JUDGMENT 1. Heard Mr. Pise, the learned advocate for the petitioner and Ms. V.S. Mhaispurkar, the learned APP for the State. 2. Rule. By consent, rule made returnable forthwith. By consent, heard finally. 3. By this writ petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India, the petitioner challenges the externment order dated 11.4.2011, passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Miraj, SubDivision Miraj, under Section 56(1) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”) externing the petitioner from the districts of Sangli, Satara, Kolhapur and Solapur, for a period of two years. The petitioner had challenged the said order by filing an appeal under Section 60, but the State Government dismissed the same. 4. On 20.8.2010, the petitioner was served with a notice by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Miraj Division, Miraj, to show cause, as to why he should not be externed from the districts of Sangli, Satara, Kolhapur and Solapur, for a period of two years. The notice stated that the petitioner was being given an opportunity, to show cause with respect to the allegations levelled against him, vide the said notice, and that he was at liberty to give his say, either in writing or orally. The notice, inter alia, alleged that the petitioner was “cruel”, “dare devil” and of a “vindictive” type. That, on 2.9.2009, he had spread rumours among the Muslim community, and as a result of it, about 400 to 500 persons assembled at Miraj Laxmi Market and gave slogans as “LANGUAGE” That, some of the persons in the mob were holding green flags and were loudly giving the aforesaid slogans, and that, though there was a prohibition for an assembly or procession, issued by the Competent Authority under Sub Section (3) of Section 37 of the said Act, and that, an appeal was made by the police to maintain peace, the petitioner did not pay any heed to the same and climbed on a police jeep, holding green flag in his hand and started dancing on the jeep. That therefore, the mob became offensive and started throwing stones on the mob of Hindu ShivSainiks, who were standing there and that, persons from both the communities started throwing stones on each other. That, as a result, a communal riot took place in Miraj city and during the riots, 37 cognizable cases were registered at the City Police Station. That therefore, the mob became offensive and started throwing stones on the mob of Hindu ShivSainiks, who were standing there and that, persons from both the communities started throwing stones on each other. That, as a result, a communal riot took place in Miraj city and during the riots, 37 cognizable cases were registered at the City Police Station. It was alleged in the said notice that the petitioner was the 'ringleader' “LANGUAGE” behind the said crimes. The notice also mentioned the details of the cases registered against the petitioner as follows: 5. The petitioner replied to the said notice denying the allegations. After holding an inquiry, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Miraj, Sub-Division Miraj, passed the impugned order, the appeal against which was, as aforesaid, dismissed on 24.6.2011. 6. A number of contentions have been raised by the petitioner in support of his claim that the impugned order is bad and deserves to be quashed. It is however, not necessary to refer to all such contentions, because during the oral arguments, only two contentions were pressed. The first is, that the order of externment is bad, on account of delay, that has been caused in the process. The second ground is, that the order suffers from the vice of being excessive, in as much as, though the incident on the basis of which proceedings came to be initiated against the petitioner had taken place in Miraj city, the petitioner had been externed from four districts. 7. I have carefully considered the matter. 8. A perusal of the impugned order shows that it claims to have been passed under Section 56(1)(a) of the said Act. The notice however, does not refer to any particular clause of Sub Section (1) of Section 56, and merely purports to be under Sub Section (1) of the said Section. Thus, without discussing this aspect further, it may be observed that some sort of vagueness was kept in the notice. 9. Clause (a) of Sub Section (1) of Section 56 deals with cases, where the movements or acts of any person, are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property. Thus, without discussing this aspect further, it may be observed that some sort of vagueness was kept in the notice. 9. Clause (a) of Sub Section (1) of Section 56 deals with cases, where the movements or acts of any person, are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property. The externment order does show that because of the crimes committed by the petitioner, a danger to the person and property of the residents of Miraj city and surrounding area had arisen and that there has been a breach of the peace and order in the city and creation of terror. The tenor of the order is that the petitioner had aroused the religious feelings of the Muslim community, had hurt the sentiments of the persons from other religions, had created terror in society, and that basically because he was responsible for the communal riots, that had taken place on 2.9.2009, he was being externed. Now this consideration is outside the scope of Clause (a) of Sub Section (1) of Section 56, by virtue of which, the externment order is claimed to have been passed. Clause (a) as aforesaid, relates to the movements or acts of any person, which are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property, arousing communal feelings and being responsible for communal riots, is not contemplated by the said Clause. 10. The order also says that preventive actions had been repeatedly taken against the petitioner, but still there was no improvement in his behaviour. This has been given as one of the grounds, on which decision to extern the petitioner came to be taken. It was however conceded that no preventive action had actually been taken against the petitioner, at any time, and at any rate, there is no record of any such measures, having been taken against the petitioner, in the past. The affidavit in reply, filed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, also does not say that any preventive action had been taken, against the petitioner, in the past. Clearly therefore, this consideration for externing the petitioner, was factually incorrect and the said ground, nonexistent. 11. A perusal of the details of the cases, said to be pending against the petitioner, shows that they are given successive crime report numbers and are related to one single incident that had taken place on 2.9.2009. Clearly therefore, this consideration for externing the petitioner, was factually incorrect and the said ground, nonexistent. 11. A perusal of the details of the cases, said to be pending against the petitioner, shows that they are given successive crime report numbers and are related to one single incident that had taken place on 2.9.2009. It is also clear that all these cases are still under investigation and no charge sheet has been filed as yet in any of these cases. 12. It would be interesting to note the dates of certain events. The incident, on the basis of which, the action came to be initiated against the petitioner, is dated 2.9.2009. The show cause notice under Section 59 of the said Act, was issued to the petitioner on 20.8.2010, i.e. after about one year from the incident. The inquiry concluded and the order of externment came to be passed on 11.4.2011, i.e. after a period of more than one and a half year, from the date of the incident, which gave rise to the proposed action against the petitioner. 13. The externment order passed in this case is clearly bad in law and unsustainable. 14. The measure of externing a person cannot be lightly resorted to. Such action would be justified, only if there would be no other satisfactory way or method of tackling the problems, that would arise by the acts or actions of the person, proposed to be externed. Now, when for initiating an action by issuing a show cause notice, a time of more than one year, from the date of the alleged incident was taken, the whole necessity of the proposed action became doubtful. It had taken a further period of about six months, even thereafter, for passing the externment order. Apart from the fact, that the validity and even the bonafides of an action, based on a solitary incident that had taken place on 2.9.2009, is itself doubtful, the delay in taking the action must be held fatal, rendering the externment order bad, particularly because, in the intervening period, no new cases were reported against the petitioner. There was, therefore, no basis for the supposition, that in future also, similar offence would be committed by the petitioner, and that the petitioner had been committing the breach of peace. 15. There was, therefore, no basis for the supposition, that in future also, similar offence would be committed by the petitioner, and that the petitioner had been committing the breach of peace. 15. It has already been seen that the nature of the allegations against the petitioner and the tenor of the show cause notice, as also the impugned order, is not consistent with, what Clause (a) of Sub Section (1) of Section 56 of the said Act contemplates. The basic case is that the petitioner encouraged the communal riots to take place on 2.9.2009 and it is evident from the contents of the show cause notice itself, that a number of offences were registered against the petitioner in a communal riot, that had taken place between two communities. The show cause notice itself says that a mob of Hindu ShivSainiks had already assembled at the same place. Therefore, the attempt to bring the case of the petitioner within Clause (a) of Sub Section (1) of Section 56 of the said Act, does not appear to be tenable, even if, whether it is bonafide, is kept out of consideration. 16. It cannot be ignored that no charge sheet has been filed in any of the cases registered against the petitioner. Thus, no formal accusation, of he being responsible for the riot or having committed the alleged offences, has been levelled against him, even by the police till now. Under these circumstances, passing an externment order on the basis of registration of the cases against him, which obviously have been registered against several other persons, is absurd and unreasonable. 17. Lastly, externing the petitioner from four districts, for what took place in a part of Miraj, is excessive and cannot be allowed to stand. The acts attributed to the petitioner, have been committed by him along with the residents of a particular locality, and therefore, why there was a necessity of externing him from four districts, is difficult to understand and impossible to accept. 18. The impugned order also suffers from vagueness, in as much as, the notice did not specify under which clause of Sub Section (1) of Section 56, it was being issued, and the externment order, though purports to have been passed under Clause (a) of the said sub section, the assertions therein are not in consonance with the requirements of the said clause. Moreover, the impugned order refers to the provisions of Section 56(b)(1), and there being no such provision, apparently, the reference is to Section 56(bb)(1). Interestingly, the show cause notice did not make any reference to Clause (bb) of the said sub section of Section 56. Thus, the order also suffers from vagueness and inconsistency, indicating non application of mind. 19. The impugned order, thus, suffers from a number of vices. It suffers from non application of mind. It also suffers from the vice of being excessive. It also creates a doubt about it being bonafide, and at any rate, it is clearly unreasonable. 20. The order, being not in accordance with law, cannot be allowed to stand. 21. The petition therefore succeeds. The petition is allowed in terms of Prayer Clauses (a) and (b). Rule is made absolute accordingly.