ORDER 1. By filing this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner-plaintiff has challenged the order dated 17.7.2012 passed in Miscellaneous Civil Case No.12/2012 by the Court below. By the impugned order the petitioner’s application preferred under section 24 CPC for transferring the said matter was rejected by the Court below. 2. The necessary facts for adjudication of this matter are as under : The petitioner preferred a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the respondents. The defendants-respondents filed an application under Order 7 rule 11 CPC, which was allowed by the trial Court on 8.11.2011. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the said order dated 8.11.2011 preferred First Appeal No.315/2011 before this Court. A Division Bench of this Court by order dated 13.4.2012 allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back for further proceeding. The petitioner, on remand, started participating in the matter. The petitioner on 19.6.2012 filed an application under Order 14 rule 5 CPC, which was disallowed by Court below on 19.6.2012. The petitioner preferred yet another application under Order 6 rule 17 CPC for amendment in the pleadings which was also rejected by the Court below on 20.6.2012. In the present petition it is alleged that the perusal of the order sheets whereby aforesaid applications preferred under Order 14 rule 5 CPC and Order 6 rule 17 CPC are rejected would show that the trial Court was prejudiced with the petitioner. It is further alleged that the trial Court is conducting proceedings on day to day basis which shows its prejudice against the petitioner. In para 5.7 of writ petition it is stated that the learned Court on several occasions orally stated that the orders of the trial Court are set aside at the instance of the petitioner and this attitude of the trial Court shows its bias. The application preferred under section 24 CPC dated 18.6.2012 is Annexure P-5. The respondents-defendants filed their reply, Annexure P-6, on 10.7.2012. Shri Pawan Dwivedi submits that the application under section 24 CPC (Annexure P-5) was filed along with written submissions (Annexure P-6) on the same date. In nutshell, it is stated that the Court below is biased and the learned District Judge has erred in rejecting the application under section 24 of CPC. Shri Pawan Dwivedi submits that the application under section 24 CPC (Annexure P-5) was filed along with written submissions (Annexure P-6) on the same date. In nutshell, it is stated that the Court below is biased and the learned District Judge has erred in rejecting the application under section 24 of CPC. In support of the contention, the judgment of Supreme Court in (2008)3 SCC 659 (Kulwinder Kaur alias Kulwinder Gurcharan Singh v. Kandi Friends Education Trust and others), and judgment of this Court reported in 2009(3) JLJ 347=2009(5) MPHT 450 (Vishnu Goyal v. Jyoti Sharma (Smt.) and another), are relied upon. 3. Per Contra, Shri N.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents No.4 to 8 supported the order passed by the Court below and relied on certain judgments. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 5. In the application under section 24 CPC (Annexure P-5) the petitioner has prayed for transfer of the matter for following reasons only : (i) The civil suit of petitioner was rejected by the trial Court because earlier application of defendant under Order 7 rule 11 was allowed. This order was set aside by the High Court on 13.4.2012 and matter was remitted. (ii) Earlier an application of petitioner preferred under Order 39 rule 3 CPC was considered by the trial Judge and a conditional direction was given but the Court fixed the matter on 8.11.2011 and in the meantime the sale-deed was executed. On 8.11.2011 the trial Court without any basis rejected the suit. (iii) On remand by the High Court by order dated 13.4.2012 the District Judge has again assigned the matter to the same trial Judge, which is not proper and on the basis of circumstances which speak for themselves, the matter needs to be transferred in the interest of justice. 6. If Annexure P-5 is examined in juxtaposition of the written submissions (page 43), it is clear that the written submissions were not filed along with the application under section 24 (Annexure P-5) which was filed on 18.6.2012. Written submissions were filed lateron on 13.7.2012. Thus, contention of Shri Pawan Dwivedi that written submissions was part of the application, Annexure P-5, is factually incorrect and not sustainable. Written submissions were filed lateron on 13.7.2012. Thus, contention of Shri Pawan Dwivedi that written submissions was part of the application, Annexure P-5, is factually incorrect and not sustainable. This is established practice and a matter of common knowledge that by written submissions only bolster/support is given to the contentions already made in the main application by giving it legal colour. In other words, on the basis of existing pleadings of an application/petition, written submissions are filed to provide legal support to it. In written submissions the legal provisions, legal position, judgments etc. are relied upon to bolster the stand taken in the application/petition in support of which written submissions are filed. Accordingly, by way of written submissions no new fact or new pleading can be entertained. However, written submission shows that certain new factual assertions are made which are not made part of the application, Annexure P-5. For example, an allegation is made in para 5 of written submissions that the trial Court directed the defendants to file the reply of petitioner’s miscellaneous application immediately with an observation that the defendants should file reply immediately and upon receiving reply the said application would be rejected immediately. There are other factual assertions also which are made for the first time in this written submission. The writ petition, on the other hand, also contains the allegations which do not form part of the application, Annexure P-5. For example, there is no assertion in Annexure P-5 that applications preferred under Order 14 rule 5 CPC and Order 6 rule 17 CPC are erroneously rejected and these orders and circumstances in which those applications were rejected speak for themselves. Thus, at every stage the petitioner has changed his stand and added things as per his convenience. 7. No doubt, section 24 CPC gives power to the Courts to transfer a matter in the interest of justice provided certain conditions are fulfilled. However, this exercise is not a mechanical exercise which is to be done as a matter of course or merely on the demand of a litigant. In Kulwinder Kaur (supra), the apex Court opined as under : “23. Regarding sections 24 and 25 of the Code together and keeping in view various judicial pronouncements, certain broad propositions as to what may constitute a ground for transfer have been laid down by Courts. In Kulwinder Kaur (supra), the apex Court opined as under : “23. Regarding sections 24 and 25 of the Code together and keeping in view various judicial pronouncements, certain broad propositions as to what may constitute a ground for transfer have been laid down by Courts. They are balance of convenience or inconvenience to the plaintiff or the defendant or witnesses; convenience or inconvenience of a particular place of trial having regard to the nature of evidence on the points involved in the suit; issues raised by the parties; reasonable apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he might not get justice in the Court in which the suit is pending; important questions of law involved or a considerable section of public interested in the litigation; “interest or justice” demanding for transfer of suit, appeal or other proceeding, etc. Above are some of the instances which are germane in considering the question of transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding. They are, however, illustrative in nature and by no means be treated as exhaustive. If on the above or other relevant considerations, the Court feels that the plaintiff or the defendant is not likely to have a “fair trial” in the Court from which he seeks to transfer a case, it is not only the power, but the duty of the Court to make such order.” This judgment is again considered by Supreme Court in (2010)8 SCC 401 (DAV Boys Senior Secondary School and others v. DAV College Managing Committee). In para 12 of this judgment the apex Court opined as under : “12. Section 25 of the Code itself makes it clear that if any application is made for transfer, after notice to the parties, if the Court is satisfied that an order of transfer is expedient for the ends of justice necessary direction may be issued for transfer of any suit, appeal or other proceedings from a High Court or other civil Court in one State to another High Court or other civil Court in any other State. In order to maintain fair trial, this Court can exercise this power and transfer the proceedings to an appropriate Court. The mere convenience of the parties may not be enough for the exercise of power but it must also be shown that in the chosen forum will result in denial of justice. In order to maintain fair trial, this Court can exercise this power and transfer the proceedings to an appropriate Court. The mere convenience of the parties may not be enough for the exercise of power but it must also be shown that in the chosen forum will result in denial of justice. Further illustrations are, balance of convenience or inconvenience to the plaintiff or the defendant or witnesses and reasonable apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he might not get justice in the Court in which the suit is pending. The abovementioned instances are only illustrative in nature. In the interest of justice and to adherence of fair trial, this Court exercises its discretion and orders transfer in a suit or appeal or other proceedings.” The finding of apex Court in para 23 of Kulwinder Kaur (supra), makes it clear that the Supreme Court has clearly expressed its view that certain examples given in the said para are illustrative in nature and are not exhaustive. However, the basic tests are -- (i) balance of convenience or inconvenience to the plaintiff or the defendant or witness; (ii) convenience or inconvenience of a particular place of trial having regard to the nature of evidence on the points involved in the suit; (iii) issues raised by the parties; (iv) reasonable apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he might not get justice in the Court in which the suit is pending; (v) important questions of law involved or a considerable section of public interested in the litigation; (vi) “interest of justice” demanding for transfer of case, etc. are certain instances which are germane in considering the question of transfer. 8. By and large, the same principle is followed by the apex Court in DAV Boys Senior Secondary School (supra). Thus, there cannot be any straight-jacket formula or thumb rule which can be applied mechanically in every case. It depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case whether such transfer is necessary to secure the ends of justice. The basic contention of Shri Pawan Dwivedi is that if there is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he might not get justice in the Court, it is sufficient for transferring a case. For this, he relied on a judgment of this Court in Vishnu Goyal (supra). 9. The basic contention of Shri Pawan Dwivedi is that if there is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he might not get justice in the Court, it is sufficient for transferring a case. For this, he relied on a judgment of this Court in Vishnu Goyal (supra). 9. A bare perusal of the judgment in Vishnu Goyal would show that the suit of plaintiff for eviction and recovery of rent was dismissed. Aggrieved by same, plaintiff preferred civil appeal wherein order was passed by lower appellate Judge and accordingly the judgment and decree of trial Court was set aside and matter was remitted back to re-decide the suit. On remand, the matter was posted before the same Presiding Officer. By filing application under section 24 CPC for transfer it is alleged that the learned Presiding Officer had already giving finding about existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant after discussing the evidence in para 8 to 30 of the judgment which was set aside by the lower appellate Court. Thus, there is every likelihood for the said Presiding Officer to stick to his views if same is again permitted to be decided by him. Thus, to get fair justice and avoid miscarriage of justice the transfer was prayed. This Court considered various judgments and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case allowed it. However, this Court observed that if the revisionist had been alert at the time of passing of the order by lower appellate Court, the position could have been avoided and such a request could have been made before the lower appellate Court for transferring the matter. This Court also opined that on remand the matter was posted before the same Judge who opined about issues No.1 to 9 earlier. Referring the Cardial principle that justice should not be merely done but it should equally appear to have been done and considering peculiar and exceptional situation aforesaid the District Judge it was directed to transfer the matter. Even this judgment makes it clear that such a direction was given “due to the peculiar and exceptional situation explained herein above ....” (para 29). At the costs of repetition, it may be remembered that there is no thumb-rule for transfer of a matter in a mechanical manner. It depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 10. Even this judgment makes it clear that such a direction was given “due to the peculiar and exceptional situation explained herein above ....” (para 29). At the costs of repetition, it may be remembered that there is no thumb-rule for transfer of a matter in a mechanical manner. It depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 10. In my considered opinion, the orders of inferior Courts are put to challenge before the higher Courts as a matter of course and it is a part of game. Merely because an order of inferior Court is set aside by the superior Court and it is remitted back and, in turn, it is posted before the same Presiding Judge would not mean that the said Judge will become biased or on remand would not be able to handle the matter dispassionately. In Vishnu Goyal (supra), the peculiar facts were that the evidence was led before the same Presiding Judge who marshalled, appreciated and opined about the same by passing judgment and decree. Thus, there was already an adjudication of an issue by the said Judge. In the present case, there is no adjudication on merits by the trial Court in the previous round. Earlier suit was dismissed because the application of defendant under Order 7 rule 11 was allowed.Thus, the reasons which were available in Vishnu Goyal’s case (supra), are missing here and, therefore, said judgment cannot be made applicable here. 11. It is profitable to quote para 6 of the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in 2004 AIHC 3135 (Soundara Raju and another v. Bore Prasad) in this regard, which reads as under : “6. The proceedings cannot be transferred from one Court to another on the basis of such contentions. Remanding of matters after setting aside the orders under revision of appeal is not an uncommon feature. In many cases, the matters come to be re-heard and adjudicated upon by the same Presiding Officers after remand. Almost without exception, it needs to be said to the credit of the officers that the matters were decided dispassionately uninfluenced by their findings or views in the orders that are set aside. Such a dispassionate consideration is in fact, the hallmark of the very adjudicatory process. Almost without exception, it needs to be said to the credit of the officers that the matters were decided dispassionately uninfluenced by their findings or views in the orders that are set aside. Such a dispassionate consideration is in fact, the hallmark of the very adjudicatory process. A Judge worth his name would never assosiate associate with any case, much less with the findings recorded in it in the earlier proceedings. The petitioners have not doubted the integrity, impartiality or an independence of the learned Presiding Officer. There is nothing on record to lend any support to the apprehension of the petitioners. It is needless to observe that if the petitioners feel aggrieved of the outcome of the appeal or any interlocutory orders passed, it is always be open to them to seek appropriate remedy.” 12. Pausing for a moment, it is relevant to examine the reasons for rejection assigned by the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge opined that application under Order 7 rule 11 CPC of defendants was rejected on 8.11.2011 by the trial Court. The High Court set aside and remitted the matter back on 13.4.2012 with a direction to decide the matter on merits. The High Court fixed the matter before the trial Court on 7.5.2012 and directed both the parties to remain present before the trial Court. The High Court further directed that the matter be decided finally by the trial Court within nine months. On 7.5.2012 an application under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 ws preferred by the plaintiff which was heard and decided on 14.5.2012. The application of plaintiff was allowed by the trial Court. On the same date (14.5.2012) the defendants filed written statement and matter was posted for framing of issues on 15.5.2012. On the said date, issues were framed and matter was posted for evidence on 19.5.2012. On 19.5.2012 the plaintiff-petitioner did not file its list of witnesses. The matter was fixed and plaintiff was directed to file his affidavit under Order 18 rule 1 CPC and matter was fixed for cross-examination of plaintiff’s witnesses on 19.6.2012. On 18.6.2012 the affidavits were not filed by the plaintiff and an application was preferred that he wants to file certain documents from Revenue Court and he will get those certified copies from Revenue Court in the first week of July and, therefore, time was sought for. On 18.6.2012 the affidavits were not filed by the plaintiff and an application was preferred that he wants to file certain documents from Revenue Court and he will get those certified copies from Revenue Court in the first week of July and, therefore, time was sought for. On 19.6.2012 the Court below fixed the matter for cross-examination of plaintiff’s witness on 20.6.2012. On 19.6.2012 the plaintiff filed an application under Order 14 rule 4 CPC, which was heard on the same day and was rejected by the Court below. The plaintiff was again directed to file affidavits/evidence on 20.6.2012. On 20.6.2012 an application for amendment under Order 6 rule 17 CPC was filed which was heard and decided by the Court below on 21.6.2012. Learned District Judge opined that section 24 application was filed only on 18.6.2012 and before that without any damour or objection the plaintiff participated in the proceedings and the trial Court allowed his application under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 on 14.5.2012. The Court below is fixing the matter on day to day basis because of the order passed by the High Court to decide the matter within a stipulated time. On the basis of aforesaid facts, learned District Judge opined that it cannot be held that learned Presiding Officer is prejudiced in any manner. It is further held that merely because two miscellaneous applications of petitioner are rejected, it cannot be presumed that the Presiding Judge is annoyed with the petitioner or he will not get justice from him. More so, when his earlier application under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 was allowed by the same Presiding Judge. 13. The word “reasonable apprehension” has a definite connotation/meaning in law. Apprehension cannot be permitted to be divorced from “resonable”. It is very easy to make an allegation that there exists an apprehension that the litigant will not get justice from a particular Court. On such apprehension alone in a mechanical manner power under section 24 CPC cannot be exercised. One has to establish on some prima facie material that such apprehension is “reasonable” also. That has to be gathered on the basis of material on record and not on mere assertion of a party praying for it. 14. In 1999(1) MPJR 577 (Dr. Balmukund Singhal v. Biharilal), this Court has taken the same view. One has to establish on some prima facie material that such apprehension is “reasonable” also. That has to be gathered on the basis of material on record and not on mere assertion of a party praying for it. 14. In 1999(1) MPJR 577 (Dr. Balmukund Singhal v. Biharilal), this Court has taken the same view. It is held that merely because short dates are given by the Presiding Officer, it is no ground to apprehend that Judge was biased. Para 6 of this order reads as under : “6. .... The Superior Courts or the High Courts considering the facts and circumstances, direct early hearing and some times even the time-limit is fixed. The Courts subordinate thereto especially the trial Court have to comply with the directions and in complying with the direction, short dates are necessarily required to be given. Such procedure is necessarily to be adopted and this should not be construed by any of the parties that the Court has somehow or other interest in the matter.” A Division Bench of this Court in 1979 MPLJ 305 (Jagatguru Shri Shankaracharya Jyotish Peethadhiswar Shri Swamy Swaroopanand v. Ramji Tripathi Lal Bihari Tripathi, now calling himself Swami Shantanand Saraswati and others), also opined that transfer may be sought for when there is a reasonable apprehension or where there is surcharged atmosphere which shows that no fair trial is possible at that place. In AIR 1996 Andhra Pradesh 34 (Gorrela Veerraju v. Velugubantla Chandrakantham), in para 9 the Court opined that there should be a reasonable apprehension that party will not get fair trial. In 2001(1) MPWN SN 35 (Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Smt. Balbir Kaur), this Court opined that the discretion to transfer a case under section 24 CPC is to be exercised judicially. The transfer can only be ordered when the party has reasonable apprehension that justice will be denied to him. Mere fact that the party has suspicion in this regard would not constitute a valid ground for transfer. 15. On marshalling the said legal position laid down by various Courts, it is crystal clear that mere allegation, apprehension or suspicion is not enough to order transfer of a case in a mechanical manner. Applying the aforesaid litmus test laid down by the Courts in aforesaid matters will show that the petitioner’s contention is not based on any reasonable apprehension. On marshalling the said legal position laid down by various Courts, it is crystal clear that mere allegation, apprehension or suspicion is not enough to order transfer of a case in a mechanical manner. Applying the aforesaid litmus test laid down by the Courts in aforesaid matters will show that the petitioner’s contention is not based on any reasonable apprehension. The petitioner himself could have prayed at the time of adjudication of first appeal to transfer and post the matter before other Presiding Judge. No such prayer was made. Upon remand, he participated in the proceedings. His application under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 CPC was allowed. Upto this stage he never raised his eye-brows nor prayed for transfer of the matter. At a later stage on 18.6.2012 he prayed for transfer on the basis of certain grounds. As already pointed out, the reason seeking transfer varies in Annexure P-5, in written submissions and in the writ petition. The Court below was only obliged to see the reasons mentioned in section 24 application, Annexure P-5. 16. On the basis of aforesaid, learned District Judge passed a detailed order and after marshalling the entire factual backdrop opined that there is no reasonable ground for ordering transfer. In the considered opinion of this Court based on above analysis, there is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned District Judge. Plausible and permissible reasons are assigned in the impugned order. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is not to sit and exercise the power of judicial review as an appellate Court. In cases of jurisdictional error, serious procedural irregularity or impropriety or in cases of palpable perversity interference can be made. It cannot be made as a matter of routine on a drop of hat. The basic principle to exercise this power is to keep the Courts below within the bounds of their authority, so that the faith of the people on justice delivery system is not shaken. This law is laid down by Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010)8 SCC 329 . 17. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, I am unable to hold that petitioner was able to show any reasonable apprehension or reason on which transfer was necessary. It is clearly an after thought by the petitioner to file an application, Annexure P-5. 17. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, I am unable to hold that petitioner was able to show any reasonable apprehension or reason on which transfer was necessary. It is clearly an after thought by the petitioner to file an application, Annexure P-5. Therefore, there is no error of law in Annexure P-1 whereby application under section 24 CPC is rejected. 18. Before parting, I would like to observe that if the application for transfer is granted as a matter of course or on mere demand of a party, it will not be in the interest of justice. Such applications may be filed for Bench hunting or avoiding a particular Judge. Considering the aforesaid, test is laid down by Supreme Court that mere demand is not sufficient and certain ingredients should be satisfied before such application is allowed. 19. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, in the opinion of this Court, those ingredients on which transfer can be ordered are missing in this matter. The petition is devoid of merits and substance and is hereby dismissed. Petitioner shall pay Rs.2,000/- as costs to the other side.