Judgment :- Prasenjit Mandal, J. This application is at the instance of the defendant No. 1(b)/respondent No.1(a) and is directed against the judgment dated July 4, 2009 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No.3, Sealdah in Misc. Appeal No.7 of 2008 thereby reversing the order No.61 dated January 11, 2008 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1st Court, Sealdah in Title Suit No.80 of 2003. The plaintiffs/appellants/opposite parties herein instituted a suit being Title Suit No.80 of 2003 for declaration that the plaintiffs and the defendant No.s 3 to 5 are joint thika tenants of the ‘C’ schedule property, permanent injunction restraining the defendant No.s 1 and 2 from trespassing the ‘C’ schedule property and/or from changing the nature and character of the said propertyby raising any structure thereon and/or from transferring ‘C’ schedule property or any portion thereof in anyway or manner and from interfering with the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession and injunction of the ‘C’ schedule property and other consequential reliefs. In that suit, the plaintiffs filed an application for temporary injunction against the defendants praying for restraining them from trespassing in the ‘C’ schedule property and/or from changing the nature and character of the said ‘C’ schedule property in any way. Initially, the learned Trial Judge, by an interim order, directed the parties to maintain status quo of the suit property. After appearance, the defendants filed an application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC. The learned Trial Judge disposed of both the applications thereby rejecting the application of the plaintiffs for temporary injunction and allowing the application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC filed by the petitioner and the defendant No.1(a). The plaintiffs preferred a Misc. Appeal being Misc. Appeal No.7 of 2008. The said Misc. Appeal was allowed by the Lower Appellate Court thereby setting aside the order passed by the learned Trial Judge. The Lower Appellate Court also restrained the defendants from transferring, alienating any portion of the suit property to any person till the disposal of the suit. Being aggrieved by the order of the Lower Appellate Court, this application has been filed by the defendant/petitioner herein. Now, the question is whether the impugned order should be sustained. The Lower Appellate Court also restrained the defendants from transferring, alienating any portion of the suit property to any person till the disposal of the suit. Being aggrieved by the order of the Lower Appellate Court, this application has been filed by the defendant/petitioner herein. Now, the question is whether the impugned order should be sustained. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on going through the materials-on-record, I find that admittedly, Sarat Chandra Naskar (since deceased) was the Zaminder/landlord in respect of the suit property. Admittedly, the defendant No.3 of the said suit filed a suit being Title Suit No.470 of 1988 for declaration, permanent injunction and recovery of possession against one Shelly Roy and others in respect of the ‘A’ schedule property as described in the present suit. Upon a contested hearing, the said suit was decreed in favour of the defendant No.s 3 to 5 in part. During the Trial, the defendant No.3 relinquished his claim in respect of the ‘B’ schedule property as described in the said suit being Title Suit No.470 of 1988. The plaintiffs were declared thika tenants in respect of ‘A’ schedule property in the said judgment and decree. Late Phanindra Nath Ghosh, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, was a thika tenant in resect of ‘A’ schedule property and after his demise, the plaintiffs and the defendant No.s 3 to 5 are in possession of the ‘A’ schedule property after relinquishment of the right of the defendant No.3 in ‘B’ schedule property in favour of the said Shelly Roy. Thus, the plaintiffs and the defendant No.s 3 to 5 became the thika tenants in respect of the ‘C’ schedule property and the said property is the subjectmatter of the present suit. The defendant No.s 1 and 2 have contended that they became the owners of the suit property by purchase. The plaintiffs have contended that the defendant No.s 1 and 2 cannot acquire any right, title and interest in the suit property, i.e., the ‘C’ schedule property and so, they cannot interfere with the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession in the suit property. On the other hand, the defendants have contended that the plaintiffs have no right, title, interest and possession over the suit property and the defendant No.1(b) is in actual physical possession of the suit property. On the other hand, the defendants have contended that the plaintiffs have no right, title, interest and possession over the suit property and the defendant No.1(b) is in actual physical possession of the suit property. The defendant No.1(b) has also contended that Sarat Chandra Naskar (since deceased), father of Shelly Roy, executed a Deed of Gift dated April 2, 1954 in favour of Shelly Roy in respect of land measuring about 4 cottahs including a structure thereon, who, in turn, sold the same by a Deed of Conveyance dated November 30, 1992 to Jasoda Jiban Saha and Kanan Bala Saha and the said plot of land had been renumbered as 82B, Dr. Suresh Chandra Banerjee Road. Jasoda Jiban Saha and Kanan Bala Saha purchased 4 cottahs and 9 chittaks of land from Sneha Prova Mondal, who obtained the property by way of gift from her father, Sarat Chandra Naskar, on August 2, 1954 and the said property had been renumbered as ‘82A, Beliaghat Main Road’, now known as ‘Dr. Suresh Chandra Banerjee Road’. Thereafter, both Shelly Roy and Sneha Prova Mondal handed over the possession to Josoda Jiban Saha and Kanan Bala Saha and the said land was mutated in their favour as owners. The defendant has also contended that on August 11, 1954, Sarat Chandra Naskar, since deceased, executed a Deed of Gift in respect of 12 cottahs of land in favour of his two sons, namely, Nipendra Nath Naskar and Upendra Nath Naskar and after the death of Upendra before 1956, Nipendra became the owner of the said property. After his (Nipendra Nath Naskar’s) death, his wife, six sons and five daughters became the owners of the property of Nipendra and they sold land measuring about 4 cottahs with structure to the defendants and since then the defendants are in possession of the same and mutation had been done in their names with the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and the premises is now numbered as 82C, Dr. Suresh Chandra Banerjee Road. Thus, the defendant No.s 1 and 2 became the owners and possessors of the said property. The defendants have also contended that in 2003, Josoda Jiban Saha and Kanan Bala Saha transferred the aforesaid three premises to the present defendant No.1(b) and the plaintiffs have no title to the said property. Suresh Chandra Banerjee Road. Thus, the defendant No.s 1 and 2 became the owners and possessors of the said property. The defendants have also contended that in 2003, Josoda Jiban Saha and Kanan Bala Saha transferred the aforesaid three premises to the present defendant No.1(b) and the plaintiffs have no title to the said property. The defendants have also contended that after the purchase, the defendant No.1(b) amalgamated the three premises 82A, 82B and 82C into one as ‘82A, Dr. Suresh Chandra Banerjee Road’ and after obtaining the sanctioned plan, the defendant No.1(b) had raised multi-storied construction thereon. Mr. S.P. Roy Chowdhury, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, has contended that, by the order dated January 11, 2008 in Title Suit No.80 of 2003, the learned Trial Judge has disposed of two applications, one under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 filed by the plaintiffs and another under Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC filed by the defendants in the manner already recorded earlier. Since two matters were discussed together, but, one appeal being Misc. Appeal No.7 of 2008 has been filed by the plaintiffs, if either of the applications under above order is allowed, the other will be affected and as such, the plaintiffs should have preferred two separate Misc. Appeals. So, the question arises whether the appeal is maintainable in the present form. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has also contended that the learned Lower Appellate Court did not consider all the essential ingredients in order to dispose of the application for temporary injunction. He has also contended that the Lower Appellate Court did not consider the documents referred to by the petitioner. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has also submitted the change of law as per decision of Apex Court with regard to injunction with the passage of time. He has contended that the decision of Satish Chandra Som & ors. v. Tarak Nath Mahapatra & ors. reported in 2004(1) CLJ 430 is the guiding principle relating to injunction. With the passage of time, the principle of granting injunction was changed in the decision of Bepin Krishna Sur & ors. v. Gautam Kumar Sur & ors. reported in 85 CWN 393 and Phani Bhusan Dey v. Sudhamoyee Roy & anr. reported in 91 CWN 1078. He has also contended that the present position relating to grant of injunction is the decision of Mandali Ranganna & ors. v. Gautam Kumar Sur & ors. reported in 85 CWN 393 and Phani Bhusan Dey v. Sudhamoyee Roy & anr. reported in 91 CWN 1078. He has also contended that the present position relating to grant of injunction is the decision of Mandali Ranganna & ors. v. T. Ramachandra & ors. reported in (2008)11 Supreme Court Cases 1 and thus, he has submitted that the Court should look into the trend of the Apex Court in dealing with the injunction matter at present. So far as lis pendens is concerned, Mr. Roy Chowdhury has referred to the decision of Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy & ors. reported in (2006)13 Supreme Court Cases 608 and Nagubia & ors. v. B. Shama Rao & ors. reported in 1956 Supreme Court Appeals 959. He has next contended that since plaintiffs are thika tenants, in view of the decision of Gurucharan Singh v. Kamla Singh & ors. reported in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 5,[under Head Note (B)] Bihar Land Reforms Act (30 of 1950), Ss. 35 and 6 – Bar of Civil Court’s jurisdiction – Suit for declaration of title and for possession – Civil Court’s jurisdiction held not barred – (Civil P.C. (1908), Section 9). On the other hand, Mr. Haradhan Banerjee, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite parties, has contended that the application for temporary injunction was filed at the stage when the examination-in-chief was filed. In fact, two appeals should have been preferred. However, Mr. Banerjee has contended that in view of the decisions of Narhari & ors. v. Shanker & ors. reported in AIR 1953 SC 419 since there was one suit and two matters, one under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 and another under Order 39 Rule 4 of the CPC were disposed of by the common judgment, the principle of res judicata would not apply and so, this application may be decided in accordance with law. Mr. Banerjee has also contended about the scope of this Bench in entertaining the matter under Article 227 and he has referred to the bundle of decisions such as decisions of Puran Ram v. Bhaguram & anr. reported in AIR 2008 Supreme Court 1960, Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & anr. Mr. Banerjee has also contended about the scope of this Bench in entertaining the matter under Article 227 and he has referred to the bundle of decisions such as decisions of Puran Ram v. Bhaguram & anr. reported in AIR 2008 Supreme Court 1960, Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & anr. reported in (2003)3 Supreme Court Cases 524, Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. reported in (2001)8 Supreme Court Cases 97 and Radhey Shyam & anr. v. Chhabi Nath & ors. reported in (2009)5 Supreme Court Cases 616. These decisions are of general nature in the matter of disposal of an application under Article 227 and the basic principle is that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227 unless the order of the Court or Tribunal is either without jurisdiction or suffering from perversity or arbitrariness. It is also decided in the said decisions that every wrong order need not be entertained unless there is flagrant violation of law or manifest miscarriage of justice. The power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised to keep the Tribunals and Courts within the bounds of their authority and such power is to be exercised very sparingly. Mr. Banerjee has also referred to the decisions of Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & ors. v. Coca Cola Co. & ors. reported in (1995)5 Supreme Court Cases 545, Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot v. Baldev Dass reported in (2004)8 Supreme Court Cases 488, Israil & ors. v. Samset Rahman & ors. reported in AIR 1914 Calcutta 362, Sm. Muktakesi Dawn & ors. v. Haripada Mazumdar & anr. reported in AIR 1988 Calcutta 25, Chinnamal & ors. v. P. Arumugham & anr. reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1828 and D.R. Chawla & ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported in (1993)3 Supreme Court Cases 162. These decisions are of general nature in the matter of consideration of the application for temporary injunction and so, I am of the view that since the learned Lower Appellate Court has discussed the general principles relating to disposal of an application for injunction matter, these decisions need not be discussed in details. Mr. Banerjee has next referred to the decisions of Sahib Chandra & anr. v. Lachmi Narain & ors. Mr. Banerjee has next referred to the decisions of Sahib Chandra & anr. v. Lachmi Narain & ors. reported in AIR 1929 Privy Council 243, Rappel Augusthi v. Gopalan Ramakrishna Panicker & ors. reported in AIR 1970 Kerala 188, Rajender Singh & ors. v. Santa Singh & ors. reported in (1973)2 Supreme Court Cases 705, M/s. Ceean International Private Limited. V. Ashok Surana & anr. reported in AIR 2003 Calcutta 263, Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb & anr. reported in (2004)1 Supreme Court Cases 191 and Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy & ors. reported in (2006)13 Supreme Court Cases 608 relating to the general principles of lis pendens. On perusal of the impugned judgment and other materials-onrecord, I find that the Lower Appellate Court while disposing of the injunction matter has made clear observation that there was a suit being Title Suit No.470 of 1998 between the predecessor-in interest of the parties and the concerned thika controller. Smt. Shelly Roy and Smt. Sneha Prova Mondal were the parties to the said suit and the said suit was decreed in favour of the appellants/opposite parties herein declaring that the appellants were the thika tenants under the thika controller in respect of ‘A’ schedule property. The vendors of the petitioners purchased the suit property by virtue of deeds of purchase from Smt. Shelly Roy, Smt. Sneha Prova Mondal and others. It may be noted herein that the said Title Suit No.470 of 1998 was decreed on August 17, 1992. It is surprising to see how Smt. Shelly Roy and Smt. Sneha Prova Mondal and others could transfer a portion of the suit property of the said suit to Jasoda Jiban Saha and Kanan Bala Saha by executing a deed of transfer dated August 31, 1992, i.e., within 14 days from the date of passing of the decree. Therefore, it could be understood that on knowing the results of the Title Suit being NO.470 of 1998, Smt. Shelly Roy and Smt. Sneha Prova Mondal had transferred to Jasoda Jiban Saha and Kanan Bala Saha, the vendors of the petitioners. Therefore, it could be understood that on knowing the results of the Title Suit being NO.470 of 1998, Smt. Shelly Roy and Smt. Sneha Prova Mondal had transferred to Jasoda Jiban Saha and Kanan Bala Saha, the vendors of the petitioners. The learned Lower Appellate Court has rightly recorded that it is not very important for the purpose of ascertaining the title whether the CMC registered the name of any person as assessee in respect of any property or whether the plan had been sanctioned in respect of any property in the name of anyone or not. The civic authorities have no authority to determine the title of any property. In view of the above findings and the decisions referred to above, I am of the view that the learned Lower Appellate Court had rightly recorded that it cannot be presumed that the plaintiffs/appellants have no prima facie case as their names had not been mutated in the assessment register of the CMC in respect of the suit property. The question of right, title and interest or whether the thika property could be sold or not in favour of the respondent No.1(b) can be decided only by recording evidence. This is, I hold, the right conclusion of the Lower Appellate Court. Similarly, I am of the view that the learned Lower Appellate Court has rightly observed that the plaintiffs/appellants/opposite parties herein would suffer irreparable loss, if the respondent No.1(b)/petitioner is allowed to transfer the suit property to other persons during the pendency of the suit. I also hold that he has rightly concluded that the learned Trial Judge was wrong in holding that the plaintiffs have not been able to prove their prima facie case and that the balance of convenience and irreparable loss are not in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants. Thus, I am of the view that the learned Lower Appellate Court has rightly addressed the issue that if the injunction as granted by the Lower Appellate Court is not maintained, the object of the filing of the suit may be frustrated by transfer of the flats already constructed. It is not the question of delay in filing the application but the Court is to dispose of the application for temporary injunction on merits. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from perversity at all. It is not the question of delay in filing the application but the Court is to dispose of the application for temporary injunction on merits. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from perversity at all. I am also of the view that there is no scope of interference with the impugned order. However, direction may be given to the learned Trial Judge to expedit the disposal of the suit. The prayer for setting aside the impugned order is hereby rejected. However, the learned Trial Judge is directed to dispose of the suit within one year from the date of communication of this order, without fail. If necessary, he shall take up the matter for day-to-day basis hearing and he shall not grant any adjournment to either of the parties except in extreme emergent cases. This application is disposed of in the manner indicated above. Considering the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.