Judgment :- Kanchan Chakraborty, J. 1. Praying for quashing of the criminal proceeding being -CBI/ BS&FC/Kolkata Case No--RCBSK 2011E0001 , these two applications have been filed by (a) Somenath Guin and (b) Vijoy Kumar Kanoria under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Since both the applications have arisen out of same proceedings and points taken are similar, both the applications are disposed of by the common order below. 2. The proceedings was initiated by Manoj Kr. Senapati, the Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank, Midnapore Branch against the petitioner Somenath Guin (petitioner in CRR-3677/11) and other four persons. In course of the investigation of the case, Vijoy Kr. Kanoria (petitioner in CRR-3699/11) was added to as another accused. The offences allegedly have been committed by them are under sections-420, 471 & 120B 0f I.P.C. read with Section 13(2) & 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act , 1988. 3. Contention of Mr. Basu, Ld. senior Counsel for the petitioners, mainly, was twofold:---firstly, no case under sections 120B , 420 & 471 of the I.P.C. read with section 13(2) & 13 (1 ) (d) of the P.C. Act is made out against the petitioners even if the uncontroverted allegations in the F.I.R. are accepted on their face value and, secondly, the C.B.I. has no authority to conduct investigation into the case in view of the mandatory provisions of section 6 of The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. 4. Mr. De Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of C.B.I., contended that there are materials in abundance in the F.I.R. suggesting strongly that criminality is attributed to the petitioners and that C.B.I. is empowered to investigate into the case in view of the consent accorded under section 6 of the Act by Govt. of West Bengal vide its order no: -----1869PL dt. 21.4.1960. It was further submitted by Mr. De that civil outfit of the matter cannot denude its criminal profile and change the character of the case. Therefore, there is no impediment in initiating the criminal action against the petitioners who miappropriaed public exchequers in clandestine manner. 5. of West Bengal vide its order no: -----1869PL dt. 21.4.1960. It was further submitted by Mr. De that civil outfit of the matter cannot denude its criminal profile and change the character of the case. Therefore, there is no impediment in initiating the criminal action against the petitioners who miappropriaed public exchequers in clandestine manner. 5. At the Bar, the following decisions have been referred to: --------- (1) S.N.Palanitkar & others vs. State of Bihar & others, reported in (2002) 1 S.C.C.--241; (2) Ajaya Mitra vs. State of M.P., reported in (2003) 3 S.C.C.--11; (3) M/S. Indial Oil Corporation vs. M/S.NECP India Ltd. & others , repoted in A.I.R. 2006 S.C.--2780; (4) Thermax Ltd. & others vs. K.M.Johny & others; reported in (2012) 2 S.C.C.(cri)-650; (5) All Cargo Movers(India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dhanesh Bhadarmal Jain & others, reported in (2007) 14 S.C.C.-776; (6) State Of W.Bengal & others vs. Committee for protection of democrative Rights, West Bengal & others, reported in (2010)2 S.C.C.-(cri)-401; (7) Union Of India vs. Prakash P. Hinduja & others, reported in 2003 S.C.C.(cri)1314; (8) C.B.I. vs. Laxmi Dhaul, reported in (2009) 3 S.C.C (cri)--204; (9) Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwala vs. State Of Punjab & others, reported in (2009)3 S.C.C.(cri)-620; (10) Uma Shankar Gopalika vs. State Of Bihar & others, reported in (2005) 10 S.C.C.336; (11) Dilip Kaur & others vs. Jagnar Singh & others, repoted in (2010) 2 S.C.C.(cri) 223; (12) Vir Prakash Sharma vs. Anil Kr. Agarwal & others, reported in (2007) 3 S.C.C.(cri) 370; (13) J Th Zwart & others vs. Indrani Mukherjee, reported in 1990 C.Cr.L.R.(cal) 1; (14) P.Ravindran vs. Inspector of Police,S.P.E.,C.B.I., reported in 1999 Cri.L.J. 3789; (15) State Of Hariyana vs. Ch. Bhajanlal & others, reported in AIR 1992 S.C. 604 ; (16) M.Narayan Das vs. State of Karnataka & others, reported in 2004 S.C.C.(cri) 118; (17)CBI vs. Ravisankar Srivastava, IAS & others ; reported in (2006) 7 SCC 188 ; (18) Indermohan Goswami & others vs. State of U.P. & others, repoted in (2007) 12 SCC--1 ; (19) Kishan Singh (dead) through L.R.s vs. Gopal Singh & others reported in (2010) 3 SCC (cri) 1091; (20) B.Suresh Yadav vs.Sarifa Bee & others, reported in JT 2007 (12) S.C. 341; (21) Zandu Pharmaceutical Ltd. & others vs. Md. Saraful Haque & another, reported in (2005) SCC(cri)283; (22) Babul Choubey vs.State of West Bengal & others, reported in (1993) 1 CALLT 420 (H.C.); (23) M/S. Eicher Tractor Ltd.& others vs. Harihar Singh & another, reported in JT 2008 (12) SC 661; (24) M.Balakrishna Reddy vs.Director, CBI, New Delhi, reported in (2008) SCC (cri) 391; (25) Goutam Ghosal vs. The State of West Bengal, reported in (2012) 1 CLJ (cal) 372; 6. This apart, all the notifications relating to Delhi Police Establishment Act, 1946, issued by the Govt. of India and cosequent thereto by the Govt. of West Bengal have also been referred to by the Ld. counsels for the parties in order to assist the court. 7. In State of Hariyana vs. Ch. Bhajanlal (supra), the Honourable Apex court observed , " In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice , though it may not be possible to lay down any precise , clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myried kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised----1) where the allegations made in the Frist Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R., do not disclose any cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of section 155(2) of the Code. 3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or Complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or Complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R., do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non--cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155(2) of the code. 5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclution that there is sufficient groungm for proceeding against the accused. 6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/ or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 8. The above proposition of law propounded by the Apex court in Ch. Bhajanlals' case (supra), was followed by the High courts as well as the Apex court in strings of decisions subsequently, most of which have been referred to at the Bar in this case. 9. Mr. Basu, in fact and in substance, made his contention basing on the category No. (1) & (6) of the guidelines given by the Apex court in Bhajanlals' case(supra). 10. Now, it is time to look at the F.I.R. and contents thereof as to ascertain whether or not, the allegations in the F.I.R. and evidence collected in support of the same, prima facie, disclose commission of any cognizable offence and make out a case against the petitioners. 11. Manoj Kr. Senapati, Chief Manager, PNB, Midnapore Branch lodged one F.I.R. directly with the CBI, Bank seucrities & fraud cell, Kolkata against (a) R.R. Mishra, the then Senior Manager, PNB, Midnapore branch (b) Somenath Guin (the petitioner in CRR--3677/11), (c) Jamini Kr. 11. Manoj Kr. Senapati, Chief Manager, PNB, Midnapore Branch lodged one F.I.R. directly with the CBI, Bank seucrities & fraud cell, Kolkata against (a) R.R. Mishra, the then Senior Manager, PNB, Midnapore branch (b) Somenath Guin (the petitioner in CRR--3677/11), (c) Jamini Kr. Guin, (d) Smt. Rakhi Guin, (e) Smt. Shibani Guin (all the Directors of M/S. Sitalamata Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., M/S. Sitalamata Oil Mills Pvt. Ltd. and M/S. Sitala mata Food products Pvt. Ltd.) and (e) other unknown persons. The petitioner Vijay Kr. Kanoria (the petitioner in CRR-3639/11) was added to the F.I.R. named accused in course of investigation. The allegations against them made in the F.I.R. is set out below: ---- 12. The Sitalamata groups of industries consisting of M/S. Sitalamata Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd,. M/S. Sitalamata Oil Mills Pvt. Ltd. and M/S. Sitalamata Food Products Pvt. Ltd. Somenath Guin (petitioner in CRR-3677/11), Jaminikanta Guin, Mrs. Rakhi Guin and Mrs. Shibani Guin were the Directors of the companies. The companies were availing credit facilities from Axis Bank initially but, on the approach of the Petitioner Somenath, the entire term loan liabilities to the tune of Rs 360 lacs and cash credit liabilities to the tune of Rs.500 lacs was taken over by the PNB, Midnapore branch from Axis bank. Mr. R.R.Mishra, the then senior branch manager, however, arranged for enhanced term loan and cash credit limit in favour of the companies for some definite purposes, such as, installation of galvanized Silo storage system and colour sorter, to meet working capital requirements and for installation of packaging machinaries. Against the limits sanctioned, some landed properties, plant & machinaries of the companies were charged as primary securities while some personal properties belonging to the directors were offered as collateral securities. The Directors stood as guarantor for the limits sanctioned. Without bringing in the margin money prescribed in the sanction for the particular purposes, they diverted the cash credit of huge amount in their personal real estate business soon after availing the same and resigned from the companies without informing the bank. Everything was done in conivance with R.R.Mishra and the new Director Vijay Kr. Kanoria (petitioner in CRR-3639/11) in order to deceive the bank and get themselves free from the liabilities. From the very beginning, they submitted inflated stock holding value and finally stopped submitting the statement. Everything was done in conivance with R.R.Mishra and the new Director Vijay Kr. Kanoria (petitioner in CRR-3639/11) in order to deceive the bank and get themselves free from the liabilities. From the very beginning, they submitted inflated stock holding value and finally stopped submitting the statement. The diversion of funds for unrelated purposes and non-payment of dues have resulted in outstanding liabilities of Rs. 1986.86 lacs. The petitioner Mr. Kanoria although informed the bank about change in management but neither acknowledged the liabilities nor repaid the loan. He also submitted false and inflated stock holding value supressing the real value. 13. On the basis of the F.I.R. above , the CBI, BS & FC/ RCBSK 2011E 0001 dt. 15. 2. 2011 was started against the petitioners and others under sections 120B, 420 , 471 of the I.P.C. read with section 13(2) & 13(1) (d) of the P.C. Act . It was brought into the notice of this court that on conclution of the investigation, chargesheet has also been filed against the petitioners & others. 14. A cursory perusal of the F.I.R., the following facts can well be gathered:--- (a) that the petitioner Somenath Guin was one of the Directors of M/S. Rice Mills Pvt., M/S Sitalamata Oil Mills Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Sitalamata Food products Pvt. Ltd.at the relevant period of time while the petitioner Vijay Kr. Kanoria was the subsequent Director the those companies; (b) that Somenath and other directors approached the Opposite party P.N.B. on 27.1.2009 in writing to take over the existing loan liabilities of the companies from Axis Bank and and sanction enhanced term loan and cash credit facilities; (c) that the O.P. P.N.B. agreed to such proposal and sanctioned enhanced term loan to those three companies, in all, to the tune of Rs. 646 lakhs and cash credit facilities in all, to the tune of Rs. 646 lakhs and cash credit facilities in all, to the tune of Rs. 1470 lakhs; (d) that said huge loan and cash credit facilities was sanctioned in favour of those three companies only for the purposes [1] proposed installation of galvanized Silo storage system [2] meeting the working capital required for M/S Sitalamata Oil Mills Pvt. Ltd. [3] installation of packaging machineries; (e) that the petitioner Somenath & others diverted and engaged that huge amount of term loan and cash credit facilities to & in their personal real-estate business; (f) that the stock statement declared, time to time, falsely by the companies showing inflated stock value suppressing actual value of holding of stock and, finally, stopped submitting such inflated statement keeping the Bank in dark about the stock holding position of the companies; (g) that the petitioner Somenath Guin and other the then directors of the companies, soon after availing the cash credit facilities and withdrawing huge money from that account, resigned from the Directorship of the companies on 25.11.2009 without intimating the bank and without obtaining permission of the bank in violation of the terms of the agreement; (h) that not only the petitioner Somenath and three other directors never requested the bank to release them from the loan liabilities undertaken by them at any point of time but did not also bring the margin money prescribed in the sanctioned for the specific purposes or replaced themselves by others as guarantors against collateral securities; (i) that the primary securities against the limit sanctioned were belonging to the companies; (j) that the petitioner Mr. Kanoria although informed the bank about change in the management of the companies, did never acknowledge or accept the liability of loan & cash credit facilities withdrawn by the erstwhile directors which they diverted to their personal real estate business; (k) that it has been averred categorically in the F.I.R. that the petitioner Somenath & other three directors got sanction of huge cash credit facilities in favour of the companies with fraudulent and dishonest intention to grab the money and for using the same for their personal business by way of detouching themselves form the companies soon after withdrawal of huge amount of money from the account in order to get away from the liabilities; (l) that the new director, i.e., the petitioner Mr. Kanoria has also furnished false inflated statement of stock holding value of the companies;. (m) that investigation of the case is ended in a charge-sheet suggesting a strong prima facie case against the petitioners. 15) Mr. Basu, Ld. Counsel for the petitioners contended that in order to attract the offence "cheating" as defined in section 415 of the I.P.C., dishonest intention on the part of the accused from the very inception must be shown to have been existing. Simple violation of terms and conditions of an agreement and non-payment of loan money do not constitute an offence of cheating. This apart, he contended, no case of forgery has been made out at all. Submitting of inflated stock holding value is not amounting to forgery. Therefore, he contended, continuation of the proceedings against the petitioners for cheating and forgery would be amounting to abuse of the process of the court and, thus, is liable to be quashed. 16. Section 415 of the I.P.C. defined "cheating" as follows; ---' Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person , or to consent that any person shall retain any property , or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat".' 17. No doubt, the language used in the section itself implicit enough to understand that, amongst others, one of the most essential ingredients of the offence 'cheating', is dishonest and fraudulent intention on the part of the accused to induce /deceive another to deliver any property. In S.W. Palanitkar (supra), Ajoy Kr. Mitra (supra), Termax Ltd & others (supra), All Cargo movers [India] Pvt. Ltd.(supra), Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia (supra), Omprakash Sharma (supra ), Indermohan Goswami and others (supra), MsS Eicher Tructor Ltd. And others (supra), and in B.Suresh Jydav (supra), the Honourable Apex court explained the legal proposition very clearly on this point. In S.W. Palanitkar (supra), Ajoy Kr. Mitra (supra), Termax Ltd & others (supra), All Cargo movers [India] Pvt. Ltd.(supra), Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia (supra), Omprakash Sharma (supra ), Indermohan Goswami and others (supra), MsS Eicher Tructor Ltd. And others (supra), and in B.Suresh Jydav (supra), the Honourable Apex court explained the legal proposition very clearly on this point. There is no dispute as to the proposition of law propounded by the Apex court that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating if there existed no fraudulent and dishonest intention from the very inception when the promise or representation was made. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same can not be amounting to an offence of cheating as contemplated in the section 415 of the I.P.C. However, a careful scrutiny of the decisions referred to above it is found that the fact-position of those cases before the Apex court and fact position of the case in hands, are quite different. Be that as it may, the settled principle of law is not disputed and keeping that trite law in mind, the entire matter is to be assessed. 18. In the case in hands, the approach to take over the existing liability of term loan & cash credit of the companies from Axis Bank by the PNB, was made by the petitioner Somenath and the then directors. On their approach/request, the PNB sanctioned term loan and cash credit facilities at an enhanced rate beside taking over the existing liabilities. Purposes of doing so were clearly mentioned in the agreement to which the parties were abide by. Some of the properties in form of land, plant & machineries were kept as 1st charge against the term loan while some personal properties of the directors were kept as collateral securities. Suppressing the actual stock holding value, the companies, from the very beginning started submitting inflated stock holding value and finally, stopped submitting the statements. The directors withdrew huge sum of money from the cash credit account of the companies and diverted the same in their personal real estate business. Soon thereafter, they resigned from the companies surreptitiously without informing the PNB in order to take themselves away from the liability of the loan of the company. The directors withdrew huge sum of money from the cash credit account of the companies and diverted the same in their personal real estate business. Soon thereafter, they resigned from the companies surreptitiously without informing the PNB in order to take themselves away from the liability of the loan of the company. Interestly enough, they did not even ask the PNB to release them from the liabilities as guarantors when the management of the companies was changed. They wanted to wash their hands off the entire episode. No only that, they also challenged the claim of the PNB over the collateral securities in DRT. The new director, the Petitioner Vijay Kr. Kanoria although informed the PNB about change in management, did not acknowledge the liability undertaken by the erstwhile directors of the companies. Again, it is not correct to say that the F.I.R. does not disclose the fraudulent and dishonest intention of the petitioners in the matter of deceiving the bank incognizance with the then senior branch manager R.R.Mishra. The investigation of the case ended in a charge-sheet also suggesting a strong prima facie case against the petitioners. Taking everything into consideration, it appears to this court that this is not a proper case continuation of which would be abuse of the process of the court as claimed by Mr.Basu. Fraudulent and dishonest intention to deceive the bank from the very inception can well be gathered from the fact situation of the case, conduct of the petitioners, suppression of material facts, not bringing in the margin money prescribed in the sanction for the specific purposes and their efforts to wash their hands off the deal. Therefore, this court finds it inexpedient to exculpate the petitioners by way of quashing the proceedings in exercising its power under section 482 of the Code on the ground that no case is, prima facie, made out against them. 19. However, this court doubts about the correctness of the charge under section 471 of the IPC brought against the petitioners. It is the case of the prosecution that the petitioners submitted inflated stock holding value, time to time, suppressing the actual value and thereby committed the offence of ' forgery'. In J. TH. 19. However, this court doubts about the correctness of the charge under section 471 of the IPC brought against the petitioners. It is the case of the prosecution that the petitioners submitted inflated stock holding value, time to time, suppressing the actual value and thereby committed the offence of ' forgery'. In J. TH. ZWART & others (supra) the division bench of this court held that incorporation or inclusion of false statement in a document would not ipso-facto make the document false for a document to be false it has to tell a lie about itself. It is true, in this case, false statements showing inflated stock holding value were filed, time to time, but, that itself does not necessarily made those documents forged documents. The documents were real and genuine but containing incorrect informations. Therefore, the offence under section 471 possibly has not been made out against the petitioners. The decision in M.Narayan Das (supra) is not applicable here as the same was based on different fact-situation. 20. The second point raised by Mr.Basu is purely technical one but, of course, important as it questioned the legality and validity of the investigation of the case itself. In view of Mr. Basu when the Government of India superseded its earlier notifications [i] No-7/5/55-AVD dated. 6.11.1956 [ii] No-7/1/57 AVD dt.12.2.1957 [111] No-7/7/57-AVD dt.21.6.57 and [iv] No-7/3/57 dt.27.8.57 and issued new notifications under section (3) & (5) of the Act , the earlier consent given by the Govt. of West Bengal under section -6 of the act became infructuous. The notification of the Govt. of West Bengal was related to the earlier notifications of the Govt. of India, which by virtue of supersession subsequently on 18.2.1963 , became non-est for not being ratified by another notification under section -6 of the Act 21. Section -6 of the CBI Act is reproduced below:---"Consent of state Government to exercise of powers and jurisdiction-----Nothing contained in section --5 shall be deemed to enable any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to exercise powers & jurisdiction in any area in a state, not being a union territory of Railway area, without the consent of that state." 22. In State of West Bengal vs. Committee for Democratic Rights & others (supra), it was held that authorities of CBI can be extended to State/states under section--5 of the Act but can not function unless the state concerned accords consent to do so. This court in Goutam Ghoshal(Supra) followed the view of the Apex court in the above mentioned case. It is a trite law and the issue is no longer res-integra. However, in Goutam Ghoshals case, the West Bengal Govt. Notification no-1869PL dt. 21.4.1960 was not placed before the court by the CBI and the court also did not take that notification into consideration. Had that notification been taken into consideration, the view would have been different. This court, in another case--Babul Chouby (supra) discussed this particular issue on similar point raised by the Ld. counsel for petitioner. This court observed--" It is true that the Government of India's notification dated 6.11.56 under section 3 of the Act was substituted by their notification dated 18.2.63. But the substituted notification retains the several sections of the I.P.C., mentioned in the earlier Notification. There was, therefore, no gap between the supersession of one notification and the enforcement of the other. In other words the effects of section 3 of the Act so far as the offences mentioned in the present criminal case is concerned was no affected by the substitution of the old notification by a new one. What the West Bengal Government's notification No-1869 P1 dt. 21.4. 60 purported to serve is that it conveyed the consent of the state Government to the Delhi Special Police Establishment to investigate the offences specified in the different Notifications mentioned therein. Thus without mentioning the offences directly the State Government referred to the documents in which the offences were mentioned. So change of the documents does not affect the efficacy of the notification giving the consent provided the subject-matter of consent remained unaltered. It is not the case of the petitioner that the offences under sections 420, 468 and 471 of the I.P.C. have ceased to be included within the Notifications issued under section -3 and 5. As a matter of fact simultaneous order under section 5 of the Act contained in the other notification issued under section-3 of the Act on the same day. As a matter of fact simultaneous order under section 5 of the Act contained in the other notification issued under section-3 of the Act on the same day. It is, therefore, clear that the notification and order dated 18.2.63 have not affected the validity of the consent given by the state Government by its Notification dated 21.4.60. It has not been suggested by any of the parties that this consent was subsequently withdrawn. So, I hold that the authority of the CBI, to investigate the offences involved in the case has not been vitiated for want of consent of the State Government under section-6 of the Act." 23. The view above taken by this court appears to be convincing. The position was clarified more precisely by Apex court in M.Balakrishnan Reddy(supra) .It was observed by the Honourable court that the Section -3 refers to notification and requires the Central Government to issue notification specifying the offence or class of offences to be investigated by the CBI . Section--5 uses the term 'order' and enables the Central government to extend powers and jurisdiction of CBI to other areas not covered by the Act. Section--6 which speaks of consent of the State Government for the exercise of powers and jurisdiction of CBI neither refers to 'notification' nor 'order'. It merely requires consent of the State Government for the application of the CBI Act. Parliament advisedly & deliberately did not specify the mode, method or manner for granting consent though in two preceding sections such mode was provided. 24. In the instant case, the notifications under section-3 and -5 of the Act dt. 6.11.1956, 12.2.1957, 21.6.1957 & 27.8.1957 of the Government of India were superseded by another notification dt.18.2.1963 but, did not change the contents of the superseded notifications. In fact, all those earlier notifications are combined together in a subsequent notification without omitting the offences of the IPC and other Acts investigation of which by the CBI was allowed by the Government of West Bengal vide No-1869 PL dt. 21.4.1960. In fact, all those earlier notifications are combined together in a subsequent notification without omitting the offences of the IPC and other Acts investigation of which by the CBI was allowed by the Government of West Bengal vide No-1869 PL dt. 21.4.1960. So, when the Government of West Bengal has neither issued any order of fresh consent in respect of investigation by CBI nor rescinded it but issued new notification under section-6 of the Act in respect of other offences not found place in the earlier notifications, it can well be assumed that consent once given by the Government of West Bengal is still continuing as far as the offences covered by the earlier notification. Government of West Bengal intended to continue applicability of its notification and, accordingly, no ratification of the notification dt. 18.2.63 was required further and, as such, the same has not affected the validity of the State Government notification dt 21.4.1960 .In the facts and conspectus above, this court finds it difficult to accept the contention of Mr.Basu on this issue also. 25. In view of the discussion above, this court declines to exercise its extraordinary power under section 482 of the Code and quash the proceedings as prayed for. However, the case is supposed to be tried by the Special court established for the CBI cases and avenues are open to the petitioners to pray for their discharge under section 239 of the Code in that court. Since that court will be having all the documents and evidence in detail, it can take an independent view without being influenced or swayed by this order. 25. Accordingly, the applications stand dismissed and disposed of without cost. 26. Urgent certified copy of the order be supplied to the parties on compliance of usual formalities 27. Order interim stay if any, stands vacated.