Judgment Mehinder Singh Sullar, J. (Oral) Assailing the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.01.2003, appellant Ragunath Singh @ Rana (for brevity 'the appellant) has preferred the instant appeal, by virtue of which, he was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months, two years, three years, to pay a fine of Rs.500/- & two years, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 186, 332, 333, 353 and 354 Indian Penal Code respectively. In case of default of payment of fine, he was further ordered to undergo RI for a period of two months in this relevant connection. 2. Tersely, the facts and evidence, unfolded during the trial, culminating in the commencement, relevant for disposal of present appeal and emanating from the record, are that, on 09.06.1999, complainant Lajpal Kaur (PW-3) was posted as LDC in the office of the Punjab State Electricity Board (for short 'the PSEB'), Udhanwal, whereas the appellant was employed as Clerk (at a distance of 10/15 Kms away) in the office of XEN of PSEB, Hargobindpur. The prosecution claimed that the appellant came to the office and sent a message to her to come outside, but she did not agree. Thereafter, the appellant again came to her office at noon time and asked her to talk with him, she refused. Thereafter, the appellant grappled with the complainant, slapped and torn her shirt. He gave injury with some knife like weapon, which landed on the wrist of her left hand. He gave a push to her. She felled on the ground, as a result of which, she received injuries on her back side of right shoulder, back and left arm. She raised noise, which attracted PWs Jaswant Singh, Joginder Singh ALMs and Janak Raj. After seeing them, the appellant fled away from the place of occurrence. She went to her residence, from where, her husband Tirlok Singh took her to Civil Hospital, Batala, where she was medicolegally examined. On 11.06.1999, ASI Paramajit Singh (PW8) went to Civil Hospital, Batala and recorded her statement (Ex.PB), which formed the basis of FIR (Ex.PB/2). 3.
After seeing them, the appellant fled away from the place of occurrence. She went to her residence, from where, her husband Tirlok Singh took her to Civil Hospital, Batala, where she was medicolegally examined. On 11.06.1999, ASI Paramajit Singh (PW8) went to Civil Hospital, Batala and recorded her statement (Ex.PB), which formed the basis of FIR (Ex.PB/2). 3. Leveling a variety of allegations and narrating the sequence of events, in all, the complainant claimed that the appellant has voluntarily caused grievous hurt to her with intent to prevent and deter from discharge of her official duty as such public servant and torn her shirt. In the background of these allegations and in the wake of the statement of complainant-Lajpal Kaur (PW-3), the present case was registered against the appellant, vide FIR No.66 dated 11.06.1999 (Ex.PB/2), on accusation of having committed the offences punishable under Sections 186, 332, 333, 353 and 354 IPC by the police of Police Station, Ghuman, District Gurdaspur, in the manner depicted here-in-above. 4. After completion of the investigation, the police submitted the challan/final police report, in terms of Section 173 Cr.P.C. against the appellant. Since the case was triable by the Court of Session, so, the case was committed for trial by the Magistrate, vide commitment order dated 22.09.1999. 5. After completion of all the codal formalities, the trial Judge framed the charges against the appellant to face the trial of the indicated offences, vide order dated 03.11.1999. As he did not plead guilty and claimed trial, therefore, the case was slated for evidence of the prosecution. 6. The prosecution, in order to substantiate the charges framed against the appellant, examined PW1 Janak Singh son of Sohan Singh, who has stated that on 09.06.1999, he went to the office of the PSEB. He did not notice any person causing hurt to the complainant. Even he did not see the accused there. The statement of Jaswant Singh (PW-2) is also to that effect that he did not notice any occurrence. Tarlok Singh (PW4) husband of Lajpat Kaur (PW-3) is not an eye witness. He has only deposed that he took his wife to Civil Hospital, Batala, where, she was medico-legally examined. 7. Sequelly, the next to the notice of the testimony of Naresh Kumar Dogra, SDO (PW-5), who has only proved certificate (Ex.PD) and application (Ex.PF).
Tarlok Singh (PW4) husband of Lajpat Kaur (PW-3) is not an eye witness. He has only deposed that he took his wife to Civil Hospital, Batala, where, she was medico-legally examined. 7. Sequelly, the next to the notice of the testimony of Naresh Kumar Dogra, SDO (PW-5), who has only proved certificate (Ex.PD) and application (Ex.PF). Dr.S.K.Sharma (PW-7), medico-legally examined PW-3 and found diffused swelling 10 cm x 8 cm on the upper border of the right scapula, an incised wound 1.5 cm x 0.5 cm on the lower end at the head of radius bone of the left forearm and complain of pain. Injury Nos. 1 and 2 were kept under observation and x-ray was advised, whereas injury Nos. 3 and 4 were declared simple in nature. Subsequently, Injury No.2 was declared grievous in nature and injury No.1 was simple in nature. 8. Likewise, ASI Paramjit Singh (PW-8) has maintained that on 11.06.1999 he moved application (Ex.PD/1) for taking opinion of the doctor regarding the fitness of injured Lajpal Kaur to make the statement. The doctor, vide his endorsement (Ex.PD) declared her fit to make the statement. Thereafter he recorded the statement (Ex.PB). He made his endorsement (Ex.PB/1) and sent the same to the police for registration of the case. He has corroborated his investigation. 9. Last to note is the testimony of the complainant, who while appearing as PW-3, has maintained that the appellant came to her office and complained to the XEN that she was habitually late in her office and XEN rebuked the appellant directing him to improve his conduct. According to PW-3 that on the same very day, at about 1/1.30 PM (noon), the appellant again came to her office and sent a message through messenger that she should come out, but she refused. Thereafter, he came to her office and remarked her to explain as to how she could deal with him in that manner and gave a slap on her face. She grappled with the appellant. Then, the accused took out some sharp object from the belt and gave a blow, which landed on the wrist of her left arm. She raised noise and the appellant ran away from the spot. 10. Having closed the prosecution case, the statement of the appellant was recorded.
She grappled with the appellant. Then, the accused took out some sharp object from the belt and gave a blow, which landed on the wrist of her left arm. She raised noise and the appellant ran away from the spot. 10. Having closed the prosecution case, the statement of the appellant was recorded. The entire incriminating material appearing in the evidence, was put to enable him to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence, as contemplated under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The appellant stoutly denied all the evidence of the prosecution in its entirety and pleaded false implication on account of previous enmity. 11. Similarly, in order to corroborate his plea of defence, the appellant has examined DW-1 Satbir Singh LDC from the office of XEN of PSEB, who has, inter alia, deposed that as per the attendance register (Ex.D-1), the appellant was present on his duty in the office on 09.06.1999. DW-2 Daljit Singh LDC proved the minutes of meeting (Ex.D-2), from the original record and stated that the appellant was General Secretary of the Union. His seat is near to the seat and the appellant remained present on his seat for the whole day from 9.00 AM to 5.00 PM with him. They had lunch together. On 09.06.1999 at about 5.00 PM, they went together at Gurdaspur after office hours. 12. Sequelly, DW-3 Faqir Chand, Election Kanungo, has produced the copy of voter list (Ex.D-3) of Gurwinder Kaur w/o Tarlok Singh. This is the entire evidence brought on record by the parties. 13. The trial Judge, after taking into consideration the entire evidence on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant, in the manner described here-in-above. 14. The appellant did not feel satisfied with the impugned judgment of conviction & order of sentence and preferred the present appeal. That is how, I am seized of the matter. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant, has contended with some amount of vehemence that the story of the prosecution is highly improbable, there is an inordinate & unexplained delay in recording the FIR, all the material/independent eye witnesses of the occurrence did not support the prosecution version, medical evidence contradicted the ocular version of the prosecution story, all the essential ingredients of the indicated offences are not complete and the appellant has been falsely implicated by the complainant due to previous enmity. Thus, he prayed for his acquittal. 16.
Thus, he prayed for his acquittal. 16. On the contrary, the learned State counsel has fairly admitted that although all the material/independent eye witnesses did not support the prosecution version, but still, he urged that even otherwise, since there is ample evidence and the trial Court has rightly convicted & sentenced the appellant, so, no interference is warranted in this regard. 17. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence on record with their valuable assistance. 18. At the very outset, what cannot possibly be disputed is that all the cogent cardinal fundamental principles and basic rules of criminal law/jurisprudence, have to be kept in focus while deciding such criminal cases. Some of these are that the absolute onus is always on the prosecution to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt. The accused cannot possibly be convicted without any substantive evidence as the evidence is essential element in the criminal proceedings, notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations alleged against him. The criminal proceedings require strict proof of guilt. It is the legal evidence, on the basis of which, the decision of a criminal court is based and is the legal requirement of criminal justice. Otherwise, in the absence of cogent substantive evidence, the Courts have no option, but to record an order of acquittal howsoever painful the same may be. 19. Taking into consideration the indicated cardinal fundamental principle of law vis-a-vis the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, now the short & significant question, though important that, arises for determination in the present appeal is, as to whether the prosecution has proved the culpability of the appellant by producing cogent evidence or not in this relevant direction ? 20. Having regard to the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, to me, the answer must obviously be in the negative. The pointed arguments of learned counsel for the appellant have considerable force and the appellant deserves the benefit of doubt and acquittal for the following reasons. 21.
20. Having regard to the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, to me, the answer must obviously be in the negative. The pointed arguments of learned counsel for the appellant have considerable force and the appellant deserves the benefit of doubt and acquittal for the following reasons. 21. As is evident from the record, that the appellant was charge sheeted for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 186, 332, 333 & 353 IPC, which commonly postulate that “whoever voluntarily obstructs, assaults or uses criminal force or causes simple/grievous hurt to any person being a public servant in the discharge of his official duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person or any other public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by that person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be accordingly punished therein. Complainant Lajpat Kaur, while appearing as PW3, has only stated that the accused had come in her office in the morning and complained to XEN that she was habitually late in the office and spoke ill of her. She, in her statement (Ex.PB) has maintained that the appellant again came to her office at 2.30 PM, but while appearing in the Court as PW3, she has stated that he came to her office at 1/1.30 PM in the noon. She has also admitted in her cross-examination that it was lunch time at the time of occurrence and no person from the public was present. She has thus no where stated in her statement as to how, in what manner, when and where the appellant has deterred her from discharge of her any particular official duty, during the course of lunch time. In view of her categoric admission, to my mind, all the essential ingredients of the offences in question are missing in the instant case. 22. Not only that, the incident is stated to have taken place at about 2.30 PM on 9.6.1999, but the present FIR was registered against the appellant at 3.15/4.15 PM, vide Rapat No.17/18 dated 11.6.1999. That means, there is a delay of more than two days in lodging the FIR.
22. Not only that, the incident is stated to have taken place at about 2.30 PM on 9.6.1999, but the present FIR was registered against the appellant at 3.15/4.15 PM, vide Rapat No.17/18 dated 11.6.1999. That means, there is a delay of more than two days in lodging the FIR. The vague explanation put forth by the prosecution in this regard that the complainant straightway went to the police station from the place of occurrence on the same day, but no police official was present in the police station on account of VIP duty and thereafter, she went to her house, does not inspire confidence. It is highly improbable to believe that no police official was present in the police station at the relevant time, as claimed by the complainant. No explanation, much less cogent, is forth coming on record to indicate, as to why the matter was not reported and the police did not record the statement of the complainant or any other eye witness on 9.6.1999 or 10.6.1999. In this manner, the inordinate delay of more than two days in recording the FIR remains deeply unexplained and which, to me, is per-se fatal to the prosecution case. 23. This is not the end of the matter. The complainant claimed that the occurrence was also witnesses by Janak Singh son of Sohan Singh, Jaswant Singh son of Piara Singh, Joginder Singh ALMs and other staff members. Janak Singh son of Sohan Singh, while appearing as PW1, has stated, on oath, that he did not see any person causing hurt on the person of Lajpat Kaur (PW3). Even he did not see the accused at the spot. Sequelly, PW2 Jaswant Singh, ALM has maintained that he did not see any occurrence and had only assured that he will effect a compromise between the appellant and the complainant, but subsequently, the present case was registered against him (appellant). The prosecution did not examine PW Joginder Singh and he was given up on the routine pretext of having been won over by the accused. Meaning thereby, the material eye witnesses Janak Singh (PW1) & Jaswant Singh (PW2), instead of supporting, have totally demolished the prosecution version in its entirety and stated that no such incident had occurred in their presence. 24.
Meaning thereby, the material eye witnesses Janak Singh (PW1) & Jaswant Singh (PW2), instead of supporting, have totally demolished the prosecution version in its entirety and stated that no such incident had occurred in their presence. 24. Possibly, it cannot be disputed that even the conviction can be based on the solitary statement of a witness, if it is otherwise trust worthy and reliable. Above being the position on record, the next question that falls for consideration at this stage is as to whether the solitary statement of complainant Lajpat Kaur (PW3) is sufficient to base the conviction of the appellant or not ? 25. Initially, the prosecution version oozing out from her complaint (Ex.PB) that the appellant came to her office on 9.6.1999 at 10 AM and sent message to her to come out. She did not agree. At about 2.30 PM, he again came to the office and asked her to talk to him, but she refused. At this, the appellant grappled, slapped, torn her shirt and caused injury with knife like object on her wrist of left hand. She felled on the ground in scuffle and sustained injuries on her person. On the contrary, the complainant, while appearing as PW3 in the Court, improved the version and stated that the accused came to her office in the morning and complained to XEN that she was habitually late in the office and spoke ill of her. The XEN rebuked him that it was none of his business to report such a matter, but it was not so stated in her complaint (Ex.PB). Similarly, she has stated in her statement (PW3) in the court that the appellant came to her office and remarked her to explain as to how she could deal with him in that manner. However, it is not so stated in her complaint (Ex.PB). Not only that, she in her complaint (Ex.PB) has stated that the appellant again came to her office at 2.30 PM, but while appearing in Court as PW3, she has stated that he came to her office at about 1/1.30 PM in the noon.
However, it is not so stated in her complaint (Ex.PB). Not only that, she in her complaint (Ex.PB) has stated that the appellant again came to her office at 2.30 PM, but while appearing in Court as PW3, she has stated that he came to her office at about 1/1.30 PM in the noon. She has also admitted in her cross-examination that it was lunch time and no person from public was present, whereas in her statement (Ex.PB), it was specifically claimed that the occurrence was witnessed by PW1 Janak Singh, PW2 Jaswant Singh, PW Joginder Singh ALMs and other staff members, as discussed here-in-above. 26. Likewise, according to original version contained in the complaint (Ex.PB), she straightway went to her house from the office, whereas while appearing as PW3 in the Court, she stated that she first went to the police station and then to her house. All the independent eye witnesses PW1 Janak Singh and PW2 Jaswant Singh did not corroborate the prosecution version and stated that neither they had witnessed any occurrence nor seen the appellant at the spot at the relevant time. PW Joginder Singh was not examined by the prosecution on the routine pretext of having been won over by the accused. That means, there are inherent contradictions and improvements in the statement of complainant (PW3) as compare to her original complaint (Ex.PB), which formed the basis of FIR (Ex.PB/2). There is no other evidence on record to corroborate the solitary statement of PW3. Having considered the inherent improbability in the prosecution version and contradictions in its evidence, to my mind, no implicit reliance can be placed on the contradictory statement of complainant Lajpat Kaur and her self serving and contradicted statement is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the appellant. 27. There is another aspect of the matter, which can be viewed from entirely a different angle. The appellant, from the very beginning, has adopted the following line of defence:- “I am innocent. In fact Smt. Laj Pal Kaur is not the real Lajpal Kaur. Her real name is Gurwinder Kaur wife of Tarlok Singh and she is working in the PSEB office by mis-representing herself as Lajpal Kaur who is her sister and living abroad i.e., in England since 1976-77.
In fact Smt. Laj Pal Kaur is not the real Lajpal Kaur. Her real name is Gurwinder Kaur wife of Tarlok Singh and she is working in the PSEB office by mis-representing herself as Lajpal Kaur who is her sister and living abroad i.e., in England since 1976-77. This case of bogus appointment of Lajpal Kaur was raised by me in the meeting of Circle office with Superintendent Engineer (operation circle Gurdaspur) on 24-5-1999. I was present in the said meeting as General Secretary of Gurdaspur Circle of Bijli Mazdoor Sang. On the alleged date of occurrence i.e. 9-6-99 I never sent to the alleged place of occurrence i.e. Udhanwal and remained present for the whole day in my office i.e. from 9.00 A.M. to 5.00 PM at X-en Office (operation Division) PSEB Shri Hargobindpur and did my official work there. I have been falsely involved in this case because I raised the above said impersonation of Smt. Lajpal Kaur who in fact is Gurwinder Kaur @ Balwinder”. 28. In order to substantiate his plea of defence, the appellant has produced on record a copy of attendance register (Ex.D1) proved by Satbir Singh (DW1), which would go to show that the appellant remained present on his duty from 9 A.M. to 5 P.M. on 9.6.1999, which is 10/15 Kms away from the place of occurrence. DW2 Daljit Singh LDC has also corroborated the presence of appellant in the office from 9 A.M. to 5 P.M. on that day. Ex.D2 is a copy of minutes of meeting dated 24.5.1999 attended by the appellant in the capacity of General Secretary of the Union, in which, he had raised that Lajpat Kaur (PW3) is fictitiously working as LDC in the office of SDO Udhanwal, impersonating her sister Gurwinder Kaur alias Balwinder. It was decided in the meeting that this matter shall be investigated by the concerned XEN. The proceedings (Ex.D2) were signed by Deputy Chief Engineer (Operation Circle). 29. Likewise, DW3 Faqir Chand, Election Kanungo has produced the record of voter list of Vidhan Sabha Halqa Qadian, pertaining to the year 1988. He has maintained that copy of voter list (Ex.D3) relates to entries No.118 & 119, in respect of Tarlok Singh (PW4) son of Kesar Singh and Gurwinder Kaur wife of Tarlok Singh, House No.19 of village Manoharpura, whereas PW4 Tarlok Singh has wrongly claimed that complainant Lajpat Kaur is his wife.
He has maintained that copy of voter list (Ex.D3) relates to entries No.118 & 119, in respect of Tarlok Singh (PW4) son of Kesar Singh and Gurwinder Kaur wife of Tarlok Singh, House No.19 of village Manoharpura, whereas PW4 Tarlok Singh has wrongly claimed that complainant Lajpat Kaur is his wife. Ex.D4 is a copy of disability certificate of the appellant. 30. Meaning thereby, the evidence brought on record by the appellant duly corroborates his plea of defence that Lajpat Kaur is not real Lajpat Kaur. Her name is Gurwinder Kaur wife of Tarlok Singh and she is working in PSEB by misrepresenting herself as Lajpat Kaur, who is her sister and living abroad (in England) since 1976-77. When the case of her bogus appointment was raised by the appellant in the meeting dated 24.5.1999 (Ex.D2) and the Deputy Chief Engineer assured to investigate the matter, then, possibility of his (appellant) false implication on 9.6.1999 by complainant Lajpat Kaur cannot be ruled out under the present set of circumstances. 31. Therefore, if the inordinate & unexplained delay of more than two days in recording the FIR (Ex.PB/2), lacks of essential ingredients of the pointed offences, the fact that the star/eye witnesses of the occurrence, instead of supporting, have totally demolished the prosecution version in its entirety, major contradictions, previous enmity of complainant with the appellant, possibility of his false implication, totality of other facts and circumstances, emanating from the evidence on record, as discussed here-in-above, are put together, then, to me, the conclusion is inescapable that it would not be safe to base the conviction of the appellant on the self serving, interested, un-credible & solitary contradictory statement of complainant Lajpat Kaur (PW3) and he is entitled to the benefit of doubt in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 32. No other point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 33. In the light of aforesaid reasons, the instant appeal is hereby accepted. Consequently, the impugned judgment of conviction & order of sentence are set aside. Having extended the benefit of doubt, the appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him in this relevant behalf.