Judgment :- 1. Petitioner, Proprietorship firm is seeking for a Writ of Certiorari to quash the order dated 22.2.2011 passed by Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in ATA No. 712 (6) /2006 vide Annexure-E. 2. Heard Sri. K.R. Anand, learned Counsel appearing for petitioner and Sri Harikrishna S. Holla, learned counsel appearing for respondent. Perused the impugned order, statement of objections filed by respondent as also Annexures appended to the writ petition. 3. Petitioner is carrying on transport business by employing workers and said establishment was not covered under the Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to ‘Act’ for the sake of brevity). On 9.3.2006 squad of Enforcement Officer headed by Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Regional Office, Mangalore, inspected the petitioner Company. At the time of inspection, the Proprietor of the establishment by name Sri K. Jayachandra Hegde was present and he was issued with a spot memo u/s. 13 of the Act directing the employer to produce the records as stated in the spot memo. In response to the same, said Sri. K. Jayachandra Hegde submitted a list of vehicles with registration number relating to Hegde Motors under him and his family members and also a list of 26 employees as on 9.3.2006 employed for Hegde Motor Transport. Thereafter, the said Sri. K. Jayachandra Hegde submitted one more letter on 23.3.2006 stating that employees stated vide letter dated 9.3.2006 were bifurcated and shown against each of the family members consisting of sriyuths: (1) K. Jayachandra Hegde (2) Seetharam Hegde, (3) Ganantha Hegde and (4) Smt. Jayalaxmi Hegde assigning 15 employees, 5 employees, 4 employees and 2 employees respectively are working under these persons and contending that all the family members have independent books of accounts and separate files, separate income tax returns and as such, it was contended that employment strength does not exceed beyond 20 in M/s. Hegde Motors under his partnership and as such, there is no question of said establishment being covered in the EPF & MP Act. 4. Thereafter, summons was issued under the Act directing said Sri K. Jayachandra Hegde to appear before the authority who in response appeared and gave a list of bifurcation of vehicles and employees against each of the persons namely family members consisting of employees, working under his wife and two sons. 4. Thereafter, summons was issued under the Act directing said Sri K. Jayachandra Hegde to appear before the authority who in response appeared and gave a list of bifurcation of vehicles and employees against each of the persons namely family members consisting of employees, working under his wife and two sons. On the day fixed for hearing , none appeared on behalf of said Sri K. Jayachandra Hegde. Hence, adjudicating authority adjourned the matter to 25.5.2006 and thereafter to 26.6.2006 for which notices were also issued and subsequently in the hearings held on 12.7.2006 and 11.8.2006 it was duly attended by the authorized representative on behalf of Sri K. Jayachandra Hegde. In the interregnum, the Enforcement Officer also filed his report dated 14.7.2006 enumerating the list of vehicles, Registration number, name of the employees working in respect of each vehicle, daily allowance paid, vouchers under which payments have been made and after considering the reply submitted by Sri K. Jayachandra Hegde, documents produced and the report of the Enforcement Officer, the authority was of the view that combined strength of M/s. Hegde Motor Transport is more than 20 persons and as such, it is coverable under the provisions of the Act and accordingly an order u/s. 7A came to be passed on 24/26.10.2006. 5. Aggrieved by the said order, petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 712 (6)/2006. During the pendency of the appeal. IA Nos. II/2011 and IA III/2011 came to be filed before the EPF & Appellate Tribunal on 24.1.2011 under Order I Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure read with Rules 7 and 22 of EPF Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 praying to implead the applicants therein i.e., Sriyuths Gananath Hegde and Jayalakshmi J. Hegde to be impleaded as parties to the appellate proceedings enclosing therewith number of documents. The Tribunal after considering the arguments advanced by the respective learned advocates by its order dated 2.2.2011 ‘Annexure-E’ dismissed the appeal by holding that material on record revealed that all establishments were controlled by one family member and there was functional interdependency as also geographical proximity and managerial control. On these grounds amongst other as enumerated in the impugned order, appeal came to be dismissed which is at Annexure – E. It is this order which is impugned in the present Writ Petition. 6. It is the contention of Sri. On these grounds amongst other as enumerated in the impugned order, appeal came to be dismissed which is at Annexure – E. It is this order which is impugned in the present Writ Petition. 6. It is the contention of Sri. K.R. Anand that at the first instance, Tribunal has committed a serious error in not considering the applications IA II and III/2011 filed for impleading and disposing it of on merits and on account of non consideration of these applications itself, the impugned order is vitiated. He would further contend that additional documents produced along with these two applications having not been considered has caused serious prejudice to the rights of the petitioners in as much as these documents would go to show that employees working under the impleading applicants have been erroneously shown as working under petitioner; the order of the Tribunal is based on assumptions and presumptions and it erred in coming to a conclusion that business is controlled by one family member and there is one managerial control without there being and supportive claim or contention by the authorities in this regard. 7. He would further elaborate his submissions by contending that observations of the Tribunal that all establishments run under the name and style of M/s. Hegde & Company and the basis for conclusion that there is functional interdependency between the establishments is not only contrary to records but equally imaginary. He would submit that separate registration being in existence which was one of the main criteria ought to have been considered to accept the contention of the petitioner that they are separate and distinct entities and without considering this aspect, Tribunal erred in dismissing the appeal. 8. He would also contend that Tribunal erred in not considering the fact that in the subsequent letter issued by the said Sri K. Jayachandra Hegde on 23.3.2006, he had specifically stated as to how the employees were working and under whom and in support of said claim material being placed, same was not considered by the Tribunal and as such, order of the Tribunal is erroneous. He would also contend that until and unless there is clear evidence available on record to show that there was any supervisory control or managerial control between different units, it cannot be held there is interdependency particularly in the back drop of these three individual persons being assessed under the Income Tax Act, 1961 separately and independently. He would also submit that the test that ought to have been applied by the authority was to ascertain as to whether these units were interdependent and if so, by virtue of one of the units or establishments seizing to operate whether other unit would be able to carry on its functions independently and separately and as to whether there was any financial inter dependability on each other and these aspects have been lost sight of by the authorities while passing the order dated 24/26.10.2006. He would also submit that on account of non consideration of parameters laid down in catena of decisions, the matter be remitted back to the authority for adjudication afresh with a liberty to the petitioner to place all such materials to establish the fact that there is no functional integrality and inter dependability between them. He contends that same being question of fact ought to have been examined, verified and scrutinized on the basis of the records available and this exercise having not been done by the adjudicating authority, he would submit that matter may be remitted back to the authority for adjudication. In support of his submission he has relied upon following judgments: (1) 2007 ILR 642 [Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Vs. M/s. Raj’s Continental Exports (P) Ltd., ] (2) 1998 (1) LLJ 1060 [Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Another Vs. Dharamsi Morarji Chemical Cp. Ltd.,] 9. Per contra, Sri Harikrishna S. Holla, learned counsel appearing for respondent would support the orders passed by the authority as also the Tribunal and contend that documents which was produced along with application filed under Order 1 and Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure had no nexus whatsoever to the issue under consideration and as such. Ltd.,] 9. Per contra, Sri Harikrishna S. Holla, learned counsel appearing for respondent would support the orders passed by the authority as also the Tribunal and contend that documents which was produced along with application filed under Order 1 and Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure had no nexus whatsoever to the issue under consideration and as such. Tribunal has rightly not considered the said application and question of considering the said documents produced along with application would not arise and as such, Tribunal has rightly not considered the application and documents annexed thereto and contends even otherwise some of the documents produced are relating to subsequent period which has no relevancy to the period involved in question. He would further contend that said documents namely balance sheet, profit and loss account of Smt. Jayalakshmi Hegde would go to show that she has not paid any salary from her account and as such, the question of there being separate entity or establishment does not arise. 10. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the following decisions: (1) ILR 1986 KAR [ Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs. M/s. Ratna Enterprises] (2) AIR 2012 SC 273 [M/s. L.N. Gadodia & Sons & Anr. Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner.] 11. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for parties, I am of the considered view the following questions would arise for my consideration: (1) Whether order passed by the authority u/s. 7A of the Act as affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal is just and proper or it is liable to be quashed.? (2) Whether the Appellate Tribunal was correct in not considering the applications filed under Order 1 Rule 10 code of civil procedure filed by Sri Gananth Hegde and Smt. Jayalaxmi Hegde?. (3) What order.? 12. Before delving upon the points formulated herein above, it would be necessary to extract the provisions of the EPF and MP Act which would have bearing on the contentions raised in these proceedings which are as under: “1. Short title, extent and application. (3) What order.? 12. Before delving upon the points formulated herein above, it would be necessary to extract the provisions of the EPF and MP Act which would have bearing on the contentions raised in these proceedings which are as under: “1. Short title, extent and application. (1) xxxxx (2) xxxxx (3) Subject to the provisions contained in section 16 it applies (a) to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I and in which twenty or more persons are employed and (b) to any other establishment employing twenty or more persons or class of such establishments which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf: Provided that the Central Government may, after giving not less than two months’ notice of its intention so to do, by notification in the Official Gazette, apply the provisions of his Act to any establishment employing such number of persons less than twenty as may be specified in the notification. 2 (e) “employer” means: (i) in relation to an establishment which is a factory the owner or occupier of the factory including the agent of such owner or occupier, the legal representative of a deceased owner or occupier and where a person has been named as a manager of the factory under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Factories act, 1948 (63 of 1948), the person so named, and (ii) in relation to any other establishment the person who or the authority which has the ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment and where the said affairs are entrusted to a manager, managing director or managing agent, such manager, managing director or managing agent; (f) “employee” means any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work manual or otherwise in or in connection with the work of an establishment and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer and includes any person. (i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the establishment; (ii) engaged as an apprentice not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act 1961, [52 of 1961], or under the standing orders of the establishment;” 13. (i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the establishment; (ii) engaged as an apprentice not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act 1961, [52 of 1961], or under the standing orders of the establishment;” 13. A cursory look at these provisions would clearly go to show that all establishments where 20 or more persons are employed would be required to be covered under the Act. The Employees Provident Fund Act is a social beneficial enactment by the parliament enacted keeping in mind the interest of working class. The authorities appointed under the Act are empowered to conduct inspection, examine the records available at the establishment, scrutinize the same, obtain statements of the persons, hold an enquiry after giving all reasonable opportunity to the establishment and if found on such scrutiny of records that establishment is required to be covered and they come within the purview of the act, such establishments would be covered after passing necessary order u/s. 7A of the Act. There are instances where the employer would take a stand that it need not be covered since the employees are less in number and they are not required to be covered. To ascertain this aspect enquiry has to be held and ultimately on enquiry such contention may be found to be true or otherwise. It is the precise exercise which the authority has to undertake to discern as to whether an establishment is liable to be covered or not. 14. It is also not in dispute that on certain occasions a stand has been taken by the employers to contend that establishments though run under one management, they are separate, independent and distinct legal entities. There may be instances where there are two or more companies, firms under one management working at different places having common interest, common supervisory control and yet claim they are separate and distinct legal entities. There are also instances where two companies under the same management are having different sphere or areas of operation where there is no nexus to one with the other and still attempts made by the authorities to cover them as one establishment has yielded negative results. There are also instances where two companies under the same management are having different sphere or areas of operation where there is no nexus to one with the other and still attempts made by the authorities to cover them as one establishment has yielded negative results. It is in this back ground, employers have to establish in an enquiry that there is no functional integrality between establishments if there are more than one and authorities are required to find out as to whether there is functional interdependency on each other and whether one can survive in the absence of the other unit. In this regard, it would be necessary to note the judgments of the Honorable Supreme Court whereunder it has been held as under: (1) 2007 ILR 642 reported in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner vs. M/s. Raj’s Continental Exports (P) Ltd. “7. In Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Anr. Vs. Dharamsi Morarji Chemical Co. Ltd., 1998 (2) SCC 446 , it was held that unless there is clear evidence to show that there was any supervisory financial or managerial control, it cannot be said that one is the branch of the other. As noted by learned Singly Judge, the respondent was separately registered under the Factories Act. It was separately registered under the Central Sales Tax Act and the Employees State Insurance Act. It has also been found by learned Single Judge that there was total independence of the two units. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench were right in their conclusion that the respondent is not a branch of M/s. Continental Exporters. (2) 1998 (1) LLJ 1060 reported in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner & Another vs. Dharamsi Morarji Chemical Co. Ltd. “4. It is true that if an establishment is found, as a fact, to consist of different departments or branches and if the departments and branches are located at different places, the establishment would still be covered by the net of section 2-A and the branches and departments cannot be said to be only on that ground not a part and parcel of the parent establishment. However, on the facts of the present case, the only connecting link which could be pressed in service by the learned counsel for the appellant was the fact that the respondent – company was the owner not only of the Ambarnath factory but also of Roha factory. However, on the facts of the present case, the only connecting link which could be pressed in service by the learned counsel for the appellant was the fact that the respondent – company was the owner not only of the Ambarnath factory but also of Roha factory. On the basis of common ownership it was submitted that necessarily the Board of Directors could control and supervise the working of Roha factory also and therefore, according to the learned counsel, it could be said that there was interconnection between Ambarnath factory and Roha factory and it could be said that there was supervisory, financial or managerial control of the same Board of Directors. So far as this contention is concerned the finding reached by the High Court, as extracted earlier, clearly shows that there was no evidence to indicate any such interconnection between the two factories in the matter of supervisory, financial or managerial control of the same Board of Directors. So far as this contention is concerned the finding reached by the High court, as extracted earlier, clearly shows that there was no evidence to indicate any such interconnection between the two factories in the matter of supervisory, financial or managerial control. Nothing could be pointed out us to contradict this finding. Therefore, the net result is that the only connecting link which could be effectively pressed in service by the learned counsel for the appellant for culling out interconnection between Ambarnath factory and Roha factory was that both of them were owned by a common owner, namely, the respondent-company and the Board of Directors were common. That by itself cannot be sufficient unless there is clear evidence to show that there was interconnection between these two units and there was common supervisory, financial or managerial control. As there is no such evidence in the present case, on the peculiar facts of this case, it is not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that Roha factory was a part and parcel of Ambarnath factory or it was an adjunct of the main parent establishment functioning at Ambarnath since 1921. (3) 1997 LLR 137 reported in Devesh Sandeep Associates and others vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. “12. (3) 1997 LLR 137 reported in Devesh Sandeep Associates and others vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. “12. To answer and to satisfy the test of functional integrality, the respondent has applied only the fact of common ownership of the two units and the location of two units in the common premises. In my view, the fact recorded and the test applied by respondent No. 1 is not the relevant test to consider the applicability of section 2A of the P.F.Act. The predominant test as enunciated by supreme courts and his court in Ganapathy Bhandarkar’s case is whether subsequent unit viz., M/s. Mody sales & Service could survive on closure of M/s. Devesh Sandeep Associates and whether in matters of finance and employment, the employer has actually kept the two units distinct or integrated. Mere fact of common ownership of the two units and mere location of two units in common premises by itself is not sufficient to satisfy the test of functional integrality and further mere common object of the two units to carry on the business of sale and servicing of wall papers and similarly when two units work for each other would also not answer the test of functional integrality. The first and the foremost to establish the test of functional integrality would be whether the second unit would survive in the absence of first unit or when the first unit is closed whether the second unit continue to do its business activity. This aspect has not been noticed by first respondent in its order dated 9.9.1986 and in my view, the test applied by first respondent is not the relevant test laid down by decisions of Supreme Court and this Court in Ganapathy Bhandarkar’s case. In this view of the matter, the impugned order dated 9.9.1986 passed by 1st respondent is not only opposed to the provisions of the P.F. Act but also to the decision of jurisdictional Court. (4) AIR 2012 SC 273 reported in M/s. L.N. Gadodia & Sons & Anr. V. Regional Provident Fund commissioner. “14. In the present case the Directors of the two petitioner-companies belong to the same family. The Managing Director is common. The two senior officers i.e., Commercial Manager and Technical Manager are common. At the time of inspection, the enforcement officer noticed that the employees of the two companies were being swapped. V. Regional Provident Fund commissioner. “14. In the present case the Directors of the two petitioner-companies belong to the same family. The Managing Director is common. The two senior officers i.e., Commercial Manager and Technical Manager are common. At the time of inspection, the enforcement officer noticed that the employees of the two companies were being swapped. Both of them have same registered address and common telephone numbers and a common gram number. The audited accounts revealed that the second petitioner – company had given a loan of Rs. 5 lakhs to the first petitioner in the year 1988. The two companies are family concerns of the Gadodial family. Hence, in the facts of the present case we have to hold that there is an integrity of management, finance and the workforce in the two private limited companies. The two companies have seen to it that on record each of the two entities engage less than twenty employees, although the number of employees engaged by them is more than twenty when taken together. The entire attempt of the petitioners is to show that the two entities are separate units so that the Provident Funds Act does not get attracted. The material on record however, lead to only one pointer that the two entities are parts of the same establishment and in which case they get covered under the Provident Funds Act.” 15. Principles enunciated in the judgments would go to establish that ultimate object is to ensure that the unit or the establishment is one and there has been no camouflage by an establishment to go outside the purview of the Act so as to deprive the employees of an establishment to have the fruits of this beneficial legislation. The exercise which the authorities will have to undertake to discern the truth is to find out as to whether in such circumstances the units, or establishments are separate establishments termed as branches, units, etc., and if so whether they are mutually interdependent and whether their functioning is complimentary and supplementary to each other and they are mutually dependant on each other. Last, but not the least as to the existence of one is sufficient even though other unit/establishments as the case may be, becomes dis-functional. Last, but not the least as to the existence of one is sufficient even though other unit/establishments as the case may be, becomes dis-functional. There may be instances where two units which separate legal entities may be run in one premises which by itself is not sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that there is functional integrality between such establishments. Even if there are two or units or establishments, the exercise which the authorities will have to undertake as is enumerated in the decisions referred to above namely to pierce the corporate veil and discern the truth. It would be of benefit to note the judgment of the Honorable Apex court in the cases of: (1) Calcutta Chromotype Ltd., Vs. Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta reported in AIR 1998 SC 1631 “12. The principle that a company under the Companies Act, 1956 is a separate entity and, therefore, where the manufacturer and the buyer are two separate companies, they cannot, than anything more, be ‘related persons’ within the meaning of clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Act is not of universal application. Law has traveled quite a bit after decision of the House of Lords in the case of Salomon Vs. Salomon [1897 AC 22]. This is how this Court noticed in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. [ (1964) 6 SCR 885 ]: “The true legal position regard to the character of a corporation or a company which owes its incorporation to a statutory authority. Is not in doubt or dispute. The corporation in law is equal to a natural person and has a legal entity of its own. The entity of the corporation is entirely separate from that of its shareholders; it bears its own name and has a seal of its own its assets are separate and distinct from those of its members; it can sue and be sued exclusively for its own purpose’; its creditors cannot obtain satisfaction from the assts of its members; the liability of the members or shareholders is limited to the capital invested by them; similarly, the creditors of the members have no right to the assets of the corporation. This position has been well-established ever since the decision the of salomon vs. Salomon & Co. This position has been well-established ever since the decision the of salomon vs. Salomon & Co. [(1897)AC 22 HL] was pronounced in 1987; and indeed, it has always been the well recognized principle of common law. However, in the course of time, the doctrine that the corporation or a company has a legal and separate entity of its own has been subjected to certain exceptions by the application of the fiction that the veil of the corporation can be lifted and its face examined in substance. The doctrine of the lifting of the veil thus marks a change in the attitude that law has originally adopted towards the concept of the separate entity or personality of the corporation. As a result of the impact of the complexity of economic factors, judicial decisions have sometimes recognized exceptions to the rule about the juristic personality of the corporation. It may be that in course of time these exceptions may grow in number ant to meet the requirements of different economic problems, the theory about the personality of the corporation may be confine more and more. 14.) M/s. Mcdowel and Company Ltd. Vs Commercial Tax Officer [ (1985) 3 SCC 230 = (1985) 154 ITR 148], this court examined the concept of tax avoidance or rather the legitimacy of the art of dodging tax without breaking the law. This court stressed upon the need to make a departure from the Westminster principle base upon the observation of Lord Tomlin in the case of IRC vs. Duke of Westminister [1936) AC 1] that every assessee is entitled to arrange his affairs as to not attract taxes. The court said that tax planning may be legitimate provided it is within the framework of law. Colourable devices, however, cannot be part of tax planning. Dubious methods resorting to artficeor subterfuge to avoid payment of taxes on what really is income can today no longer be applauded and legitimized as a splendid work by a wise man but has to be condemned and punished with severest of penalties. If we examine the thrust of all the decisions, there is no bar on the authorities to left the veil of a company whether a manufacturer or a buyer, to see it was not wearing that mask of not being treated as related person when, in fact, both, the manufacturer and the buyer, are in fact the same persons. If we examine the thrust of all the decisions, there is no bar on the authorities to left the veil of a company whether a manufacturer or a buyer, to see it was not wearing that mask of not being treated as related person when, in fact, both, the manufacturer and the buyer, are in fact the same persons. Under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Act, value of the excisable goods shall not be deemed to be normal price thereof, i.e., the price at which such goods are ordinarily sold by the assessee to a buyer in the course of wholesale trade for delivery at the time and place of removal, if the buyer is a related person and price is not the sole consideration for sale, As to who is a related person, we have to see its definition in section 4 (4) (c) of the Act. It is not only that both, the manufacturer and the buyer associated with each other for which corporate well may be lifted to see who is being it but also that they should have interest, directly or indirectly, in the business of each other. But once it is found that persons being the manufacturer and the buyer are same, it is apparent that buyer is associated with the manufacturer, i.e, the assessee and then regard being had to the Common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business it can be presumed that they have interest, directly or indirectly, in the business of each other (refer section 114 of the Evidence Act). It is however, difficult to lay down any broad principle to hold as to when corporate veil should be lifted or if on doing that, could it be said that the assessee and the buyer are related persons. That will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it will have to be seen who is calling the shots in both the assessee and the buyer. When it is the same person the authorities can certainly fall back on the third proviso to clause (a) of section 4 (1) of the Act, to arrive at the value of the excisable goods. When it is the same person the authorities can certainly fall back on the third proviso to clause (a) of section 4 (1) of the Act, to arrive at the value of the excisable goods. It cannot be that when the same person incorporates two companies of which one is the manufacturer of excisable good and other is the buyer of those goods, the two companies being separate legal entities the excise authorities are barred from probing anything further to find out who is the person being these two companies. It is difficult to accept such a narrow interpretation. True that shareholdings in a company can change by that is the very purpose to lift the veil to find out if the two companies are associated with each other. Law is specific that when duty of excise is chargeable on the goods with reference to its value than the normal price ono which the goods are sold shall be deemed to be the value provided (1) the buyer is not a related person and (2) the price is the sole consideration. It is a deeming provision and the two conditions have to be satisfied for the case is to fall under clause (a) of section 4 (1) keeping in view as to who is the related person within the meaning of clause (c) of section 4 (4) of the Act. Again if the price is not the sole consideration, then again clause (a) of section 4 (1) will not be applicable to arrive at the value of the excisable goods for the purpose of levy of duty of excise. (2) State of U.P. & Others Vs. Renusagar Power Co. and others reported in AIR 1988 SC 1737 , whereunder in para -63 it has been held as under: “It is high time to reiterate that in the expanding of horizon of modern jurisprudence, lifting of corporate veil is permissible. Its frontiers are unlimited. It must, however, depend primarily on the realities of the situation. The aim of the legislation is to do justice to all the parties. The veil on corporate personality even though not lifted sometimes, is becoming more and more transparent in modern company jurisprudence. Its frontiers are unlimited. It must, however, depend primarily on the realities of the situation. The aim of the legislation is to do justice to all the parties. The veil on corporate personality even though not lifted sometimes, is becoming more and more transparent in modern company jurisprudence. The concept of lifting the corporate veil is changing concept and is of expanding horizons.” Keeping the principles enunciated in these two judgments when facts on hand are examined, it would emerge that authorities have never contended or never taken a stand that there is more than one establishment and it is the petitioner who took such a stand. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner as also learned counsel appearing for respondent are on the issue as to whether the units are two separate companies and they would form one unit or one establishment for the purposes of bringing such establishments within the scope and purview of section 2A of the Act. Mere fact of common ownership by itself is not sufficient to satisfy that two units or branches is a part of one establishment. The test of functional integrality is the prime test. Under section 1 (13) (a) of the act an establishment which has more than 20 employees employed under it, provisions of the Act would get attracted. At the first instance Enforcement Officer (squad) visited the establishment of the petitioner, the list of employees have been furnished which consists of 26 persons. These employees are working in M/s. Hegde Motor Transport as its employees. However, the contention of the petitioner is that salaries to these persons have been paid by others namely Sriyuths Gananath Hegde, Preetam Hegde and Smt. Jayalakshmi Hegde other than Jayachandra Hegde. If for the purposes of tax planning, the salaries are paid by the members of the family so as to have a legitimate tax planning that by itself would not be sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that they are the employees of those persons. It is not in dispute that these employees are working under the banner of M/s. Hegde Motor Transport. Though profit and loss account and balance sheet produced by the petitioner before the Appellate Tribunal which is said to have been not considered and same being available on record when perused would clearly go to show that Smt. Jayalakshmi Hegde and Sri. Though profit and loss account and balance sheet produced by the petitioner before the Appellate Tribunal which is said to have been not considered and same being available on record when perused would clearly go to show that Smt. Jayalakshmi Hegde and Sri. Gananath Hegde are also claiming themselves to be the proprietors of M/s. Hegdeis also claiming to be the proprietrix. Thus, all 3 including Sri. Jayachandra Hegde are claiming to be the proprietors of M/s. Hegde Motor Transport. In this factual background let me examine and answer the points formulated hereinabove. RE POINT No.1 16. In response to the notice issued by the authorities a reply has been submitted by Sri Jayachandra Hegde on 6.6.2006 to the respondent whereunder documents were furnished namely balance sheet, income tax returns of all the four persons alongwith written submissions as stated above. Mere payment of salary from the account of Sriyuths K. Jayachandra Hegde, Seetharam Hegde, Gananath Hegde and Smt. Jayalakshmi Hegde, even if it were to be so that by itself would not be sufficient to hold there is no functional integrality in as much as these persons themselves claim to be the proprietors of M/s. Hegde Motor Transport in the Income Tax returns filed by them. Hence, they cannot wriggle out of this situation and take a contrary stand to contend they are not associated with M/s. Hegde Motor Transport. It is no doubt true that perusal of order passed u/s. 7A of the Act, nothing has been stated in the order by use of words like functional integrality. However, the conclusion arrived at by the authority to hold that there is strength of more than 20 persons working in M/s. Hegde Motor Transport is sufficient enough to hold that they would be covered u/s. 1(3) (b) of the Act. Following glaring aspects noticed in the instant case are: (1) There are no two establishments or units as such in existence. (2) There is only one establishment by name M/s. Hegde Motor Transport and three persons are simultaneously claiming to be the proprietors/ proprietreix and in fact they have filed their income tax returns as such. (3) All, these three persons are related to each other and they are none other than husband, wife and son. (2) There is only one establishment by name M/s. Hegde Motor Transport and three persons are simultaneously claiming to be the proprietors/ proprietreix and in fact they have filed their income tax returns as such. (3) All, these three persons are related to each other and they are none other than husband, wife and son. (4) Even in the income tax returns filed by them, they claim that salary is paid to these employees who have worked for M/s. Hegde Motor Transport. (5) The premises in which M/s. Hegde Motor Transport Company is being run, and buses said to be standing in the names of other persons are being used by said Transport Co., and there is no different legal entity in so far as buses owned by persons other than Jayachandra Hegde. (6) Vouchers are obtained from the employers as employees of M/s. Hegde Motor transport Company only. These facts would clearly go to show that all the employees are working under one banner namely M/s. Hegde Motor Transport Company and question of interdependency or applying the ration laid down in this regard to the facts on hand does not arise at all. 17. In that view of the matter, I am of the considered view that Point No. 1 formulated herein above is to be answered against petitioner. RE POINT NO. 2: 18. It was contended by the learned counsel for petitioner as noted herein above that non consideration of two application filed for impleading and with out passing orders thereon has resulted in prejudice. When examined with reference to the facts on hand, it would go to show that these two applicants namely wife and son of Sri Jayachandra Hegde intended to come on record by producing the income tax returns and other documents appended to the said applications and contending that some of the buses are owned by them and employees working in those buses are their employees. This contention cannot be accepted for reasons more than one: (i) It is not the case of these applicants they are having separate company or firm; (ii) Even accepting salary is paid by them, it is noticed from Audit Reports filed by them, they are claiming to be the proprietors/proprietrix of M/s. Hegde Motor Company. This contention cannot be accepted for reasons more than one: (i) It is not the case of these applicants they are having separate company or firm; (ii) Even accepting salary is paid by them, it is noticed from Audit Reports filed by them, they are claiming to be the proprietors/proprietrix of M/s. Hegde Motor Company. As observed herein above, the said Sri Jayachandra Hegde himself while replying to the notice dated 12.6.2006 issued by respondent vide reply dated 16.6.2006 has enclosed the balance sheet, income tax returns etc. of himself, his sons and wife along with his written submissions which was admittedly available on record and same has been looked into by the authority. Hence, even if Appellate Tribunal has failed to consider them it has not caused any prejudice to the petitioner. This fact is also evident from reply dated 16.6.2006 submitted by Jayachandra Hegde to the notice dated 12.6.2006. hence, it cannot be said that non consideration of this aspect by the Tribunal has resulted in prejudice. It would be of benefit to note the judgment of the Honorable Apex Court in the case of Aligarh Muslim University and Others Vs. Mansoor Ali Khan reported in (2000) 7 SCC 529 wherein the principles of doctrine of “Useless formality theory” has been applied and it has been held as: “F. Administrative law – Natural Justice – Notice – Exception – “Useless formality theory” – Applicability of, held, may depend on the facts of a particular case – Doctrines – Doctrine of “useless formality”.” “24. The ‘useless formality’ theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of “admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion” referred to above, there has been considerable debate of the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent, views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this court in M.C. Mehta, 1999 AIR SCW 2754: ( AIR 1999 SC 2583 ), referred to above. This court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lrd Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Singham, Megarry, J. and staughton, L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs, Garner, craig, De Smith, wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the court will be prejudging the issue. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs, Garner, craig, De Smith, wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said, that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via-media rules. We do not think it necessary, in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case.” The principles laid down in the said judgment is squarely applicable to the facts on hand for two reasons: (1) By non considering all these documents by the Appellate Tribunal there is no prejudice caused to the petitioner inasmuch as it had no relevance whatsoever; and (2) Even otherwise these documents had already been filed by the said Sri Jayachandra Hegde alongwith reply dated 16.06.2006. Hence, Tribunal has committed no error in not considering the applications filed by the applicants whereunder they sought to come on record as appellants by relying on these documents. 19. In that view of the matter, Point No.2 deserves to be answered against the petitioner. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER (1) Writ petition is dismissed with costs. (2) Petitioner shall pay cost of Rs. 5,000/-to the respondent within an outer limit of four weeks from today. (3) The order of EPF Appellate Tribunal in ATA No. 712 (6) /2006 vide Annexure-A is hereby affirmed.