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2012 DIGILAW 987 (MAD)

T. Kuppuswamy v. Special Officer, Tambaram Cooperative Urban Bank Ltd.

2012-02-23

K.N.BASHA

body2012
Judgment :- W.P.No.6976/2006 is filed, challenging the order of the second respondent dated 30.11.2004 in Na.Ka.9571/2003 A3, confirming the order of the first respondent dated 04.08.2003 in Na.Ka.1/2002 TA with a prayer to quash the same and direct the respondents to give all service benefits to the petitioner. 2. W.P.No.4360/2006 is filed, challenging the order of the first respondent dated 22.07.2004 with a prayer to quash the same and direct the first respondent to pay the unpaid subsistence allowance in full amounting to Rs.39,227/-to which the petitioner is legally entitled to with 18% interest thereon. 3. Both the above writ petitions have been filed by one and the same petitioner and the respondents are also one and the same and apart from the said factor, the issue involved is also in respect of the charges framed against the petitioner and pursuant to the said charges, a suspension order was passed and as such, both the writ petitions have been taken up together by mutual consent for final hearing and for passing the common order. 4. As already pointed out, W.P.No.4360/2006 is in respect of the grievance of nonpayment of subsistence allowance during the suspension period pursuant to the issue of charge memo and W.P.No.6976/2006 is filed challenging the final order passed after completion of disciplinary proceedings, inflicting the punishment of stoppage of increment for a period of two years with cumulative effect. 5. The brief facts of the case which are necessary for the disposal of these writ petitions are as follows: 5.1. The petitioner joined the service as Assistant under the first respondent on 24.04.1976. There were strained feelings between the petitioner and the then Special Officer as the petitioner questioned the reckless transfers given to him at frequent intervals. The petitioner filed a suit for damages in O.S.No.62/2001 on the file of the Sub-Court, Kanchipuram against the President of Tambaram Co-operative Urban Bank Limited for frequent transfer orders issued against him. 5.2. There were strained feelings between the petitioner and the then Special Officer as the petitioner questioned the reckless transfers given to him at frequent intervals. The petitioner filed a suit for damages in O.S.No.62/2001 on the file of the Sub-Court, Kanchipuram against the President of Tambaram Co-operative Urban Bank Limited for frequent transfer orders issued against him. 5.2. The petitioner was suspended as per the order dated 13.08.2002 for the following charges: (a) O.S.No.62/2001 was filed against the Management of the Bank impleading the Joint Director as one of the defendants ; (b) Submitted an explanation letter by causing threat to the Management of the Bank ; (c) Sent a defamative letter to the Chief Executive Officer and Special Officer by threatening him ; and (d) Committed dereliction of duty by not performing his day-to-day work in the Bank and not obeyed the orders passed by the superior officers. 5.3. The petitioner challenged the suspension order by filing W.P.No.36312/2002 and the same was disposed of by this Court by the order dated 23.09.2002 giving liberty to the petitioner to challenge the same by filing a revision. The petitioner preferred a revision and the same was dismissed by the second respondent by the order dated 31.12.2002. Challenging the said order of dismissal of revision, the petitioner filed W.P.No.6123/2003 before this Court and the same was dismissed as withdrawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner in view of the prayer in that writ petition becoming infructuous and in view of the final orders passed in the disciplinary proceedings itself. 5.4. Pursuant to the issue of the charge memo, an enquiry was conducted and as per the enquiry report, all the charges are held to have been proved against the petitioner. The explanation offered by the petitioner dated 22.07.2003 was not at all considered and further, the petitioner was not served with all the documents relied by the Enquiry Officer. On the basis of the Enquiry Report, final order dated 04.08.2003 was passed by the second respondent by imposing a punishment of stoppage of increment for a period of two years with cumulative effect on the retirement benefits by treating the suspension period, viz., from 13.08.2002 to 04.08.2003, as the period of punishment. On the basis of the Enquiry Report, final order dated 04.08.2003 was passed by the second respondent by imposing a punishment of stoppage of increment for a period of two years with cumulative effect on the retirement benefits by treating the suspension period, viz., from 13.08.2002 to 04.08.2003, as the period of punishment. Being aggrieved against the said order, a revision was preferred by the petitioner under Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 and the same was dismissed by the second respondent as per the order dated 30.11.2004. Being aggrieved against the above said orders, W.P.No.6976/2006 is filed with the above said prayer. 6. Mr.R.Mubarak Basha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would put forward the following contentions: (1) The charges levelled against the petitioner are not only flimsy but are baseless and motivated one. (2) The petitioner has been charged mainly on the ground of initiating proceedings by filing a civil suit against the President of the Bank for issuing frequent transfer orders and on the basis of instituting cases against the Society and merely because of filing cases against the Society, the petitioner cannot be alleged to have been committed any misconduct. (3) The Authority, who had framed charges and issued the suspension order, also conducted the disciplinary proceedings and as such, the entire proceedings is vitiated on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice, as no person can be a Judge in his own cause. (4) The documents relied by the Disciplinary Authority have not been furnished to the petitioner and apart from the same, the explanation offered by the petitioner is also not considered by the authorities concerned. In support of above such contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner would place reliance on the following decisions: (i) Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2010 (6) SCR 88 (SC) (ii) K.Chandrahasan v. Director of Medical Education, Chennai and another reported in 2009 (4) L.L.N. 947 (iii) Justice Y.Venkatachalam v. Union of India and Others reported in (2005) 2 M.L.J. 465 (iv) State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal and Another reported in (1998) 6 SCC 651 7. Per contra, Mr.Durai Solaimalai, learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order. Per contra, Mr.Durai Solaimalai, learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order. It is contended that the petitioner is having the habit of filing cases frequently against the Society and all those cases are pending before the Court of law and as such, he is having the ulterior motive, only to harass and humiliate the officers, namely, the respondents herein. It is further contended that serious charges have been framed against the petitioner and all the charges are held to have been proved as per the Enquiry Officer's report. It is also contended that the petitioner having participated in the proceedings without raising any objection, now cannot contend that he was not served with all the relevant documents and as such, it cannot be stated that there is any violation of the principles of natural justice. It is contended that the disciplinary proceedings have been conducted in a fair and unbiased manner. 8. This Court carefully considered the rival contentions put forward by either side and perused the entire materials available on record including the affidavit filed by the petitioner, counter filed by the respondents 1 and 2 in both the matters and also the impugned order. 9. At the outset, it is to be stated that the disciplinary proceedings conducted in this matter suffers from serious infirmities and illegalities as the Disciplinary Authority conducted a strange procedure unknown to law. The fact remains that the very same authority, who has framed the charges against the petitioner and issued the suspension order, also conducted the disciplinary proceedings and thereafter passed the final order inflicting punishment against the petitioner. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court that no person can be a Judge in his own cause. It is suffice to cite one decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, as rightly relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2010 (6) SCR 88 (SC), has held as hereunder: "Authority who initiated the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant became a witness before the inquiry officer appointed by him, who is subordinate to him in his office and also accepted the enquiry report and passed the order of punishment. Thus the order of punishment stood vitiated. Thus the order of punishment stood vitiated. As the punishment order has been passed in violation of the statutory rules and the principles of natural justice as well, it is rendered null and void. If a person appears as a witness in disciplinary proceedings, he cannot be an inquiry officer nor can he pass the order of punishment as a disciplinary authority. This rule has been held to be sacred. An apprehension of bias operates as a disqualification for a person to act as adjudicator. No person can be a Judge in his own cause and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true. Any one who has personal interest in the disciplinary proceedings must keep himself away from such proceedings. The violation of the principles of natural justice renders the order null and void." The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision cited supra is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case as in this case also, admittedly, the first respondent not only framed the charges against the petitioner, but also passed the order of suspension and thereafter conducted the disciplinary proceedings and ultimately, passed the final order inflicting punishment against the petitioner and as such, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the entire proceedings is vitiated on the ground of flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice rendering the final order of inflicting punishment as null and void. 10. The yet another disturbing feature in this matter is that the root cause for framing the charges against the petitioner is the conduct of the petitioner in preferring cases against the Society and that is also one of the charge framed against the petitioner. It is very unfortunate to note that the first respondent has framed such a charge, which, in the considered opinion of this Court, would not amount to misconduct at all. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer the decision of the First Bench of this Court in Justice Y.Venkatachalam v. Union of India and Others reported in (2005) 2 M.L.J. 465 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as hereunder: " TheCourt is shocked and surprised to peruse the order dated 21.08.2003. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer the decision of the First Bench of this Court in Justice Y.Venkatachalam v. Union of India and Others reported in (2005) 2 M.L.J. 465 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as hereunder: " TheCourt is shocked and surprised to peruse the order dated 21.08.2003. In this country, every citizen has a right to approach a Court of law, and the fact that he approached the Court of law can certainly not be treated as a misconduct. It seems that certain officers of the Pondicherry Government are unaware of even these simple and elementary matters. If this kind of attitude of the respondents is countenanced, then no one will feel free to file cases in Court and everybody will be afraid of approaching the Courts of law. The Court is deeply distressed at the attitude of the respondents in this case. The rule of law prevails in this country and everybody has a right to approach the Court of law." The principle laid down by the First Bench of this Court in the decision cited supra is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case as in this case also, the petitioner has preferred certain cases both before this Court as well as before the lower Court and filing such cases itself would not amount to any misconduct. 11. The next ground raised by the petitioner is in respect of non-furnishing of relevant documents relied by the Disciplinary Authority. It is the grievance of the petitioner that inspite of requesting for the supply of relevant documents relied by the Disciplinary Authority, the same were not furnished to him. The said factor and the grievance of the petitioner is not disputed in the counter. The Hon'ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that in order to ensure fair procedure in conducting disciplinary proceedings, the delinquent should be furnished with all necessary and relevant documents, otherwise he would be deprived of his opportunity to defend his case effectively. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal and Another reported in (1998) 6 SCC 651 , has held as hereunder: "4.Now, one of the principles of natural justice is that a person against whom an action is proposed to be taken has to be given an opportunity of hearing. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal and Another reported in (1998) 6 SCC 651 , has held as hereunder: "4.Now, one of the principles of natural justice is that a person against whom an action is proposed to be taken has to be given an opportunity of hearing. This opportunity has to be an effective opportunity and not a mere pretence. In departmental proceedings where charge-sheet is issued and the documents which are proposed to be utilised against that person are indicated in the charge-sheet but copies thereof are not supplied to him inspite of his request, and he is, at the same time, called upon to submit his reply, it cannot be said that an effective opportunity to defend was provided to him [See: Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India ( AIR 1988 SC 117 ); Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India ( (1986) 3 SCC 229 ); State of U.P. v. Mohd. Sharif (1982) 2 SCC 376 .] 5. In High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. Amrik Singh [1995 Supp (1) SCC 321] it was indicated that the delinquent officer must be supplied copies of documents relied upon in support of the charges. It was further indicated that if the documents are voluminous and copies cannot be supplied, then such officer must be given an opportunity to inspect the same, or else, the principle of natural justice would be violated. 6. Preliminary enquiry which is conducted invariably on the back of the delinquent employee may often constitute the whole basis of the charge sheet. Before a person is, therefore, called upon to submit his reply to the charge-sheet, he must, on a request made by him in that behalf, be supplied the copies of the statements of witnesses recorded during the preliminary enquiry particularly if those witnesses are proposed to be examined at the departmental trial. Before a person is, therefore, called upon to submit his reply to the charge-sheet, he must, on a request made by him in that behalf, be supplied the copies of the statements of witnesses recorded during the preliminary enquiry particularly if those witnesses are proposed to be examined at the departmental trial. This principle was reiterated in Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India [1995 Supp(1) SCC 321] wherein it was also laid down that this lapse would vitiate the departmental proceedings unless it was shown and established as a fact that non-supply of copies of those documents had not caused any prejudice to the delinquent in his defence." In yet another earlier decision in State Bank of India and Others v. D.C.Aggarwal and Another reported in (1993) 1 SCC 13 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as hereunder: “The disciplinary authority, while imposing punishment, major or minor, cannot act on material which is neither supplied nor shown to the delinquent. Imposition of punishment on an employee, on material which is not only not supplied but not disclosed to him, cannot be countenanced. Procedural fairness is as much essence of right and liberty as the substantive law itself. The order of the disciplinary authority in this case is vitiated not because of mechanical exercise of power or for non-supply of the inquiry report but for relying and acting on material which was not only irrelevant but could not have been looked into. Purpose of supplying document is to contest its veracity or give explanation. Effect of non-supply of the report of Inquiry Officer before imposition of punishment need not be gone into nor it is necessary to consider validity of Rule 50(5) of the S.B.I. Supervisory Staff (Service) Rules. But non-supply of CVC recommendation which was prepared behind the back of respondent without his participation, and one does not know on what material which was not only sent to the disciplinary authority but was examined and relied on, was certainly violative of procedural safeguard and contrary to fair and just inquiry. The submission that CVC recommendations are confidential, copy of which could not be supplied, cannot be accepted. Taking action against an employee on confidential document which is the foundation of order exhibits complete misapprehension about the procedure that is required to be followed by the disciplinary authority. The submission that CVC recommendations are confidential, copy of which could not be supplied, cannot be accepted. Taking action against an employee on confidential document which is the foundation of order exhibits complete misapprehension about the procedure that is required to be followed by the disciplinary authority. Once the disciplinary authority found that the action of the respondent did not cause any harm to the Bank nor the respondent gained out of it, the order had been rightly quashed by the High Court for procedural error.” The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions cited supra are squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case as in this case also, admittedly, all the documents relied by the Disciplinary Authority were not furnished to the petitioner and as such, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioner has been deprived of his opportunity to put forward his case effectively. 12. To sum up the findings, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order of inflicting punishment was passed not only on baseless allegations and charges, but also in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and the entire proceedings is vitiated in view of the admitted fact that the Disciplinary authority, namely, the first respondent herein has not only framed charges, but also passed the suspension order and ultimately, passed the impugned order of inflicting punishment against the petitioner, as no person can be a Judge in his own cause and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true and on that ground, the entire proceedings is liable to be declared as null and void. 13. In view of the aforesaid reasons, W.P.No.6976/2006 is allowed and the impugned order passed by the second respondent dated 30.11.2004 in Na.Ka.9571/2003 A3 confirming the order of the first respondent dated 04.08.2003 in Na.Ka.1/2002 TA are hereby set aside. 14. In view of allowing the above writ petition, namely, W.P.No.6976/2006, the relief sought for by the petitioner is fulfilled as the very impugned order inflicting punishment itself is now set aside by this Court. Therefore, there is no necessity for passing a separate order in the other writ petition, namely, W.P.No.4360/2006. 14. In view of allowing the above writ petition, namely, W.P.No.6976/2006, the relief sought for by the petitioner is fulfilled as the very impugned order inflicting punishment itself is now set aside by this Court. Therefore, there is no necessity for passing a separate order in the other writ petition, namely, W.P.No.4360/2006. It is reported by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had already attained the age of superannuation and retired and as such, the petitioner is entitled to get all the retiral and other service monetary benefits. The above said exercise shall be completed by the respondents within a period of twelve (12) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.