Shri Shaikh Mohammad Murghay Adult v. State of Maharashtra through its Chief Secretary
2012-05-11
D.D.SINHA, V.K.TAHILRAMANI
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- D.D. Sinha, J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for the State – respondent nos.1 to 5 and the learned counsel for CIDCO – respondent no. 6. 2. The petitioners are challenging the order dated 5.12.2005 passed by the respondent no. 2 – Secretary, Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of Maharashtra under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1954 (for short “Act of 1954”). 3. The facts which has given rise for filing of this petition in nutshell and as stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners are as follows: (I) By a Notification dated 17.8.1950 issued under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, certain properties were notified as Evacuee properties which included, interalia, a property bearing Survey No. 487 of Village Panvel. The area shown in the Notification is 2 acres and 10 and ¾ gunthas which according to the petitioners was a mistake, since as per the revenue records the total area of Survey No. 487 was 11 acres & 13 gunthas. The said land vested in the Central Government. (II) By a Notification dated 8.8.1956, an area admeasuring 2 acres and 10 gunthas was allotted to one Shri Lalwani. (III) On 12.4.1988, petitioner no.2 applied to the Settlement Commissioner for allotment of the remaining area of plot Survey No. 487 admeasuring 9 acres and 3 gunthas. By an allotment order dated 27.5.1988, the said land was allotted to petitioner no. 2 and the Tahsildar was asked to hand over possession thereof to petitioner no. 2. (IV) On 31.5.1988, the Government of Maharashtra executed a sanad in favour of the petitioner no.2 in respect of the said portion of Survey No. 487 admeasuring 9 acres & 3 gunthas. The petitioner no.2 was put in possession of the said land on 13.7.1988, by executing possession receipt. (V) By a Registered Sale Deed dated 27.12.1989 the petitioner no.2 conveyed the said property admeasuring 9 acres and 3 gunthas to the petitioner no. 1. On an application dated 28.7.1995 made by the petitioner no. 1, N.A. Permission was granted on 21.11.1995. (VI) Respondent no.
(V) By a Registered Sale Deed dated 27.12.1989 the petitioner no.2 conveyed the said property admeasuring 9 acres and 3 gunthas to the petitioner no. 1. On an application dated 28.7.1995 made by the petitioner no. 1, N.A. Permission was granted on 21.11.1995. (VI) Respondent no. 6 CIDCO raised objection regarding grant of N.A. permission by the Additional District Collector on the ground that the property in question was not an evacuee property and the Government of Maharashtra had already allotted the said land to CIDCO in 1972. As a result of the objection the N.A. Permission was stayed vide order dated 2.12.1995 & S.D.O. was directed to submit report after examining the documents. The S.D.O. submitted a report on 21.4.1996 stating that the said property was covered by Notification of 1950 and that the said area shown was a technical error and ought to have been corrected by the Government. (VII) By an order dated 27.5.1996, the objection submitted by CIDCO was rejected and the N.A. permission which was granted by the Additional District Collector was affirmed on the basis of the report referred to above. (VIII) On 7.11.1996, the respondent no.3, Authorized Chief Settlement Commissioner of Evacuee properties, Maharashtra State, issued a notice under Section 24(2) of the Act of 1954. CIDCO filed an appeal bearing No. 60 of 1996 against the order dated 27.5.1996 whereby CIDCO's objections were rejected. By an order dated 7.4.1997 the appeal was dismissed on a preliminary issue that the same was not maintainable in view of the pendency of the proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 1954. (IX) In the proceedings under Section 24(2), the respondent no.3 passed an order on 20.8.1997. Paragraph 16 of the said order reads thus: “16. In the present case the allotment order is passed by the Settlement Commissioner and the Sanad has also been issued in favour of the Displaced Person. I am therefore inclined to believe that my Authority to exercise jurisdiction in my capacity as the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 24 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation Act), 1954 requires confirmation orders of the Competent Court or any other Authority which is competent to decide this issue finally.
I am therefore inclined to believe that my Authority to exercise jurisdiction in my capacity as the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 24 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation Act), 1954 requires confirmation orders of the Competent Court or any other Authority which is competent to decide this issue finally. In view of these observations and also in the interest of justice it is proper and worthwhile for me to stop proceeding further in the matter as per the notice issued under Section 24(2) of the D.P. Act, 1954 by my office. I therefore hereby order that the execution of Show Cause Notice or any further action in this matter be stayed till the preliminary issue of jurisdiction is finally decided.” (X) On 24.9.1997, The petitioners filed two revisions bearing nos.1 of 1997 and 2 of 1997 before the respondent no.3, who in turn referred the matter to the respondent no.2. (XI) On 2.1.1999, the respondent no.2 converted the reference made by the respondent no.3 into a review petition & issued a notice under Section 33 of the Act of 1954. The petitioner no. 2 filed writ petition bearing writ petition No. 1399 of 1999 challenging the order dated 2.1.1999 of issuance of notice under Section 33 as well as order dated 7.11.1996 and also notice dated 7.11.1996 issued under Section 24(2) of the Act of 1954. (XII) The said petition was disposed of by this Court by an order dated 26.4.1999 by observing thus: “Mr. D'Gama, the learned A.G.P. Makes a statement that the Show Cause Notice issued by Desk Officer to the petitioner, which is annexed at Exhibit 'L' to the petition, is being withdrawn as the same does not contain the requisite details. A fresh Show Cause Notice will be issued to the petitioner containing the requisite details, on such Show Cause Notice being issued, it will be open to the petitioner to submit her reply taking such contentions as are open in law. All the contentions raised in the present Petition, including the one in regard to jurisdiction to issue such a Show Cause Notice, are kept open. Petition is disposed of with the aforesaid observations.” (XIII) On 1.10.2003, the Chief Land & Survey Officer wrote to petitioner no.1 that the land was required by CIDCO for development.
All the contentions raised in the present Petition, including the one in regard to jurisdiction to issue such a Show Cause Notice, are kept open. Petition is disposed of with the aforesaid observations.” (XIII) On 1.10.2003, the Chief Land & Survey Officer wrote to petitioner no.1 that the land was required by CIDCO for development. Petitioner no.1 send a reply on 7.10.2003 stating that there were no acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in question which belonged to petitioner no.1. (XIV) On 13.7.2004 a notice came to be issued under Section 33 and petitioner no. 1 was called for hearing. On 5.9.2005 the Act of 1954 was repealed. As a result of the said repeal, all proceedings came to an end. On a reference made by the State Government to the Central Government regarding the issue as to whether by virtue of the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the proceedings continued despite of the repeal. The Central Government by its letter / opinion dated 19.10.2005 addressed to the State Government opined that all proceedings came to an end. (XV) On 5.12.2005 the impugned order came to be passed by the respondent no.3 under Section 33 of the Act of 1954 by observing thus : “Finally, it is declared that the allotment order issued by the Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner dated 27.5.1988 is illegal, malafide and in transgression of Displaced Persons (C& R) Act. In respect to the question of restoring the possession of land, it would lie within the purview of the Collector and concerned revenue authorities.” 4. Being aggrieved by the Order dated 5.12.2005 passed by the respondent no. 3, the petitioners filed the present writ petition impugning the same. 5. Mr. Tulzapurkar, the learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that impugned order passed by the respondent no. 3 is without jurisdiction in view of the fact that all the proceedings were abated as a result of repeal of the Act of 1954. It is contended that though the notice dated 13.7.2004 was issued under Section 33 of the Act of 1954, however, as the Act itself came to be repealed with effect from 5.9.2005, the Authority concerned had no jurisdiction to continue those proceedings nor had jurisdiction to pass the impugned order.
It is contended that though the notice dated 13.7.2004 was issued under Section 33 of the Act of 1954, however, as the Act itself came to be repealed with effect from 5.9.2005, the Authority concerned had no jurisdiction to continue those proceedings nor had jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. Counsel for the petitioners has contended that on a plain reading of the Repeal Act, it is clear that the General Clauses Act is not attracted. All proceedings came to an end on the Repeal. Intention of the legislature is made clear vide communication of the Central Government dated 19.10.2005 which demonstrates consequence of the repeal. 6. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the contention of CIDCO that the opinion expressed by Central Government in communication dated 19.10.2005 is not applicable to the present case is not sustainable. The opinion reflects the intention of the legislation which was to terminate all proceedings on repeal. In any event, CIDCO's contention that the said opinion is restricted to the fresh allotment applications if made and not proceedings under Section 33 of the Act of 1954 is also incorrect. It is well settled position in law that interpretation of a statute which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution should be avoided and therefore the contention canvassed by the CIDCO is unsustainable. 7. Alternative submission of the petitioners is that assuming though denied that the respondent no.3 had jurisdiction to continue with the proceedings, the impugned order having been passed beyond reasonable time is arbitrary and unsustainable. The original notice dated 2.1.1999 was withdrawn by the Assistant Government Pleader which is evident from the Order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 26.4.1999, no fresh notice was issued within a reasonable period of three years though liberty to issue fresh notice was granted by this Court. The impugned notice was issued on 13.7.2004 by the respondent no. 3 after inordinate delay, cannot be acted upon since the revisional power, in absence of any period of limitation being statutorily provided for are required to be exercised within the reasonable period. It is submitted that at the most a period of three years can be said to be a reasonable period. In the instant case the earlier notice was withdrawn on 26.4.1999 and the impugned notice was issued four years and three months thereafter.
It is submitted that at the most a period of three years can be said to be a reasonable period. In the instant case the earlier notice was withdrawn on 26.4.1999 and the impugned notice was issued four years and three months thereafter. The power has not been exercised within the reasonable time, hence the impugned order is liable to be set aside. In order to substantiate this contention, reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court and the Apex Court in the cases of Automotive Research Association of India & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [2003 (1) MLJ 604] and Mohamed Kavi Mohamad Amin vs. Fatimabai Ebrahim [ (1997) 6 SCC 71 ]. 8. Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, it is contended that impugned order even on merits is liable to be set aside. The entire Survey No. 487 was included in the Notification of 1950. In view of provisions of Rule 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950 any error in the notification is to be ignored in view of the revenue record. 9. Counsel for the petitioners further contended that the respondent no. 3 had no power to direct the Collector to take steps to restore the possession to CIDCO. CIDCO had made its claim as early as in the year 1995 which was rejected by order dated 27.5.1996 by the Additional Collector. It is in this background the claim of CIDCO was hopelessly barred by limitation on the day on which impugned notice dated 13.7.2004 was issued. It is submitted that the respondent no.3 clearly erred in exercising revisional power to defeat the vested right accrued in favour of the petitioners at such a belated stage. 10. Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that by reason of the conduct of CIDCO in sanctioning the plans, recovering the development charges as well as N.A. Tax from the petitioner no.1 granting No Objection Certificate on 25.11.2002, it is estopped from making any claim to the said land on the alleged ground that the land did not form part of the notification of 1950 or that the possession of the petitioner no. 1 was illegal. It is therefore submitted that the impugned order is without jurisdiction, contrary to law and is therefore liable to be quashed and set aside. 11.
1 was illegal. It is therefore submitted that the impugned order is without jurisdiction, contrary to law and is therefore liable to be quashed and set aside. 11. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that Survey No. 487 of Panvel District Raigad was having an area of 11 acres & 13 gunthas. The area admeasuring 2 acres 10 gunthas was declared as an evacuee property by the Government Notification No. EVASR 306 dated 17.8.1950, which was allotted to Shri Harkishandas Ghumanmal Lalwani, being a displaced person. Remaining area of 9 acres and 3 gunthas land from Survey No. 487 which was not an evacuee property was allotted to Smt. Sheela Lakhanpal against her claim as displaced person by Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner by an allotment order dated 27.5.1988. Thereafter sanad was issued on 31.5.1988 in her name. She transferred the said land to petitioner no. 1. 12. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has contended that the Authorised Chief Resettlement Commissioner should not have allotted the land against the verified claim of a displaced person because the said land was not an evacuee property. At the same time the said land was already allotted to CIDCO by the Government Order dated 20.12.1972. The Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner in these circumstances had referred this matter to Secretary (Relief and Rehabilitation) Revenue and Forest Department, Government of Maharashtra. The Secretary was having powers under Section 33 of the then Displaced Persons (C & R) Act 1954 considered these facts and by impugned order dated 5.12.2005 has declared the order dated 27.5.1988 passed by the Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner as illegal and malafide and in transgression of provisions of the Displaced Person (C & R) Act of 1954. 13. Mr. Hegde the learned counsel for the respondent no. 6 – CIDCO has submitted that the respondent no. 6 is a Corporation constituted under Section 113(3A) of the Maharashtra Regional town Planning Act, 1966 (for short “MRTP Act”) and being a New Town Development Authority they were / are concerned with the development of entire area known as Navi Mumbai. The State Government decided to acquire 95 villages from Thane and Raigad District and the lands involved in the present petition was also subject matter of acquisition being notified area.
The State Government decided to acquire 95 villages from Thane and Raigad District and the lands involved in the present petition was also subject matter of acquisition being notified area. Since large area was required to be acquired and developed the Corporation decided to develop the land in phased manner and therefore certain portions of the notified areas were acquired from time to time and developed. 14. Counsel for the respondent no. 6 has submitted that the land in question was allotted by the Government to CIDCO vide G.R. No. 2771/821265/B/1 dated 1.4.1972 and on 20.10.1973 CIDCO took over possession of the said land being Survey No. 487. It is specifically denied that the entire Survey No. 487 was declared to be an evacuee property. Only 2 acres 10.5 gunthas from Survey No. 487 was declared to be an evacuee property and remaining land of Survey No. 487 i.e. 9 acres and 3 gunthas was never declared to be an evacuee property. It is contended that the area 2 acres 10.5 gunthas which was declared as an evacuee property of Survey No. 487 was allotted to Shri Harkishandas Ghumanmal Lalwani. 15. Counsel for the respondent no. 6 vehemently contended that inspite of the fact that 9 acres 3 gunthas of Survey No. 487 was not declared to be an evacuee property, the Settlement Commissioner had allotted the same to Smt. Sheela Lakhanpal, on misconception of the fact that it was an evacuee property and therefore the said allotment is wholly illegal and did not create any right or interest in favour of the petitioner no. 2 who therefore could not transfer the title by sale of said property to the petitioner no.1. It is contended that the land in question was already allotted to CIDCO in the year 1972 & possession thereof was taken over by CIDCO in 1973 hence question of treating the land as an evacuee property did not arise. Counsel for the respondent no. 6 has submitted that Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 saves the legal proceedings and permits its continuation, despite repeal of the parent Act. That the review petition was pending at the time of repeal of the Act and by virtue of Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, the pending proceeding were continued and decided.
6 has submitted that Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 saves the legal proceedings and permits its continuation, despite repeal of the parent Act. That the review petition was pending at the time of repeal of the Act and by virtue of Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, the pending proceeding were continued and decided. It is contended that the circular dated 19.10.2005 issued by the Central Government is in the different set of facts. It is submitted that when the application for allotment of plot is made there was no right accrued in favour of the applicant & therefore the inchaote right was not protected on repeal of the Act, consequently clause 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act in such situation is not attracted. However, in the present case, the right has already been crystallized and by virtue of Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act review petition was maintainable and was properly decided. The opinion of the Government cannot override the statutory provisions of section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act. 16. Counsel for the respondent no. 6 has submitted that it is not in dispute that the land in question out of Survey No. 487 was not an evacuee property and therefore the allotment order dated 27.5.1988 passed by Chief Settlement officer, allotting the said land to Smt. Sheela Lakhanpal by treating the same to be an evacuee property was not sustainable hence review petition was filed by invoking the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act. It is submitted that Section 7 of the Act did not ipso facto designate a plot as an evacuee property and there has to be proper notification under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act notifying the land (plot) as an evacuee property. Since the petition plot was not notified under the Displaced Persons Act as an evacuee property, the allotment of the said plot by Chief Settlement Officer vide order dated 27.5.1988 in favour of Smt. Sheela Lakhanpal was wholly illegal. 17. The counsel for the respondent no. 6 has further submitted that since order of allotment of land passed by Chief Settlement Commissioner dated 27.5.1988 was non est and could be challenged at any point of time.
17. The counsel for the respondent no. 6 has further submitted that since order of allotment of land passed by Chief Settlement Commissioner dated 27.5.1988 was non est and could be challenged at any point of time. The learned counsel further submitted that the contention of the petitioners that the CIDCO had granted permission for development, hence it is estopped from taking a different stand is not sustainable in law. It is no doubt true that the permission for development was granted by CIDCO but due to inadvertence and by ignoring the fact that the land in question was already allotted to CIDCO in the year 1972 and possession thereof was also taken by CIDCO in 1973 as well as the land in question was also not notified as an evacuee property which rendered the allotment thereof to Smt. Sheela Lakhanpal invalid in law. It is therefore contended that the order impugned is unsustainable in law. 18. We have considered the contentions canvassed by the respective counsel. Perused the provisions of relevant Acts and Notifications. In the present petition, the petitioners have challenged the validity & propriety of order dated 5.12.2005 passed by the Secretary (Relief & Rehabilitation), Revenue and Forest Department and therefore this Court is called upon to adjudicate, consider and decide the legality, propriety and sustainability of the impugned order dated 5.12.2005. The case of the petitioners is that Survey No.487 was belonged to one Mr. Mohammad Akbar Mohd. Ibrahim Tungekar who migrated to Pakistan after partition leaving behind certain properties including the land in question from Survey No. 487. The Notification dated 17.8.1950 was published in the then Bombay Government Gazette Part – I on 24.8.1950 in pursuance of sub section 3 of section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. It is not in dispute that the land admeasuring 2 acres 10 ¾ gunthas from Survey No. 487 was only notified as an evacuee property in the Notification dated 17.8.1950 though the total area of the city survey number 487 was 11 acres 13 gunthas. It is not in dispute that on 8.8.1956 an area of 2 acres and 10 gunthas out of Survey no. 487 Part was allotted to Mr. Harkishandas Gumanmal Lalwani (displaced person). It is the case of the petitioner no.2 that petitioner no.
It is not in dispute that on 8.8.1956 an area of 2 acres and 10 gunthas out of Survey no. 487 Part was allotted to Mr. Harkishandas Gumanmal Lalwani (displaced person). It is the case of the petitioner no.2 that petitioner no. 2 was also a displaced person and therefore she made an application to the Settlement Commissioner on 12.4.1988 for allotment of remaining land admeasuring 9 acres 3 gunthas out of Survey no. 487. As per petitioner no. 2 her claim was verified under the Act of 1954. The Settlement Commissioner issued an allotment order No. SC/CEP/Allotment/Raigad/Panvel/556/61 dated 27.5.1988 in favour of the petitioner no.2 allotting land admeasuring 9 acres 3 gunthas i.e. 3 hectors 77.2 ares and 7 mts. from survey No. 487 situate at Panvel. 19. We have perused the impugned order dated 5.12.2005 which shows that the Secretary has categorically observed that the relevant record including notification bearing No. EAVSR/306 dated 17.8.1950 clearly shows that only 2 acres 10 ½ gunthas out of survey no. 487 was declared as an evacuee property which was already allotted to Shri Harkishandas Ghumanmal Lalwani and remaining land i.e. 9 acres 3 gunthas which was subsequently allotted by Settlement Commissioner vide order dated 27.5.1988 to the petitioner no. 2 was not an evacuee property. The Secretary (Relief & Rehabilitation) therefore concluded that once the record proves that the land which was allotted to the petitioner no. 2 was not an evacuee property, the allotment order dated 27.5.1988 was illegal and therefore subsequent proceedings were void. In the instant case, the petitioners did not place on record any evidence to rebut or disprove the findings recorded by the Secretary (Relief & Rehabilitation). In absence thereof it is difficult for us to find fault with the findings of fact Recorded by the Secretary in the impugned order dated 5.12.2005. The counsel for the petitioners though contended that the entire land admeasuring 11 acres 13 gunthas of Survey No. 487 was declared as an evacuee property, however, the Notification dated 17.8.1950 clearly shows that only 2 acres 10 ¾ gunthas land was the only land out of Survey No.4 87 was declared as an evacuee property.
The counsel for the petitioners though contended that the entire land admeasuring 11 acres 13 gunthas of Survey No. 487 was declared as an evacuee property, however, the Notification dated 17.8.1950 clearly shows that only 2 acres 10 ¾ gunthas land was the only land out of Survey No.4 87 was declared as an evacuee property. If the land in question i.e. 9 acres 10 ¾ gunthas was never declared as an evacuee property, the question of vesting the said land in the State Government did not arise and therefore neither the Settlement Commissioner nor any other Authority under the Act had any power or jurisdiction to allot the said land to the petitioner no. 2. It is in these circumstances, we are of the view that the findings recorded in the impugned order by the Secretary that the order of allotment dated 27.5.1988 was without jurisdiction, illegal and therefore nullity is just, proper and sustainable in law. 20. We would like to express that the Settlement Commissioner was vested with the power, jurisdiction and authority under the provisions of the Act to allot only such lands against the verified claims which are declared as an evacuee lands by notification. In the instant case the land admeasuring 9 acres 3 gunthas out of survey no. 487 was not being an evacuee property, the Settlement Commissioner did not have any jurisdiction, power or authority to allot that land to the petitioner no.2. The order of allotment is therefore without jurisdiction and is passed by completely ignoring statutory provisions and law, therefore the order of allotment, in our view, is wholly unwarranted with regard to the jurisdictional fact and therefore the same was nullity. It is in this context we want to observe that the observations made by the Secretary in the impugned order that all other proceedings undertaken subsequent thereto were not merely erroneous but were without jurisdiction and void ab initio are also sustainable in law. 21. It is well settled principle of law that the order or decree which is passed without jurisdiction is a nullity, its validity could be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even in the collateral proceedings and therefore the question of limitation in such situation does not arise.
21. It is well settled principle of law that the order or decree which is passed without jurisdiction is a nullity, its validity could be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even in the collateral proceedings and therefore the question of limitation in such situation does not arise. In the instant case the order of allotment dated 27.5.1988 passed by the Settlement Commissioner in favour of petitioner no.2 being nullity, the impugned order dated 5.12.2005 passed by the Secretary (Relief and Rehabilitation) declaring the order of allotment dated 27.5.1988 as illegal and void cannot be held to be bad in law on the ground of limitation, since the order which is a nullity cannot creates any right, title or interest and therefore its validity can be questioned whenever it is sought to be enforced. 22. In the instant case, the petitioners have annexed with the petition the Notification dated 17.8.1950 issued under sub-section (3) of section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 which is at Exh. `A' to the petition. Perusal of the Schedule to the Notification demonstrates that the area i.e. 2.10¾ acres was the only land out of Survey No. 487 was declared as an evacuee property which was originally owned by Mohamed Akbar Mohamed Ibrahim Tungekar, which was allotted to Mr. Harkishandas Ghumanmal Lalwani vide allotment order dated 8.8.1956. It is not in dispute that survey no.487 consisted of land admeasuring 11.3 acres and only 2.10 ¾ acres was declared as an evacuee property. It is in view of these facts, the Settlement Commissioner could not have allotted the land admeasuring 9 acres 3 gunthas out of Survey no. 487 to the petitioner no. 2 vide order dated 27.5.1988 for want of jurisdiction, consequently the Secretary was justified in setting aside order dated 27.5.1988 passed by the Settlement Commissioner vide impugned order dated 5.12.2005 being without jurisdiction and void. The contention of the petitioner that the area of survey no.
487 to the petitioner no. 2 vide order dated 27.5.1988 for want of jurisdiction, consequently the Secretary was justified in setting aside order dated 27.5.1988 passed by the Settlement Commissioner vide impugned order dated 5.12.2005 being without jurisdiction and void. The contention of the petitioner that the area of survey no. 487 shown in the Notification dated 17.8.1950 as 2.10 ¾ acres was due to inadvertence or by mistake is not possible for us to accept in view of the text of the Notification dated 17.8.1950 which is annexed to the petition There is nothing placed on record to show that there was any other subsequent notification issued under Section 7 of the Act in this regard whereby the land admeasuring 9 acres 3 gunthas out of Survey No. 487 was declared as an evacuee property before allotment order dated 27.5.1988 was passed, in absence thereof the impugned order passed by the Secretary whereby the order dated 27.5.1988 passed by the Settlement Commissioner came to be set aside, is, in our view is sustainable in law. 23. The contention of the petitioners that the Act of 1954 came to be repealed with effect from 5.9.2005 and, therefore, the authority concerned who had passed the impugned order had no jurisdiction to pass such an order is concerned, it will be appropriate to consider this aspect in the light of the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The purport of section 6 of the General Clauses Act is that the repeal of the statute which is not retrospective in operation does not prima facie affect the pending proceedings which continues as if the repealed enactment was still in force. In other words, such repeal does not affect the pending cases which would continue to be concluded as if the enactment has not been repealed. It is well-settled by the decisions of the Apex Court that the mandate of section 6 of the General Clauses Act is simply to leave the pending proceedings unaffected which commenced under the unrepealed provisions unless contrary intention is expressed. The provisions of section 6 are attracted not merely because of the existence of vested right, but it also are attracted in respect of all the clauses from (a) to (e) of section 6.
The provisions of section 6 are attracted not merely because of the existence of vested right, but it also are attracted in respect of all the clauses from (a) to (e) of section 6. For example, the repealed statute would not affect the right accrued or acquired as per sub-section (c) of section 6 and the pending proceeding is saved under sub-section (e) of section 6 of the General Clauses act. In the instant case, the Act of 1954 came to be repealed with effect from 5.9.2005. At the relevant time, the proceedings before the Secretary (Relief & Rehabilitation) were pending and in view of the scheme of section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, they were saved and, therefore, the impugned order dated 5.12.2005 passed by the Secretary is just and proper and is also sustainable in law. The contention canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioners that as a result of repeal of the Act of 1954, all proceedings came to an end is devoid of substance and is rejected. 24. Similarly, the stand of the petitioners that the Central Government in its letter dated 19.10.2005 addressed to the State Government expressed that on repeal, all the proceedings came to an end, is merely an opinion of the Central Government which, in our view, cannot either override the statutory provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act nor affect the legal force thereof. The contention of the petitioners that as a result of repeal, all proceedings came to an end, based on opinion of the Central Government lacks merit and is rejected. 25. After considering the issue in totality, in the context of the undisputed facts and circumstances and for the reasons stated herein above, the petition suffers from lack of merits. Same is dismissed. Rule discharged. No order as to costs. After the order was pronounced, the learned counsel for the petitioners prayed for stay of the operation of the order. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners. He has submitted that interim order granted by this Court on 20.2.2006 is continued till today. It is submitted that by virtue of the said order, possession of the land in question was protected. It is therefore prayed, that the parties may be directed to maintain status quo as on today for a period of eight weeks. Learned counsel for the respondent no.
It is submitted that by virtue of the said order, possession of the land in question was protected. It is therefore prayed, that the parties may be directed to maintain status quo as on today for a period of eight weeks. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 6 – CIDCO has opposed the request made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and states that possession of the property in question is with CIDCO. Be that as it may. Since interim order dated 20.2.2006 is in existence till today, we direct the parties to maintain status quo as on today for a period of six weeks. This order shall stand automatically vacated on expiry of last day of six weeks