JUDGMENT 1. - This review petition has been filed by the review-petitioner respondent Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation seeking review of the judgment passed by this Court on 20/8/2008. 2. Shri J.K. Singhi, learned senior counsel for the review-petitioner has argued that review-petitioner had originally filed appeal before the Division Bench assailing the judgment of which review is sought. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the review petitioner has placed on record Notification dated 15/6/1996 as Document-1, which was not placed before the Single Bench when the writ petition was allowed. Division Bench taking note of this fact required the review-petitioner to approach the Single Bench by filing proper review petition on that basis. Hence, this review petition. 3. Shri J.K. Singhi, learned senior counsel appearing for the review petitioner argued that though reference of the notification dated 15/6/1996 was made in reply to the writ petition but it could not be placed on record. The aforesaid notification had important bearing on the case. This Court allowed the writ petition on the basis of the interpretation of clause 3(1) of the RSRTC Employees Pension Regulations, 1989 for short, the "Regulations of 1989", which provides that if no such option is exercised within the stipulated time then, Pension Rules, 1989 would mutatis mutandis apply to the employees. This provision however, was amended by the Board of Directors in its 164th meeting convened on 16/12/1994, which has resolved that amendment in clause 3(1) of the Regulations of 1989 shall be effective w.e.f. 1/4/1989 and this would be to the effect that - "any existing employee who does not exercise the final option in favour of pension within the specified period of 90 days shall continue to be regulated under the RSRTC, CPF Regulations 1964". However, the notification dated 15/6/1996 was issued precisely with a view to giving opportunity to such of the employees, who, under the impression that as per originally inserted clause (1) of the Regulations of 1989 that they would be deemed to have opted for pension, were again required to exercise option if they wanted to opt for pension. Learned counsel argued that this important aspect of the matter has not been touched upon by this Single Bench while allowing the writ petition. Learned counsel argued that this important aspect of the matter has not been touched upon by this Single Bench while allowing the writ petition. Reading of the judgment does not show that Single Bench was aware of the fact about amendment in clause 3(1) and it has decided the writ petition on the basis of unamended original clause 3(1). 4. Shri M.K. Shah, learned counsel for the respondent-writ-petitioner has opposed the review petition and argued that writ-petitioner was on deputation with the police department and he on his repatriation from deputation, he rejoined in the Corporation on 14/4/1997. The RSRTC gave fresh option to the employees on 25/2/2003 to submit the option on or before 30/4/2003 and writ-petitioner accordingly submitted his option by 11/4/2003 but option of the writ petitioner was rejected by the Corporation on the premise that he failed to submit the same within thirty days as per clause (8) of the notification dated 15/6/1996. Learned counsel argued that neither copy of the notification dated 15/6/1996 was endorsed to the writ petitioner, nor was he otherwise aware of the requirement of submitting option within thirty days. He therefore exercised such option on the basis of the Circular dated 25/2/2003. Since option was exercised on 11/4/2003 much before the outer limit of 30/4/2003 stipulated therein. He may be deemed to have exercised option within time. 5. Shri J.K. Singhi, learned senior counsel for the review petitioner rejoined and submitted that the circular dated 25/2/2003 does not govern the case of the petitioner. It is meant to give an opportunity to employees, who had earlier opted for pension but if now they wanted to come within the purview of CPF Scheme instead of Pension, they could opt for CPF Scheme. 6. Shri Mahendra Shah, learned counsel for the writ petitioner submits that in prayer clause (i) of the writ petition, a prayer has been made to set-aside the order dated 27/5/2003 by which option was rejected by the RSRTC on the ground that it was not submitted within thirty days as per notification dated 15/6/1996. However, this Court while allowing the writ petition set-aside the validity of the said order and left the question undecided. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submission of the parties and gone thorough the material available on record. 8. However, this Court while allowing the writ petition set-aside the validity of the said order and left the question undecided. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submission of the parties and gone thorough the material available on record. 8. It is no doubt true that review-petitioner Corporation has made a reference to the notification dated 15/6/1996 in their reply to the writ petition but copy of that notification was not produced on record. It was not specifically mentioned therein nor even pressed during the course of arguments that clause 3(1) of the Regulations of 1989 has been amended to say that any existing employee who does not exercise the final option in favour of pension within the specified period of 90 days shall continue to be* regulated under the RSRTC, CPF Regulations 1964. This changes the whole complexion of the case. In prayer clause (i) of the writ petition, a prayer has been made to set-aside the order dated 27/5/2003 by which option was rejected by the RSRTC on the ground that it was not submitted within thirty days as per notification dated 15/6/1996. It was because of this reason that this Court was persuaded to allow writ petition because it only applied clause 3(1) as originally inserted in the Regulations of 1989, according to which, any existing employee who does not exercise the final option in favour of pension within the specified period of 90 days, would be deemed to have exercised option in favour of pension. It was because of this reason that instead to examining validity of the order dated 27/5/2003 rejecting option of the writ petitioner on the ground of delay, this Court so held and left the issue of validity undecided. This is indeed an error apparent on the face of record, which justify review of the judgment. Even if however the writ petition deserves to succeed on that ground, that argument, which the review-petitioner is now raising being a new question, is required to be decided afresh. 9. This is indeed an error apparent on the face of record, which justify review of the judgment. Even if however the writ petition deserves to succeed on that ground, that argument, which the review-petitioner is now raising being a new question, is required to be decided afresh. 9. Learned counsel for the writ-petitioner at this stage submitted that once the original provisions of clause 3(1) of the Regulations of 1989 meant to say that such of the employees, who do not exercise the option within the stipulated period of ninety days, would be deemed to have exercised option in favour of pension, and thus thereby a right stood vested in favour of the writ-petitioner and this vested right cannot be taken away by subsequently amending clause 3(1) of the Notification dated 15/6/1996 to the contrary. Such an issue cannot be examined in the scope of review petition. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has alternatively argued that in case this Court is persuaded to allow the review petition, he may be given an opportunity to assail the validity of clause 3(1) inserted in the Regulations of 1989 vide amendment dated 16/12/1994 w.e.f. 1/4/1989 vide Notification dated 15/6/1996 by the Board of Directors in its 164th meeting convened on 16/12/1994. That goes without saying that the writ petitioner would be entitled to apply for amendment of writ petition, which issue shall be examined afresh. 10. In view of above, the review petition deserves to succeed and it is accordingly allowed. The writ petition is restored to its original number however with liberty to the writ petitioner to apply for amendment of writ petition so as to challenge the validity of the notification dated 15/6/1996. 11. Having said so, I find that review petitioner-Corporation was not vigilant in defending its case before this Court even though it has referred to the Notification dated 15/6/1996 in reply to the writ petition but copy of that notification was not placed on record of this Court and was not even placed before the Division Bench where it was cited for the first time during the course of argument. No averments were made about contents of the notification. It is because of negligence on the part of the Corporation that the writ petition, which was allowed vide order dated 20/8/2008, has to be again restored on recall of the judgment. No averments were made about contents of the notification. It is because of negligence on the part of the Corporation that the writ petition, which was allowed vide order dated 20/8/2008, has to be again restored on recall of the judgment. Writ petitioner is therefore entitled to receive cost from the review-petitioner-Corporation, which is quantified at Rs. 2500/-. The review-petitioner shall pay the aforesaid cost to the writ-petitioner within a period of one month.Review Petition Allowed; Writ Petition Restored. *******