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2012 DIGILAW 972 (CAL)

Lokesh Nag v. UNION OF INDIA

2012-10-18

HARISH TANDAN

body2012
Judgment :- Harish Tandon, J. A short but very interesting point is involved in this writ petition relating to the competence and jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order of reduction of pay as well as the stoppage of increment passed by the original authority situate outside the jurisdiction of the High court. Against the alleged misconduct committed outside the territorial jurisdiction and the order of the appellate authority which is also situated outside the jurisdiction of this court but the revisioning authority confirming and/or affirming the aforesaid order is situated within the jurisdiction of this court, the present writ petition is filed before this Court. The matter relates to a disciplinary proceeding initiated under the Central Industrial Security Force Act 1968 by the competent authority against the enrolled members of the force for alleged misconduct committed by the said delinquent while posted as port commander in DGDB Rig at Nazira, Assam. It is alleged that the petitioner demanded a sum of Rs. 5000/-from one civil contractor for entry of his labourers and materials and handed over his bank account number together with pay-in-slip for deposit. Having not deposited the said amount the petitioner alleged to have refused the entry of the trucks and materials in the said Rig. The enquiry officer submitted the Articles of charge and invited reply from the petitioner and after recording the evidence and the statement, the enquiry officer came to the finding that the petitioner is guilty of misconduct. The copy of the said enquiry report was served upon the petitioner and the disciplinary authority called upon the petition to deliver his defence against the said enquiry report which was duly submitted by the petitioner. The disciplinary authority, ultimately, found the petitioner guilty of misconduct and awarded the punishment of reduction of pay to the lowest stage in the time scale of pay for a period of three years with immediate effect and further ordered that the petitioner will not earn increment of pay during the period of reduction. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority situated at Nazira, Assam and the appellate authority modified the order of the disciplinary authority by inflicting a penalty of reduction of the pay scale in three stages for a period of three years and maintained the other orders passed by the disciplinary authority. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority situated at Nazira, Assam and the appellate authority modified the order of the disciplinary authority by inflicting a penalty of reduction of the pay scale in three stages for a period of three years and maintained the other orders passed by the disciplinary authority. The petitioner thereafter challenged the said order of the appellate authority before the revisioning authority, situated within the jurisdiction of this court and upon dismissal thereof, have filed the instant writ petition. The respondent authorities have taken a plea that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the instant writ petition. It is stated that the misconduct is committed outside the jurisdiction of the court and the entire disciplinary proceeding was conducted by an authority situated outside the jurisdiction including the order passed by the appellate authority. Mere situs of the revisioning authority within the jurisdiction does not confers power to adjudicate the said dispute. Mr. Uttam Mazumdar, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that the situs of the revisioning authority is within the jurisdiction of this court and as such the writ petition is maintainable. In support of the aforesaid contention he relies upon the following judgments : 1. Nabin Chandra Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2966 2. Union of India Vs. Adani Export Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 126 3. Union of India Vs. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. Ltd., AIR 1983 Cal 307 4. Chairman & Managing Director, Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. Dilip Kumar De, 1987 (1) CLJ 354 5. Raichand & co. & Anr. Vs. Director General of Foreign Trade & Ors., 1998 (1) CLJ 425 Mr. Mazumdar strenuously submits that the person i.e. the civil contractor who alleged that the petitioner have demanded money, has not been examined by the authorities and therefore inflicting of the punishment upon the delinquent is not proper and placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of U.P State Road Transport Corpn. Dehradun Vs. Suresh Pal reported in (2006) 8 SCC 108 and Union of India & Ors. Manab Kumar Guho reported in (2011) 3 WBLR (SC) 71. Mr. Dehradun Vs. Suresh Pal reported in (2006) 8 SCC 108 and Union of India & Ors. Manab Kumar Guho reported in (2011) 3 WBLR (SC) 71. Mr. Dilip Kumar Chatterjee, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent authorities submits that if the original authority is situated outside the jurisdiction of this court then even if the revisioning authority is within the jurisdiction, does not confer the jurisdiction upon the high court. He strenuously submits that the entire cause of action is outside the jurisdiction of this high court and thus this High court is not competent to entertain the writ petition. Lastly he submits that the writ court cannot exercise the power of the appellate authority and should not interfere with a concurrent finding of facts. Having considered the submissions, the points emerge for consideration are firstly whether the high court assumes jurisdiction as situs of the revisioing authority is within the territorial jurisdiction when the entire cause of action arose outside the jurisdiction. Secondly the finding made by the authorities shall be interfered in exercise of the power of judicial review. Before dealing with the first point as indicated above it would be profitable to quote Article 226 of the constitution of India which reads thus: “Art. 226. (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without- (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. (4) the power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.” Clause 1 of Article 226 of the Constitution confers jurisdiction upon all the authorities, tribunals within the territorial jurisdiction but by subsequent amendment of Clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution, the high court is further clothed with the power if a cause of action or a part thereof arise within the territorial jurisdiction. Admittedly the cause of action being the alleged misconduct committed at Nazira, Assam where the petitioner was deployed. The enquiry authority was appointed therein and the petitioner was served with the Articles of Charge and submitted his reply thereat. The entire enquiry was conducted outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court and ultimately the disciplinary authority at Nazira, Assam inflicted the punishment of reduction of pay to the lowest stage i.e from Rs. The enquiry authority was appointed therein and the petitioner was served with the Articles of Charge and submitted his reply thereat. The entire enquiry was conducted outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court and ultimately the disciplinary authority at Nazira, Assam inflicted the punishment of reduction of pay to the lowest stage i.e from Rs. 7250/-to 5500/-in the time scale of pay for a period of three years with immediate effect and also the petitioner will not earn increment of pay during the period of reduction and on expiry of the said period the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay. Under Rule 46 of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules 2001 the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General at Nazira, Assam where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was reduced in these terms : “reduction of three stages i.e. from Rs. 7250/-to Rs. 6725/-in time scale of pay for a period of three years. It is further ordered that he will not earn increment of pay during the period of reduction and that on expiry of this period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay.” Rule 52 of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules 2001 provides the methodology of consideration of appeals and it is profitable to quote the same : “R 52. Consideration of appeals.-(1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of rule 33 and having regard to the circumstances of the case, the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly. Consideration of appeals.-(1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of rule 33 and having regard to the circumstances of the case, the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly. (2) in the case of an appeal against the order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 34, or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rules, the appellate authority shall consider- (a) whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been complied with and if not whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice; (b) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted on the basis of the evidence on the record; and (c) whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is excessive, or adequate, on inadequate and pass orders- (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty, or to any other authority with such directions it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case; (iii) No order imposing enhanced penalty shall be made in any other case unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity, as far as may be in accordance with the provisions of rule 37, of making a representation against such enhanced penalty. Provided that- (i) If such enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clauses (I) to (v) of rule 34 and an inquiry under rule 36 has not already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall, subject to the provisions of rule 39, itself hold such an inquiry or direct that such inquiry be held in accordance with rule 36 and thereafter on a consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry make such orders as it may deem fit; and (ii) If the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clauses (I) to (v) of rule 34 and an inquiry under rule 36 has already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall make such orders as it may deem fit.” The petitioner has a further right to challenge the order passed by the appellate authority by filing a revision under Rule 54 of the said Rules and the said revisioning authority shall consider in terms of the provisions contained under Rule 52 of the said Rules which is applicable to the appellate authority. From the aforesaid provisions it appears that the order of the disciplinary authority merges with the order of the appellate authority as in this case the appellate authority has modified the penalty. On conjoint reading of Rule 52 and Rule 54 of the said Rules one could have an impression that the revisioning authority has a trappings of the appellate authority by introduction of sub-rule 2 of Rule 54. Therefore the order affirming, confirming or reversing by the revisioning authority shall be treated as a final order as the order impugned merges with the order of Revisioning Authority. In this regard the reference can be made to the three-judges Bench of the Supreme Court in case of State of Madras Vs. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. reported in AIR 1967 SC 681 where the Supreme Court held that if the appellate authority modifies or reverse the order of the Tribunal there was a merger of an order with the appellate authority and it is the appellate order alone that is effective and can be enforced in these words : “6. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. reported in AIR 1967 SC 681 where the Supreme Court held that if the appellate authority modifies or reverse the order of the Tribunal there was a merger of an order with the appellate authority and it is the appellate order alone that is effective and can be enforced in these words : “6. On behalf of the appellant, the argument was put forward that if a statutory appeal is provided against an order passed by a Tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law. It was said that if the appellate authority modifies or reverses the order of the Tribunal, there was a merger of the latter order with the appellate order and it was the appellate order alone that is effective and can be enforced. But if the appellate order affirms the order of the Tribunal, there is a merger of the original order in the appellate order and it is the appellate order alone which is operative and capable of enforcement. In support of this argument reliance was placed upon the observation of Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co. (1958) 34 ITR 130 at p. 136: ( AIR 1958 SC 86 8 at p. 871). But the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application and it cannot be said that wherever there are two orders, one by the inferior Tribunal and the other by a superior Tribunal, passed in an appeal or revision, there is a fusion or merger of two orders irrespective of the subject-matter of the appellate or revisional order and the scope of the appeal or revision contemplated by the particular statute. In our opinion, the application of the doctrine depends on the nature of the appellate or revisional order in each case and the scope of the statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. For example in Amritlal Bhogilal and Co's case, 1958-34 ITR 130: ( AIR 1958 SC 86 8 ) (supra) it was observed by this Court that the order of registration made by the Income-tax Officer did not merge in the appellate order of the Appellate Commissioner, because the order of registration was not the subject-matter of appeal before the appellate authority. It should be noticed that the order of assessment made by the Income-tax Officer in that case was a composite order viz., an order granting registration of the firm and making an assessment on the basis of the registration. The appeal was taken by the assessee to the Appellate Commissioner against the composite order of the Income-tax Officer. It was held by the High Court that the order of the Income-tax Officer granting registration to the respondent must be deemed to be merged in the appellate order and that the revisional power of the Commissioner of Income-tax cannot, therefore, be exercised in respect of it. The view taken by the High Court was overruled by this Court for the reasons that the order of the Income-tax Officer granting registration cannot be deemed to have merged in the order of the Appellate Commissioner in an appeal taken against the composite order of assessment. Similarly, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, 1958 SCR 595 : ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ) it was held by this Court that the principle of merger cannot apply in the case of an order of dismissal of a public servant which was made by the departmental Tribunal on the 20th April, 1948 and against which the appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Authority on the 7th May, 1949, and the revisional application was rejected on the 22nd April, 1950. In the circumstances of the present case it cannot be said that there was a merger of the order of assessment made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer dated the 28th November, 1952 with the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes dated the 26th August, 1954 because the question of exemption on the value of yarn purchased from outside the State of Madras was not the subject-matter of revisions before the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. The only point that was urged before the Deputy commissioner was that the sum of Rs. 6,57,971-4-9 collected by the respondent by way of tax should not be included in the taxable turnover. This was the only point raised before the Deputy Commissioner and was rejected by him in the revision proceedings. On the contrary, the question before the Board of Revenue was whether the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Madurai was right in excluding from the net taxable turnover of the respondent the sum of Rs. This was the only point raised before the Deputy Commissioner and was rejected by him in the revision proceedings. On the contrary, the question before the Board of Revenue was whether the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Madurai was right in excluding from the net taxable turnover of the respondent the sum of Rs. 7,74,62,706-1-6 which was the value of cotton purchased by the respondent from outside the State of Madras. We are, therefore, of opinion that the doctrine of merger cannot be invoked in the circumstances of the present case.” In the same year, the five-judges Bench of the Supreme Court in case of M/s. Hazi Ismail Noor Mohammad & Co. Vs. Competent Officer, Lucknow reported in AIR 1967 SC 1244 held that where the order of the appellate authority outside the jurisdiction merges with that of the appellate authority within the jurisdiction, the high court assumes jurisdiction in these words : “12. On these facts the question arises whether the High Court of Allahabad has jurisdiction to issue a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the Appellate Officer. It has now been well settled that under Art. 226 of the Constitution, before it was amended, the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ thereunder against a person or authority unless the person or authority resided or was located within the territorial jurisdiction of the appropriate High Court: See Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao. I953 .SCR 1144 ( AIR 1953 SC 210 ) and Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India, 1961-2 SCR 828 : ( AIR 1961 SC 532 ). I953 .SCR 1144 ( AIR 1953 SC 210 ) and Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India, 1961-2 SCR 828 : ( AIR 1961 SC 532 ). In the context of jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari against orders made by a hierarchy of tribunals or authorities, two situations arise, namely, (i) where the order of an appellate authority or tribunal, having its office outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, is a nullity, and (ii) where the order of the original authority within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court merges with that of the appellate authority outside its territorial jurisdiction, in the former case the appropriate High Court can issue a writ against the order of the original authority and in the latter it cannot : see Thangal Kunjo Musaliar v. M. Venkatatchalam Potti, 1955-2 SCR 1196 : ( AIR 1956 SC 246 ) Collector of Customs Calcutta v. East India Commercial, Co. Calcutta, 1963-2 SCR 563: ( AIR 1963 SC 1124 ) and Shriram Jhunjhunwala v. State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 670 . This Court has also held that in all cases after the appellate authority has deposed of the appeal, the operative order was of the final authority whether it has reversed, modified or confirmed the original order : see 1963 SCR 563 : ( AIR 1963 SC 1124 ). Though Das, C. j in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, 1958 SCR 595 at p. 610: ( AIR 1958 SC 86 at p. 94), was not able to equate the orders made in departmental enquiries with decrees in civil Courts in the context of the doctrine of merger, this Court in 1963-2 SCR 563: ( AIR 1963 SC 1124 ), distinguished that case with the following observations at p. 573 (of SCR): (at p. 1127 of AIR) "That case was not concerned with the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court where the original authority is within such territorial jurisdiction while the appellate authority is not and must, therefore, be confined to the special facts with which it was dealing." In that case the Court held that, as the Central Board of Revenue which had confirmed the order of the Collector of Customs had its office in New Delhi, the Calcutta High Court could not issue a Writ against it. But in none of the cases the Court considered a situation similar to that now presented to us. They dealt with the case of an appellate authority or tribunal which had been appointed by the Central Government and was disposing of only statutory appeals or other proceedings in a place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned High Court though in one of the cases, i.e., 1953 SCR 1144 : ( AIR 1953 SC 210 ), the Central Authority for convenience heard the parties and made the order within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. In all those cases the appellate authority, both factually and legally, had its residence or location outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. But in the present case, the appellate authority, though for convenience is having its head office in New Delhi is factually and legally functioning under the State Act within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. To hold that such an authority which is appointed by the State Government and holds office, entertains and disposes of appeals within the State is outside the jurisdiction of the High Court is to carry technicality beyond reasonable limits. One can hold reasonably that such an appellate authority is located within the territorial limits of the High Court for the purpose of disposing of the appeals under the Act. This is a converse case where legally and factually the appellate authority is located in the State though for convenience it also holds office in New Delhi, as presumably the same officer has been appointed appellate officer by other States under different Acts. We, therefore, hold that the High Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ in appropriate cases against such an authority under Art 226.” In case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India & anr. reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254 , the Apex Court held that the situs of the appellate or revisioning authority may give rise to a part of the cause of action in these words: “25. The said decision is an authority for the proposition that the place from where an appellate order or a revisional order is passed may give rise to a part of cause of action although the original order was at a place outside the said area. The said decision is an authority for the proposition that the place from where an appellate order or a revisional order is passed may give rise to a part of cause of action although the original order was at a place outside the said area. When a part of the cause of action arises within one or the other High Court, it will be for the petitioner to choose his forum. 27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority.” In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principle, the position is inescapable that the power exercised by the revisoning authority under Rule 54 of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules 2001 and any order passed therein either confirming, modifying or setting aside the order of the appellate authority results into the merger of the order of the inferior authority. The situs of the revisioning authority is within the territorial jurisdiction. Clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution is the conferment of the jurisdiction on additional grounds but the power of the high court under Clause 1 of Article 226 is retained. In case of Union of India Vs. Adani Export Ltd. reported in AIR 2002 SC 126 the apex court was considering the territorial jurisdiction of the high court in respect of the accrual of the cause of action where it has been held that a part of the cause of action if arose within the jurisdiction confers power upon that high court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Similar view has been taken by the apex court in case of Nabin Chandra Majithia (supra). Similar view has been taken by the apex court in case of Nabin Chandra Majithia (supra). The Division Bench in case of Union of India Vs. Hindustan Aluminum Corpn. Ltd. reported in AIR 1983 Cal 307 was also considering the case relating to the accrual of the part of the cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. Same as in case of The Chairman & Managing Director, Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. Dilip Kumar De reported in 1987 (1) CLJ 354 . In case of Raichand & Co. (supra) the Single Bench of this court held that if all the respondents are within the jurisdiction of the court or if all are not but the presence of the concerned respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court or if a cause of action wholly or in part arises within the territorial limits the high court assumes jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. As indicated above, the revisoning authority is within the territorial jurisdiction of this court and the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority merges with the ultimate order passed by the revisioning authority which is a subject matter of the challenge in this writ petition. Considering the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the revisioning authority under Rule 54 and order confirming and/or reversing and/or modifying becomes an effective order capable of being enforced. Therefore the writ petition is competent and/or maintainable before this court. Turning to the other point, the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision making process and not the decision (See Union of India vs. K G Soni reported in (2006) 6 SCC 794 ). In exercise of the power of judicial review, the High Court should not act as an appellate authority to reappraise the evidence and to substitute its own views. Unless, the finding recorded by the authority of the tribunal is found perverse, based on no material, without any evidence, actuated with malice or bad faith and an outcome of abuse or misuse of power, the writ court should be sole in exercising such power of judicial review. Unless, the finding recorded by the authority of the tribunal is found perverse, based on no material, without any evidence, actuated with malice or bad faith and an outcome of abuse or misuse of power, the writ court should be sole in exercising such power of judicial review. (See Indian Railway Construction Co.Ltd vs. Ajay Kumar reported in (2003) 4 SCC 579 ), Anil Kapoor (Dr.) vs. Union Of India reported in (1998) 9 SCC 47 ) However, in case of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 , the Supreme Court held that the Court should not interfere with the finding of fact recorded in the departmental inquiries except where the same is based on no evidence or apparently perverse and is passed in gross violation of principles of natural justice or statutory regulations or is found to be arbitrary, capricious, malafide or based on extraneous consideration. On perusal of the report submitted by the enquiry authority the complainant i.e. the civil contractor was cited as a witness and it was ultimately found that the petitioner is guilty of misconduct under the Articles of charge. The appellate authority have recorded its independent finding for reducing the punishment and/or penalty which has been affirmed by the revisioning authority upon recording reasons in the impugned order. Mr. Majumdar was very much audacious in contending that the punishment inflected by the disciplinary authority was too excessive and not incommensurate with the misconduct, if at all, committed by the delinquent. The aforesaid submission of Mr. Majumdar is not tenable. The Central Industrial Security Force is a disciplined organization where unauthorized absence is brought within the ambit of neglect of duties and, the delinquent may be dismissed and/or removed and/or terminated from the service. The disciplinary authority, instead of dismissing and/or termination his service, has inflected the punishment of reduction in scale of pay which has been affirmed by the appellate authority with some modification. Unless, it is shown that such punishment is too excessive or shockingly disproportionate, the court should not interfere. (See Mithilesh Singh vs. Union of India reported in (2003) 3 SCC 309 , Charanjit Lamba Vs. Army Southern Command reported in (2010) 11 SCC 314 ) Thus, I do not find any merit in the instant writ petition. The writ petition is thus dismissed. (See Mithilesh Singh vs. Union of India reported in (2003) 3 SCC 309 , Charanjit Lamba Vs. Army Southern Command reported in (2010) 11 SCC 314 ) Thus, I do not find any merit in the instant writ petition. The writ petition is thus dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.