Judgment :- Prasenjit Mandal, J. This application is directed against the judgment and order dated March 15, 2012 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court, Alipore in Civil Revision Case No.16 of 2007 thereby setting aside the Order No.178 dated March 16, 2002 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 3rd Court, Alipore in Misc. Case No.34 of 1986 arising out of Misc. Execution Case No.1 of 1984. The facts as narrated in the application may be etymologized as follows: The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners filed an application under Section 47 of the C.P.C. in an execution proceeding arising out of an order of pre-emption on an application under Section 24 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949. The order of pre-emption having been affirmed by the Appellate Court and the Hon’ble High Court in revision, the pre-emptor / opposite party herein lodged the said Execution Case being Misc. Execution Case No.1 of 1984. In that execution case, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners filed an application under Section 47 of the C.P.C. being Misc. Case No.34 of 1986 contending that he had constructed a hut on the land in case and that he had been residing thereon along with the members of his family. The property is now situated within the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. The Executing Court held that the order of pre-emption was invalid and inexecutable. So, the execution case should be dismissed. The Misc. Case being No.34 of 1986 was allowed on contests and in consequence, the execution case being Misc. Execution Case No.1 of 1984 was dismissed without costs. Being aggrieved, the pre-emptor filed a revision being Civil Revision No.16 of 2007 which was allowed on contests and the judgment and order dated March 16, 2002 passed by the learned Executing Court in Misc. Case No.34 of 1986 was set aside and the misc. execution case was restored. Being aggrieved, this application has been preferred by the judgment debtors / petitioners herein. Now, the question is whether the impugned order should be sustained. Having heard the learned Advocates of both the sides and on perusal of the materials on record, I find that the misc. case being Misc. Case No.46 of 1973under Section 24 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 was filed in April 1973 and the said misc. case was allowed by the learned Trial Judge on May 12, 1981. Having heard the learned Advocates of both the sides and on perusal of the materials on record, I find that the misc. case being Misc. Case No.46 of 1973under Section 24 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 was filed in April 1973 and the said misc. case was allowed by the learned Trial Judge on May 12, 1981. Thereafter, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners preferred an appeal being Misc. Appeal No.349 of 1981 and the same was also dismissed on contests with costs on February 5, 1983. Then, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners preferred a revision before this Hon’ble Court being C.O.1331 of 1983 and the said revisional application was also dismissed on contests on November 9, 1983. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners then preferred a review application being C.R. No.1689(R) of 1984 which was ultimately dismissed for non-prosecution. There being no move before the Apex Court, I find that the order of preemption under Section 24 of the 1949 Act had attained its finality. In 1984, the opposite party filed an execution case being Misc. Execution Case No.1 of 1984 before the learned Trial Judge for execution of the order of pre-emption. The writ of delivery of possession was issued and the same was resisted by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners. Thereafter, on May 6, 1986, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners preferred an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the said application was registered as Misc. Case No.34 of 1986 in the learned Executing Court and upon hearing both the sides, the learned Executing Court allowed the said Misc. Case No.34 of 1986 on March 16, 2002 holding, inter alia, that the judgment and order passed in the pre-emption case was invalid and inexecutable and accordingly, the Misc. Execution Case No.1 of 1984 was dismissed without costs. The opposite party preferred a misc. appeal being Misc. Appeal No.131 of 2002 before the learned District Judge, Alipore and the same was subsequently treated as a civil revision under Section 115A of the C.P.C. being Civil Revisional Case No.16 of 2007. Upon the death of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, the petitioners were substituted and the said revisional application was finally allowed on contests thereby setting aside the order dated March 16, 2002 passed in Misc. Case No.34 of 1986 and restoring the Misc. Execution Case No.1 of 1984. Upon the death of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, the petitioners were substituted and the said revisional application was finally allowed on contests thereby setting aside the order dated March 16, 2002 passed in Misc. Case No.34 of 1986 and restoring the Misc. Execution Case No.1 of 1984. It is pertinent to mention that in the meantime, West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 was amended by the Amending Act of 1981 thereby changing the definitions of land in Section 2(7) and raiyat in Section 2(10) of the Act and the Sections 3 & 3A of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. The Section 3A of the said Act was further amended by the West Bengal Land Reforms Act (3rd Amending Act of 1986) giving the effect of vesting on and from September 9, 1980 in respect of rights of non-agricultural tenants and under-tenants in non-agricultural land to vest in the State. In the instant case, we are dealing with the non-agricultural lands of a raiyat. Several litigations were held in respect of non-agricultural tenancies. In Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Krishak Samity v. State of West Bengal reported in (1996) 2 CHN 212 , the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court held, inter alia, that the definition of land as contended in Section 2(7) and the provisions of Section 3A of the West Bengal Land Reforms (3rd Amendment) Act, 1986 ultra vires Article 300A of the Constitution. The effect of the said decision is that the original definition of land under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 has been revived and the inclusion of tenancies held under the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 within the purview of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 has come to a halt and, consequently, it has to be held that the nonagricultural lands of a tenant, are outside the purview of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. An appeal is pending before the Hon’ble Apex Court. An appeal is pending before the Hon’ble Apex Court. It is pertinent to mention Section 63(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and the same is quoted below:- (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (1) any proceeding pending on the date of such coming into force before any authority appointed under the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 or before any court shall be continued or disposed of as if the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1981 had not come into force in that district of area. So, in spite of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1981, the pre-emption case by a raiyat under the provisions of Section 24 of the 1949 Act can well be proceeded with provided an appropriate notification under Section 1(3) of the Act has been made in the official gazette. But no notification has yet been made. So, Section 63 (2) of the Act cannot be made applicable here. Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has referred to the decisions of Smt. Bakul Nag v. Sri Saibal Guin reported in 1991(1) CLJ 255 (Division Bench Judgment) and Prafulla Kumar Maity v. Amal Krishna Mishra & ors. reported in 1997 (II) CHN 20 and thus, he has submitted that in view of the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Amendment) Act, 1981 vis-à-vis the definitions of ‘land’ as contained in Section 2(7) and ‘raiyat’ under Section 2(10) of the Act having gone changes w.e.f. August 7, 1969, this Hon’ble Court directed retrial of the matter according to the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and so, impugned order has been wrongly passed and cannot be supported. So, appropriate steps may be taken. The aforesaid decisions, in my view, were relating to appeals arising out of the misc. case under Section 24 of the 1949 Act and so, appropriate directions were given for retrial. But, in the instant case, as recorded above, the order of pre-emption had attained its finality. There is no scope of re-opening of the same in the execution proceeding. Mr. Bhattacharjee has also contended that Section 3 of the 1955 Act has been amended by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1981 w.e.f. August 7, 1969 giving the overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law, agreement or decree or order or decision of a Court. Mr. Bhattacharjee has also contended that Section 3 of the 1955 Act has been amended by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1981 w.e.f. August 7, 1969 giving the overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law, agreement or decree or order or decision of a Court. Thus, Mr. Bhattacharjee has contended that according to the definition of land as mentioned in Section 2(7) of the Act after amendment, the decree passed by the learned Trial Judge has become inexecutable. The amended section is quoted below for convenience. 3. Act to override other laws.-The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time being in force or in any custom or usage or contract, express or implied, or agreement or decree or order or decision or award of a court, tribunal or other authority. In this regard, it is pertinent to mention that Section 3 of amended Act of 1955 has not been declared ultra vires Article 300A of the Constitution of India in the case of Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Krishak Samity (supra). The pre-emptor being a raiyat of a non-agricultural land could seek a remedy under Section 8 of the 1955 Act provided the application under Section 24 of the 1949 Act is pending at any stage. The executing Court, I hold, cannot direct re-opening of the matter under Section 8 of the 1955 Act. On the other hand, Mr. Haradhan Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party, has contended that at present there is no scope for re-opening of the matter by way of remand as the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge had attained its finality and the matter is pending for execution of the order. By referring the ratio of the decision of Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Krishak Samity & ors. v. State of West Bengal & ors. reported in 1996(2) CHN 212 , he has submitted that since the definition of land as recorded in Section 2(7) of the Act and the provisions of Section 3A(3) of the Act and Section 14V of the said Act having been declared as ultra vires Article 300 of the Constitution, the definition of land as recorded in the Amending Act of 1981 shall not be taken into consideration at all in the present case. He has also contended that the said decision of Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Krishak Samity & ors. (supra) being under challenge before the Apex Court and stay has been granted, the stay order of the Apex Court is binding upon the parties of that case. But since the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench in Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Krishak Samity & ors. (supra) has not been set aside by an elaborate judgment, the ratio of the said judgment will be in force in respect of other matters other than the parties to the said case. In support of his contention, Mr. Banerjee has also referred to the decision of Pijush Kanti Chowdhury v. State of West Bengal & ors. reported in 2007(3) CHN 178 and thus, he has submitted that Interim Order – Effect of – On binding nature of a judgment – Mere passing of an interim order staying the operation of a judgment, the existence of the judgment is not wiped out – Authority of the decision as a precedent is never undermined. He has also submitted that unless a decision is set aside, it remains as a binding precedent although it may not be binding on the parties to the proceeding where the Supreme Court passed an interim stay order. It may be noted herein that the effect of interim order passed in the Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Krishak Samity & ors. (supra) has been taken into consideration along with other the decision of Pijush Kanti Chowdhury (supra). Thus, Mr. Banerjee has submitted that the question of retrial taking application as one under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act as decided in Bakul Nag’s case (supra) need not be considered. In reply Mr. Bhattacharjee has contended that the decision of Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Krishak Samity & ors. (supra) would not be taken into consideration in view of the fact that the said matter relates to the principle for computation of compensation when vesting had taken place and so, the decision cannot be accepted. With due respect to Mr. Bhattacharjee, I am of the view that though the matter of Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Krishak Samity & ors. (supra) would not be taken into consideration in view of the fact that the said matter relates to the principle for computation of compensation when vesting had taken place and so, the decision cannot be accepted. With due respect to Mr. Bhattacharjee, I am of the view that though the matter of Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Krishak Samity & ors. relates to the compensation, the definition of land as described in Section 2(7) of the Act has been declared ultra vires, it will not be fit and proper to accept the definition as recorded in Section 2(7) by the Amending Act of 1981 in the present matter before us which is nothing but in respect of pre-emption of nonagricultural land of a raiyat. Mr. Banerjee has also referred to the decision of Bhaswati Roy Pandey & ors. v. The State of West Bengal & ors. reported in 2004(2) CLJ(Cal) 123 particularly the provisions of paragraph no.13 and thus, he has submitted that for the enforcement of Section 63 (2), no notification is required for application of the said section. He has also contended that the case of Bakul Nag (supra) will not be taken into consideration because it was an earlier decision and there is no scope of consideration of the Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Krishak Samity & ors in that case. Mr. Banerjee has also referred to the decision of Abdulla Kabir v. Md. Nasiruddin reported in AIR 1989 SC 931 particularly the paragraph no.19 on Section 3A as introduced by the West Bengal Amending Act of 1981 and thus, he has submitted that so far as the non-agricultural land of a raiyat is concerned, even if the preemptee resides thereon as homestead as in the present case, yet, the land is to be treated as agricultural land though might not be on agricultural land and its sale to stranger gives right to the co-sharer for pre-emption. Such a pre-emption case is maintainable. Thus, he submits that the decree has been rightly passed by the learned Trial Judge and at present there is no scope of interference with the impugned order. Mr. Banerjee has also referred to the decision of Municipal Commissioner, Calcutta & ors. v. Salil Kumar Banerjee & ors. Such a pre-emption case is maintainable. Thus, he submits that the decree has been rightly passed by the learned Trial Judge and at present there is no scope of interference with the impugned order. Mr. Banerjee has also referred to the decision of Municipal Commissioner, Calcutta & ors. v. Salil Kumar Banerjee & ors. reported in (2000) 4 SCC 108 particularly the paragraph no.4 and thus, he has submitted that the principle of res judicata as laid down in the said decision in a matter under the provisions of Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 would be applicable in the instant case. He has contended that though, the Garden Reach came within the Municipality on January 4, 1980, that is, prior to the date of passing of the judgment, the pre-emptee did not take plea that the prayer for pre-emption would not be applicable when the land in question has come under the jurisdiction of Garden Reach Police Station. In the instant case, since no such plea have been taken, I am of the view that this principle as laid down in the Municipal Commissioner, Calcutta (supra) shall be applicable in the instant situation. Mr. Banerjee has also referred to the decision of Anil Kumar Biswas & ors. v. Subodh Chandra Paul & ors. reported in 2010(1) CHN 50 particularly paragraph no.14 and thus, he submitted that after loosing all the battles starting from the Court of original jurisdiction up to the Hon’ble High Court as referred to earlier, the objection of the petitioners for setting up the challenge of the legality of the decree cannot be set up in the execution proceeding on the ground of bar of constructive res judicata in view of the Explanation VII to the Section 11 of the C.P.C. This decision, in my view, would also be applicable in order to consider the objection raised by the petitioners in the application under Section 47 of the C.P.C. So, I am of the view that the Lower Revisional Court has rightly rejected the contention of the petitioners in deciding the C.R. No.16 of 2007. Having taken into the consideration of the aforesaid decisions cited by the contending parties, I am of the view that the decision of the Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Krishak Samity & ors. Having taken into the consideration of the aforesaid decisions cited by the contending parties, I am of the view that the decision of the Paschim Banga Bhumijibi Krishak Samity & ors. (supra) relating to definitions of land as recorded in Section 2(7) and raiyat in Section 2(10) of the Amending Act of 1981 would be applicable here. There is no question of re-opening the matter of pre-emption in spite of Section 3 of the Amending Act of 1981. The principles decided in Municipal Commissioner, Calcutta (supra) and Anil Kumar Biswas (supra) shall be applicable to decide whether the impugned order should be sustained or not. In my view, the learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court has rightly allowed the Civil Revision Case No.16 of 2007 thereby setting aside the order of the learned Executing Court. Since the Executing Court is not permitted to travel behind the decree, I am of the view that the learned Lower Revisional Court has rightly concluded that the learned Executing Court has erred in passing the judgment and order dated March 16, 2002 thereby holding that the order of pre-emption has now become in-executable. The learned Lower Revisional Court, I hold, has addressed the issue properly. The question of law need not be pleaded. Consequently, the Misc. Execution Case No.1 of 1984 has been rightly restored by the lower revisional Court. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that there is no scope of interference with the impugned order. This application is devoid of merits and is, therefore, dismissed. Considering the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.