JUDGMENT :- BISWANATH SOMADDER, J. A short but important question of law arises for consideration in the instant matter, as well as several other similar matters which are pending before this Court. The issue relates to introduction of certain new provisions into the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 2006, (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act) by way of a recent amendment of the Principal Act. The Principal Act was amended by the West Bengal Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act), which obtained the assent of the Governor and was published for general information by way of a notification dated 30th January, 2012. Later, by a notification dated 06th February, 2012, issued by the Government of West Bengal and published in the Kolkata Gazette, the Amendment Act came into force. The moot question is whether certain provisions of the Amendment Act are repugnant to the legal fiction introduced under the non obstante provision in the Repeal and Savings clause, as contained under section 6 of the Principal Act and ultra vires the Constitution of India and also contrary to the provisions of the Constitution (One Hundred and Eleventh Amendment) Bill, 2009, which later on became the Constitution (Ninety Seventh Amendment) Act, 2011, upon receiving Presidential assent on 12th January, 2012 and coming into force later on 15th February, 2012. In order to examine the issue, at first it is necessary to consider some relevant details. In the instant writ petition, the writ petitioner no. 1 is described as the West Bengal State Co-operative Bank Limited and the writ petitioner no. 2 is described as its Chairman. According to the petitioners, a democratically elected Board has been functioning continuously since the year 1989-90 and election of the Board is being held regularly in accordance with law and there is no complaint regarding holding of election and/or annual general meeting against the present functioning Board. 2 is described as its Chairman. According to the petitioners, a democratically elected Board has been functioning continuously since the year 1989-90 and election of the Board is being held regularly in accordance with law and there is no complaint regarding holding of election and/or annual general meeting against the present functioning Board. It is the specific contention of the petitioners that upon the Amendment Act coming into force on 06th February, 2012, the life of the Board of the writ petitioner no.1 has been reduced to 36 months from 60 months and as such, the present elected Board, which came into existence on 24th November, 2009, will cease to exist in the month of November, 2012, although it would have otherwise continued for a total period of 60 months, calculated from 24th November, 2009. It has been stated on behalf of the petitioners that such reduction of the tenure of the Board from 60 months to 36 months is ultra vires the provision of section 6 of the Principal Act and also ultra vires the Constitution of India and contrary to the provisions of the 97th Amendment of the Constitution of India, which provides for a five year term of office in respect of elected members of a Board of a Co-operative Society. When the last annual general meeting of the writ petitioner no.1 and election of its Board of Directors took place on 24th November, 2009, the law that was in force at that material point of time was the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Repealed Act of 1983). Section 27 of the Repealed Act of 1983 provided for management of Co-operative Societies. Sub-section (8) of section 27 of the Repealed Act of 1983, reads as follows: - “(8) A director elected under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) or nominated under sub-section (5) or sub-section (5A) shall hold office for a period of three years from the date of his election or nomination, as the case may be: Provided that a director elected under sub-section (3) or nominated under sub-section (5) shall not be eligible for re-election or re-nomination, as the case may be, within a period of three years from the date of expiry of his terms of office. Provided further that a director elected under sub-section (3) shall not be entitled to attend any meeting of the board, if he incurs any disqualification as may be prescribed.” An office bearer who was elected under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) of section 27 of the Repealed Act of 1983 was, therefore, required to hold office for a period of three years from the date of election. In case of a nominated Director, the tenure was to remain the same. However, the said Act stood repealed with effect from 18th January, 2011, upon the Principal Act coming into force. The Principal Act brought about certain important changes concerning, inter alia, formation of Co-operative Societies, its democratic functioning, which also included changes in the tenure of the elected or nominated office bearers of Co-operative Societies. However, the said Act stood repealed with effect from 18th January, 2011, upon the Principal Act coming into force. The Principal Act brought about certain important changes concerning, inter alia, formation of Co-operative Societies, its democratic functioning, which also included changes in the tenure of the elected or nominated office bearers of Co-operative Societies. The relevant provision of the Principal Act, which introduced change in respect of the tenure of the Board of Co-operative Societies from 36 months (three years) to 60 months (five years), is clause (a) under sub-section (5) of section 32, which reads as follows: - “(5) (a) A director elected or nominated under sub-section (1) except the chief executive shall hold office throughout a term of five years of the board or till the board is dissolved under sections 34 or 35 or 36 whichever is earlier: Provided that a director under clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section (1) shall not be eligible for re election or nomination, as the case may be, within a period of five years from the date of expiry of his term of office: Provided further that a director under clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall not be entitled to attend any meeting of the board, if he is suspended or punished in a departmental proceeding or a departmental proceeding against him is pending.” According to the petitioners, the aforesaid provision of the Principal Act is wholly in consonance with the 97th Amendment of the Constitution of India, especially if one takes into consideration the provision of clause (2) of Article 243 ZJ, which reads as follows:- “(2) The term of office of elected members of the board and its office bearers shall be five years from the date of election and the term of office bearers shall be conterminous with the term of the board.” It was further submitted that the State Government had obtained the assent of the Hon’ble Governor in respect of the Amendment Act on 30th January, 2012, without even considering that by that time, the 97th Amendment of the Constitution of India had already received assent of the Hon’ble President of India on 12th January, 2012 and the same was published in the Gazette of India, on the very next day. On 06th February, 2012, when the Amendment Act was given effect to, it resulted in automatic dissolution of the Boards of various Co-operative Societies, which were elected in terms of the Repealed Act of 1983 upon expiry of 36 months and was, therefore, contrary to section 6 of the Principal Act, which saved such elections and the elected Boards were deemed to have a tenure of 60 months from the date of election. During the course of hearing, the learned senior counsel for petitioners also highlighted the object of the Constitution (One hundred and Eleventh Amendment) Bill, 2009, which was to ensure that Co-operative Societies in our country function in a democratic, professional, autonomous and economically sound manner. While referring to and relying on the speech of the Hon’ble Union Minister of Agriculture and Minister of Food Processing Industries, made in the Parliament while introducing the said Constitutional Amendment Bill, he submitted that the proposed Constitutional Amendment sought to empower the Parliament in respect of multi State Co-operative Societies and the State Legislatures in case of other Co-operative Societies, to make appropriate law laying down matters, inter alia, relating to incorporation, regulation, democratic member control, member-economic participation and autonomous functioning and providing for a fixed term of five years from the date of election in respect of the elected members of the Board and office bearers of Co-operative Societies. By virtue of the 97th Amendment of the Constitution, Co-operative Societies have been given the status of local self-Governments. A specific contention of the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners was that the West Bengal State Legislature, keeping in tune with the provisions of the Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Bill, 2006, which was introduced in the Fourteenth Lok Sabha on 22nd May, 2006 had enacted the Principal Act. Section 6 of the Principal Act provides the ‘Repeal and Savings’ clause. Section 6 begins with a ‘non obstante clause’ which governs all other sections of the Principal Act. According to him, section 6 of the Principal Act not only saves the action taken under the earlier repealed Acts, but also creates legal fiction providing that “.........shall be deemed to have been done or suffered or taken under this Act, as if the provisions of this Act were in force at all material times when such thing was done or suffered or such action was taken”. By such legal fiction, elections held under the provision of the Repealed Act of 1983, would be deemed to have been held under the Principal Act. Accordingly, all elected Boards of Co-operative Societies would continue for 60 months (five years) from the date of holding of election under the Repealed Act of 1983. The learned senior counsel referred to and relied on the two following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the proposition that election of the writ petitioner no.1 having already been held on 24th November, 2009, under the relevant provision of the Repealed Act of 1983, such election would be deemed to have been held under the Principal Act by operation of legal fiction. (1) Nar Bahadur Bhandari & Anr. Vs. State of Sikkim & Ors., reported in (1998) 5 SCC 39 (particularly, paragraphs 10, 12 and 17), (2) Aneeta Hada Vs. M/s Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., reported in AIR 2012 SC 2795 (particularly, paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 31 and 32). The learned senior counsel for the petitioners also contended that the concerned authority had understood that the legal fiction was in operation, which is why the Board that was elected on 24th November, 2009, was allowed to continue even after the Principal Act came into force with effect from 18th January, 2011. He, thus, contended that Amendment Act, introducing amendments to the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 2006 was ultra vires the non obstante provision of section 6 of the Principal Act and was also unconstitutional. He, thereafter, submitted that the principles of Article 251 of the Constitution of India were applicable in the instant case. In any event, the 97th Amendment of the Constitution, having been passed in the Parliament, any subsequent or previous law would have no manner of application. He further submitted that the impugned Amendment Act suffers from legislative arbitrariness. For the said proposition, he relied on the following judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court: (1) Ajay Hasia & Ors. Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors., reported in (1981) 1 SCC 722 (particularly, paragraph 16), (2) State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. Vs. K. Shyam Sundar & Ors. reported in (2011) 8 SCC 737 (particularly, paragraphs 14, 16, 29, 35, 40, 43, 82 and 90), (3) Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Corporation Federation Vs. Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors., reported in (1981) 1 SCC 722 (particularly, paragraph 16), (2) State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. Vs. K. Shyam Sundar & Ors. reported in (2011) 8 SCC 737 (particularly, paragraphs 14, 16, 29, 35, 40, 43, 82 and 90), (3) Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Corporation Federation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy & Ors., reported in (2011) 9 SCC 286 (particularly, paragraphs 14, 34, 40, 52, 60 and 61). On the question of placing relevant materials before the Hon’ble President of India vis-à-vis the power of the Constitutional Courts, the following judgments were relied upon: (1) Gram Panchayat of Village Jamalpur Vs. Malwinder Singh & Ors., reported in (1985) 3 SCC 661 (particularly, paragraphs 9, 12 and 13), (2) Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North) Ltd. & Ors., reported in (2002) 8 SCC 182 (particularly, paragraphs 3, 14, 16, 20, 28, 29 and 65), Relying on another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, rendered in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs District Collector, Raigad & Ors., reported in (2012) 4 SCC 407 (particularly, paragraphs 24, 25 and 26), he submitted that the Constitutional Courts must protect all democratic institutions. He finally submitted that the Amendment Act be declared ultra vires and void. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel representing the State drew this Court’s attention to the fact that when the last annual general meeting of the writ petitioner no.1 and election of its Board of Directors took place on 24th November, 2009, the relevant statute that was in force was the Repealed Act of 1983 and such elections were carried out by virtue of the provisions of subsection (8) of section 28 of the said Act. At the time of such election, the Board of Directors knew that they were to hold office for three years from the date of election and as such they knew that they were to retire on 23rd November, 2012. The Principal Act came into effect on and from 18th January, 2011. By sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Principal Act, the entire statute i.e., the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, stood repealed. According to the rules of construction, upon such repeal, except as to transactions past and closed, the statute was completely obliterated as if it had never been enacted. By sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Principal Act, the entire statute i.e., the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, stood repealed. According to the rules of construction, upon such repeal, except as to transactions past and closed, the statute was completely obliterated as if it had never been enacted. However, in order to keep alive any act done or suffered or any action taken under the Repealed Act of 1983, sub-section (2) of section 6 was incorporated in the Principal Act. Had it not been for the saving provision, as contained under subsection (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act, any action taken or anything done under the Repealed Act of 1983, would have come to an end and terminated by reason of repeal. However, by creating the legal fiction and stating that the actions taken or done under the Repealed Act of 1983, shall be deemed to have been done or suffered or taken under the Principal Act, the legislature kept alive such action taken or the things done. That is the significance of creation of a legal fiction and insertion of a deeming provision in the savings clause in a statute. Repealing statute, by such savings clause, does not create any substantive right in any of the parties. What it actually does is that it saves the actions taken or anything done or suffered under the old Act. In this context, he referred to and relied upon the provision of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, (being pari materia with section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899), which is reproduced hereinbelow: - “6. Effect of repeal. In this context, he referred to and relied upon the provision of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, (being pari materia with section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899), which is reproduced hereinbelow: - “6. Effect of repeal. – Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not – (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment as repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.” According to the learned senior counsel for the State, the above provisions of the General Clauses Act are applicable in respect of any provision regarding repeal in any Act, unless a different intention appear. He submitted that no such different intention appears in the Principal Act and hence the relevant provision of the General Clauses Act will apply in the fact of the instant case. In this context, he referred to and relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s P.V. Mohammad Barmay Sons Vs. Director of Enforcement reported in 1993 Supp (2) SCC 724. Referring to the said judgment, he submitted that the Repeal and Savings clause, as contained under section 81 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He submitted that section 81 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 was similar to section 6 of the Principal Act. Referring to the said judgment, he submitted that the Repeal and Savings clause, as contained under section 81 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He submitted that section 81 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 was similar to section 6 of the Principal Act. Referring to paragraph 8 at page 731 of the said judgment, he submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the provision of section 81 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, did not evince any “contrary intention”, as contemplated in section 6 of the General Clauses Act and merely reiterated the earlier law operating in the field and as such, the effect of repeal would be in the manner as provided under section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (which is pari material with section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899). He further submitted that since no “different intention” appears in the Principal Act, the previous operation of the Repealed Act of 1983 or anything duly done thereunder, shall not be affected by the provisions of the repealing Act, i.e. the Principal Act. Similarly, the rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities acquired, accrued or incurred under the Repealed Act of 1983, will not be affected by the provision of the repealing Act, i.e. the Principal Act. In other words, an election of the Board of Directors of the writ petitioner no.1 held under sub-section (8) of section 27 of the Repealed Act of 1983, having been held on 24th November, 2009, the operation of the Repealed Act of 1983 would allow continuance of the Board of Directors for a period of three years and such tenure would not be affected by the coming into force of the repeal provision, as contained under the Principal Act. This is what section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 mandates. This is what section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 mandates. The other submission advanced on behalf of the State, was that when on 24th November, 2009 the Board of Directors of the writ petitioner no.1 was elected under sub-section (8) of section 27 of the Repealed Act of 1983, they were fully aware of the fact that they were to hold office for three years from the date of election and that they would be required to vacate their office on 23rd November, 2012, in terms of sub-section (8) of section 27 of the Repealed Act of 1983. Even if it was contended on behalf of the writ petitioners that the right to hold office of Directors was a vested right of Directors, the same having been acquired under the Repealed Act of 1983, such right continues for three years thereunder. If the election of the Directors is considered to be a privilege, the same accrued and continues under the Repealed Act of 1983 for three years i.e., upto 23rd November, 2012. If the election of the Directors and their continuance in office was considered to be an obligation, the same was incurred under the Repealed Act of 1983 for a period of three years from the date of their appointment. Such right/ privilege/ obligation is to continue for three years from their appointment in terms of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The learned senior counsel for the State submitted that in the light of the above submissions, the Amendment Act was required to be read. On 06th February, 2012, the said Amendment Act came into force. By the amending Act, section 36 of the Principal Act stood amended. The amending Act was merely clarificatory in nature and made express what was already there in the Principal Act. In consonance with section 6 of the General Clauses Act, it was provided by the amending Act that the Board of Directors who had come into existence under sub-section (8) of section 27 of the Repealed Act would have a tenure of 36 months from the date of their election. The said amendment did not, in any way, affect the existing right of a member elected under sub-section (8) of section 27 of the Repealed Act of 1983. The said amendment did not, in any way, affect the existing right of a member elected under sub-section (8) of section 27 of the Repealed Act of 1983. On the contrary, it protected the previous operation of the Repealed Act of 1983 and the election of the Board duly done thereunder and also saved the right, privilege or obligation acquired, accrued or incurred under the Repealed Act of 1983, in accordance with the provisions contained under sub-sections (b) and (c) of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The provision of the Amendment Act was merely to protect the existing right and not to create a new right or curtail any vested right. He, thereafter, proceeded to distinguish the judgments relied on by the petitioners. He submitted that the Constitution (Ninety-seventh Amendment) Act, 2011 which received Presidential assent on 12th January, 2012, but came into force on 15th February, 2012 has set at rest all controversies with regard to the tenure of a Board of any Co-operative Society. He referred to Article 243 ZJ (2) of the Constitution (Ninety-seventh Amendment) Act, 2011, which provides that the term of office of the elected members of the Board and its office bearers shall be five years from the date of election and the term of office bearers shall be conterminous with the term of the Board. According to him, the said provision of the Constitution has to be read prospectively. It should not be read to give retrospective operation. In this context, he relied on a Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Keshavan Madhava Menon Vs. The State of Bombay reported in AIR 1951 SC 128 (paragraph 7). He also referred to the provision of Article 243 ZT of the Constitution (Ninety-seventh Amendment) Act, 2011 and submitted that it is provided in the said Article itself that notwithstanding anything in this Part, any provision of any law relating to Co-operative Societies in force in a State, immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Ninety-seventh Amendment) Act, 2011, which is inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall continue to be in force until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority or until expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is less. He submitted that it can, therefore, be concluded that Article 243ZJ (2) read with Article 243ZT clearly indicates that the said Constitutional provision is prospective in its operation. Lastly, he submitted that the Principal Act, as it stood amended by the Amendment Act, was the provision of law relating to Co-operative Societies which was in force in the State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Ninety-seventh Amendment) Act, 2011, which came into effect on and from 15th February, 2012. No provision of the Principal Act being inconsistent with the provision of Part IXB of the Constitution (Ninety-seventh Amendment) Act, 2011, there was no question of either amending or repealing any provision of the Principal Act for continuance of any of its provision for a period of one year from the commencement of the Constitution (Ninety-seventh Amendment) Act, 2011, as envisaged in Article 243 ZT thereof. After considering the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and in order to answer the issue, it is necessary to take note of the fact that the applicable law which was in force when the last annual general meeting of the writ petitioner no.1 and election of its Board of Directors took place was the Repealed Act of 1983, sub-section (8) of section 27 whereof has been quoted hereinbefore. The West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 was repealed in its entirety, upon the Principal Act coming into force on 18th January, 2011. Sub-section (8) of section 27 of the Repealed Act of 1983 was replaced by clause (a) under sub-section (5) of section 32 of the Principal Act, which has also been quoted hereinbefore. At this juncture, it may be profitable to take note of the Repeal and Savings clause, as provided under section 6 of the Principal Act. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act, which are relevant in the instant matter, are set out hereinbelow: - “6. Repeal and savings. – (1) The West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (West Ben. Act XLV of 1983) is hereby repealed. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act, which are relevant in the instant matter, are set out hereinbelow: - “6. Repeal and savings. – (1) The West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (West Ben. Act XLV of 1983) is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal anything done or suffered or any action taken including any rule made, and transaction entered into, any notification or notice issued with prospective or retrospective effect, any order passed, any appointment or registration made, any suit or proceeding commenced, any dispute decided or referred to arbitration, any right or title accrued, or any liability or obligation or penalty incurred under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 (2 of 1912) or the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 (Ben. Act XXVI of 1940) or the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 (West Ben. Act XXXVIII of 1973) or the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (West Ben. Act XLV of 1983) shall be deemed to have been done or suffered or taken under this Act, as if the provisions of this Act were in force at all material times when such thing was done or suffered or such action was taken.” It is clearly evident from a plain reading of the above quoted provision of law that the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, stood repealed in its entirety in terms of sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Principal Act. However, the non obstante clause as contained under sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act, requires careful reading since it introduces a legal fiction whereby anything done or suffered or any action taken under the previous Co-operative Societies laws (which includes the Repealed Act of 1983) “shall be deemed” to have been done or suffered or taken under the Principal Act, “as if” the provisions of the Principal Act were in force at all material times when such thing was done or suffered or such action was taken (emphasis supplied). As discussed at the very outset, the State Government introduced the Amendment Act by way of a notification published in the Kolkata Gazette on 30th January, 2012, upon receiving assent of the Governor. The said Amendment Act came into effect on and from 06th February, 2012. In section 2 of the Amendment Act, the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 2006, is sought to be referred as the Principal Act. The said Amendment Act came into effect on and from 06th February, 2012. In section 2 of the Amendment Act, the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 2006, is sought to be referred as the Principal Act. Section 12 of the Amendment Act introduces, inter alia, the following amendments to section 36 of the Principal Act: - “In section 36 of the principal Act, – (a) in clause (a), – (i) the words “the board of directors, if any, of the Co-operative societies mentioned in the Fifth Schedule”, the words “the board of directors of any of the Co-operative societies” shall be substituted; (ii) after the word and figure “section 29”, the following words shall be inserted:- “or within a period of thirty six months from the date of their election under sub-section (8) of section 27 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983” Thus, clause (a) of section 36 of the Principal Act, upon insertion of the above amendment, reads as follows:- “the board of directors of any of the Co-operative Societies shall, if the election of its directors has not been held within a period of 60 months from the date of their election under sub-section (1) of section 29, or within a period of 36 months from the date of their election under sub-section (8) of section 27 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 stand dissolved on and from the date immediately following the date of expiry of the said period.” (emphasis supplied in bold and italics for distinction and for highlighting the effect of amendment) Similarly, clause (c) of section 36 of the Principal Act was substituted by clause (b) of section 12 of the Amendment Act. Two new clauses, (cc) and (ccc) were also inserted after clause (c) of section 36 of the Principal Act, by virtue of clause (c) of section 12 of the Amendment Act. It is quite apparent that insertion of sub-clause (ii) of clause (a), as appearing under section 12 of the Amendment Act, into clause (a) of section 36 of the Principal Act has the effect of retrograding the Principal Act to the extent of bringing down the tenure of the Board of a Co-operative Society elected under the Repealed Act of 1983 from 60 months to 36 months. The question is, can it be sustained as a valid piece of legislation in the facts and circumstances of the instance case? The submission advanced on behalf of the State by the learned senior counsel, principally relying on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s P.V. Mohammad Barmay Sons (supra), does not hold much water. That judgment was rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court upon taking into consideration the Repeal and Savings clause as provided under section 81 of the Foreign Exchange Act, 1973, which is significantly different from the Repeal and Savings clause as provided under section 6 of the Principal Act. Although the learned senior counsel for the State relied on paragraph 8 of the said judgment as well as section 6 of the General Clauses Act (which is pari materia with section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act) to contend that the effect of repeal of the Repealed Act of 1983 would be squarely governed by the provisions of the General Clauses Act unless a “different intention” appeared specifically in the Repeal and Savings clause as contained in the Principal Act, he did not take notice of the fact that the Repeal and Savings clause under section 81 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, specifically provides for general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, with regard to the effect of repeal. Sub-section (3) of section 81 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, reads as follows:- “(3) The mention of particular matters in sub-section (2) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeal.” The above quoted clause is absent in the Repeal and Savings clause, as provided under section 6 of the Principal Act. In its place, “a different intention” has been clearly expressed in sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act. In its place, “a different intention” has been clearly expressed in sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act. As discussed earlier, sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act begins with a non obstante clause and introduces a legal fiction whereby anything done or suffered or any action taken under the previous Co-operative Societies laws, “shall be deemed” to have been done or suffered or taken under the Principal Act, “as if” the provisions of the Principal Act were in force at all material times when such thing was done or suffered or such action was taken (emphasis supplied). As such, referring to and/or relying upon the provisions of the General Clauses Act to understand the effect of repeal of the Repealed Act of 1983, does not enure to the State’s benefit at all. The case made out by the State based on applicability of the provision of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, is fallacious in nature, in the absence of a similar provision under section 6 of the Principal Act, as contained under sub-section (3) of section 81 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. At this stage, the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Aneeta Hada’s case (supra), as reflected in paragraph 32 of its judgment, cited by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, may be quoted: - “32. From the aforesaid pronouncements, the principle that can be culled out is that it is the bounden duty of the court to ascertain for what purpose the legal fiction has been created. It is also the duty of the court to imagine the fiction with all real consequences and instances unless prohibited from doing so. That apart, the use of the term ‘deemed’ has to be read in its context and further the fullest logical purpose and import are to be understood. It is because in modern legislation, the term ‘deemed’ has been used for manifold purposes. The object of the legislature has to be kept in mind. That apart, the use of the term ‘deemed’ has to be read in its context and further the fullest logical purpose and import are to be understood. It is because in modern legislation, the term ‘deemed’ has been used for manifold purposes. The object of the legislature has to be kept in mind. ” Following the ratio as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision referred above, it is now required to be seen as to whether the object and purpose of creation of the legal fiction under a non obstante clause, as provided under section 6 of the Principal Act, is sought to be frustrated or rendered nugatory by introduction of the Amendment Act, with effect from 06th February, 2012, whereby the tenure of a Board of a Co-operative Society, which is elected under the provision of the Repealed Act of 1983, is reduced from five years to three years. It is noticed that although the 97th Amendment of the Constitution of India had not come into force on the date the Principal Act came into force, i.e., on 18th January, 2011, the Constitution (One Hundred and Eleventh Amendment) Bill, 2009, relating to Co-operative Societies had already been introduced in the Lok Sabha on 30th November, 2009, whereupon it was referred to a Parliamentary Standing Committee. Even prior thereto, an earlier Bill, being the Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Bill, 2006, was introduced in the Fourteenth Lok Sabha on 22nd May, 2006, with a view to incorporate certain provisions in the Constitution to provide protection to Co-operatives and to insulate them from avoidable political and bureaucratic interference, upon such view being endorsed by the conference of State Co-operative Ministers, held way back in December 2004. On reference from the Hon’ble Speaker, a Parliamentary Standing Committee had also examined the Bill. However, the said Bill could not be considered by the House as it had lapsed. It was, therefore, decided to reintroduce the Bill. This resulted in the Constitution (One Hundred and Eleventh Amendment) Bill, 2009, being introduced by the Hon’ble Minister of Agriculture and Food Processing Industries in the Lok Sabha. The object of the Bill was to ensure that the Co-operative Societies in the country functioned in a democratic, professional, autonomous and economically sound manner. This resulted in the Constitution (One Hundred and Eleventh Amendment) Bill, 2009, being introduced by the Hon’ble Minister of Agriculture and Food Processing Industries in the Lok Sabha. The object of the Bill was to ensure that the Co-operative Societies in the country functioned in a democratic, professional, autonomous and economically sound manner. The proposed amendment in the Constitution, inter alia, sought to empower the Parliament in respect of multi-state Co-operative Societies and the State Legislatures in case of other Co-operative Societies, to make appropriate law. One of the proposals that was laid down, which later on formed part of the 97th Amendment of the Constitution, under Article 243ZJ (2), was with regard to providing for a fixed term of five years from the date of election (emphasis supplied) in respect of the elected members of the Board and its office bearers. One significant aspect which is also required to be noticed is that whenever a Bill, passed by a State legislature in exercise of its exclusive power under Article 246 (3) of the Constitution of India to make laws for such State or any part thereof in respect of matters enumerated in the “State List” contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, is kept reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President, such a Bill will necessarily assume a distinct and special character and will also necessarily be quite different from a Bill passed by the State Legislature in its ordinary course of legislative business, since its impact will be of such significance, which the Governor would consider important enough for its reservation for the consideration of the President. Article 200 of the Constitution provides for assent to Bills passed by State legislatures and legislative Councils. Article 200, however, does not lay down any guidelines in respect of which matters should the Governor reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President, except in respect of those matters governed by its second proviso. The Principal Act, although falling within the field of law-making as enumerated in the ‘State List’ contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, was kept reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President and finally got assent of the Hon’ble President of India on 25th May, 2010. The Principal Act, although falling within the field of law-making as enumerated in the ‘State List’ contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, was kept reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President and finally got assent of the Hon’ble President of India on 25th May, 2010. The only plausible reason for the Governor to reserve the Bill that lead to the Principal Act for the consideration of the President is clearly evident from the scheme of the Principal Act, which is moulded in the same pattern as was proposed in the Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Bill, 2006, relating to Co-operative Societies, that had already been tabled in the Lok Sabha but could not be considered by the House as it had lapsed and which was subsequently reintroduced as the Constitution (One Hundred and Eleventh Amendment) Bill, 2009, on 30th November, 2009. While legislative competence is not in issue, one must be mindful of the fact that whatever crystallizes in the form of a statute emanates from the drafting skill of a competent legislative draftsman. It is not the job of a legislator to draft a piece of legislation himself in order to bring it before a competent legislative assembly for consideration so that it is passed as a Bill, which later enters into the statute-book as valid law. Legislators come from all walks of life and not everybody is a legal expert. The metamorphosis of a political idea into a valid piece of legislation within the law-making framework provided in our Constitution is possible only through the skill of a competent legislative draftsman. It is precisely for this reason that the drafting of our Constitution was left to the wisdom, skill and competence of a Drafting Committee, which consisted of some of the great erudite minds of those times, whose wisdom, competence and skill were considered legendary. Every word which flows from the Constitution gives shape to its basic structure and our existence under that structure. A statute is required to be carefully and meticulously drafted because its coming into force may create new rights or extinguish existing rights, provide new remedies or abrogate existing remedies and so on and so forth. Thus, legislative drafting demands a very high degree of competence and skill. A statute is required to be carefully and meticulously drafted because its coming into force may create new rights or extinguish existing rights, provide new remedies or abrogate existing remedies and so on and so forth. Thus, legislative drafting demands a very high degree of competence and skill. A weakly drafted piece of legislation by an incompetent legislative draftsman, on the other hand, invariably becomes vulnerable upon its coming into force and may not be able to withstand the scrutiny of a judicial review by a Constitutional Court. The Amendment Act, which came into effect from 06th February, 2012, without even factoring-in the true effect of the Repeal and Savings clause as contained under section 6 of the Principal Act, is an example of incompetent legislative drafting as distinct from legislative incompetence. Had it been a skilled legislative draftsman, he would not have ignored the general scheme of the Principal Act and also its genesis. A skilled legislative draftsman would also be mindful and observant of the fact that although it was within the legislative competence of the State to introduce the Principal Act, which was in respect of a matter enumerated in the ‘State List’ in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the Governor, nonetheless, had deemed it necessary to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President of India and only upon obtaining the assent of the President of India on 25th May, 2010, the law was brought into force with effect from 18th January, 2011. A skilled legislative draftsman would have intensely studied the Principal Act and would have minutely noted its distinct and special character, which necessitated its reservation by the Governor for the consideration of the President, even though the field of law that was legislated upon came under the ‘State List’, as contained in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, thus falling within the exclusive law making power of the State Legislature under Article 246(3) of the Constitution of India. He would have also noticed the impact of the legal fiction introduced under a non obstante clause, as contained in sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act. He would have also noticed the impact of the legal fiction introduced under a non obstante clause, as contained in sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act. By contrast, the Repeal and Savings clause, as contained in section 6 read with clause (a) under sub-section (5) of section 32 of the Principal Act, is an example of how a legislative draftsman had kept in mind even a proposed Constitutional Amendment, at the time of drafting of the Principal Act. It is quite evident that the Amendment Act is a hasty piece of legislation. However, proceeding in haste by itself cannot be a ground of challenge to the validity of a statute, though proceeding in haste amounts to arbitrariness (see State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. Vs. K. Shyam Sunder & Ors. reported in (2011) 8 SCC 737 ). The resultant action of proceeding in haste has tantamounted to a palpable demonstration of legislative arbitrariness by the State legislature. The Amendment Act came into effect from 6th February, 2012, whereas the Principal Act came into effect from 18th January, 2011. Insertion of the provision contained under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of section 12 of the Amendment Act into section 36 of the Principal Act after the word and figure “section 29”, has the effect of reduction of tenure of only those Boards of Co-operative Societies which were elected prior to the Principal Act coming into force and whose initial tenure of thirty six months stood extended up to sixty months by virtue of the legal fiction introduced under the non obstante provision in the Repeal and Savings clause contained under section 6 of the Principal Act. On the other hand, all Boards of Co-operative Societies elected between 18th January, 2011 and 6th February, 2012 or even thereafter, notwithstanding such amendment introduced by the Amendment Act, would have an automatic tenure of sixty months. In other words, the effect of the Amendment Act does not at all touch the tenure of the Boards of Co-operative Societies, which have been elected after 18th January, 2011. Such legislative action clearly illustrates the concept of negation of equality and squarely hits Article 14 of the Constitution; the ipsissima verba being, arbitrary. It is well-settled that what Article 14 strikes at is arbitrariness because an action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality. Such legislative action clearly illustrates the concept of negation of equality and squarely hits Article 14 of the Constitution; the ipsissima verba being, arbitrary. It is well-settled that what Article 14 strikes at is arbitrariness because an action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality. The doctrine of classification, which is evolved by the Courts is not paraphrase of Article 14 nor is it the objective and end of that Article. It is merely a judicial formula for determining whether the legislative or executive action in question is arbitrary and therefore constituting denial of equality. If the classification is not reasonable and does not satisfy the two above-mentioned conditions, the impugned legislative or executive action would plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of equality under Article 14 would be breached. Whenever, therefore, there is arbitrariness in State action, whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of an “authority” under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such action of the State. The concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire Constitutional Scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of the fabric of the Constitution (see Ajay Hasia & Ors. Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. reported in (1981) 1 SCC 722 ). As observed earlier, once the legal fiction under a non obstante clause was introduced by the Principal Act, the three years tenure of the Boards of all State Co-operative Societies, including the writ petitioner no.1, who were elected under the provision of sub-section (8) of section 27 of the Repealed Act of 1983, was deemed to be extended for a further period of two years, immediately upon the Principal Act coming into force with effect from 18th January, 2011, in consonance with the proposed Constitutional Amendment. The State, without making necessary amendment to the Repeal and Savings clause of the Principal Act, sought to bring about a retrograde change in the tenure of the Boards of Directors of Co-operative Societies elected under the Repealed Act of 1983, by whittling down its tenure from five years to three years, thereby rendering nugatory the conscious and deliberate change that was brought about by the State earlier, upon bringing into force the Principal Act, which was in consonance with the proposed Constitutional Amendment. For reasons stated above, sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of section 12 of the Amendment Act is held to be repugnant to the provision of sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act, to the extent it seeks to reduce the tenure of the Boards of Co-operative Societies to thirty six months from sixty months, as originally provided under clause (a) of section 36 of the Principal Act and is further held to be ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of section 12 of the Amendment Act is, therefore, liable to be struck down and is accordingly struck down. Consequently, the Board of writ petitioner no.1, which came into effect from 24th November, 2009, shall continue in office for a period of sixty months to be computed from that date, subject of course, to all other provisions of law, as applicable for its continuance. The writ petition stands allowed accordingly.