the principles are necessary for the upliftment and growth of industry in the country. Industrial democracy is the necessary complements to political democracy. The State has to be served its member by organizing and avenue of augmentation of revenue. This can be done only by socialization of these elements in the common welfare which are integral to the well being of the community. Since the grant of permission and allotment of land to establish beer industry is for more augmentation of revenue and production of beer fit for human consumption which shall create avenue of more revenue to the State as well as shall generate employment is in the larger public interest of the State. It is settled law that after acquisition of land for public purpose can be transferred to any other public purpose. Thus, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners fails and is hereby rejected. 21. The next point argued by Shri Chaubey is that urgency clause has wrongly been invoked. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that a proposal was sent by the BIADA for industrial growth in the Bihar to acquire the land for establishment of industries which was accepted by the Secretary, Industrial Development and accordingly decision was taken to acquire the land. Before acquisition proceedings, the efforts were made to negotiate with the owners of the land and these owners gave consent of the land who gave consent for acquisition their land have been acquired. Therefore, the petitioners cannot say that urgency clause was wrongly invoked. 22. Before acquisition proceedings, the efforts were made to negotiate with the owners of the land and these owners gave consent of the land who gave consent for acquisition their land have been acquired. Therefore, the petitioners cannot say that urgency clause was wrongly invoked. 22. From perusal of Annexure-A to the counter affidavit, it is clear that on 16.03.2007 the industries department Government of Bihar, Patna wrote to the Accountant General for administrative approval of acquisition of 105 acres of land in the first phase situated in Mauza-Kopkala, Block- Naubatpur, Thana No.151 for Industrial Development Scheme on 17.03.2007. The Industries Department, Government of Bihar requested to the Collector, Patna to take steps for acquisition. The Collector informed to the Government of Bihar vide Memo No.2176 dated 04.05.2007 that a general meeting was held between the owners of the land and the Collector, Patna and the local representatives. The owners of 6.83 acres had expressed their unwillingness remaining land owners of 98.17 acres expressed their consent for acquisition of the land which is evident from Annexure-C. Accordingly, the 6.83 acres of land was not taken into acquisition proceedings and only 98.17 acres was taken for which every land owners gave their consent. Acquisition proceedings were initiated. On 20.07.2007 60 farmers entered into agreement with BIADA with regard to acquisition of land. One proforma is annexed as Annexure-E to the counter affidavit. The notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) read with Section 74 was issued and published in two newspapers and gazette for acquisition of 98.17 acres of land. After notification under Section 4 & 17(4) notification under Section 6 was issued on 13.12.2007 and published in gazette and newspapers as required under the Act. On 01.05.2008 BIADA deposited 80% of estimated amount of compensation worth Rs.60573419 vide Cheque No.84399. The Collector on 17.02.2008 handed over the possession of land to the BIADA as per possession of transfer certificate. This writ petition was filed on 24.11.2011 and came up for orders before this Court. Three Judges Bench of Hon?ble Supreme Court in Case of Satyendra Pd. Jain and others V. State of U.P. & Others reported in (1993) 4 SCC 369 after referring various judgments relying by the same Court in Rajasthan Housing Board Vs. This writ petition was filed on 24.11.2011 and came up for orders before this Court. Three Judges Bench of Hon?ble Supreme Court in Case of Satyendra Pd. Jain and others V. State of U.P. & Others reported in (1993) 4 SCC 369 after referring various judgments relying by the same Court in Rajasthan Housing Board Vs. Shree Kishan reported in (1993) 2 SCC 84 , wherein it was held that when the possession of the land is taken over under Section 17(1) of the Act the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested would transfer to the original owner held in para-15 of the Satyendra Pd. Jain and others case as under:- “15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provision of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reasons of urgency, government takes possession of the land prior to making the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title on the land which is vested in the government states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner.” 23. In the present case possession was taken over under Section 17(1) of the Act on 17.02.2008. After that date the owners of the land has lost their title to the government. In the present case possession was taken over under Section 17(1) of the Act on 17.02.2008. After that date the owners of the land has lost their title to the government. Thus, the petitioners have no locus to challenge the acquisition proceeding on the ground that the urgency clause was wrongly invoked. Here in the present case award has also been made and thereafter advertisement was made by the BIADA for allotment of land for setting up sugar mill. Since no entrepreneur came up therefore the decision to establish the beer factory was taken by the government, which was duly advertised and respondent No.7 was given allotment by the BIADA. Respondent No.7 taken possession on 21.10.2011. Before taking over possession by the respondent No.7, the award was also made. It has further come that Development and Construction work is going on and respondent No.7 has incurred heavy expenditure to establish beer factory before filing of writ petition. Thus, at this stage, the grounds for wrongly invoking of urgency clause under Section 17(4) cannot be sustained and rejected accordingly. For the same reasoning and for the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge we agree with the judgment which was delivered on 09.05.2008. 24. The Connected L.P.A. has been filed challenging the same acquisition proceeding against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 921 of 2008. The learned Single Judge has dealt with every pleading raised by the petitioner and reply by the respondents and has elaborately dealt with the point raised mala fide in exercise of power under Section 17(4) has rejected. After considering several decisions, we agree with the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge, we do not find any merit in the L.P.A. as well as writ petition and are liable to be dismissed. 25. The filing of this writ petition after receipt of the award and additional compensation paid by the respondent No.7 after due bargain shows that the petitioners are pressing for undue/illegal bargain just to pressurize the Respondent No.7 for more compensation which is not permissible in the interest of public at large and if under such circumstances any disturbance is made, by the petitioners, the DGP, Bihar and D.M., Patna shall provide full protection and maintain law and order. 26. For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition as well as the L.P.A. are dismissed.