JUDGMENT Dev Darshan Sud, J.(oral) This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the plaintiff against the judgment and order of the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Shimla reversing the judgment and order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), (V), Shimla granting an injunction in favour of the plaintiff and against the respondent directing the respondent-defendant No.1 from interfering in possession of the plaintiff in the suit premises described as ‘Gift Centre’, Shop No. 89, The Mall, Shimla. 2. The plaintiff instituted the suit in which application for interim directions under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed out of which these proceedings arise. 3. In the suit, it was pleaded that plaintiff Pardeep Kumar Abrol is the proprietor of shop described as ‘Gift Centre’ The Mall, Shimla and was carrying on business with his father since the year 1978. It was pleaded that the premises had been taken on rent by Shri Tilak Raj from the proforma-defendant namely Chander Mohan Sharma in the year 1970 for running the business under the name and style of ‘Gift Centre’. The plaintiff had joined the business of his father in 1978. In 1996 late Shri Tilak Raj had executed a general power of attorney in favour of the plaintiff by which he had granted all rights to the plaintiff to carry on all business activities. Shri Tilak Raj died in the year 2006 and tenancy was inherited by his sons and daughter namely Pradeep Kumar Abrol (the plaintiff), Rajinder Abrol and Jitender Abrol and Anjana. The younger brother Rajinder Abrol had permanently settled in United States of America with his family in 1993 and family of Shri Jitender Abrol had also migrated to United States of America and settled there permanently. Anjana was married in Punjab and had left Shimla. Jitender was living in Shimla from 1998 to January 2012. The plaintiff was running the business of his father from 1996 till 2006 as his attorney, but in 2002 Jitender also joined the family business pursuant to an oral agreement having been arrived at between the parties. In 2006, after the death of Shri Tilak Raj, both the brothers i.e. the plaintiff and Jitender carried on the business in a cordial manner. In 2006, after the death of Shri Tilak Raj, both the brothers i.e. the plaintiff and Jitender carried on the business in a cordial manner. Jitender had maintained a separate corner but all dues in the nature of rent and taxes etc. were paid by the plaintiff and the exclusive possession of the premises was with the plaintiff. In January, 2012, Jitender migrated to United States of America and decided to settle there with his family permanently and handed over the management of the shop to the plaintiff. He continued doing so without any little hindrance or any claim raised by the legal heirs of Tilak Raj Abrol i.e. his brothers and sister. In June, 2011, the defendant was hired by Jitender as a salesgirl. She had worked in the shop for 6-7 days and thereafter she ceased to attend the shop. On 28th January, 2012 she came to the spot and tried to take its possession. The plaintiff restrained her from entering the premises and told her that her employer had gone to abroad and she had no right to enter the shop but she did not heed to this request and threatened the plaintiff. She was described as a trespasser and stranger to the suit property having no relationship with tenant Tilak Raj or any other heirs of the deceased tenant. It was pleaded that on 5th June, 2012 the defendant-respondent tried to forcibly enter the shop proclaiming that she is the owner and would carry on the business as such. The shop had to be closed down and it is in this eventuality that a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction was sought restraining the defendant from entering or in any manner interfering in the shop named as ‘Gift Centre’, Shop No. 89, The Mall, Shimla. 4. The suit was resisted by the defendant on a number of preliminary objections. It was not disputed that the landlord was proforma-defendant No. 2 and that late Shri Tillak Raj Abrol was the tenant and thereafter, the tenancy was inherited by the heirs of the deceased tenant, which included the plaintiff. It was pleaded that Shri Tilak Raj only allowed the plaintiff to manage the business for a short period of time when he was undergoing some medical treatment. Jitender also continued to manage the business since 1995. It was pleaded that Shri Tilak Raj only allowed the plaintiff to manage the business for a short period of time when he was undergoing some medical treatment. Jitender also continued to manage the business since 1995. It was denied that Rajinder Abrol had settled in United States of America with his family since 1993. He had also inherited the rights in all the properties of deceased Shri Tilak Raj regarding which all brothers and sister including the plaintiff entered into a family settlement on 12.9.2011. In this settlement it had been decided by the parties that all of them have equal rights in the shop i.e. ‘Gift Centre’ and the plaintiff would only be entitled to only 40% of the share in case he left the shop. 5. The family of Jitender Abrol had gone to United States for the purpose of higher education of their sons/wards and his departure from India was neither permanent nor such which would indicate permanent abandonment of his domicile from India. The suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as Jitender had not been impleaded as a party who was equally entitled to carry on the business in the shop either by himself or through any worker or attorney. He had in fact been doing business since 1995. A Special power of attorney had been executed by Jitender Abrol in favour of the defendant inter alia authorizing her to carry on business in the shop on his behalf and Rajinder and Anjana brother and sister of the plaintiff had consented to this agreement though the terms were to be reduced into writing in future. On 20th January, 2012 when the defendant was carrying the business in the corner occupied by Jitender Abrol, she was obstructed by the plaintiff and his family members who hurled filthy invectives at her. The defendant was compelled to lodge a report with the SHO, Sadar Shimla on 28.1.2012 which matter was amicably settled by the parties and statement/terms to this effect was reduced into writing which was signed by the parties on 30.1.2012. On 21.3.2012 the plaintiff lodged a report with the Superintendent of Police and Kalendra under Sections 107, 150, 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was drawn up which was pending adjudication. The plaintiff had admitted that the defendant-respondent used to sit on the counter allotted to Jatinder Abrol. On 21.3.2012 the plaintiff lodged a report with the Superintendent of Police and Kalendra under Sections 107, 150, 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was drawn up which was pending adjudication. The plaintiff had admitted that the defendant-respondent used to sit on the counter allotted to Jatinder Abrol. The defendant had complained against the plaintiff to the State Women Commission who had asked the SHO, Police Station Sadar, Shimla to inquire into the matter. The police visited the spot on 2.6.2012 where disregarding the presence of the police, the plaintiff and his family members started misbehaving with the defendant. The matter was again compromised in the presence of witnesses. The defendant had produced the special power of attorney, which was in the knowledge of the plaintiff, to show that she had spent a sum of Rs.1 lac on the business. This in brief is the pleadings of the parties. 6. The learned trial Court on the pleadings before it granted injunction to the plaintiff holding that the status of the respondent who is the attorney of Jitender Abrol and it is in this capacity that she seeks possession of the suit premises and secondly as an independent right to be protected from being ousted of possession from the suit premises. The Court holds that it was a joint tenancy between the plaintiff and the other heirs of deceased Tilak Raj Abrol and in this eventuality, they have the right with respect to the other part of the property and cannot allow a third party in possession of a specific portion of the suit premises “especially when the remaining co-tenants or any of them objects to the same.” The learned Court holds that right of the tenant is personal and it cannot be transferred to a third person. The appointment of a power of attorney operates only with regard to the running of business on behalf of Jitender Abrol with respect to customers etc. and not against the co-tenants. In this eventuality, she cannot claim any independent right nor can such right be protected by the Court. The Court refers to the documents but only cursorily to establish that the respondent has been in possession of the suit premises along with the applicant and that there is also compromise dated 30.1.2012. and not against the co-tenants. In this eventuality, she cannot claim any independent right nor can such right be protected by the Court. The Court refers to the documents but only cursorily to establish that the respondent has been in possession of the suit premises along with the applicant and that there is also compromise dated 30.1.2012. The Court then proceeds that it is not clear from the pleadings of any party as to why respondent-defendant No.1 has been ousted from the shop. Injunction was granted till the decision of the suit. 7. The respondent appealed and the learned Appellate Court holds that in the compromise which was entered into on 30.1.2012, there is a clear admission that the respondent is looking after the business of the brother of the plaintiff by using the same counter which was being used by Jitender before he went to abroad. Another application was moved by the defendant against the plaintiff in March, 2012 and compromise was effected in the month of May, 2012 in which proforma-defendant Chander Mohan Sharma was one of the signatory. The Court records that it is clearly mentioned in that compromise dated 5.5.2012 that the parties will maintain status quo regarding the business to be conducted in the shop. All documents, according to the learned Appellate Court, establish that there was an admission on the part of the plaintiff that both the brothers were carrying on the business under the same roof by maintaining different accounts and counters; Jitender had executed a special power of attorney only in the month of January, 2012, there was no whisper about the disputes, complaints and compromises in the pleadings of the plaintiff, the proforma-defendant/landlord was signatory to one of the compromises which was effected in May, 2012. The learned Appellate Court holds that plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands but only with a part of facts in the pleadings that the respondent was employed as a sales girl. In this eventuality, the Court relying upon the decision in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath & others AIR 1994 SC 853 & Arunima Baruah vs. Union of India, (2007)6 SCC 120 holds that the discretionary relief cannot be granted to a party, who withholds material facts from the court. It is this judgment which has been challenged before me. 8. In this eventuality, the Court relying upon the decision in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath & others AIR 1994 SC 853 & Arunima Baruah vs. Union of India, (2007)6 SCC 120 holds that the discretionary relief cannot be granted to a party, who withholds material facts from the court. It is this judgment which has been challenged before me. 8. At the outset, I note that it has now become a standard practice of parties to get embroiled in disputes and prolong litigation pushing the main cause into oblivion. 9. The principles applicable for grant of interim injunction have been stated in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd and others vs. Coca Cola Co. and others (1995)5 SCC 545 in which the Supreme Court holds: 43. The grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the Court. While exercising the discretion the Court applies the following tests-(i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie ease; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. The decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when the existence of the legal right assailed by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. Relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection has, however, to be weighed against the corresponding need to the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The Court must weigh one need against another and determine where the balance of convenience lies. (See : Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 at Pp. 731-32). The Court must weigh one need against another and determine where the balance of convenience lies. (See : Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 at Pp. 731-32). In order to protect the defendant while granting an interlocutory injunction in his favour the Court can require the plaintiff to furnish an undertaking so that the defendant can be adequately compensated if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. ………. 47. In this context, it would be relevant to mention that in the instant case GBC had approached the High Court for the injunction order, granted earlier, to be vacated. Under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with an order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court, on being approached, will, apart from other considerations, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his conduct was free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show that he himself was not at fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the party against whom he was seeking relief. His conduct should be fair and honest. These considerations will arise not only in respect of the person who seeks an order of injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 or Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also in respect of the party approaching the Court for vacating the ad interim or temporary injunction order already granted in the pending suit or proceedings. (at pp. 574 & 576) 10. Further in N.R. Dongre and others vs. Whirlpool Corporation and another (1996)5 SCC 714 case relating to passing off action the Court holds: “16. In our opinion, the above concurrent findings, on which the grant of interlocutory injunction in favour of the plaintiffs is based is, to say the least, a reasonable conclusion on the relevant material available at this stage. In our opinion, the above concurrent findings, on which the grant of interlocutory injunction in favour of the plaintiffs is based is, to say the least, a reasonable conclusion on the relevant material available at this stage. It is not for this court at the stage of second appeal to reassess the material and reach an independent conclusion thereon for the first time and it has only to be seen whether the conclusion reached by the trial court was reasonably possible on the material. Moreover, even on a reassessment, it appears to us that the conclusion reached by the trial court in favour of the plaintiffs is the one more probable and reasonable on this material. 17……… 18. Injunction is a relief in equity and is based on equitable principles. On the above concurrent findings, the weight of equity at this stage is in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. It has also to be borne in mind that a mark in the form of a word which is not a derivative of the product, points to the source of the product. The mark/name 'WHIRLPOOL' is associated for long, much prior to the defendants' application in 1986 with the Whirlpool Corporation, Plaintiff I. In view of the prior user of the mark by Plaintiff 1 and its trans-border reputation extending to India, the trade mark 'WHIRLPOOL' gives an indication of the origin of the goods as emanating from or relating to the Whirlpool Corporation, Plaintiff 1. The High court has recorded its satisfaction that use of the 'WHIRLPOOL' mark by the defendants indicates prima facie an intention to pass off the defendants' washing machines as those of the plaintiffs or at least the likelihood of the buyers being confused or misled into that belief. The fact that the cost of the defendants' washing machine is l/3rd of the cost of the plaintiffs' washing machine as stated by Shri Sibal, itself supports the plaintiffs' plea that the defendants' washing machines are not of the same engineering standard and are inferior in quality to the washing machines of the plaintiffs. In addition, it has been rightly held that the grant of interlocutory injunction would cause no significant injury to the defendants who can sell their washing machines merely by removing the small metallic strip bearing the offensive trade mark/name which includes 'WHIRLPOOL'. In addition, it has been rightly held that the grant of interlocutory injunction would cause no significant injury to the defendants who can sell their washing machines merely by removing the small metallic strip bearing the offensive trade mark/name which includes 'WHIRLPOOL'. On the other hand, refusal of the interlocutory injunction would cause irreparable injury to the plaintiffs' reputation and goodwill since the trade mark/name 'WHIRLPOOL' is associated for long because of prior user and even otherwise with Plaintiff I, Whirlpool Corporation. These factors which have been relied on for grant of the interlocutory injunction by the trial court indicate that the exercise of discretion was in accordance with the settled principles of law relating to the grant of interlocutory injunctions in a passing-off action. The affirmance of the trial court's order by the Division Bench on an appeal reinforces the trial court's view.” (at pp.726-727) 11. In Agriculture Produce Market Committee-Gondal and others vs. Girdharbhai Ramjibhai Chhaniyara and others (1997)5 SCC 468 the Court rules:- “6. The primary question that arises for consideration is whether the respondents have any right to be enforced by way of injunction? Part III of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 deals in that behalf by way of preventive relief. Section 36 postulates that "[P]reventive relief is granted at the discretion of the Court by injunction, temporary or perpetual." Temporary or perpetual injunctions are regulated by S. 37, which reads as under : "37. Temporary and perpetual injunctions. (1) Temporary injunctions are such as are to continue until a specified time, or until the further order of the court, and they may be granted at any stage of a suit, and are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) (2) A perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon the merits of the suit; the defendant is thereby perpetually enjoined from the assertion of a right, or from the commission of an act, which would be contrary to the right of the plaintiff." 7. It is seen that the respondents do not have at present any concluded right to seek for enforcement against the Market Committee. At best, they have got a right to apply for and seek allotment in respect of those who are governed by the second category, namely, A type and B type shops. It is seen that the respondents do not have at present any concluded right to seek for enforcement against the Market Committee. At best, they have got a right to apply for and seek allotment in respect of those who are governed by the second category, namely, A type and B type shops. We are not concerned in this case with the first category, viz., shop for shop because they are not seeking any relief by way of perpetual or temporary injunction in this behalf. Since the respondents are not having any concluded right as at present, the court has not applied its mind to consider what would be the right which is claimed to be infringed. The High Court has further proceeded on the premise that they have a right, without applying its mind; it has stated that the right is sought to be regulated by injunction, without looking into the above provisions of the Act. The trial Court had stated as under: "1. Temporary injunction against the defendant No. 1 their servants, agents etc. is hereby granted restraining them in making allotment of any shop on premium of Rs. 2,55,000/-and Rs. 2,30,000/- respectively for 'A' type and 'B' type shops are concerned (this is based on XXVIII(2) G.L.R. 214). This interim injunction relates so far as pltfs. and others meaning thereby 81 persons and subject to decision of High Court for 146 persons on record are concerned, and it shall not effect to those allottees whom shops are allotted by draw previously held if any and to those whom allotment is made otherwise than draw system. 2. Defendant No. 1 to frame legal and reasonable conditions for the allotment of shop and thereafter defendant No. 1 is allowed to make allotment of shops in one group consisting of plaintiffs and persons on record and others in order to prevent fragmentation of group. 3. Subject to the decision of Hon'ble High Court in regard to 146 persons in Civil Revision Application No. 1646/96, deft. No. 1 shall protect right. 4. 3. Subject to the decision of Hon'ble High Court in regard to 146 persons in Civil Revision Application No. 1646/96, deft. No. 1 shall protect right. 4. In order to avail opportunity to obtain shops in new market yard to plaintiffs and others, and in order to avail defendant No. 1 to repay loan and interest and to avail financial sources to defendant No. 1, temporary injunction till the final disposal of the suit is further granted as under:- (i) All plaintiffs and other persons on record have raised contentions and dispute about 'A' type and 'B' type shops in new market yard. Therefore, subject to the final determination of price of such each type of shop. Plaintiffs and others on record subject to decision of necessary party by High Court are afforded an opportunity and directed to participate in draw for the allotment of each type of shop. (ii) For this plaintiff and other persons on record who want to participate in allotment of the shop shall make payment of price at this stage nor more than Rs. 1,17,000/- for 'A' type of shop and Rs. 1,06,200/- for 'B' type of shop; for this defendant No. 1 shall afford facility of instalment as availed to other allottees. (iii) Plaintiffs and other persons to take note that above payment of Rs. 1,17,000/- and Rs. 1,06,200/- is subject to the final determination of the price that would be decided by the Court after recording evidence and in final judgment of the suit." (at pp. 469-470) 12. I only need to notice judgment in Nirmala R. Bafna (Smt.) / Kershi Shivax Cambatta and others vs. Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and another/Official Liquidator and others (1992)2 SCC 322 where on facts it was held:- “17. From the facts narrated above, it would be evident that the rights of the appellant have to be adjudicated in the suit filed by her which is now transferred to the High Court with the consent of both the parties. Whether the sub-tenancy is true, whether it is valid in law and whether the consent of the landlord is true and valid, are all questions which arise for decision in the suit. We cannot pronounce upon them at this stage. Whether the sub-tenancy is true, whether it is valid in law and whether the consent of the landlord is true and valid, are all questions which arise for decision in the suit. We cannot pronounce upon them at this stage. The only question for our consideration is whether the directions given by the Division Bench, extracted hereinabove, are justified in the circumstances of the case and in law ? 18. It is admitted by the official liquidator that the Board of directors of the company had indeed passed a special resolution affirming the agreement of sub-tenancy in favour of the appellant. (In her plaint in Suit No. 4873 of 1984 the appellant has referred to the said special resolution of the Board of directors.) This fact coupled with the statement of the learned counsel for the landlord trust establishes, prima facie, the appellant's plea of sub-tenancy. That she was in possession of a major portion of the said flat on the date of appointment of liquidator is also not in dispute. According to the sub-tenancy agreement, the rent payable by the appellant is Rs. 600/ - per month as against Rs. 900/- per month payable by the company to the landlord for the entire -flat. In the above circumstances, we cannot reject, prima facie speaking, the appellant's claim of protection of Bombay Rent Control Act. In addition to this factual situation, there are two other circumstances which must be taken into consideration, viz., (a) The tenancy rights, the company had, in the said flat may not be an asset for the purpose of liquidation proceedings and (b) merely because a company goes in liquidation and a liquidator/ official liquidator is appointed, the rights of the company vis-a-vis its landlord and/ or its tenants, do not undergo any change. 19. In view of the above facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the directions made by the Division Bench were not really warranted at this stage. The said directions have the effect of dispossessing the appellant from the said premises at an interlocutory stage. The character of her possession has also been altered - she is now permitted to be in occupation of a portion of the flat as the agent of the liquidator. The said directions have the effect of dispossessing the appellant from the said premises at an interlocutory stage. The character of her possession has also been altered - she is now permitted to be in occupation of a portion of the flat as the agent of the liquidator. These directions, in our opinion, were not really warranted, at any rate, at this stage of the proceedings, when the rights of the appellant are yet to be adjudicated upon. One important circumstance, which was not present before the Division Bench and which has been brought to our notice is the consent of the landlord to the sub-tenancy in her favour. In the light of a the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the directions extracted hereinbefore in para were really not called for, at the interlocutory stage. However, having regard to the particular facts and circumstances of this case, and with a view to safeguard the rights of the Company in the event of dismissal of the aforesaid suit, we direct the appellant to furnish security in a sum of Rupees 5 lakhs by way of a Bank guarantee to the satisfaction of the learned company Judge of the Bombay High Court, within two months from today. The amount already deposited by the appellant in pursuance of the order under appeal shall continue to lie in court. The said amount and the security furnished by her in pursuance of this order shall be subject to the decision in the appellant's suit, now transferred to the Bombay High Court.” (at pp.328-239) 13. I need not multiply precedent further, but in conclusion, in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. vs. Hindustan Lever Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 3105 , the principle laid down is:- “20. In Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. (1995) 5 SCC 545 : AIR 1995 SC 2372 : (1995 AIR SCW 3521) this Court, however sounded a different note, though however, emphasised the discretionary power in the matter of grant of interlocutory injunction and in paragraph 43 (of SCC) : (para 46 of AIR) this Court observed : "43. The grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the Court. The grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the Court. While exercising the discretion the Court applies the following tests - (i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. The decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when the existence of the legal right assailed by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. Relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before that uncertainty could be resolved. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection, has, however, to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The Court must weigh one need against another and determine where the "balance of convenience" lies. (see : Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727 at pp. 731-32. In order to protect the defendant while granting an interlocutory injunction in his favour the Court can require the plaintiff to furnish an undertaking so that the defendant can be adequately compensated if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial." 23. Thus on an analysis of the decisions as noticed above, there does not seem to be any difficulty in appreciating the view as expressed by Lord Diplock in American Cyanamid (1975 (1) All ER 504). As a matter of fact, Laddie, J.'s decision in Series 5 Software case (1996 (1) All ER 853) (supra) has been able to resolve the issue without any departure from the true perspective of the judgment as noticed above. 24. As a matter of fact, Laddie, J.'s decision in Series 5 Software case (1996 (1) All ER 853) (supra) has been able to resolve the issue without any departure from the true perspective of the judgment as noticed above. 24. We, however, think it fit to note hereinbelow certain specific considerations in the matter of grant of interlocutory injunction, the basic being non-expression of opinion as to the merits of the matter by the Court, since the issue of grant of injunction usually, is at the earliest possible stage so far as the time-frame is concerned. The other considerations which ought to weigh with the Court hearing the application or petition for the grant of injunctions are as below :- (i) Extent of damages being an adequate remedy; (ii) Protect the plaintiff's interest for violation of his rights though however having regard to the injury that may be suffered by the defendants by reason therefor; (iii) The Court while dealing with the matter ought not to ignore the factum of strength of one party's case being stronger than the others; (iv) No fixed rules or notions ought to be had in the matter of grant of injunction but on the facts and circumstances of each case - the relief being kept flexible; (v) The issue is to be looked from the point of view as to whether on refusal of the injunction the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury keeping in view the strength of the parties' case; (vi) Balance of convenience or inconvenience ought to be considered as an important requirement even if there is a serious question or prima facie case in support of the grant; (vii) Whether the grant or refusal of injunction will adversely affect the interest of general public which can or cannot be compensated otherwise.” (at pp.3110-3112) 14. In State of Assam vs. Barak Upatyaka D.U. Karmachari Sanstha (2009)5 SCC 694 the Supreme Court holds: “21. A precedent is a judicial decision containing a principle, which forms an authoritative element terms as ratio decidendi. An interim order which does not finally and conclusively decide an issue cannot be a precedent. Any reasons assigned in support of such non-final interim order containing prima facie findings, are only tentative. A precedent is a judicial decision containing a principle, which forms an authoritative element terms as ratio decidendi. An interim order which does not finally and conclusively decide an issue cannot be a precedent. Any reasons assigned in support of such non-final interim order containing prima facie findings, are only tentative. Any interim directions issued on the basis of such prima facie findings are temporary arrangements to preserve the status quo till the matter is finally decided, to ensure that the matter does not become either infructuous or a fait accompli before the final hearing.” (at p. 702) 15. In Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and others vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (dead) through LRs (2012)5 SCC 370 a note of caution has been sounded:- “81. False claims and defences are really serious problems with real estate litigation, predominantly because of ever-escalating prices of the real estate. Litigation pertaining to valuable real estate properties is dragged on by unscrupulous litigants in the hope that the other party will tire out and ultimately would settle with them by paying a huge amount. This happens because of the enormous delay in adjudication of cases in our courts. If pragmatic approach is adopted, then this problem can be minimized to a large extent. 82. This Court in a recent judgment in Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi (2011)8 SCC 249 aptly observed at p. 266, para 43 that unless wrongdoers are denied profit from frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to prevent it. In order to curb uncalled for and frivolous litigation, the courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for uncalled for litigation. It is a matter of common experience that the court’s otherwise scarce time is consumed or more appropriately, wasted in a large number of uncalled for cases. In this very judgment, the Court provided that this problem can be solved or at least can be minimised if exemplary costs is imposed for instituting frivolous litigation. The Court observed at pp. 267-68, para 58 that imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and/or ordering prosecution in appropriate cases would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties. The Court observed at pp. 267-68, para 58 that imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and/or ordering prosecution in appropriate cases would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties. In appropriate cases, the courts may consider ordering prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain purity and sanctity of judicial proceedings. Grant or refusal of an injunction 83. Grant or refusal of an injunction in a civil suit is the most important stage in the civil trial. Due care, caution, diligence and attention must be bestowed by the judicial officers and Judges while granting or refusing injunction. In most cases, the fate of the case is decided by grant or refusal of an injunction. Experience has shown that once an injunction is granted, getting it vacated would become a nightmare for the defendant. 84. In order to grant or refuse injunction, the judicial officer or the Judge must carefully examine the entire pleadings and documents with utmost care and seriousness. The safe and better course is to give a short notice on the injunction application and pass an appropriate order after hearing both the sides. In case of grave urgency, if it becomes imperative to grant an ex parte ad interim injunction, it should be granted for a specified period, such as for two weeks. In those cases, the plaintiff will have no inherent interest in delaying disposal of injunction application after obtaining an ex parte ad interim injunction. 85. The court, in order to avoid abuse of the process of law may also record in the injunction order that if the suit is eventually dismissed, the plaintiff undertakes to pay restitution, actual or realistic costs. While passing the order, the court must take into consideration the pragmatic realities and pass proper order for mesne profits. The court must take serious endeavour to ensure that even-handed justice is given to both the parties. 86. Ordinarily, three main principles govern the grant or refusal of injunction: (a) prima facie case; (b) balance of convenience; and (c) irreparable injury; Which guide the court in this regard. The court must take serious endeavour to ensure that even-handed justice is given to both the parties. 86. Ordinarily, three main principles govern the grant or refusal of injunction: (a) prima facie case; (b) balance of convenience; and (c) irreparable injury; Which guide the court in this regard. In the broad category of prima facie case, it is imperative for the court to carefully analyse the pleadings and the documents on record and only on that basis the court must be governed by the prima facie case. In grant and refusal of injunction, pleadings and documents play a vital role.” (at pp. 393-394) The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised merely to collect the facts or to pronounce a different conclusion on the same facts. 16. In these circumstances, orders of the two Courts below are to be considered. One fact which stands out is that the second respondent who is the landlord has been a silent spectator in the entire matter and not to choose to file his reply or to contest the dispute arrived at between the plaintiff and first respondent. This Court also issued a notice to this respondent, but no appearance put in. The learned Appellate Court also notices that in the dispute inter se between the parties, this respondent has been a signatory to the arrangement/compromise arrived at between them. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urges that there is sub-tenancy in the premises and this fact is apparent and evident from the record. He places reliance on the judgment of this Court in Salig Ram and others vs. M/s Kishori Lal Jagat Ram1997(1) Shim. L.C. 446 holding: “13. It is well settled that a conclusion on the question of sub-letting is a conclusion on a question of law derived from the findings on the materials on record as to the transfer of exclusive possession and as to the said transfer of possession being for consideration (See Dev Kumar v. Smt. Swaran Lata, 1996 (1) RCR40). 14. The expression ‘sub-letting’ has not been defined in the Rent Act. 14. The expression ‘sub-letting’ has not been defined in the Rent Act. The apex Court in Jagdish Chand vs. Angoori Devi 1984(3) SCR 216 has held that merely from the presence of a person, other than the tenant in the shop, sub-letting cannot be presumed and as long as control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, sub-letting flowing from the presence of the person, other than the tenant in the shop, cannot be assumed.” (at pp. 449-450) On the evidence, this Court further holds: “…….In view of the fact that respondent No. 2 has been found to be in exclusive possession of a part of the tenanted premises, the two courts below have rightly held that such part of the tenanted premises have been sub-let in favour of respondent No. 2 without the written consent of the landlords.” (at p.454) 17. The point for consideration urged by learned counsel is that stand of the respondent clearly establishes sub-tenancy which arrangement has not been accepted by the plaintiff as the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act contemplates written permission/consent of the landlord for its creation. Learned counsel also relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal Sharma vs. Purshottam Harit, AIR 1974SC 1066 to urge that any document which creates rights in immovable property value of ` 100/- and above requires registration. Submission made by learned counsel is that since the power of attorney executed by Shri Jitender specifically creates interest in the shop, in these circumstances, it requires registration and can not be looked into for any purpose. It was on the basis of that power of attorney that the respondent claims interest in the property. 18. I have noted one fact in the lis between the parties which is that the landlord seems to have distanced himself from the entire feud and has at one point of time witnessed a compromise arrived at between the parties. Whether this would amount to prima facie tacit consent or not for the purpose of granting interim injunction or not is a fact to be established in the suit. But the trial Court has been remiss in ignoring/considering this aspect. Whether this would amount to prima facie tacit consent or not for the purpose of granting interim injunction or not is a fact to be established in the suit. But the trial Court has been remiss in ignoring/considering this aspect. I find that pleading of both the parties seriously disputed that as to whether Jitender has permanently settled in USA as pleaded with intention never to return to India. But this pleading is required to be proved by evidence. It is also the pleading of the respondent that there has been a family settlement between the members of the family of the plaintiff of which Jitender was a part, defining the rights inter se amongst themselves. This is again is a fact which has to be established by evidence. There are also two compromises between the parties as noticed and recorded by the learned District Judge. With respect to these, the case of the plaintiff is that the same cannot bind his interest as proceedings before the police do not constitute substantive evidence and such evidence is inadmissible. At the stage of granting interim injunction, the learned trial Court was in error in holding that the respondent had no right for the reason that tenancy was inherited after the death of Shri Tilak Raj Abrol by the plaintiff and his brothers and sister. That was but stating the obvious. What was to be considered by the learned trial Court was that whether on the basis of power of attorney executed by Jitender the respondent had any right to look after his business counter in the suit premises. Submission made on behalf of the petitioner is that Jitender had exhausted the entire arrangement and settled in abroad after selling the stock to the respondent, in which circumstances, she is free to do the work where she likes, but not in the suit premises. This fact also requires evidence on the point. I also note from the judgment of the learned appellate Court that it notices that the petitioner has not disclosed the complete facts and wanted to obtain a favourable order by suppression of such facts. The learned trial Court was remiss in not considering the two compromises and the participation of the landlord is accepting this arrangement. 19. I also note from the judgment of the learned appellate Court that it notices that the petitioner has not disclosed the complete facts and wanted to obtain a favourable order by suppression of such facts. The learned trial Court was remiss in not considering the two compromises and the participation of the landlord is accepting this arrangement. 19. In these circumstances, the appropriate order would be that which has been passed by the learned appellate Court with this addition that the respondent will only be allowed to use one corner of the shop and will not in any manner interfere with the possession or working of the business by the petitioner. She will be subject to all laws, rules and regulations governing business/trade, she shall not create any little hindrance in the working of the business of the plaintiff, his family members or authorized agents and will not disturb the business activities of the petitioner. She will not be allowed to occupy any portion which effectively blocks the access to the business premises of the petitioner nor create any little hindrance in his working. It will be open to the parties to apply for modification of this order in case any necessity arises. This order does not pronounce upon the final rights of the parties. Petition stands disposed of.