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2012 DIGILAW 984 (KER)

Smijo K. Sunny v. State of Kerala Represented by its Chief Secretary Government Secretariat Thiruvananthapuram

2012-11-07

K.SURENDRA MOHAN

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JUDGMENT : K. Surendra Mohan, J. Petitioners have filed this writ petition aggrieved by Ext.P2 order by which an application for building permit submitted by them has been rejected. Reason stated for the rejection is that, as per G.O.(MS) No.2/2010 LSGD dated 01-01-2010, only documents registered prior to 19-01-2009 can be considered. According to the counsel for the petitioners, the application of the petitioners has been rejected under the provisions of Act 28 of 2008. Since the rejection has been without ascertaining the present condition of the land, it is contended that the order is liable to be set aside. It is further contended that no restriction on land use can be placed by a Master Plan that has not been implemented by follow up Land Acquisition proceedings. The petitioners, therefore, seek the issue of orders quashing Ext.P2. 2. Advocate P.A. Ahamed, who appears for the second respondent, has filed a counter affidavit. It is stated in the counter affidavit that, rejection of the petitioners' application was not on the basis of Act 28 of 2008. The same has been rejected in view of the fact that as per the Detailed Town Planning Scheme of the Municipality published on 02-02-1976, the property of the petitioners is coming within the Agricultural Zone (Paddy Field Zone). Therefore, no construction activities can be permitted therein. It is also contended that as per Ext.R2(a) Government Order, the Detailed Town Planning Scheme was varied, permitting construction up to an area of 300 sq.m. with the concurrence of the Chief Town Planner, with a rider that, existing paddy fields shall be retained as such. It is further pointed out that, as per Ext.R2(a), such applications are to be considered on the basis of the recommendation of a committee consisting of the Chairman of the Municipality, Secretary of the Municipality, the Agricultural Officer and the Village Officer. As per Ext.R2 (a), it is contended that, only applications for construction on lands that were registered prior to 19-01-2009 shall be considered. It is contended that, the petitioners' application is not falling within the scope of the exemption contained in Ext.R2(a). 3. I have heard the counsel appearing for the contesting parties. I have anxiously considered the contentions advanced before me. 4. Identical questions had come up for consideration before a single Bench of this Court and has been considered in Ext.P3 judgment. 3. I have heard the counsel appearing for the contesting parties. I have anxiously considered the contentions advanced before me. 4. Identical questions had come up for consideration before a single Bench of this Court and has been considered in Ext.P3 judgment. It has been held in the said decision that, prescribing a cut off date, as done by Ext.R2 (a) is without any justification. In this case, the respondent has no case that the petitioners' property was converted illegally or in violation of the provisions of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Act, 2008 (Act 28 of 2008). Therefore, even if the land of the petitioners is described in the records as paddy field, there is no justification for treating the same as paddy field. If the petitioners' property is not paddy field, then, the provisions of Ext.R2(a) Government Order also does not apply to the property of the petitioners. However, it does not appear from Ext.P2 that, any attempt was made to ascertain any of the facts mentioned above. Therefore, Ext.P2 has been passed without ascertaining the present condition of the land of the petitioners. 5. It has been settled by a number of decisions of this Court that, merely because the property is described as paddy field in the Revenue records, the property cannot be treated as one coming within the definition of a paddy field under Act 28 of 2008. The decisions in Shahanaz Shukoor v. Chelannur Grama Panchayat [2009 (3) KLT 899], Praveen v. Land Revenue Commissioner [ 2010 (2) KLT 617 ] and Jararkhan v. K.A.Kochumakkar and others [2002 (1) KHC 523(DB)] are all on the point. It has been specifically held that, Act 28 of 2008 does not have any retrospective operation and, therefore, cannot apply to paddy lands that were converted long back. Action can be initiated only after ascertaining the ground reality. 6. The other question is whether in view of the implementation of the Detailed Town Planning Scheme the petitioners' application was liable to be rejected. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in Raju S. Jethmalani v. State of Maharashtra [ (2005) 11 SCC 222 ], it has been held that a Detailed Town Planning Scheme, that has not been followed up by proceedings for acquisition of the property cannot be a ground for restricting user of the land by the owner thereof. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in Raju S. Jethmalani v. State of Maharashtra [ (2005) 11 SCC 222 ], it has been held that a Detailed Town Planning Scheme, that has not been followed up by proceedings for acquisition of the property cannot be a ground for restricting user of the land by the owner thereof. The said dictum has been followed by this Court in Padmini v. State of Kerala [ 1999 (3) KLT 465 ]. In the said decision, it has been held that mere inclusion of the property in a master plan cannot be a ground to deny building permit to a land owner. 7. In view of the dictum laid down in the decisions referred to above, consideration of the petitioners' application for building permit can be made only in accordance with the dicta thereof. It does not appear that any such consideration has been made in Ext.P2. Even if it is assumed that Ext.P2 has been issued in terms of Ext.R2 (a), there is no answer as to why their application was not referred to the committee that is stipulated by the said Government Order. For the above reasons, Ext.P2 is not sustainable. This writ petition is, therefore, allowed. Ext.P2 is quashed. The second respondent shall consider the petitioners' application afresh and shall pass appropriate orders thereon, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible and at any rate, within a period of one month of the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.