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2012 DIGILAW 957 (MAD)

V. Prakash Naidu v. Secretary To Govt. Handloom And Textiles Industries

2012-02-22

VINOD K.SHARMA

body2012
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner was appointed as a last grade servant in the Sericulture department on 01.06.1973. In the year 1997 and was promoted as Operator and thereafter to the post of Junior Inspector. 2. The petitioner was placed under suspension on the charges of serious misconduct on 24.07.1980, and was issued charge memo. The petitioner was found guilty of charges levelled against the petitioner and a major punishment of stoppage of two years increment with cumulative effect was imposed on the petitioner. 3. The department, in addition to the departmental enquiry, also registered a criminal case against the petitioner. 4. The petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case. The petitioner, on acquittal, filed representation to the respondents for treating the period of suspension to be the period spent on duty under Fundamental Rule 54. 5. The petitioner also relied upon G.O.Ms.No.228 dated 13.04.1989, laying down that any Government servant when reinstated in service on acquittal, then it must be regarded, as he was prevented from discharging his duties, therefore, the period of suspension is to be treated as the period spent on duty for all purpose, in terms of fundamental rule 54. 6. Another G.O.Ms.No.261 dated 04.08.1992 was issued stipulating that the period suspension may be regulated after final decision of the criminal proceedings, and in case employee is acquitted by the Court, then suspension order is to be regulated under Fundamental Rule 54. 7. The petitioner cannot take any advantage of the Government Orders, as Fundamental Rule 54 itself deals with the jurisdiction of the authority to take decision on the period of suspension. The Fundamental Rules stipulates that it is only in the case where a finding is recorded that the suspension was totally unjustified, that the employee would be entitled to the benefit of full pay. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that representation filed by the petitioner was forwarded to the Secretary, who has not taken any decision on the representation filed by the petitioner, though the stand in the counter is that the period of suspension has been treated to be the period spent on leave of the kind due. 9. On consideration, I find no force in this writ petition. It is not the case where the petitioner has been suspended, because of pendency of criminal case, but was suspended on specific charges and departmental enquiry was held against the petitioner. 9. On consideration, I find no force in this writ petition. It is not the case where the petitioner has been suspended, because of pendency of criminal case, but was suspended on specific charges and departmental enquiry was held against the petitioner. 10. In the departmental enquiry, the petitioner was found guilty and imposed major punishment, therefore, once the petitioner was punished on proved charges, then it cannot be said that the period of suspension was unjustified. 11. It was always open to the competent authority, to take a decision as to how the period of suspension was to be treated. The representation of the petitioner, invoking Fundamental Rule is totally misconceived and not warranted in facts and circumstances of the case. However, at the same time, it is incumbent upon the appellate authority to take a decision on the period of suspension by giving notice to the petitioner. 12. Consequently, this writ petition is disposed of by directing the respondents to take decision with regard to period of suspension after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, as the competent authority imposing punishment is also required to take decision with regard to suspension. 13. It is made clear that petitioner is not entitled to benefit under Fundamental Rule 54. The decision is to be taken under Service Rule by the competent authority. No costs.