Judgment :- S.C. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. Rule. The respondents waive service. Since all the affidavits are filed, pleadings are complete, with the consent of the parties, the petition is heard finally. 2. This writ petition together with other petitions involve identical questions of fact and law, they were heard together & are, therefore, disposed off by this common judgment. 3. The State of Goa has initiated proceedings for Acquisition of the lands of the petitioners for the construction of the New International Airport at Mopa in Pernem Taluka. 4. The Notification and Declaration in that behalf was issued on 25th July 2008 and 28th July 2009, respectively, under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the L.A Act”) and under section 6 of the L.A Act. Both are impugned on various grounds to which we will advert a little later. 5. The petitioners claim to be owners/tenants of the properties indicated against their names/ the names of their ancestors in this Notification. They are thus persons interested in these lands. 6. It is the case of the petitioners that the respondent Nos.1 and 2, namely, the State of Goa and the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Mopa Air Port Cell, in Panjim, Goa had issued these Notifications for the public purpose, namely, “for construction of new international airport in Pernem Taluka in the State of Goa”. At the same time, the State Government declared that in its opinion, sub-section 1 of section 17 of the L.A Act is applicable and, therefore, by virtue of sub-section 4 of section 17 of the L.A Act, section 5-A thereof shall not apply in respect of the said acquisition. 7. It is the case of the petitioners that vast track of land and admeasuring around 74,99,490 sq.mtrs stretching over seven (7) villages in Pernem Taluka is proposed to be compulsorily acquired. The land is agricultural in nature. The land comprises of paddy field, cashew plantation, areca nuts and coconut plantation (Kulagars) and other fruit bearing orchids and forest land. Besides this, in the land proposed to be acquired, there are several dwelling units for residence, constructed and existing. The petitioners, therefore, protested against this proposed acquisition and their objections in writing are set out in the annexure to the writ petitions. 8. Besides this, in the land proposed to be acquired, there are several dwelling units for residence, constructed and existing. The petitioners, therefore, protested against this proposed acquisition and their objections in writing are set out in the annexure to the writ petitions. 8. The grievance of the petitioners is that ignoring these objections, the declaration under section 6 of the L.A Act came to be issued. 9. In such circumstances and knowing that the urgency clause was wrongfully and illegally invoked, further protests were lodged. 10. It is the grievance of the petitioners that even Gram Sabha Resolutions were passed and forwarded to the Authorities. 11. It is the case of the petitioners that the Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism, Government of India appointed a Committee to examine the matter of construction of international airport at Goa. On 29th March 2000, the Union Cabinet approved the proposal of setting up of new airport of international standard. The Deputy Secretary, Government of India conveyed the decision of the Central Government to the State Government on 1st May 2000. 12. It is pertinent to note that on 18th February 2003, a Notification under section 4 of the L.A Act notifying an area of around 21,49,000 sq.mtrs for acquisition, came to be issued. On 30th March 2004, a declaration under section 6 of the L.A Act was issued. There was a further acquisition plan proposed and the urgency clause was applied and section 5-A inquiry/hearing was dispensed with on 10th January 2005. However, the proceedings in furtherance of this Notification and Declaration were allowed to be lapsed and no reasons have been disclosed as to why the said course was permitted and allowed. 13. Thereafter, it appears that a feasibility study was commissioned by the State of Goa and that study recommends in August 2007 opening of an international airport at Mopa by 2013. It is in furtherance of such study that the subject Notification & declaration has been issued but there is absolutely no explanation for the delay between August 2007 and July 2008 which is of eleven months. Equally, there is no explanation about the delay and when the section 4 Notification in this case was published on 25th July 2008, the declaration under section 6 came to be published on 28th July 2009. The delay of thus twelve months (one year and more) remains unexplained. 14. Equally, there is no explanation about the delay and when the section 4 Notification in this case was published on 25th July 2008, the declaration under section 6 came to be published on 28th July 2009. The delay of thus twelve months (one year and more) remains unexplained. 14. It is in such circumstances that the Notification and the declaration is challenged on several grounds in these writ petitions. 15. On being served with the memos of writ petitions & their annexures, affidavits in reply had been filed on behalf of the State of Goa. Mr.Pandharinath N. Naik, the Under Secretary (Revenue), filed an reply affidavit in Writ Petition No.510 of 2009 in which in paras 3.1 and 3.2, it is stated as under: “3.1 I say that the proposal for construction of a new international airport was mooted more than 10 years ago. I say that the land acquisition process for the construction of the new international airport was commenced in the year 2003 with the issuance of a Notification under section 4 on 18/2/2003. I say that thereafter, after submitting a report under section 5-A, a declaration under section 6 was also issued on 30/3/2004 and a draft Award was also prepared, however the same was kept in abeyance by the Hon’ble Minister for Revenue. I say that proceedings for acquisition of additional land as well as acquisition for the approach road were initiated however the same were also kept in abeyance by the Hon’ble Minister for Revenue, I say that due to various reasons the proceedings lapsed and the acquisition could not be completed. 3.2 I say that it is pertinent to note that during the previous acquisition proceedings no objections were received by the Land Acquisition Officer qua the land. I say that the only representations were received by the Government from the locals demanding that locals should be provided employment in the project etc. I say that all the petitioners in this petition were also interested parties in the previous land acquisition and the lands notified to be acquired in the earlier notification were also the same. I say that considering the urgency of the matter and the fact that no objections were received in the previous acquisition proceedings, the Government decided to apply the urgency clause.” 16. I say that considering the urgency of the matter and the fact that no objections were received in the previous acquisition proceedings, the Government decided to apply the urgency clause.” 16. It is then contended that Goa is a premier tourist destination and the flow of tourists into the State has grown over the years and this traffic is likely to increase. The present airport at Dabolim is not exclusively civilian airport but actually a Naval airport from which civilian flights are also being permitted to be operated. 17. Thereafter, it is stated by Mr.Naik, thus: “3.4 I say that the Union Cabinet in its meeting held on 29/03/2000 had approved the setting up of a new airport of international standards at Mopa. I say that by a letter dated 01/05/2000 the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Civil Aviation had conveyed the said decision of the Union Cabinet to the State Government. The letter also categorically states that the policy on the Airport Infrastructure permits airports to be owned by the Central Government, PSU’s, State Government, urban local bodies, private companies and individuals, as also by Joint Ventures involving one or more of the above. The letter further permitted the State Government to take further necessary action for setting up of the new international airport and directed that the progress be intimated to the Ministry. 3.5 I say that the Government has appointed international consultants for the construction of the new international airport. I say that these consultants have opined that the present airport at Dabolim will be fully saturated by the year 2012-2013. I say that it has also been observed that the construction of the new airport will require approximately 5 years and therefore it is important that the work on the project starts as expeditiously as possible. 3.6 I say that on 24/06/2008 the Collector (North) submitted a proposal, along with all relevant documents, stating therein that the Director of Transport has proposed for acquisition of land for the purpose of constructing a new international airport at Mopa in Pernem Taluka." 18. Thereafter, on the point of invocation of section 17(4) of the L.A Act dispensing with inquiry/hearing under section 5-A of the L.A Act, this is what is stated: “3.7 I say that it was proposed that the provisions of section 17(4) be invoked while issuing the Notification under section 4. 4. Thereafter, on the point of invocation of section 17(4) of the L.A Act dispensing with inquiry/hearing under section 5-A of the L.A Act, this is what is stated: “3.7 I say that it was proposed that the provisions of section 17(4) be invoked while issuing the Notification under section 4. 4. I say that taking the above facts into consideration and the importance of the project to the State and the urgent need for a new full fledged international airport, the Government decided to invoke the provisions of section 17(4) be invoked while issuing the Notification under section 4, thereby dispensing with the inquiry under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. 5. I say that the Notification under section 4 alongwith section 17(4) was issued on 25/07/2008. The same was also published in two newspapers, namely, Herald dated 30/07/2008 and Gomantak dated 31/07/2008 and was also published in the Official Gazette dated 08/08/2008. 6. I say that under the said Notification the area being acquired is as follows: 7. I say that as can be seen above the total area being acquired is a large area totaling 74,99,490 sq.mtrs. I say that there is also another acquisition alongwith the present acquisition for the construction of an approach road to the new international airport which also involves acquisition of a large area of about 8,84,812 sq.mtrs. 8. I say that in the present acquisition the names of about 763 persons are shown as interested persons. It is submitted that if an inquiry under section 5-A is required to be held then the persons raising objections will be far greater than the said figure since, like some of the petitioners, the legal heirs of the interested persons are also bound to raise their objections. I say that a similar number of persons will also be required to be heard in the land acquisition proceedings for the land acquisition for the approach road. 9. It is submitted that it would not be practicable or feasible to hear the objections of such a large number of persons, complete the 5-A report and submit the same within a short time especially when it is imperative that the new international airport will be required by 2012- 2013.” The Notification was then published by affixation on 14/08/2008. 19. It is submitted that it would not be practicable or feasible to hear the objections of such a large number of persons, complete the 5-A report and submit the same within a short time especially when it is imperative that the new international airport will be required by 2012- 2013.” The Notification was then published by affixation on 14/08/2008. 19. Lastly, on the point of the State Government of Goa being not the “Appropriate Government” for initiating the acquisition project, in paras 10 to 12 of this affidavit of Mr.Pandharinath Naik affirmed on 15th February 2010, this is what is stated: “10 I deny that the State Government is not the appropriate Government for initiating the acquisition project. I say that the project is of great importance to the State. I say that tourism is a major industry in the State of Goa. I say that the new international airport is essential to the growth of the tourism sector in the State as well as to provide better facilities to the residents of the State. 11. I say that the project is envisaged to be on a public-private ownership basis and will be operated on a “Build-Own-Operate-Transfer” (BOOT) basis. I say that the State Government will have a percentage share in the project which will be in the form of the land component. I say that as per the decision of the Union Cabinet dated 29/03/2000, referred to in the above paragraph 3.4, the State Government is permitted to own the Airport in joint venture with any of the other parties enumerated therein. I say that the project is not a Central Government project, though permission of the Union Government is required for operating the same. I say that the State Government is the Appropriate Government to acquire land for the construction of the said project. 12. I say that section 79 of the Aircraft Rules, 1939 provides that the Central Government, the State Government or any body corporate, a registered society or even a private individual being a citizen of India can own and operate an aerodrome provided he obtains license for the same. I say that from the said Rules it is clear that the State Government has the right to own and operate an aerodrome and therefore is the “Appropriate Government” for initiating the present land acquisition process.” 20. I say that from the said Rules it is clear that the State Government has the right to own and operate an aerodrome and therefore is the “Appropriate Government” for initiating the present land acquisition process.” 20. There is an affidavit in rejoinder filed by the petitioners in which it is asserted that firstly, the State of Goa is not the Appropriate Government because it is only when powers are delegated under Article 258 of the Constitution of India by the President of India that the State of Goa can be stated to be a delegate of the Central Government. There is no such power delegated and the letter dated 1st May 2000 cannot be said to be such a delegation. 21. The rest of the paras in reply affidavit are dealt with by pointing out that there is absolutely no urgency inasmuch as firstly existing airport at Dabolim is being expanded by fresh construction. Secondly, once the acquisition proceedings were initiated in the year 2003 but were permitted to be lapsed, now the respondents cannot invoke urgency clause/ provision under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dispensing with the inquiry/hearing under section 5-A of the Act. Thus, this is nothing but colourable exercise of power and the acquisition be struck down. There is a sur rejoinder filed on behalf of the State of Goa in which what has been stated is that the earlier acquisition could not go through, is no ground to prevent invocation of section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is then contended that the expansion activities at Dabolim will not in any manner prevent the acquisition of the said lands for the international airport. 22. In para 16 of the affidavit which has been filed in sur rejoinder in Writ Petition No.510 of 2009, the stand of the Government is stated thus: “16 With reference to para 13, I say that the Government had appointed “International Civil Aviation Organization” (ICAO) as consultants for conducting a “Goa Dual Airport Study”. ICAO submitted its report to the Government in August 2007. The respondent craves leave to refer to & reply upon the said report at the time of the hearing. The report takes into consideration that both the existing airport as well as the new proposed airport will continue and examines the feasibility of simultaneous operations of the two airports. ICAO submitted its report to the Government in August 2007. The respondent craves leave to refer to & reply upon the said report at the time of the hearing. The report takes into consideration that both the existing airport as well as the new proposed airport will continue and examines the feasibility of simultaneous operations of the two airports. The Government had earlier appointed “Aeroport de Paris International” to prepare a technical-economic feasibility report on the operation of the Mopa Airport. However, the study did not include the issues involved in the operation of the two airports. Therefore before proceeding further with the construction of the new airport, the Government decided to study the feasibility of simultaneous operation of the two airports & hence ICAO was requested to undertake the study. The study was based on the assumption that the Dabolim Airport will continue to operate with the proposed expansion plans. The report refers to earlier feasibility study by “Aeroport de Paris International” and records; “The feasibility study commissioned by the Government of Goa in 2005 proposed the following main characteristics for the first phase development (2014) of a new airport in Mopa. “Airport capacity to handle 3 million passengers. One runway of 3,750 mtrs length to accommodate unrestricted operations of the B747400 and occasional operation of the A- 380. 7 narrow body, 4 wide body and 2 reserve stands on aircraft parking apron. Terminal building of 32,000 sq. mtrs to provide a good level of service while accommodating arriving or departing domestic peak hours of 550 passengers & international peak hours of 400 passengers. Parking facilities with a capacity of 800 stalls for cars, 900 for motorcycles, 70 for taxis and 60 for buses. Control tower and technical block. Fuel farm with two week storage capacity. Cargo terminal with 4500 sq mtrs of floor area.” The total cost of the project was estimated at US$205 M, including soft costs, infrastructure works, passenger terminal, control tower, all navigational and meteorological equipment, other facilities and utilities connection, but excluding land expropriation, and the construction of the new highway to Panjim. Fuel farm with two week storage capacity. Cargo terminal with 4500 sq mtrs of floor area.” The total cost of the project was estimated at US$205 M, including soft costs, infrastructure works, passenger terminal, control tower, all navigational and meteorological equipment, other facilities and utilities connection, but excluding land expropriation, and the construction of the new highway to Panjim. It was estimated that the total implementation phase for the new airport would take five years from the start of the tendering process to the opening of the new airport, under a Build, Own, Operate and Transfer (BOOT) scenario.” The report further observes as regards capacity of the Dabolim Airport as follows: (a) The biggest constraint of Dabolim Airport is its limited hours of operation especially during weekdays and thus constitutes an important impediment for further traffic growth. (b) Absence of a parallel taxiway along runway 08 26 generates delays at peak periods during every week day. (c) Lack of sufficient aircraft parking apron is serious constraint been during low season. (d) The terminal building of the existing airport has been saturated since 2004, it presently handles a great amount of arriving and departing passengers at peak period then it was originally designed to handle thereby providing service well below international standards. (e) The airport offers sufficient parking for cars, buses and taxies. The report recommends opening of the Mopa International Airport by 2013. The report further records that a new airport will be required at Mopa even with the enhanced capacity of the Dabolim Airport and that the facility improvement at Dabolim Airport will be sufficient until such time as a new airport could be opened at Mopa. 17 With reference to para 14, I deny that the reasons stated in the affidavit for justifying the urgency clause did not even exist in the proposal submitted by the Collector. I deny that the Director of Transport is not the authority to initiate the land acquisition proceedings for the purpose of construction of the airport. I say that by Notification No.23/1/87-GA&C (i) dated 20/01/2000, the Business of the Government of Goa (Allocation) Rules, 1987 were amended and under the heading “43. Department of Transport” an entry “(h) Airport” was inserted. It is therefore submitted that the Director of Transport is the appropriate authority to initiate the land acquisition proceedings. I say that by Notification No.23/1/87-GA&C (i) dated 20/01/2000, the Business of the Government of Goa (Allocation) Rules, 1987 were amended and under the heading “43. Department of Transport” an entry “(h) Airport” was inserted. It is therefore submitted that the Director of Transport is the appropriate authority to initiate the land acquisition proceedings. I further deny that the appropriate government for initiating land acquisition proceedings is the Union Government, I reiterate the stand taken by me in the earlier affidavit that the said project is a State Government project & therefore the State Government is the appropriate Government to initiate the Land Acquisition.” 23. Thus, while reiterating the stand taken earlier, what has been stated in the affidavit in sur rejoinder is as above. 24. Then, there is an affidavit in sur sur rejoinder of the petitioners. 25. However, what is material to note is that the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of India has filed an affidavit affirmed on 3rd June 2010 in which while dealing with the competency of the State Government to issue the Notification under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is stated as under: “3. I say that the Government of Goa proposed construction of the new airport Build-Own-Operate- Transfer (BOOT) basis. In this case, the private party is to be selected by global tendering. 4. As to the acquisition of land for proposed airport, it is clarified that the subject of land comes within the jurisdiction of the State Government under Entry 18 of List II of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution and the land for the airport is to be acquired by the State Government. 5. The Union has competence under Entry 29 of List I of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution to “airways, aircraft and air navigation, provision of aerodromes, provision for aeronautical education and training & regulation of such education and training provided by the states and other agencies. 6. Even wherever airports are constructed & operated by the Central Government, as a matter of general policy, it is the State Government which provides land free-of-cost and without any encumbrances to the Central Government for the said purpose. 7. 6. Even wherever airports are constructed & operated by the Central Government, as a matter of general policy, it is the State Government which provides land free-of-cost and without any encumbrances to the Central Government for the said purpose. 7. It may also be mentioned that as per the Guidelines for setting up Greenfield Airports it has been provided as under: “5.4 In case a State Government wishes to facilitate setting up of the airport, it could provide the following incentives to an Airport Company: (a) land, concessional or otherwise; (b) real estate development rights in and around the airports; (c) airport connectivity; rail, road; (d) fiscal incentives by way of exemptions from State taxes; and (e) any other assistance that the State Government deems fit.” 26. The Guidelines for setting up of Greenfield Airports have been annexed and it has been pointed out to us that these Guidelines are for approval of proposals for setting up of Greenfield Airports. These Guidelines are comprehensive & what they contemplate is, that the applicant will have to make an application to the Director General of Civil Aviation in the prescribed format for the grant of aerodrome licence. The Central Government has taken a decision for setting up of Greenfield Airports. The whole concept has been explained and what has been stated is that in terms of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994, the Central Government can grant concession to the private entity for financing, development, operation and maintenance of an airport being managed by the Airport Authority of India. The airports other than those managed by the Airport Authority of India are governed by the provisions of the Air Craft Act and Rules made thereunder. An entity other than the Airport Authority of India which is referred to as an Airport Company, can set up an airport. However, such an airport company must function on licence from Director General of Civil Aviation to be issued under the Air Crafts Act, 1953. 27. Our attention is invited to Rule 79 of the Air Craft Rules and what is essentially submitted before us by Mr.Ferreira, the learned Assistant Solicitor General is that an airport can be developed and operated either by the Airport Authority of India or by an airport company that has been given licence by the Director General of Civil Aviation as per its licence conditions. The rules also allow the Central Government or the State Government to obtain a licence. 28. As far as the development and financing of such Greenfield Airport is concerned, what is submitted before us is that financing and development of any other airport would be the responsibility of the airport company seeking the licence. The land for this purpose may be acquired by the airport company either through direct purchase or through acquisition by the State Government as per instant policy. 29. While dealing with this affidavit, what the petitioners have stated is that the reference to Entry 18 of List II (State List) does not mean that setting up an international airport ceases to be a Union purpose. In any event, the Guidelines cannot be used for interpreting the Land Acquisition Act or the Constitution of India. 30. Then, there are affidavits on the point of the Environmental Clearance and what has been contended thereafter is that not only possession of lands in certain villages has been taken of lands but even awards are passed. The acquired lands form part of six villages. It has been stated that thus far awards in respect of lands acquired from three villages have been passed. In respect of one village, the draft award has been approved by the Government and in respect of sixth village the draft award is under preparation. In respect of the land being acquired from the sixth village, it has been observed that the entire land required is already government land and, therefore, a proposal has been moved for transfer of the land. The details of village-wise acquisition, passing of awards and taking of possession have been set out in the further affidavit filed on 20th June 2011. 31. Thus, what has been urged on the above basis is that the acquisition is substantially complete. 32. It is on the above material, we have heard counsel appearing for the parties. 33. Mr. M.S. Sonak, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Writ Petition No.510 of 2009 and Writ Petition No.568 of 2009 led the arguments on behalf of the petitioners. He firstly submits that this is not an acquisition for the purposes of the State of Goa. This is an acquisition for setting up of an international airport at Mopa inPernem Taluka of the State of Goa. This is clearly a purpose of the Union. He firstly submits that this is not an acquisition for the purposes of the State of Goa. This is an acquisition for setting up of an international airport at Mopa inPernem Taluka of the State of Goa. This is clearly a purpose of the Union. Inviting our attention to the definition of the expression “Appropriate Government” as appearing in section 3(ee) of the Land Acquisition Act, it is submitted by Mr. Sonak that the “Appropriate Government” in this case is the Central Government. That would be evident from the events that led to the issuance of the prior Notifications. If the purpose of acquisition is to set up an international airport, then, that purpose is clearly a purpose of the “Union”. Mr. Sonak submits that if the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India is perused, it would be apparent that there are three lists enlisted therein. List I is the Union List, List II is the State List and List III is the Concurrent List. 34. Entry 29 of List I of Schedule 7 reads as under: “29. Airways; aircraft and air navigation; provision of aerodromes; regulation and organisation of air traffic and of aerodromes; provision for aeronautical education and training and regulation of such education & training provided by States and other agencies.” 35. In the submission of Mr. Sonak if the term “for the purpose of the Union” is to be read together with this entry, as the expression “Appropriate Government” as defined in the L.A Act can be construed and interpreted only with the aid of these entries, then, it is evident that there is no corresponding entry to the same in either the State List or the Concurrent List. Although it is conceded that these entries are not the source of power to legislate but they cover fields in which the Parliament and the State can enact and legislate, then, terms “airport” & “aerodrome” are referable to the Parliamentary legislation. The Airport Authority Act, 1994 and the prior Act, namely, the Air Craft Act, 1953, are both Acts of the Parliament. Thus, setting up the airport and aerodromes is only permitted in terms of these Central Laws. It is only the Central or the Union Government which can implement the legislation dealing with this subject so also set up and establish airport and aerodrome. Thus, setting up the airport and aerodromes is only permitted in terms of these Central Laws. It is only the Central or the Union Government which can implement the legislation dealing with this subject so also set up and establish airport and aerodrome. Therefore, Entry 42 dealing with acquisition and requisitioning of property in List III, cannot be resorted to, as that would permit the State to issue the subject Notification. 36. Further, according to Mr. Sonak Article 258 of the Constitution of India has a definite impact on the interpretation placed by him. That is a power of delegation of the Union in favour of the States in certain cases. It is only when this power is exercised that the State can issue a Notification of this nature & not otherwise. When there is no proof of exercise of such power by the Union, then, there is no delegation in favour of the State Government in the instant case. In the absence of all this, the Notification under section 4 (1) of the L.A Act and the steps in furtherance thereof, are all without authority of law, ex-facie illegal and, therefore, deserve to be quashed and set aside. 37. Mr. Sonak submits that his submissions are supported by judicial pronouncements and he derives assistance from the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramdas Thanu Desai & Ors vs. State of Goa & Ors reported in 2008 (6) All Maharashtra Law Reporter 153. Mr. Sonak submits that in this decision the Division Bench follows the judgment delivered by another Division Bench at Aurangabad in the case of Nandkumar M. Girme vs. The Union of India reported in 1989 (2) Bombay Cases Reporter 641. Therefore, according to Mr. Sonak, the impugned Notification should be struck down and quashed on this ground alone. 38. Mr. Sonak also relied upon the view taken by Allahabad High Court in the case of Balak & Ors vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., reported in AIR 1962 Allahabad 208 and decision of the learned Delhi High Court in the case of Angrup Thakar & Ors vs. State of Punjab & Anr reported in AIR 1968 Delhi 97. 39. Without prejudice to these submissions & alternatively Mr. Sonak submits that there is no case made out for invoking the urgency clause and particularly section 17 of the L.A Act, 1894. 39. Without prejudice to these submissions & alternatively Mr. Sonak submits that there is no case made out for invoking the urgency clause and particularly section 17 of the L.A Act, 1894. The delay in acquiring the lands and for undertaking the project is attributable to the inaction of the State Government. It allowed the earlier Notifications under section 4 and 6 of the L.A Act to lapse. To cover up its inefficiency and indolent attitude, the State cannot now dispense with the inquiry/hearing under section 5-A of the Act by resorting to the urgency clause. 40. Further, alternatively and without prejudice to the above submissions, it is submitted by Mr. Sonak that there is no publication of the Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act at a convenient place in the locality. Our attention is invited to section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and it is submitted that the requirement in law of publication and public notice of the substance of the Notification at convenient places in the locality, are both mandatory. In other words, the Notification under section 4(i) has to be published in the Official Gazette & in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality from which atleast one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such Notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. 41. Mr. Sonak submits that this has not been done. Once there is no compliance with this mandatory requirement, then, the preliminary Notification under section 4(1) of the L.A Act, cannot be said to be validly published. On this ground as well, this Notification is required to be quashed and set aside. 42. Further, alternatively it is submitted by Mr. Sonak that there is no Environmental Impact Assessment Study & necessary approval before the project of such magnitude is undertaken. According to Mr. Sonak this pre-condition under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and under the Environmental Impact Assessment Notification issued in September 2006, is mandatory. This pre-condition has to be satisfied before acquisition proposal is initiated and having not so satisfied it, the Notifications must be held to be bad in law. They are required, therefore, to be quashed and set aside. 43. Mr. This pre-condition has to be satisfied before acquisition proposal is initiated and having not so satisfied it, the Notifications must be held to be bad in law. They are required, therefore, to be quashed and set aside. 43. Mr. Sonak relies upon the following decisions in support of his above contentions: “AIR 1962 Allahabad 208 (Balak & Ors vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr); AIR 1968 Delhi 97 (Angrup Thakar & Ors vs. State of Punjab & Anr); (1973) 3 SCC 196 (State of Mysore vs. Adbul Razak Sahib); (1977) 1 SCC 133 (Narayan G. Gavate & Ors vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors); (1980) 2 SCC 471 (State of Punjab & Anr vs. Gurdial Singh & Ors); (1982) 1 SCC 39 (Bishambar Dayal Chandra Mohan & Ors vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors); (1985) 3 SCC 1 (Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad & Anr vs. Raja Ram Jaiswal); 1989 (2) Bom. Cases Reporter 641 (Nandkumar M. Girme vs. The Union of India & Ors); (1990) 4 SCC 557 (Bharat Coking Coal Ltd vs. State of Bihar & Ors); (2004) 8 SCC 14 (Union of India & Ors vs. Mukesh Hans); (2004) 8 SCC 453 (Union of India & Ors vs. Krishan Lal Arneja & Ors); (2005) 7 SCC 627 (Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd vs. Darius Shapur Chenai & Ors); (2006) 6 SCC 371 (Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board vs. C. Kenchappa & Ors); (2007) 8 SCC 705 (Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd & Ors); 2008 (6) All MR 153 (Ramdas Thanu Dessai & Ors vs. State of Goa & Ors); (2009) 2 SCC 377 (Essco Fabs Pvt Ltd & Anr vs. State of Haryana & Anr);” W.P.No.385 of 2009 decided by Division Bench of this Court on 3rd May 2010 (Mr. Ibaldo Alvito Gomes & Ors vs. The State of Goa & Anr); (2010) 11 SCC 242 (Anand Singh & Anr vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors); (2011) 4 SCC 537 (State of West Bengal & Ors vs. Prafulla Churan Law & Ors); Civil Appeal No.__ of 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.8939/2010 with Civil Appeal No.__ of 2011 arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.10993/10) decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 7th March 2011 (Dev Sharan & Ors vs. State of U.P & Ors); “ (2011) 5 SCC 553 (Radhy Shyam & Ors vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors); 2011 (7) SCALE 439 (Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority vs. Devendra Kumar & Ors); (2011) 9 SCC 164 (Devender Kumar Tyagi & Ors vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors); (2012) 2 SCC 327 (Darshan Lal Nagpal vs. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors);” 44. Thus, as far as section 3(ee) of the Land Acquisition Act is concerned, it is submitted that the words “Appropriate Government” have been defined to mean in relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of Union, the Central Government and in relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State Government. The words “for the purpose of the Union” have to be read in the context of the Constitution of India and particularly Schedule 7 and the Lists I, II and III thereof. 45. Since the subject of airways; aircraft and air navigation; provision of aerodromes; regulation and organization of air traffic and of aerodromes, is in List I-Union List, then, the word “for the purposes of the Union” appearing in section 3(ee) of the Land Acquisition Act, will have to be construed by referring to Entry 29 of List I. There is no corresponding entries in relation to airways; air craft and air navigation; provision of aerodromes, regulation and organisation of air traffic and of aerodromes in either List II i.e the State List or List III which is the Concurrent List. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that acquiring land for construction of an international airport at Mopa can be done by the State Government. The State Government is not at all concerned with air ways and air traffic as also aerodromes etc., as noted above. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that acquiring land for construction of an international airport at Mopa can be done by the State Government. The State Government is not at all concerned with air ways and air traffic as also aerodromes etc., as noted above. Therefore, it is wholly incompetent to issue such a Notification and particularly section 4 of the L.A Act. 46. Inviting our attention to Article 258 of the Constitution of India, it is submitted that sub-article (1) of Article 258 opens with non-obstante clause and that enables the President of India with the consent of the Governor of the State, to entrust either conditionally or unconditionally to that Government or to its officers functions in relation to any matter to which the executive power of the Union extends and sub-article (2) clarifies that a law made by Parliament which applies in any State may, notwithstanding that it relates to a matter with respect to which the State Legislature has no power to make laws, confer powers & impose duties, or authorise the conferring of powers & imposition of duties upon the State or officers or authorities thereof. 47. Therefore, unless there is an entrustment in terms of Article 258(1) or there is any law which contains a provision within the meaning of Article 258 (2), the State Government could not have issued the subject Notification. In these circumstances, when no such Notification has been produced on record the impugned acquisition cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside. 48. Mr. Sonak has invited our attention to Entry 42 in List III (Concurrent List) and submitted that it is dealing with Acquisition and Requisitioning of property. In the instant case, the law that is referable thereto, is the Land Acquisition Act but that itself defines the term “Appropriate Government”. In such circumstances, the said Entry can be of no assistance to the respondents. Similarly, Entry 18 in List II (State List) also cannot have any application in case of acquisition for setting up of an international airport. 49. The assumption on the basis of which these arguments are canvassed is that the entries in Schedule 7 may not be a source of power but they demarcate the legislative field. Similarly, Entry 18 in List II (State List) also cannot have any application in case of acquisition for setting up of an international airport. 49. The assumption on the basis of which these arguments are canvassed is that the entries in Schedule 7 may not be a source of power but they demarcate the legislative field. When they demarcate the legislative field, then, even by recourse to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and for the public purpose of construction of a new international airport, the State Government could not have issued a preliminary Notification or declaration within the meaning of sections 4 and 6 of the L.A Act. 50. On the point of urgency under section 17, the argument is that this section could not have been invoked as both pre conditions, namely, existence of urgency and need to dispense with the inquiry/hearing under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has to be shown by producing cogent & satisfactory material. There is no such material and in fact what is produced would show that the inquiry/hearing under section 5-A could not have been dispensed with because of the delay prior to issuance of the Notification and post Notification. The pre Notification delay is of three years and the post Notification delay is of one year. Both play a vital role and if there is such delay, then, section 17 could not have been invoked at all. 51. Our attention is invited to the fact that willingness to abide by the laws at one point of time is no ground to dispense with inquiry/hearing under section 5-A and equally that would be evident by the fact that the earlier Notification was allowed to lapse. 52. The above arguments have been elaborated and we will make reference to that elaboration as and when necessary. Suffice it to note that these arguments of Mr. Sonak are supported by Mr. Nigel Costa Frias appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition No.135 of 2010 as well as Ms.Amira Razaq appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petition No.641 of 2009 which pertains to a mining lease. Their argument is that it is mining lease which has been granted but no mining was permitted. Once the mining lease is granted, then, the acquisition proceedings are arbitrary & malafide and is only to defeat the grant that they have been initiated. Their argument is that it is mining lease which has been granted but no mining was permitted. Once the mining lease is granted, then, the acquisition proceedings are arbitrary & malafide and is only to defeat the grant that they have been initiated. Once the Notifications are allowed to lapse, then, there is no question of preventing a lawful mining activity. 53. Mr. Nigel Costa has invited our attention to section 5-A and 17(4) the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and para 7 of the Writ Petition No.135 of 2010 (pages 12 and 13). Our attention is also invited to the Goa, Daman and Diu Land Acquisition Rules, 1972 and particularly Rule 2 thereof to urge that the opportunity to raise objection has been denied illegally. 54. It is submitted that there is no Environment Impact Assessment or Study prior to initiation of acquisition proceedings. There is no question of any real urgency or emergency which would enable avoiding or obviating such assessment or study. It is submitted that there is no question of any acquiescence or waiver in this case merely because earlier no objection was raised by the villagers or the petitioners, as the situation was different. That was nearly five years back. Now, houses have been constructed, the lands have been improved upon. The situation has changed completely. Even the existing airport has become fully functional and there is further expansion thereof. In such circumstances, reliance on the earlier file notings or notes will not enable the State to dispense with the inquiry/hearing under section 5-A of the Land Act. 55. For the above reasons, it is submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that these writ petitions be allowed. 56. On behalf of the State of Goa and the respondents who are functionaries of the State of Goa, Mr.A.N.S.Nadkarni, learned Advocate General submitted that in so far as the issue of appropriate government is concerned, all the submissions of the counsel for the petitioners are misconceived and not well founded. 57. He submits that the power to acquire land, conferred in terms of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is wider than that of the Union Government (Central Government). Even the term “Appropriate Government” has been defined accordingly. He submits that no assistance, therefore, can be derived from the entries in the Union List or the Lists in the Schedule 7 of the Constitution of India. Even the term “Appropriate Government” has been defined accordingly. He submits that no assistance, therefore, can be derived from the entries in the Union List or the Lists in the Schedule 7 of the Constitution of India. Even otherwise these entries are not a source of power but refer to the legislative field in which the Parliament as well as the State can make laws. By no stretch of imagination any provision in a Parliamentary enactment or law can be construed or interpreted with the aid and assistance of the wordings of these entries. That would not be a safe guide for construction and interpretation of the term “Appropriate Government” or the words “for the purpose of the Union”. Ultimately, the Land Acquisition Act enables acquisition of lands by resort to the sovereign and supreme power of the State. That power is exercised for public purpose and in public interest so also for public good. If that is the intent, then, it is not as if the State Government is powerless as urged. 58. Mr. Nadkarni submits that when the law was enunciated in Nand kumar Girme’s case and followed by a latter Division Bench, there was no liberalisation or privatisation of the Economy. There was no concept of globalisation. Post 1991 the scenario in the world as also in India has undergone a drastic change. Now, it is not the State which itself undertakes the welfare and development work. It gets it done through agencies. The execution is for and on behalf of the State by such agencies. Even in the case of airport or aerodrome, now, the concept has undergone a drastic change. 59. The Air Craft Act and the Air Craft Rules, particularly, Rule 79 enables anybody other than the Central Government or any agency or authority other than the one under control of the Central Government to set up and establish an airport. In such circumstances, it is futile to urge that the State Government is not the appropriate government. The State Government can establish an airport and it is not necessary that the airport should be a public airport. There can be a public as also a private airport. Equally, there could be airport with participation of both, public and private sector. The airport can be got constructed, set up or established and thereafter operated either by the State or by any other agency. There can be a public as also a private airport. Equally, there could be airport with participation of both, public and private sector. The airport can be got constructed, set up or established and thereafter operated either by the State or by any other agency. A licence for the same is all that is now contemplated in law. On obtaining such a licence, the airport or aerodrome can be operated and managed by any private agency including the State Government. In such circumstances and when the Collector of North Goa district has been designated as the Director for the Mopa airport by the State Government and it is the project of the State Government that the subject Notifications could have been and rather have been issued by the State Government of Goa. There is nothing illegal or unconstitutional about them. The entire contribution for the construction & development of the international airport is by the State Government. Even the land cost will not come from the Central Government. In such circumstances, the judgments relied upon by Mr. Sonak are distinguishable on facts. There, the factual position was not the one as pointed out in the present case. When the Notification was for approach landing at the Aurangabad airport which was an existing airport and which belonged to the Central Government, then, the State Government was rightly not the appropriate government. In the case of Ramdas Thanu Desai (supra), the question was of acquisition for railways. The shed or the godown or yard was for the purposes of railway. There was nothing that the State Government was either contributing or managing. It is in these circumstances that both Division Bench judgments came to be rendered. 60. In any event, according to Mr.Nadkarni, learned Advocate General, the factual position has been explained in the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents so also in the Airport Policy. Once the purpose is completely of the State and not of the Union, then, the authority or power of the State cannot be questioned. The first contention shall, therefore, fail. As far as the Division Bench judgments of our Court referred to by Mr. Once the purpose is completely of the State and not of the Union, then, the authority or power of the State cannot be questioned. The first contention shall, therefore, fail. As far as the Division Bench judgments of our Court referred to by Mr. Sonak are concerned, in addition to what has been pointed out above to distinguish them the learned Advocate General would submit that the attention of the Division Bench was not invited to an authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan reported in AIR 1955 SC 810 . This decision clearly holds the field till date. Once this decision of the Supreme Court is binding on us and the same has not been noted or referred to by the Division Benches, then, this is a clear case of Division Bench’s judgment being per incuriam. In these circumstances, the first point on which the acquisition has been challenged, must fail. 61. Equally, the second point is with regard to the Environment Impact Assessment Notification having not been complied with. That Notification according to the learned Advocate General properly and completely read, would indicate that no clearance from the authority under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 is required prior to initiation of acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (supra) relied by Mr. Sonak was delivered on 12th May 2006. The EIA Notification is issued on 14th September 2006. The EIA Notification contemplates clearance of the Environment Authority prior to construction and operation of the airport and not at the stage of acquisition of land for such construction and operation. In these circumstances, reliance on this judgment and Notification is clearly misplaced. In any event, Mr.Nadkarni on instructions makes a statement that the State Government will duly and completely comply with the EIA Notification dated 14th September 2006 and apply for and obtain all prior approvals, clearances and licences as prescribed by the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and the EIA Notification before undertaking any work of construction and development of the lands as a private international airport. These statements of the State Government may be accepted as undertakings to this Court. 62. These statements of the State Government may be accepted as undertakings to this Court. 62. On the point of invocation of the urgency clause, Mr.Nadkarni, the learned Advocate General would submit that all objections raised by the petitioners have been duly replied to by the State in the affidavits placed on record. There is an urgency inasmuch as the condition at the existing airport is chaotic. There are about 800 chartered air crafts carrying tourists, passengers in addition to the cargo landing at the Dabolim airport from 31st October to 31st May and that goes on from year to year. In addition, there are several domestic and international air crafts which are landing and taking off from Goa. The existing airport is a Naval airport. It is very difficult to adjust the flight timings and the management and administration of the landings and take off is at times affected on account of shifting of timings by the Naval Authorities. In other words, it is the defence and the Naval Authority’s clearance which determines the arrival and departure of air crafts and their landings at Dabolim. In these circumstances and when the air strip is also used by the naval and defence authorities for their air crafts and for naval and defence exercises, then, it cannot be said that there is no need or warrant for a separate and independent international airport at Goa. It is clear that factually 48,13,549 sq.mtrs of land stretched over five villages has been already acquired and vested in the State. The possession thereof has already been taken and, therefore, the acquisition is complete. Yet, without prejudice to their rights & contentions and without in any manner giving up the authority or power of the State to issue the subject Notifications, if at all the petitioners desire to raise objections with regard to acquisition of their lands, then, the competent authority will hear the petitioners only and convey to them the decision of the State. The land to the extent of 23,77,121 sq.mtrs is not vested because the possession could not be taken on account of the ad-interim orders in these petitions. In these circumstances, after obtaining instructions, Mr.Nadkarni, learned Advocate General has made the above offer and has stated that the State Government would not oppose & would rather consider the objections of the petitioners and these would be restricted to their lands. In these circumstances, after obtaining instructions, Mr.Nadkarni, learned Advocate General has made the above offer and has stated that the State Government would not oppose & would rather consider the objections of the petitioners and these would be restricted to their lands. In addition, on instructions the learned Advocate General makes a statement that the State Government would not take possession of any lands on which dwelling units or houses are constructed unless alternate sites are first provided for construction of dwelling units or houses. Equally, if any of the petitioners or any of the occupants of the residential units/ dwelling units, houses desires to have an independent dwelling unit or house for his residence, the State would provide him such alternate house or dwelling unit. In either case, the State will not dispossess any of the petitioners or the occupants residing in the existing residential structures or houses so also will not demolish the units or houses until the alternate site or the alternate dwelling unit or house is provided and the persons concerned are put in possession thereof. This will not prejudice and preclude the said persons or petitioners from claiming compensation for the acquisition of their lands and even objecting to the compensation offered by taking recourse to section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Equally, on instructions the learned Advocate General makes a statement that the State Government will provide employment opportunities to the petitioners and the affected occupants of residential structures or those carrying on any plantation or agricultural operations and activities by providing them jobs in the project undertaken, namely, construction & development of the land for putting up international airport. Moreover, such person would be first handed over a letter of appointment and only then he would be dispossessed from his land or house. 63. On the point of publication of the substance of the Notification at convenient place, the learned Advocate General has invited our attention to the affidavits and has also submitted that the records would indicate that such publication has been done. This is only a technical objection but even that has no substance according to the learned Advocate General. 64. 63. On the point of publication of the substance of the Notification at convenient place, the learned Advocate General has invited our attention to the affidavits and has also submitted that the records would indicate that such publication has been done. This is only a technical objection but even that has no substance according to the learned Advocate General. 64. Mr.Nadkarni, learned Advocate General states that in view of the above statements and undertakings and also in the light of the legal position, there is no substance in any of these writ petitions and they deserve to be and should be dismissed. 65. The learned Advocate General relies upon the following decisions in support of his above contentions: “ AIR 1955 SC 810 (State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan); (1997) 1 SCC 134 (Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Anr vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors)” 66. With the assistance of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we have perused each of these writ petitions together with the annexures. We have also perused the affidavits filed by parties, the synopsis of arguments tendered, relevant statutory provisions and decisions brought to our notice. We have carefully considered the rival contentions. 67. Ordinarily, one would have expected this matter to come to an amicable end in view of the statements made by the learned Advocate General on instructions and particularly that the State is still willing to consider the objections of the petitioners by holding an inquiry/hearing under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 qua the petitioners' lands. However, despite this and other assurances of the learned Advocate General & persuasive efforts of Mr. Sonak and other counsel, we were informed that the petitioners would like to pursue the petitions & not accept these statements and undertakings of the State. The impression that we get from all this is that some cause or interest other than that of the petitioners' livelihood, shelter or rehabilitation is being pursued now. When majority of the landowners or persons having interest are not objecting to the acquisition on any grounds and land from five villages has vested in the State, then, one fails to understand what is the complaint or what is at stake as far as these objectors are concerned. 68. When majority of the landowners or persons having interest are not objecting to the acquisition on any grounds and land from five villages has vested in the State, then, one fails to understand what is the complaint or what is at stake as far as these objectors are concerned. 68. It is in such circumstances that we are constrained to deliver a judgment bearing in mind the importance of some of the issues involved. Further, even if we were to close the matter by directing an inquiry/hearing under section 5-A to be held, our attention is invited to the Goa Land Acquisition Rules, wherein it is stated that an objection to the jurisdiction and authority of theState to initiate the acquisition proceedings can be raised in such an inquiry/hearing. We are, therefore, of the view that atleast in so far as the issue of appropriate government is concerned, that will have to be decided by the Court. Even if the objections of the petitioners are considered and ultimately they are not accepted, the matter will come back to the Court on some of the legal issues and that would delay and upset the project. Such delay would not be in public interest and for public good. 69. It is in these circumstances that we first take up the contention of Mr. Sonak that the acquisition proceedings are liable to be struck down and quashed because the State Government cannot be said to be the appropriate government. His submission is that the acquisition is for the purpose of the Union, namely, setting up/ establishing of an international airport and which subject or purpose can be taken up and dealt with by the Central/Union Government alone. The State Government is not the appropriate government to issue a Notification when the public purpose is that of the Union. 70. While considering this submission, we must take note of the definition of the term “Appropriate Government” as appearing in section 3(ee) of the Land Acquisition Act, which reads as under: “3(ee) the expression “appropriate Government” means, in relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central Government, and, in relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State Government;” 71. A bare perusal of the definition would indicate that “appropriate Government” means in relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central Government, and, in relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State Government. 72. Mr. Sonak submits that this definition and the words “for the purposes of the Union” have to be construed with reference to Lists I, II and III of Schedule 7 to the Constitution of India. He submits that this Schedule is referable to Article 246 of the Constitution of India. That Article is falling under Part XI entitled “Relations Between the Union and the States”. Chapter I therein is entitled “Legislative Relations”. The sub-heading thereof is “Distribution of Legislative Powers”. Therefore, Article 246 with its title “Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States” makes specific reference to the Lists in the Schedule 7. Article 246(1) states that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Schedule 7, which is referred to in the Constitution of India as the Union List. Entry 29 of List I is entitled “Airways; aircraft and air navigation; provision of aerodromes; regulation and organisation of air traffic and of aerodromes; provision for aeronautical education and training and regulation of such education and training provided by States and other agencies”. On this subject only the Parliament can make a law. Therefore, the words “for the purposes of the Union” will have to be construed and interpreted, bearing in mind the wording of the Entry 29 falling in List I of Schedule 7. 73. Reliance is placed by Mr. Sonak on two judgments of this Court and he submits that they are binding on us. 74. Mr. Sonak submits that in those matters, a view has been taken by this Court that acquisition of land for approach lights for night landing of the airplanes at airport at Aurangabad is a purpose of the Union and the Central Government was, therefore, appropriate Government to initiate the acquisition proceedings. (See case of Nandkumar Madhukarrao Girme vs. The Union of India and others reported in 1989 (2) Bombay Cases Reporter 641). 75. Mr. (See case of Nandkumar Madhukarrao Girme vs. The Union of India and others reported in 1989 (2) Bombay Cases Reporter 641). 75. Mr. Sonak submits that this view has been followed by another Division Bench in the case of Ramdas Thanu Dessai & others vs. State of Goa and others (W.P.No.323 of 2006 decided on 13th August 2008) reported in 2008(6) ALL MR 153. When acquisition of land is for construction of railway land and cargo handling terminal, then, acquisition is for the Union of India & appropriate Government is the Central Government and not the State Government, is the view taken in the latter decision. Thus, according to Mr.Sonak, in both decisions specific reference has been made to the entries in Seventh Schedule and once that is guiding factor for interpreting the words “for the purpose of the Union”, then, we must follow the same course and hold in the instant matter as well, that the State Government is not the appropriate Government for acquiring the lands of the petitioners for the public purpose of constructing New International Airport at Mopa in Pernem Taluka. 76. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General would submit that these decisions are distinguishable on facts. In the first decision rendered by the Division Bench in Nandkumar’s case, the facts have been noted in paras 2 and 3 and thereafter in para 6 the Division Bench recorded a factual finding that there is an existing airport at Aurangabad and the land in question of the petitioners has been acquired for the purpose of approach lights for night landing. The argument of the respondents-Union of India before the Division Bench was, that there is a delegation in favour of the State Government and, therefore, the acquisition cannot be faulted otherwise. 77. The learned Advocate General submits that in Nandkumar’s case, the argument that there was a delegation in favour of the Divisional Commissioner by appropriate Notifications issued by the Central Government has been considered bu the question was not asmuch as which is the appropriate Government, but really the Division Bench was concerned as to whether the powers have been delegated to the Divisional Commissioner by the appropriate Notifications in that regard by the Central Government. Thereafter, the petitioner Nandkumar challenged the validity of these Notifications and that challenge was repelled, as is apparent from reading of paragraphs 8 to 10 thereof. 78. Thereafter, the petitioner Nandkumar challenged the validity of these Notifications and that challenge was repelled, as is apparent from reading of paragraphs 8 to 10 thereof. 78. It is thereafter submitted that in paragraphs 11 and 11A of the judgment in case of Nandkumar, there is a reference made to Entry No.29 in the Union List and the observations in para 11A have been made but in the context of rejecting the submissions of the petitioners. In fact, the argument canvassed on the point of appropriate Government was rejected. 79. Thus, according to the learned Advocate General this decision essentially turns upon the interpretation of the Notifications issued under Article 258(1) of the Constitution of India. 80. There is much substance in these contentions of the learned Advocate General. Paragraphs 6 to 11A of the decision in Nandkumar’s case read as under: “6. Turning now to the contentions raised on merits, the first contention which needs consideration in the instant writ petitions is whether it was competent for the Central Government to authorise the officers of the State Government for the purpose of exercise of its powers under section 4(1) and 6 of the Act. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the provisions of Article 73(1) and Article 258(1) of the Constitution of India to show that no such delegation of the executive power of the Union Government is permissible hereunder. In appreciating the above submission made on behalf of the petitioners it may be seen that section 3(ee) of the Act defines the expression “appropriate Government” to mean, in relation to the acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central Government, and in relation to the acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State Government. In sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act the “appropriate Government” would thus mean that if the land to be acquired is for the public purpose of the Union Government, then the appropriate Government for exercising the power thereunder would be the Union Government and for all other public purposes the appropriate Government would be State Government thereunder. It is not in dispute that the land in question of the petitioners is being acquired for the purpose of approach lights for night landing at the airport at Aurangabad, which is the purpose of the Union Government. It is not in dispute that the land in question of the petitioners is being acquired for the purpose of approach lights for night landing at the airport at Aurangabad, which is the purpose of the Union Government. It is, therefore, not in dispute that the appropriate Government in this regard would be the Union Government. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents have however, urged before us that the powers of the Union Government in relation to the acquisition of land for the Union purposes under sections 4(1) and 6 are delegated to the Divisional Commissioner by the appropriate notifications issued in that regard by the Central Government. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has, however, challenged the validity of the said Notifications on the ground that they are not authorized by virtue of the provisions of Article 73(1) and Article 258(1) of the Constitution. He has relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in (Ghousia Begum vs. Union Territory of Pondichery), A.I.R 1975 Madras 345 to show that the President has no power to delegate any of the Executive functions of the Union Government to the State Government authorities or the authorities in the Union Territory. No such proposition is laid down in the above case. Perusal of the above decision shows that the President was acting as Head of the Union Territory under Article 239(1) of the Constitution so far as delegation of power in the said case was concerned and not as Head of the Central Government. The above case is thus clearly distinguishable. 8. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners on the basis of Article 73(1), Article 258(1) and Article 298 of the Constitution is, however, no more res integra and is fully answered in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Jayantilal v. F.N.Rana & Ors), A.I.R 1964 S.C 648. It is held by the majority view in the said case that except the functions or the powers which are vested in the President by the Constitution and which are incapable of being delegated or entrusted to any authority or body under Article 258 (1), the President can delegate under Article 258(1) of the Constitution the functions of the Union Government. After pointing out the distinction between the executive, legislative & judicial functions, the majority view held that the Notification issued by the President under Article 258(1) of the Constitution had the force of law within the meaning of section 87 read with section 2(d) of the Bombay Re-organisation Act. It held that by virtue of Article 73(1)(a), the executive power of the Union extends to the acquisition of the property for the Union because the acquisition of property is a subject matter covered by Item 42 of List III, i.e the concurrent list in the Seventh Schedule, upon which the Parliament has power to make laws. As regards the requirement of the proviso to Article 73(1) about there being express provision in the Constitution or in any law made by the Parliament for the executive power of the Union to extend in any State upon matters with respect to which the State has also power to make laws, it held that the said requirement is satisfied by virtue of the provisions of Article 298 of the Constitution under which the power of the Union extends to carrying on of any trade or business and to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property and the making of contracts for any purpose. It then interpreted the expression “acquisition, holding & disposal of property’ used in Article 298 to include compulsory acquisition of property also. 9. We may venture to state that the delegation of functions of the Union in relation to matters under the concurrent list can be rested solely upon Article 258(1) itself without taking recourse to Article 298 because in view of the non-obstante clause used therein it can operate despite the proviso to Article 73(1) of the Constitution which requires an express provision in the Constitution or in the law by the Parliament for the executive power of the Union to extend in the State. It may be seen that when the functions of the Union in respect of matters over which it has power to legislate can be entrusted to the State Government or its officers with the consent of the State Government under Article 258(1) and can be entrusted to it or its officers without its consent by a law enacted by the Parliament as provided in Article 258(2) there is no reason why the proviso to Article 73(1) should not be held to be dispensed with by the non-obstante clause in Article 258 (1). 10. It is next pertinent to see that although the minority view in the Jayantilal’s case, cited supra, disagreed with the majority view on the question whether the Notification issued under Article 258(1) had the force of law within the meaning of section 87 read with section 2(d) of the Bombay Re-organisation Act, it is clear from reading the said minority view that the Notification issued under Article 258(1) possesses the authority of law. It is further clear from the minority decision that it took the view that the consent of the State of Gujarat which was formed after 1st May 1960 was lacking to the Notification under Article 258(1) which was issued on July 24, 1959 i.e prior to the formation of the State of Gujarat. It is thus clear that the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is squarely covered by the above decision. Moreover, recently, the Supreme Court has also upheld similar delegation made in respect of the Union Territory under Article 239 (1) of the Constitution in the case of (Om Prakash v. Union of India and others), A.I.R 1988 SC 350. Similar is also the view of the Delhi High Court in the case of (Kundanlal v. Union of India and others), A.I.R 1988 Delhi 63. The above contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, therefore, deserves to be rejected. 11. Similar is also the view of the Delhi High Court in the case of (Kundanlal v. Union of India and others), A.I.R 1988 Delhi 63. The above contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, therefore, deserves to be rejected. 11. It is, however, urged that since the acquisition of land is for the purpose of approach lights for night landing at the airport, which subject matter is covered by Entry No.29 in the Union List, i.e the exclusive list of the Union relating to airways, air craft and air navigation, provision for aerodromes, regulation and organisation of air traffic and of aerodromes, such power could not have been delegated to the officers under Article 73 (1) & Article 258(1) of the Constitution. The above contention in fact runs counter to the language used in Article 73(1) (a) and Article 258(1) because it is precisely in respect of the matters in the Union List that the delegation of the functions of the Union Government is provided in Article 258(1) of the Constitution. As regards the matters in the Concurrent List in regard to which the State has also power to legislate unless there is an express provision in the Constitution such as Article 298 relied upon in the decision of the Supreme Court in Jayantilal’s case, cited supra, or in the law made by the Parliament the executive functions of the Union Government do not extend in the State in view of the proviso to Article 73(1) of the Constitution. 11A Moreover, the subject matter of acquisition of land is comprehended not within Entry No.29 of the Union List but is comprehended within Entry 42 of the Concurrent List which relates expressly to the subject matter of acquisition and requisitioning of property. The Land Acquisition Act is thus referable to the aforesaid Entry No.42 in the Concurrent List. In our view, the only relevance of the Entry 29 of the Union List in the instant case is that since the public purpose of acquisition of land in the instant case, viz., approach light for night landing at the airport falls in the said entry, it is clear that the acquisition of land in the instant case is for the purpose of the Union Government which is, therefore, an appropriate Government for taking action for acquisition of land under sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act. The above contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is thus devoid of any merit.” 81. A careful perusal of these paragraphs would indicate that the functions of the Union can be entrusted to the State Government even in relation to matters over which it has power to legislate, with the consent of the State Government. They can be entrusted to the State Government or its officers without its consent by a law enacted by the Parliament as provided in Article 258(2). Therefore, the proviso to Article 73(1) of the Constitution of India was held to be dispensed with by the non-obstante clause in Article 258(1) of the Constitution of India. 82. Thereafter, the other argument in para 11 is considered that the purpose of acquisition is making of approach lights for night landing at the airport. This is a purpose exclusively of the Union. That purpose can be deduced from Entry 29 in the Union List. The argument was that any of the matters referred to in Entry 29 fall within the law making powers of the Parliament & there was no delegation permissible of the power to the officers under Article 73(1) and Article 258(1) of the Constitution of India. That argument is also rejected in para 11A and it is held that subject matter of acquisition of land is comprehended not within Entry 29 of the Union List, but within Entry 42 of the Concurrent List which relates expressly to the subject matter of acquisition and requisitioning of the property. The Land Acquisition Act is thus referable to Entry 42 in the Concurrent List. Once the only relevance of the Entry 29 was for the purpose of finding out as to which Government is the appropriate Government, but it being a conceded position that the Union Government was the appropriate Government and it had entrusted its functions in Nandkumar’s case to the State Government, then, with great respect, the observations in para 11A which have been relied upon in subsequent Division Bench judgment, cannot be read in isolation or de hors the undisputed factual context and the contentions & pleas raised in Nandkumar’s case. 83. Be that as it may, they have been relied upon by the subsequent Division Bench judgment in Ramdas case. 83. Be that as it may, they have been relied upon by the subsequent Division Bench judgment in Ramdas case. The challenge in Ramdas case (supra) was to the Notifications under section 4 and Declaration under section 6 of the L.A Act on the ground that the State of Goa is not appropriate Government to acquire land for construction of Railway line and Cargo Handling Terminal at Shelvona and Xic-Shelvona villages of Quepem Taluka for South Western Railway. Once the acquisition was for South Western Railways in order to construct railway line & cargo handling terminal but the only argument was that the State of Goa has initiated the acquisition at the request of the railways and the cost would be paid by the railways, that the Division Bench referred to the undisputed facts in para 2. 84. Thus, not only the railways but the South Western Railways were to construct a railway line and cargo handling terminal and there was a provision made in that behalf in the railway budget, that the Division Bench concluded that the railways are owned by the Union of India which is the further undisputed position. That is how para 3 reads. In paras 4, 5 and 6, this is what the Division Bench holds: “4. The Section 4(1) of the said Act provides that whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that the land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the locality. The provision also clarifies last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice shall be the date of publication of the notification under Section 4. The provision, therefore, clearly specifies that the acquisition proceedings under the said Act can commence in relation to any particular land when the same appears to the Government to be needed or likely to be needed for public purpose. The provision, therefore, clearly specifies that the acquisition proceedings under the said Act can commence in relation to any particular land when the same appears to the Government to be needed or likely to be needed for public purpose. The term “appropriate Government” is defined in Section 3(ee) to mean in relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central Government, and, in relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State Government. This definition in no uncertain terms specifies that when the acquisition of land is for the purpose of Union, the appropriate Government who is to initiate the action for acquisition by issuing the notification in that regard has necessarily to be the Central Government. 5. As already seen above, once it is not in dispute that the acquisition is for the South Western Railways for the purpose of construction of railway line and cargo handling terminal at Shelvona, and the entire acquisition cost would be borne by the respondent Nos.2 and 5, it obviously means that the acquisition is for the Union and, therefore, such acquisition has to be by the Central Government who is the appropriate Government for initiating such action. 6. It is, however, the contention on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 that it is the State Government who has taken the decision to acquire the land at Shelvona in order to alleviate the sufferings of its citizens residing in the affected area. The setting up of railway line and cargo handling terminal at Shelvona is in order to shift the activity from Sanvordem Town to Shelvona which will provide for a healthy life to the residents of the affected area. It is the contention on behalf of the said respondents that the ore, which is extracted in the State of Karnataka, is exported via Goa and for that purpose the ore is brought from Karnataka in railway wagons and is unloaded at Sanvordem railway station. It is then reloaded in the trucks & transported by road at the river loading point where it is loaded in barges and transported to Mormugao for export. The activities of unloading of ore from the railway wagons into the stack-yard, reloading the same into trucks and transporting via road passing through Sanvordem Town results in severe dust pollution in the area. The activities of unloading of ore from the railway wagons into the stack-yard, reloading the same into trucks and transporting via road passing through Sanvordem Town results in severe dust pollution in the area. It is on account of generation of hazardous dust, it results in respiratory problems and other diseases to the residents in the locality and, therefore, bearing in mind the order of this Court in Writ Petition No.123 of 1999, the State Government took a decision that the ore entering Goa from Karnataka should be directly unloaded at Shelvona which is close to the river point and for that purpose it is necessary to construct railway terminal at Shelvona and hence the acquisition of land in question was proposed. Considering the same, according to the respondent Nos.1 and 4, the acquisition cannot be said to be exclusively for the purpose of Union but it is for the benefit of the citizens in the affected area and it is the obligation of the State to take all necessary steps for a healthy life to its citizens and hence the acquisition being also for the other purpose, it would fall in the category of acquisition for “any other purposes”, as specified in Section 3(ee) of the said Act.” 85. The Division Bench was considering the other submissions that the decision to acquire the land at Shelvona was taken in order to alleviate the sufferings of the residents of Goa residing in the affected area. However, that argument was also repelled as it was based on the object of the acquisition and not purpose thereof. Then, attempt was made to stress the words “any other purpose” specified in section 3(ee) of the L.A Act & the acquisition by the State Government was justified on that ground. 86. While dealing with these contentions, in paras 7 to 13 this is what is held: “7. In our considered opinion, it is difficult to accept the contention sought to be raised on behalf of the respondent Nos.1 and 4. The Section 4 of the said Act clearly requires the appropriate Government to take initiative for commencement of acquisition proceedings and Section 3(ee) specifies as to who would be the appropriate Government bearing in mind the purpose for which the acquisition of land is contemplated. The Section 4 of the said Act clearly requires the appropriate Government to take initiative for commencement of acquisition proceedings and Section 3(ee) specifies as to who would be the appropriate Government bearing in mind the purpose for which the acquisition of land is contemplated. In the case in hand, as already seen above, the acquisition of land specified in the Schedule annexed to the notification is for the purpose of construction of railway line and cargo handling terminal for South Western Railway. The arguments on behalf of the respondent Nos.1 and 4 relates to the benefits which may arise to the local residents out of construction of such railway line and the terminal and not to the purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired. The resultant benefits which the residents of the affected area in Goa may enjoy is not the purpose for which a particular land is sought to be acquired. If the argument on behalf of the respondent Nos.1 and 4 is to be accepted, then even the land which is used for laying the railway line & which undisputedly belong to the Union of India would fall in the category of any other purpose. That is not the legislative intent behind defining the term “appropriate Government” under Section 3(ee). 8. The appropriate Government under Section 4 read with Section 3(ee) is that Government which takes decision to acquire the land for its purpose. In the case in hand, once it is not in dispute that pursuant to the proposal by the State Government it was the decision of the Union and its Department of Railways to acquire a particular land for construction of the terminal to be constructed and maintained by the respondent Nos.2 and 5, it cannot, in the same breath, be said that the acquisition is also for any other purpose. The purpose of acquisition is clearly specified in the notification. Once a particular purpose is specified in the said notification, it cannot be sought to be stated by way of an affidavit that the real purpose is something different from the one disclosed in the notification nor such additional benefits which may accrue on account of acquisition of land to the residents of the locality could be said to be the purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired. 9. 9. It is to be borne in mind that after issuance of notification under Section 4, the interested parties are entitled to object to such notification and in that regard the Collector is enjoined to hear the objections & make a report to the appropriate Government and after considering such reports, the appropriate Government is required to take appropriate decision which should culminate in the form of declaration under Section 6. The Sections 4, 5, 5A and 6 specifically refers to the appropriate Government and its satisfaction for need to acquire the land. Once it is not in dispute that the proposed acquisition of land is for the purpose of railway terminal, to be built by the respondent Nos.2 and 5 at their own cost and to be maintained by them, and such terminal is to be used for the activities in relation to the railways i.e., for unloading of ore transported by the railways from Karnataka to Goa, it cannot be said that the land is sought to be acquired for any other purpose. It is to be held that the land is being sought to be acquired for the Union purpose. 10. In spite of the fact that the land is sought to be acquired for the Union, it is undisputed fact that the State Government claims to be the appropriate Government in respect of the acquisition proceedings in question. Obviously, it is without any authority to be the appropriate Government for the purpose of such acquisition. Therefore, the notification and the declaration are to be held as bad in law. 11. It is also sought to be contended on behalf of the respondent Nos.1 and 4 that pursuant to deletion of Entries 33 and 36 in the Union and the State List, respectively, in the Constitution of India & introduction of the subject “Acquisition and requisitioning of property” in Entry 42 of the concurrent list thereof, the State Government is entitled to acquire properties for the purpose of the Union. The contention is devoid of substance. The Entries in the Lists of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution of India are not source of power to make law but they identify the legislative heads & circumscribe legislative field. The contention is devoid of substance. The Entries in the Lists of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution of India are not source of power to make law but they identify the legislative heads & circumscribe legislative field. The law in that regard is well-settled by a number of decisions including the decision sought to be relied upon by the petitioners i.e., Vijay Kumar Sharma and others v. State of Karnataka and others, reported in (1990) 2 SCC 5. Besides, no executive decision is permitted to transgress the legislative mandate. 12. When the statutory provisions comprised under Sections 4 and 6 read with Section 3(ee) of the said Act clearly provide that in cases of acquisition for the purpose of Union, the appropriate Government would be the Central Government, the exercise of executive power cannot be allowed to transgress the said statutory provisions comprised under the said Act. The petitioners are justified in contending that the executive power is always subservient to the legislative power. It is always subject to legislative provision and has to yield to the legislative power. Mere inclusion of the Entry No.42 in the concurrent list, which speaks of the principles on which compensation for the property acquired & requisitioned for the purpose of the Union and the State or for any other public purpose is to be determined & the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given, by that itself would not empower the executive to act in contravention of the provisions made in the Central legislation. It cannot be disputed that the said Act was enacted prior to the independence of India. However, the same was adapted in terms of the Adaptation Order of 1950 and, therefore, is a law made by the Parliament within the meaning of the said expression under the proviso to Article 162 of the Constitution of India. 13. It is also not in dispute that there is no delegation of power as contemplated under Article 258 of the Constitution of India by the Central Government.” 87. On careful reading of these paras, it is obvious that the decision is based purely on the undisputed factual position. Thus, it is clearly distinguishable on facts. The further observations made are only to deal with the incidental or ancillary submissions. They are not laying down any absolute legal principle, much less what is canvassed before us. On careful reading of these paras, it is obvious that the decision is based purely on the undisputed factual position. Thus, it is clearly distinguishable on facts. The further observations made are only to deal with the incidental or ancillary submissions. They are not laying down any absolute legal principle, much less what is canvassed before us. We are of the opinion that the finding that the executive cannot act merely on the basis of its own decision and transgress the statutory provisions comprised in the L.A Act is also elaborating the conclusion already reached on the delegation or entrustment contemplated by Article 258 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the Division Bench in para 13 held that if there is no delegation of power as contemplated by Article 258, then, the acquisition initiated by the State Government cannot be sustained. 88. It is in that context that it referred to the view taken in Nandkumar’s case in the subsequent paras and in para 18 which reads as follows: “18 It is thus clear that inspite of the fact that the acquisition of the land is for the Union's purpose and at the cost of the Central Government, the process of acquisition was sought to be initiated by publication of Notification under section 4 of the said Act by the State Government claiming to be the appropriate Government. As the law stands, the acquisition for the Union's purpose cannot be initiated by the State Government unless there is specific delegation of power in that regard and in the case in hand there has been no such delegation. Hence, as rightly submitted on behalf of the petitioners, the notification under section 4 and the declaration under section 6 in relation to the land in question by the State Government is bad in law and is liable to be struck down.” 89. We are of the view that Mr.Sonak’s contention that the words “purpose of the Union” as appearing in section 3(ee) of the L.A Act have to be interpreted, bearing in mind the Entry 29 of the Union List, is devoid of any substance. Both, in Nandkumar’s case as also in Ramdas’s case, a reference is made to Entry 42 in the Concurrent List (List III) “acquisition and requisitioning of property”. Both, in Nandkumar’s case as also in Ramdas’s case, a reference is made to Entry 42 in the Concurrent List (List III) “acquisition and requisitioning of property”. In terms of Nandkumar’s case it has been held that L.A Act is referable and traceable to Entry 42 of List III (Concurrent List). However, in Ramdas’s case the argument of State of Goa that pursuant to deletion of Entries 33 and 36 in the Union List & the State List and introduction of Entry 42 of the Concurrent List, would empower the State to acquire properties for the purposes of Union, has been rejected. At the same time, in Ramdas’s case it is clarified that the entries in List I of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, are not source of power to make law, but they identify the legislative heads and are circumscribing the legislative field. Therefore, to our mind, the construction placed by Mr. Sonak on the above words by relying on Entry 29 solely, cannot be accepted. The words “ for the purposes of the Union” would have to be construed bearing in mind the purpose for acquisition in each case. 90. If the acquisition is “for the purposes of the Union”, then, the appropriate Government is the Central Government. In relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes, it is the State Government which is the appropriate Government. Ultimately, the expression “appropriate Government” is defined in relation to acquisition of land. It is not the argument of Mr. Sonak that acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union cannot be initiated under L.A Act. It is not his submission that acquisition of land for providing airways; aerodromes; regulation & organisation of air traffic and of aerodromes and other matters in Entry 29, cannot be done by resorting to L.A Act. It is not the contention of the petitioners that the purpose in the instant case is not a public purpose. It is their contention that the appropriate Government, in relation to acquisition of land for the public purpose in the instant case, is the Central Government. However, reliance on the above decisions of this Court would not be of any assistance to Mr. Sonak for the purposes of his first contention. 91. It is their contention that the appropriate Government, in relation to acquisition of land for the public purpose in the instant case, is the Central Government. However, reliance on the above decisions of this Court would not be of any assistance to Mr. Sonak for the purposes of his first contention. 91. In this context, the reliance by Mr.Nadkarni, learned Advocate General on the Constitution Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan reported in AIR 1955 S.C 810 , is appropriate. Therein reversing a decision of this Court reported in A.I.R 1953 Bombay 337, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held thus: “6. The reasoning by which the learned appellate Judges of the Bombay High Court reached their conclusion is shortly this. There can be no public purpose of the Union or a purpose of the State. There are only these two categories to consider under the statute, as the words “any other purpose” in the particular context should be read 'ejusdem generis' with “the purpose of the State”. The provision of accommodation for a member of the foreign consulate staff is a “purpose of the Union” and not a “purpose of the State”. 7. We are unable to uphold this view as regards both the standpoints. Item 33 in the Union Legislative List (List I) refers to “acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purposes of the Union”. Item 36 in the State List (List II) relates to “acquisition or requisitioning of property, except for the purposes of the Union, subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III”. Item 42 of the Concurrent Legislative List (List III) speaks of “the purpose of the Union or of a State or any other public purpose”. ‘Reading the three items together, it is fairly obvious that the categories of “purpose” contemplated are three in number, namely, Union purpose, State purpose, and any other public purpose. Though every State purpose or Union purpose must be a public purpose, it is easy to think of cases where the purpose of the acquisition or requisition is neither the one nor the other but a public purpose. Acquisition of sites for the building of hospitals or educational institutions by private benefactors will be a public purpose, though it will not strictly be a 'State or Union purpose'. Acquisition of sites for the building of hospitals or educational institutions by private benefactors will be a public purpose, though it will not strictly be a 'State or Union purpose'. When we speak of a State purpose or a Union purpose, we think of duties and obligations cast on the State or the Union to do particular thing for the benefit of the public or a section of the public. Cases where the State acquires or requisitions property to facilitate the coming into existence of utilitarian institutions, or schemes having public welfare at heart, will fall within the third category abovementioned. 8. With great respect, we are constrained to say that the 'ejusdem generis' rule of construction, which found favour in the Court below for reaching the result that the words “any other public purpose” are restricted to a public purpose which is also a purpose of the State, has scarcely any application. Apart from the fact that the rule must be confined within narrow limits, and general or comprehensive words should receive their full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus, which must comprise more than one species, before the rule can be applied. If the words “any other public purpose, in the Statute in question have been used only to mean a State purpose, they would become mere surplusage; Courts should lean against such a construction as far as possible. 9. Even if it is contended that the law contemplates only two purposes, namely, State purpose and Union purpose, it is difficult to see how finding accommodation for the staff of a foreign consulate is a Union purpose and not a State purpose. Item II in the Union list specifies “diplomatic, consular & trade representation” as one of the subjects within the legislative competence of Parliament, and under Article 73 of the Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend to all such matters. It can hardly be said that securing a room for a member of the staff of a foreign consulate amounts to providing for consular representation, and that therefore it is a purpose of the Union for which the State cannot legislate. It can hardly be said that securing a room for a member of the staff of a foreign consulate amounts to providing for consular representation, and that therefore it is a purpose of the Union for which the State cannot legislate. It was conceded by Mr.Rajinder Narain, Counsel for the respondent, that there is no duty cast upon the Union to provide accommodation for the consulate staff, and this must be so, when we remember that the routine duties of a Consul in modern times are to protect the interests and promote the commercial affairs of the State which he represents, and that his powers, privileges and immunities are not analogous to those of an ambassador. The trade and commerce of the State which appoints him with the State in which he is located are his primary concern. The State of Bombay is primarily interested in its own trade and commerce and in the efficient discharge of his duties by the foreign consul functioning within the State. We are inclined to regard the purpose for which the requisition was made in this case more as a State purpose than as a Union purpose. 11. There is another way of looking at the question involved. An undertaking may have three different facets or aspects, and may serve the purpose of a State, the purpose ofthe Union and a general public purpose. Even if one may regard the requisition of a room for the accommodation of a member of a Consulate as one appertaining to a Union purpose, it does not necessarily cease to be a State purpose or a general public purpose. In this view also the requisition in this case must be held to have been validly made.” 92. Mr. Sonak would argue that this is a decision interpreting the Bombay Land Regulation Act, 1948 and the subject matter of the same is not acquisition but requisition and, therefore, it would have no application in the instant case. 93. In this view also the requisition in this case must be held to have been validly made.” 92. Mr. Sonak would argue that this is a decision interpreting the Bombay Land Regulation Act, 1948 and the subject matter of the same is not acquisition but requisition and, therefore, it would have no application in the instant case. 93. We are unable to accept this contention because while dealing with cases under the L.A Act as well, this decision has been subsequently relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Another vs. Ram Kanwar & Others reported in A.I.R 1962 SC 247, Jage Ram vs. State of Haryana reported in (1971) 1 Supreme Court Cases 671 & Daulat Singh Surana and Others vs. First Land Acquisition Collector and Others reported in (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 641 and finally in the case of Sooraram Pratap Reddy vs. District Collector, Land Acquisition and Others reported in (2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases 552. In the last judgment, the following observations are very pertinent: “129. As already adverted to earlier, the State of Andhra Pradesh in the background of “World Tourism Organisation Report” and “Vision 2020 Document” took a policy decision for the development of the city of Hyderabad. For the said purpose, it decided to establish an integrated project which would make Hyderabad a major business-cum-leisure tourism infrastructure centre for the State. The project is both structurally as well as financially integrated. It is to be implemented through Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure and Investment Corporation (APIIC) which has taken all steps to make Hyderabad a world class business destination. 130. APIIC is an instrumentality of State and works as “nodal agency” developing the project which would facilitate socio-economic progress of the State by generating revenues, weeding out unemployment & bringing in new avenues and opportunities for public at large. Development of infrastructure is legal & legitimate “public purpose” for exercising power of eminent domain. Simply because a company has been chosen for fulfillment of such public purpose does not mean that the larger public interest has been sacrificed, ignored or disregarded. It will also not make exercise of power bad, mala fide or for collateral purpose vitiating the proceedings. 131. Simply because a company has been chosen for fulfillment of such public purpose does not mean that the larger public interest has been sacrificed, ignored or disregarded. It will also not make exercise of power bad, mala fide or for collateral purpose vitiating the proceedings. 131. In our judgment, the respondents are right in submitting that in case of integrated and indivisible project, the project has to be taken as a whole and must be judged whether it is in the larger public interest. It cannot be split into different components and to consider whether each and every component will serve public good. A holistic approach has to be adopted in such matters. If the project taken as a whole is an attempt in the direction of bringing foreign exchange, generating employment opportunities and securing economic benefits to the State and the public at large, it will serve public purpose. 132. It is clearly established in this case that the infrastructure development project conceived by the State and executed under the auspices of its instrumentality (APIIC) is one covered by the Act. The joint venture mechanism for implementing the policy, executing the project and achieving lawful public purpose for realising the goal of larger public good would neither destroy the object nor vitiate the exercise of power of public purpose for development of infrastructure. The concept of joint venture to tap resources of private sector for infrastructural development for fulfillment of public purpose has been recognised in foreign countries as also in India in several decisions of this Court.” 94. It is important to bear in mind that Air, Rail and Road Network benefits the State through which it passes and that State is obliged to maintain and look after its upkeep. In the case of International Tourist Corporation vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1981 SC 774 , the Supreme Court in the context of State's power to tax vehicles using the National Highway passing through Haryana observes thus: “There cannot be the slightest doubt that the State of Haryana incurs considerable expenditure for the maintenance of roads and providing for the transport of goods and passengers within the State of Haryana. The maintenance of highways other than the National Highways is exclusively the responsibility of the State Government. The maintenance of highways other than the National Highways is exclusively the responsibility of the State Government. While the maintenance of National Highways is the responsibility of the Union Government, under Sec. 5 of the National Highways Act, that very provision empowers the Central Government to direct that any function in relation to the development and maintenance of a National Highway shall also be exercisable by the concerned State Government. Sec.6 further empowers the Central Government to give directions to the State Government as to the carrying out of the provisions of the Act and Sec. 8 authorises the Central Government to enter into an agreement with the State Government in relation to the development and maintenance of the whole or part of a National Highway situated within the State including a provision for the sharing of expenditure. Therefore, the State Government is not altogether devoid of responsibility in the matter of development & maintenance of a national highway, though the primary responsibility is that of the Union Government. It is under a statutory obligation to obey the directions given by the Central Government with respect to the development & maintenance of national highways and may enter into an agreement to share the expenditure. That part of the highway which is within a municipal area is excluded from the definition of a national highway and therefore, the responsibility for the development and maintenance of that part of the highway is certainly on the State Government & the Municipal Committee concerned. Since the development and maintenance of that part of the highway which is within a municipal area is equally important for the smooth flow of passengers & goods along the national highway it has to be said that in developing and maintaining the highway which is within a municipal area, the State Government is surely facilitating the flow of passengers and goods along the national highway. Apart from this, other facilities provided by the State Government along all highways including national highways, such as lighting, traffic control, amenities for passengers, halting places for buses and trucks are available for use by everyone including those travelling along the national highways. Apart from this, other facilities provided by the State Government along all highways including national highways, such as lighting, traffic control, amenities for passengers, halting places for buses and trucks are available for use by everyone including those travelling along the national highways. It cannot therefore, be said that the State Government confers no benefits & renders no service in connection with traffic moving along national highways and is, therefore, not entitled to levy a compensatory and regulatory tax on passengers and goods carried on national highways.” More recently, a Division Bench of the Hon'ble Madras High Court had an occasion to consider some of the identical controversy in the case of J. Parthiban & Ors vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors reported in A.I.R 2008 Madras 203 and the Division Bench speaking through the Hon’ble the Chief Justice A.P.Shah, considered the major contentions formulated in para 4 & observed thus: “4 The petitioners, who were affected by the acquisition of lands at different villages, have filed these petitions challenging G.O.Ms.No.108, Transport (I-2) Department, dated 09.10.2007 as well as the notices issued under section 3(2) of the T.N. Acquisition Act, mainly on the ground that the proceedings are without jurisdiction and ultra vires the Airports Authority Act. On behalf of the petitioners, the following four major contentions have been urged: - (i) The State Government lacks competence to acquire the land for the purpose of expansion of the Airport, as the field is occupied by the Central Legislation, namely, Airports Authority of India Act, 1994; (ii) The acquisition, even if it is assumed can be made by the State Government, cannot be made under the T.N. Acquisition Act, as the Airport is neither an industrial area nor an industrial estate nor an industry for the purposes of the State Act for which acquisition can be made; (iii) Environmental clearance is a must for the proposed project and the same ought to have been obtained before the acquisition proceedings are initiated; and (iv) The State Government has no power to acquire the land for rehabilitation of the project affected persons under the T.N. Acquisition Act”. 95. Further in paras 10, 11, 13 to 15 and 19 and 20, the Division Bench observed thus: “10 We may now refer to the relevant Entries. 95. Further in paras 10, 11, 13 to 15 and 19 and 20, the Division Bench observed thus: “10 We may now refer to the relevant Entries. Entry 29 in List I (Union List) reads as under: ''Airways; aircraft and air navigation; provision of aerodromes; regulation and organisation of air traffic and of aerodromes; provision for aeronautical education and training and regulation of such education & training provided by States and other agencies''. Entry 24 in List II, (State List) reads: ''Industries subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I." Entry 42 in List III (Concurrent List) reads: ''42. Acquisition and requisitioning of property.” It may be noted here that Entry 33 in List I, Entry 36 in List II and Entry 42 in List III were amended by Section 26 of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956, by which, Entry 33 of List I and Entry 36 of List II were deleted and Entry 42 in List III was amended to read as set out hereinabove. Entry 33 in List I and Entry 36 in List II conferred legislative power on the Union & the States respectively for acquisition or requisitioning of property for its own purpose. Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, which made the aforementioned amendment was designed to clear the ambiguity about the power of acquisition and requisitioning of property being not a power incidental to any of the legislative powers but an independent power by itself. The object behind the amendment has been thus explained: ''The existence of three entries in the legislative lists (33 of List I, 36 of List II and 42 of List III) relating to the essentially single subject of acquisition & requisitioning of property by the government gives rise to unnecessary technical difficulties in legislation. In order to avoid these difficulties and simplify the constitutional position, it is proposed to omit the entries in the Union and State Lists and replace the entry in the concurrent list by a comprehensive entry covering the whole subject. (see Statement of Objects and Reasons in respect of Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956)." 11. The scope of Entry 42 in List III of the Seventh Schedule has been considered in detail in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper -vs- Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 ). (see Statement of Objects and Reasons in respect of Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956)." 11. The scope of Entry 42 in List III of the Seventh Schedule has been considered in detail in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper -vs- Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 ). After tracing the history of different Entries in Lists I and II in relation to acquisition of property, the Court stated as under:- (SCC pp.281-282, para 38) 38. Before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, Entry 33 List I invested Parliament with power to enact laws with respect to acquisition or requisitioning for the purpose of the Union, and Entry 36 List II conferred upon the State Legislature the power to legislate with respect to acquisition or requisitioning for the remaining purposes. Those entries are now deleted, and a single Entry 42 List III invests Parliament and the State Legislatures with power to legislate with respect to ‘acquisition and requisitioning’ of property. By Entry 42 in the Concurrent List power was conferred upon Parliament and the State Legislatures to legislate with respect to ‘Principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purpose of the Union or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form in which such compensation is to be given’. Power to legislate for acquisition of property is exercisable only under Entry 42 List III, & not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists......” (emphasis supplied) 12. In Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. -vs- State of U.P. (1980) 4 SCC 136 , following the R. C. Cooper case, the court stated as follows:- ''25. There is thus a long line of decisions which clearly establishes the proposition that power to legislate for acquisition of property is an independent and separate power and is exercisable only under Entry 42, List III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists. This power of the State legislature to legislate for acquisition of property remains intact & untrammelled except to the extent where on assumption of control of an industry by a declaration as envisaged in Entry 52, List I, a further power of acquisition is taken over by a specific legislation." 13. This power of the State legislature to legislate for acquisition of property remains intact & untrammelled except to the extent where on assumption of control of an industry by a declaration as envisaged in Entry 52, List I, a further power of acquisition is taken over by a specific legislation." 13. In a subsequent judgment in Shri Krishna Gyanoday Sugar Ltd. -vs- State of Bihar, 2003 (4) SCC 378 , a three-Judge Bench expressly rejected the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners therein that the decision in Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd.-vs-State of U.P., 1990 (1) SCC 109 , overrules the decision in Iswari Khetan case, cited supra, and held that the said argument is plainly untenable. .... 14. It is thus a settled position of law that the power of acquisition is an independent power emanating from Entry 42 of List III in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and it is not ancillary or incidental to any of the Entries in List I, List II or List III. Entry 29 (List I) does not include power of acquisition and such power of acquisition flows independently from Entry 42 of List III. 15. On behalf of the petitioners, it is strenuously contended that Section 19 of the Airports Authority Act inasmuch as it refers to the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of acquisition under the Airports Authority Act is undoubtedly an occupied field on legislation by reference, and reference to the corresponding law in Section 19 also implies only a Central Act, and the State cannot by its statutory power under the T.N. Acquisition Act acquire the land in the face of the existing Central Acts namely, Airports Authority Act and the Land Acquisition Act. It is contended that under the Land Acquisition Act, the definition “appropriate Government” has classified the acquisition into two categories i.e., Union purpose and all other purposes (State purpose). The State except the Union purpose can acquire the land for any other purpose including the companies under the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, the State has no power to acquire the land for airport expansion, which is essentially a Union purpose. We find absolutely no force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. Section 19 of the Airports Authority of India Act is only a referral provision referring to Land Acquisition Act and any other corresponding law. Thus, the State has no power to acquire the land for airport expansion, which is essentially a Union purpose. We find absolutely no force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. Section 19 of the Airports Authority of India Act is only a referral provision referring to Land Acquisition Act and any other corresponding law. A mere declaration that the land can be acquired for the Authority under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or of any other corresponding law for the time being in force, does not affect the power of the State Government under Entry 42 of List III. It is difficult to see that how the field of acquisition could be said to be occupied by the Central Act by enacting Section 19 A reference to the Land Acquisition Act or any other corresponding law for the time being in force has to be construed as acquisition laws emanating from Entry 42 List III. In fact, the Airports Authority of India Act, generally speaking, does not deal with acquisition of property and it merely provides that the land may be acquired for the purpose of the Authority. There is no conflict between the State Act and the control exercised by the Central Government under the provisions of the Airports Authority of India Act and there is not even a remote encroachment on the field occupied by the Airports Authority of India Act. There is no reason to accept the narrow interpretation of the expression ''any other corresponding law'' in Section 19 of the Airports Authority of India Act to mean only the Central Act. The expression ''any other corresponding law'' would naturally include a State law as power of acquisition is held to be an independent power under Entry 42, List III of Seventh Schedule. 19. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the power to acquire land is a separate, distinct & independent power and is not an incident of the power to legislate under other entries. The Entries, which deal with “airport” and acquisition, are entirely different subject matters. Therefore, we do not think it is any longer open to the learned counsel for the petitioners to contend that the impugned acquisition of the land for the expansion of the airport is beyond the competence of the State Legislature. Re. Contention (ii) 20. The Entries, which deal with “airport” and acquisition, are entirely different subject matters. Therefore, we do not think it is any longer open to the learned counsel for the petitioners to contend that the impugned acquisition of the land for the expansion of the airport is beyond the competence of the State Legislature. Re. Contention (ii) 20. The contention advanced is that the State Government cannot resort to the T.N. Acquisition Act, as airport is not an industry for the purpose of the said Act. This contention also proceeds on the premise that the airport being a Union subject the State lacks competence to acquire the land. We have already seen that the State Act in question is in pith and substance a law for acquisition under Entry 42 of List III of the 7th Schedule. It can hardly be disputed that the State Government is primarily interested in development of the industries and in order to ensure industrial growth, infrastructural facilities like airport, railways, etc, are vitally important. In the broad sense, the purpose of expansion of the airport is also a State purpose or in other words a general public purpose. In this view also the acquisition in this case must be held to have been validly made.” 96. Once the above is the legal position and several facets of the controversy as noted by us have been already dealt with in the authoritative pronouncements by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, then, we do not see how Mr. Sonak can derive any assistance from wording of Entry 29 and urge that the State Government is completely denuded of power to acquire a land for the purposes of setting up an international airport at Mopa. It is not as if the State’s authority to acquire land by resorting the L.A Act for such a public purpose is completely taken away. Even the Division Bench decisions relied upon by Mr. Sonak do not say so. With appropriate entrustment of power and in peculiar factual situations, even the State can acquire lands for the purposes of the Union, but then the question would be the entrustment or the authorisation by the Central Government in favour of the State and the manner in which the same is done. Sonak do not say so. With appropriate entrustment of power and in peculiar factual situations, even the State can acquire lands for the purposes of the Union, but then the question would be the entrustment or the authorisation by the Central Government in favour of the State and the manner in which the same is done. Equally, where the State Government has a definite role to play and has indeed involved itself in the project or purpose, may be for the Union that is another notable and relevant feature and cannot be ignored if one takes the Division Bench judgments into consideration. Therefore, it is not possible to read the judgments of this Court as supporting the case of the petitioners that the State Government is not the appropriate Government for acquiring lands under the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of establishing or expanding an airport within the State. The Division Benches based their conclusions in Nandkumar' case and Ramdas's case (supra) because on facts it was revealed that the State Government was not properly entrusted with the functions and had no involvement in the projects which were subject matter of acquisition. There is no principle of law which can be culled out and particularly the State Government is not the appropriate Government in case of acquisition for railway, airport etc. 97. Assuming that in the instant case the acquisition by the State Government is for the purposes of setting up of an international airport and such a subject is dealt with by List I-Union List and the words “for the purposes of the Union” have to be construed in the present case by taking into account Entry 29 of List I (Union List), even then we are of the opinion that the State Government cannot be said to be incompetent to initiate the acquisition proceedings. The Notifications under section 4 and the declaration under section 6 of the L.A Act cannot be struck down and quashed on the ground that the State Government is not the appropriate Government. The words “purposes of the Union” as appearing in section 3(ee) which defines the expression “appropriate Government”, cannot be interpreted only by reading the Entry 29 as it is. The words “purposes of the Union” as appearing in section 3(ee) which defines the expression “appropriate Government”, cannot be interpreted only by reading the Entry 29 as it is. Once the conceded position in law is that these are only legislative heads and that the various Entries in the Lists are not powers of legislature but fields of legislation and the power to legislate is given by Article 246 and other Articles of Constitution of India, then, we cannot just go by the wording of the Entry 29. The settled position in law as has been noted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd vs. State of West Bengal and others reported in A.I.R 1962 SC 1044 and the source of power being Article 246 as enumerated in the case of Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia & Others vs. Union of India and Others reported in AIR 1970 SC 1453 , then, these entries which are mere legislative heads and of enabling character, cannot be considered as source of power or substantive provisions by themselves. We must see the law made by the Parliament in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 246(1) in relation to the subject Entry 29. That law to which our attention has been invited by the learned Advocate General as also the learned Assistant Solicitor General, may now be noticed. 98. The entry is dealing with airways; aircraft and air navigation; provision of aerodromes; regulation and organization of air traffic and of aerodromes; provision for aeronautical education and training and regulation of such education & training provided by States and other agencies. Each of these concepts find place in definite laws made by the Parliament. We have reproduced the statements made on affidavit by the State Government as also the Union of India. It is the specific stand of the State that as per the decision of the Union Cabinet dated 29th March 2000, the State Government is permitted to own a Airport in joint venture with any of the parties enumerated therein. The present project is envisaged as a public-private ownership and the airport will be operated on “Build-Own-Operate-Transfer” (BOOT) basis. The State Government will have a percentage share in the project which will be in the form of land component and in this behalf reliance is rightly placed on the two statutes referred above. The present project is envisaged as a public-private ownership and the airport will be operated on “Build-Own-Operate-Transfer” (BOOT) basis. The State Government will have a percentage share in the project which will be in the form of land component and in this behalf reliance is rightly placed on the two statutes referred above. The Union of India has also clarified this position by its affidavit and has submitted that even where airports are constructed & operated by the Central Government as a matter of general policy, it is the State Government which provides land free of costs & without any encumbrances to the Central Government for the said purpose. 99. Reliance is placed on the Guidelines for setting up of Greenfield Airports, copy of which is Annexure R-I to the affidavit of Mr.Oma Nand, Under Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of India filed in Writ Petition No.510 of 2009. 100. In terms of this policy, the State Government can facilitate setting up of the airport and it can provide incentives to an airport company in the form of land, Real Estate, Development Rights in and around airport, airport connectivity, rail, road and by any other assistance that the State Government deems fit. 101. Both, the learned Advocate General and the Assistant Solicitor General, place reliance on the Air Craft Act, 1934. The said Act is an Act to make better provision for the control of the manufacture, possession, use, operation, sale, import and export of aircraft. In section 2, the definitions are to be found and therein the word “aerodrome” is defined thus: “2(2) “aerodrome” means any definite or limited ground or water area intended to be used, either wholly or in part, for the landing or departure of aircraft, and includes all buildings, sheds, vessels, piers and other structures thereon or appertaining thereto;” 102. Then, there is power to make Rules conferred by section 5, on the Central Government. There is an extensive amendment made to this Act by introducing section 5 (2) (aa), (ab), (ac) and (b) and (ba). Thus, the intent is clear, namely, to regulate air transport services, issue licence authorizing establishment of air transport service, Economic Regulation of Civil Aviation and Air Transport Services, licensing, inspection & regulation of aerodromes. There is a power to issue directions vide section 5A of the Air Craft Act, 1934. Thus, the intent is clear, namely, to regulate air transport services, issue licence authorizing establishment of air transport service, Economic Regulation of Civil Aviation and Air Transport Services, licensing, inspection & regulation of aerodromes. There is a power to issue directions vide section 5A of the Air Craft Act, 1934. The rest of the provisions may not be relevant for our purpose. 103. The Air Craft Rules, 1937 have also been extensively amended by introduction of Part XI. Reliance is placed upon Rules 78 and 79, which read as under: “78 Licensing of Aerodromes.- (1) No aerodrome shall be used as a regular place of landing and departure by a Scheduled air transport service or for a series of landings and departures by any aircraft carrying passengers or cargo for hire or reward unless- (a) it has been licensed ‘for the purpose, & save in accordance with the conditions prescribed in such licence; or (b) it has been approved by the Director- General, subject to such conditions as he may deem fit, for the purpose of operation of flights in the event of national or international crisis, natural calamities, emergencies or otherwise requiring such flights to carry material goods for relief purpose, or for giving joyrides for hire or reward: Provided that any person already permitted & operating scheduled air transport services to an aerodrome before the commencement of the Aircraft (4th Amendment) Rules, 2004 may continue operation of such services till such person obtains the licence from the Director-General by the date to be notified by the Central Government. (2) An aerodrome shall be licensed by the Central Government in one of the following categories, namely:- (a) for public use; (b) for private use, that is to say, for use by the licensee and by individuals specifically authorized by the licensee. (3) An aerodrome may be licensed for all types of aircraft or for certain specified types or classes of aircraft and the licence may specify the conditions on which the aerodrome may be used. (4) No person shall operate or cause to be operated any flight from a temporary aerodrome or an aerodrome which has not been licensed or approved as the case may be, under these rules unless it meets the minimum safety requirements laid down by the Director-General. 79. (4) No person shall operate or cause to be operated any flight from a temporary aerodrome or an aerodrome which has not been licensed or approved as the case may be, under these rules unless it meets the minimum safety requirements laid down by the Director-General. 79. Qualifications of licensee.-A licence for an aerodrome shall not be granted to any person other than- (a) a citizen of India; or (b) a company or a body corporate: Provided that - (i) it is registered and having its principal place of business in India; (ii) it meets the equity holding criteria specified by the Central Government from time to time; or (c) the Central Government or a State Government or any company or any corporation owned or controlled by either of the said Governments; or (d) a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860).” 104. A bare perusal of the same would indicate that a licence can be issued for the purpose of providing an aerodrome and aerodrome can be licensed by the Central Government provided the licensee qualifies in terms of Rule 79. Thus, a licence for an aerodrome can be issued to a citizen of India or a company or a body corporate or to the Central or State Government or company or corporation owned or controlled by either of the said Governments or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, after an application is made in terms of the Aerodrome Manual. 105. The Airport Authority of India Act, 1994 is an Act to provide for the constitution of the Airports Authority of India and for the transfer and vesting of the undertakings of the International Airports Authority of India and the National Airports Authority to and in the Airports Authority of India so constituted for the better administration and cohesive management of airports and civil enclaves whereat air transport services are operated or are intended to be operated and of all aeronautical communication stations for the purpose of establishing or assisting in the establishment of airports and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. In that enactment, it has been clarified that it applies to all airports whereat air transport services are operated or intended to be operated other than airports or fields belonging to or subject to the control of any armed forces of the Union & for private airports in so far as it relates to providing air traffic service. The term “airport” is defined in section 2(b). The term “airstrip” is defined in section 2(c). The term “air traffic service” is defined in section 2(d) and the term “air transport service” is defined in section 2(e). These definitions read as under: “2(b) “airport” means a landing and taking off area for aircrafts, usually with runways and aircraft maintenance and passenger facilities and includes aerodromes as defined in clause (2) of section 2 of the Aircraft Act, 1934 (22 of 1934);” “2(c) “airstrip” means an area used or intended to be used for the landing and take-off of aircrafts with short take-off and landing characteristics and includes all buildings and structures thereon or appertaining thereto.” “2(d) “air traffic service” includes flight information service, alerting service, air traffic advisory service, air traffic control service, area control service, approach control service and airport control service;” “2(e) “air transport service” means any service, for any kind of remuneration, whatsoever, for the transport by air of persons, mail or any other thing, animate or inanimate, whether such service relates to a single flight or series of flights:” 106. Therefore, the term “airport” includes “aerodrome” as defined in section 2(2) of the Air Craft Act, 1934 and the definition of the term “private airport” is very crucial. It is defined in section 2(nn) which reads as under: “2(nn) “private airport” means an airport owned, developed or managed by- (i) any person or agency other than the Authority or any State Government, or (ii) any person or agency jointly with the Authority or any State Government or both where the share of such person or agency, as the case may be, in the assets of the private airport is more than fifty percent;” 107. All these definitions taken together, would mean that it is not as if anybody other than the Central Government cannot set up an airport or operate air traffic service or air transport service or maintain an airstrip. All these definitions taken together, would mean that it is not as if anybody other than the Central Government cannot set up an airport or operate air traffic service or air transport service or maintain an airstrip. Once the term “private airport” refers to an airport and the term “airport” is defined to mean a landing & taking off area for aircrafts, usually with runways and aircraft maintenance and passenger facilities, then, we do not see how it can be argued that the International airport, its establishment, maintenance and operation is only by the Central Government and none else. The State Government is empowered by the Aircraft Act to establish, maintain and operate a Airport. Once there can be a private airport and the function of the authority under section 12(1) inter alia is to establish airport, assist in the establishment of private airports by rendering such technical, financial or other assistance which the Central Government may think necessary for the said purpose, then, we cannot see how the role of the State Government in terms of this enactment of the Parliament can be ignored or omitted from consideration. Therefore, assuming that the instant acquisition is for the purposes of the Union/Central Government, yet, the Central Government itself being permitted by law of Parliament to aid & assist in establishing and maintaining a private airport, which could be with the involvement and participation of the State Government as well, then, the State Government is not incompetent or a inappropriate Government within the meaning of section 3(ee) of the L.A Act. Once the purpose of acquisition, in this case, is admittedly a public purpose and that public purpose is being achieved with active aid, assistance and participation of the State Government, then, all the more we cannot hold that the State Government has no power to initiate the subject acquisition proceedings. Once the purpose of acquisition, in this case, is admittedly a public purpose and that public purpose is being achieved with active aid, assistance and participation of the State Government, then, all the more we cannot hold that the State Government has no power to initiate the subject acquisition proceedings. Hence, even applying the law laid down in the decisions of the Division Benches of this Court and other High Courts, to which a reference has been made, yet, finding that the legislations in the field have undergone a definite change with the Airport Authority of India Act, 1994 being enacted and amended, which is a development subsequent to the decision in Nandkumar’s case (supra), we are of the opinion that in the present facts and circumstances, we cannot strike down the Notification on the ground that the State Government is not the appropriate Government. Moreso, when we are satisfied that the State Government has a considerable stake in the project and it will be involved at all stages including establishment & management of the International Airport of Mopa in Pernem Taluka. The State's participation and its major role is acknowledged and admitted by the Central Government also. Thus, modern trend of associating State Governments and Private Enterprises in Infrastructure Development is an important part of the Scheme, which cannot be disregarded. 108. However, we need not deal with the contentions of Mr. Sonak and other counsel on the point of invoking section 17 of the L.A Act and particularly, sub sections thereof enabling the State to dispense with the inquiry/hearing under section 5-A of the L.A Act. 109. We are of the opinion that once the learned Advocate General has conceded that qua the petitioners and their lands, the State would hold the necessary inquiry/hearing and which statement we have accepted as undertaking to this Court, then, it is unnecessary to deal with the rival contentions on this aspect. The State has conceded that the special powers in cases of urgency enumerated by section 17 could not have been invoked in the given facts and circumstances and the Notification under section 4 and a declaration under section 6 must, therefore, fail qua the petitioners and their lands alone. The State has conceded that the special powers in cases of urgency enumerated by section 17 could not have been invoked in the given facts and circumstances and the Notification under section 4 and a declaration under section 6 must, therefore, fail qua the petitioners and their lands alone. We clarify that save & except the objections as specified above nothing else would be considered in the inquiry/hearing under section 5-A which the State shall hold and conclude, as provided therein and within a period of thirty days (30) from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. At such an inquiry/hearing, the petitioners can raise objections in terms of Rule 4 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Land Acquisition Rules, 1972. However, the petitioners shall not be permitted to raise any objection on the competence of the State Government to initiate the subject acquisition proceedings nor can they urge that the notified purpose is not genuinely or properly a public purpose. These issues have been decided and atleast as far as the second aspect is concerned, we find that it is a conceded position even by the petitioners. In other words, the notified purpose is a public purpose. 110. The other contention of the petitioners' counsel pertains to non- publication of the Notification under section 4 at a convenient place in the locality. Our attention is invited to section 4 and it is submitted that it is the duty of the Collector to cause public notice of the substance of the Notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. It is submitted that this condition is mandatory. Our attention is invited to the averments in the writ petition in that behalf and it is submitted that there is no compliance with the mandatory pre-condition. The publication by affixation on 14th August 2008 as stated does not comply with the statutory requirement. Mr. Sonak has taken us through para 4 (viii) of Writ Petition No.568 of 2009. The specific averment is that the Notification under section 4 has not been published at the convenient places at the locality. While dealing with this submission, what has been stated in the affidavit in reply of the State of Goa is that the Notification was issued on 25th July 2008. The specific averment is that the Notification under section 4 has not been published at the convenient places at the locality. While dealing with this submission, what has been stated in the affidavit in reply of the State of Goa is that the Notification was issued on 25th July 2008. It was published in two newspapers, namely, Herald dated 30th July 2008 and Gomantak dated 31st July 2008, which was also published in Official Gazette dated 8th August 2008. The Notification was then published by affixation on 14th August 2008. This reply does not confirm with the requirement of section 4(1) of the Act. 111. The learned Advocate General, in reply to these submissions of Mr. Sonak which are adopted by other counsel, has urged that the statements made in the affidavit in reply are based on the record maintained by the concerned officers while discharging their official duties and conducting official business. In that behalf, he has handed over file to us which contains a letter from the Talathi of Poroscade-Saza dated 6th April 2010 addressed to the Mamlatdar, Pernem Taluka, Pernem, Goa on the subject of giving of the public notice of the substance of the Notification in relation to that village. It is stated that the same have been duly displayed on a notice board of the Village Panchayat of Poroscade-Saza and at the site of the proposed land to be acquired and he also enclosed the panchanama. We have perused both, this letter and the panchanama, and we are of the opinion that it will not be possible to uphold the contentions of the petitioners that the public notice of the substance of the Notification under section 4 was not given at a convenient place in the locality. There is also a similar letter from the Talathi of Casarvarnem and other villages. In such circumstances, when the extracts from the official files have been produced, there is no reason to disbelieve the contents thereof. We are of the view that the statements made in the affidavit in reply cannot be said to be false or based on no record. The submissions have to be considered in the backdrop of the requirement to give public notice of the substance of the Notification at a convenient place in the locality. We are of the view that the statements made in the affidavit in reply cannot be said to be false or based on no record. The submissions have to be considered in the backdrop of the requirement to give public notice of the substance of the Notification at a convenient place in the locality. That requirement in Section 4(1) is distinct from the earlier one regarding publication of the Notification in two newspapers and the Official Gazette. Admittedly, this publication is done by the State. 112. Lastly, what remains for consideration is the argument of the petitioners counsel with regard to non compliance with the Environment Impact Assessment Notification of 14th September 2006 and the directions contained in the judgment of the Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (supra). 113. The argument is that this judgment of the Supreme Court holds that prior approval or clearance from the authorities under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and the functionaries under the Environment Impact Assessment Notification dated 14th September 2006, is required for acquisition of the land for the Airport project. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General that the requirement is of obtaining prior approval and clearance so also permissions before commencing the activities mentioned in the Notification and not prior thereto. 114. With the assistance of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we have perused the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board vs. C. Kenchappa and Others reported in (2006) 6 Supreme Court Cases 371 and the Notification of the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India dated 14th September 2006. A careful perusal of the judgment as also this Notification would reveal that what the Central Government has directed is that on and from the date of publication of the Notification, the required construction of new projects or activities or the expansion or modernisation of existing projects or activities listed in the schedule to this Notification entailing the capacity addition with change in process and/or technology shall be undertaken in any part of India only after prior Environmental Clearance from the Central Government or as the case may by State level Environment Impact Assessment Authority, duly constituted by the Central Government under section 3(3) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, in accordance with the procedure specified in this Notification. 115. 115. The requirement of prior Environmental Clearance (EC) is specified in para 2 of this Notification and the same reads as under: “2 Requirements of prior Environmental Clearance (EC):- The following projects or activities shall require prior environmental clearances from the concerned authority, which shall hereinafter referred to be as the Central Government in the Ministry of Environment and Forests for matters falling under Category 'A' in the Schedule and at State level the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority (SEIAA) for matters falling under Category 'B' in the said Schedule, before any construction work, or preparation of land by the project management except for securing the land, is started on the project or activity.” 116. Thereafter, there are further stipulations & requirements and what has been specified in the Schedule, is list of project or activities requiring prior environmental clearance. In this List 7(a), under Item No.7, entitled “Physical Infrastructure including Environmental Services”, “Airports” are mentioned. Thus, this project or activity and all other enlisted therein would require prior environmental clearance. 117. We are of the opinion that the reliance placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of J. Parthiban & Ors vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors (supra), by the learned Advocate General, is appropriate. 118. Para 21 of the above decision reads as under: “21. The next submission before us is about the failure to obtain prior environmental clearance before initiation of the acquisition proceedings. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board -vs- C. Kanchappa, 2006(6) SCC 371 . In that case, the Court set aside the direction given by the Karnataka High Court to KIADB to leave a land of one kilometer as a buffer zone from the outer periphery of the village in order to maintain a ''green area'' towards preservation of land for grazing of cattle, agricultural operation, etc. The Court, however, directed that in future, before acquisition of lands for development, the KIADB must properly comprehend the consequence and adverse impact on the environment and that the lands acquired for development do not gravely impair the ecology & environment. The Board was further directed to incorporate the condition of allotment to obtain clearance from the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board before the land is allotted for development. The Board was further directed to incorporate the condition of allotment to obtain clearance from the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board before the land is allotted for development. The Court has not issued a general direction that in all the projects the authority is duty bound to obtain prior environmental clearance before initiation of the acquisition proceedings. In fact, para.2 of the Notification dated 14.9.2006 issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, provides that any project, which is covered by category (A) or category (B) before any construction work, or preparation of land by the project management except for securing the land, prior permission would be obtained. In a similar case, in respect of expansion of Mangalore Airport in the case of Environment Support Group & Others -vs- Union of India, decided on 07.2.2003, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the order of the Karnataka High Court permitting the authority to proceed with the acquisition of lands, but directed that the Government shall comply with all applicable laws & also with environmental norms in constructing the Airport. Learned senior counsel Mr. V.T. Gopalan, appearing for the Airports Authority of India, as well as Mr. P. Wilson, learned Assistant Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India gave a categorical assurance that no construction activity would commence on the land before obtaining environmental clearance. It is also brought to our notice that an application has already been made to the competent authority for necessary clearance.” 119. After having perused the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Environment Impact Assessment Notification and considering the nature of the project, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court does not require the respondents to obtain any prior environmental clearance before initiating such acquisition proceedings. All that the Supreme Court cautioned was that in future, before acquisition of lands for development, the Karnataka Industrial Development Board must properly comprehend the consequences and adverse impact on the environment and that the lands acquired do not gravely impair the ecology and environment. There is no such general direction, in this judgment as noted by the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Madras High Court. 120. There is no such general direction, in this judgment as noted by the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Madras High Court. 120. We respectfully concur with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court and hold that the subject acquisition proceedings are not vitiated for want of prior environmental clearance as urged by the petitioners. However, at the same time, we accept the statements of the learned Advocate General that due compliance will be made with the Notification of September 2006 and the provisions of the Environment Protection Act, 1986, as undertakings to this Court. He has assured the Court that the Environment Impact Assessment Study as directed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Notification, would be conducted, if not already conducted and held and wherever required prior approval, leave, permission and clearance so also licence will be applied for and obtained. We have no doubt that these assurances of the State coming through the learned Advocate General, which we have accepted as undertakings to this Court, will be duly abided by the State and its functionaries. Once such directions are issued on the basis of the undertakings of the State, the apprehension of the petitioners is taken care of. The apprehensions which have been expressed in the amended petition in relation to the Environment Impact Assessment Study and the general impact of such a project on the environment & ecology in the area, are very carefully perused by us and we have seriously considered them. We look at this matter with the required degree of care and caution and bearing in mind the impact of such projects on the ecology and future generations. We also do not brush aside or are not unmindful of the fact that in these villages there are residential houses and plantations & people have been earning their livelihood by cultivating the land as well. We do not see how on the basis of certain statements made by the petitioners, we can uphold their objections. Ultimately, that is a version of the petitioners and when the project has yet to take shape, on some general assumptions, we cannot issue the directions as sought for by the petitioners. We do not see how on the basis of certain statements made by the petitioners, we can uphold their objections. Ultimately, that is a version of the petitioners and when the project has yet to take shape, on some general assumptions, we cannot issue the directions as sought for by the petitioners. However, we are sure that all concerns of the petitioners will be duly addressed and wherever necessary, their views and suggestions during the course of the Environmental Impact Study and Assessment, would be taken into account and consideration by the appropriate & competent authorities. They must ensure that the impact of such a project is not adverse on the other villages and occupants of the houses and residents therein would be able to earn their livelihood by continuing the operations, including cultivating their lands. 121. Thus, we have dealt with all the arguments canvassed by the petitioners in each of these petitions, save and except, the above considered objections and the arguments based thereon, nothing else has been argued and urged before us. We see no merit in the complaint of Mr. Sonak and Ms.Razaq that the writ petitioner in Writ Petition No.641 of 2009 will stand to loose & the acts of the respondents in acquiring the lands of the petitioner on which he has been permitted to carry out mining activity are malafide and arbitrary as alleged. This writ petitioner cannot make any grievance now. We are in agreement with learned Advocate General that after the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this petitioner's case, it is no longer open to him to challenge the acquisition proceedings on the ground that he is deprived of the benefits of the mining lease in his favour. The understanding of parties recorded in the consent order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that the mining lease in favour of this petitioner is deemed to have been renewed and if the petitioner cannot carry on mining activities physically, does not mean that he cannot claim appropriate compensation for such physical deprivation. The understanding of parties recorded in the consent order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that the mining lease in favour of this petitioner is deemed to have been renewed and if the petitioner cannot carry on mining activities physically, does not mean that he cannot claim appropriate compensation for such physical deprivation. We have no doubt in our mind that even if the petitioner proceeds to accept the compensation offered by the respondent Nos.1 and 2 in terms of provisions made under section 11 and 12 of the L.A Act, under protest, it would be open for him to seek a Reference within the statutory period and he can claim additional or higher compensation. Our order which is based on the consent terms/understanding before the Supreme Court will not prevent him from seeking enhanced compensation in accordance with law. We keep all the contentions of the parties in that behalf open & dispose off the Writ Petition No.641 of 2009. 122. In the result, Rule is made partly absolute in Writ Petition No.568 of 2009, Writ Petition No.510 of 2009 and Writ Petition No.135 of 2010. Rule is discharged in Writ Petition No.641 of 2009. As far as our order making the Rule partially absolute in the above petitions is concerned, we direct that in terms of the undertaking given by the State, it will give a Hearing under section 5-A of the L.A Act read with the Goa, Daman & Diu Land Acquisition Rules, 1972 within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The Notification under section 4 and declaration under section 6(1) of the L.A Act stand quashed and set aside only qua the lands belonging to the petitioners in these petitions. It is only these petitioners who will be heard in the inquiry/hearing under section 5-A by the Collector/Competent Authority and none others be heard nor the proceedings in relation to acquisition of other lands and qua other villagers shall be re-opened in any case. 123. All petitions and applications on board are disposed off in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.