Judgment :- Kanchan Chakraborty, J. 1) This appeal is directed against the judgment .and order dt.7.5.2010 passed by the Ld. Additional District & Sessions Judge, FT court no-3 at Sealdah in S.T. no-3(7) of 2008 arising out of Beniapukur P.S. Police Station case no-159 dt. 28.5.2008 thereby convicting the appellant Sk . Raju @ Lala under sections 395, 397& 412 of IPC read with section 34 IPC and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years with fine and further seven years for committing offence under section 412 IPC with fine. 2) Being dissatisfied with and aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence , the judgment is assailed on the following grounds:-[a] that the Ld. trial judge failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its proper and true perspective; [b] that the Ld. court framed the charges wrongly and improperly & thereby caused prejudiced to the appellant;. [c] that the Ld. court failed to consider that seizure was not supported by independent witness; [d] that evidence of important witnesses was withheld by the prosecution; [e] that the ld. ought to have considered that the accused persons made a specific case that they were shown to the witnesses before holding of Test identification parade; [f] that the court erred in accepting the statement of the accused under section27 of the Evidence Act; [g] that the court failed to take note of the contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses on material points; [h] that the judgment being otherwise bad in law, is liable to be set aside. 3. The prosecution case before the court, succinctly, was that on 28.5.2008 at about o1.25 hr. while Melvyn Gomes was walking along the A.J.C.Bose road flyover, he noticed a Tata Indigo car stopped by the side of the road after crossing him from behind. Thinking that it would possibly be a shuttle car and stopped to pick up passenger like him, Melvyn asked the driver as to whether he would go towards Ruby. The driver agreed. Menvyn approached the rear seat of the car and found some persons in the rear seat and another person sitting by the side of the driver. Melvyn was given room in the rear seat between the persons already sitting there. The driver agreed. Menvyn approached the rear seat of the car and found some persons in the rear seat and another person sitting by the side of the driver. Melvyn was given room in the rear seat between the persons already sitting there. When the car reached the seven-point crossing of park circus, the volume of the tape recorder was raised and the car turned towards the Sundari Mohan Avenue instead of bridge no-4. Melvyn asked the driver to stop the car but, the person sitting by his side took out a razor, held that in front of his face and told him to hand over whatever he was having with him and threatened him with dire consequences. The person who was sitting on the other side of Melvyn, in the meantime, brought out Melvyns' moneybag. Melvyn had to hand over his mobile phone to him out of fear. When the car crossed the Merina hotel and stopped at an isolated place, Melvyn was asked to get down. Melvyn got down from the car and the car sped of quickly. Melvyn, however, noticed that the number of the car was WB-2K-0281. Melvyn somehow retuned back home by a taxi. The moneybag which was taken away by the miscreant was containing about Rs.150,one H.S.B.C. credit card, one ICICI debit cum ATM card, driving licence & some papers. The mobile phone was a Nokia model no2760 bearing connection no.9830931386 & I.M.E.I.no 353116021083537. 3. The investigation of the case ended in a charge sheet. The appellant Sk. Razu and three others were arrayed to face the charges under sections-395 & 397 0f I.P.C. while the appellant Sk. Razu was also charged for committing offence under section-412 of the I.P.C. All of them denied the charges and were tried by the Ld. Court . Sk. Razu and other three accused were found guilty of offences under sections-395 &397 of I.P.C. while Sk. Razu was also found guilty of offence under section 412 of I.P.C. by the Ld. trial court. Hence, this appeal. 4. In course of the trial, 17 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution .Number of documents were admitted into evidence and marked exhibits no--1 to 39 from the side of the prosecution. The offending vehicle & stolen mobile phone, razors were also produced in court , admitted into evidence and marked Material exhibits. 5. Hence, this appeal. 4. In course of the trial, 17 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution .Number of documents were admitted into evidence and marked exhibits no--1 to 39 from the side of the prosecution. The offending vehicle & stolen mobile phone, razors were also produced in court , admitted into evidence and marked Material exhibits. 5. The point to be determined is whether the judgment impunged is sustainable in law? 6. A cursory perusal of the F.I.R. makes it crystal clear that the alleged incident was not witnessed by any person other than the victim Melvyn and the miscreants. Therefore, Melvyn Gomes , the victim is the most vital & important witness . It is to be borne in mind also that the miscreants were unknown to Melvyn and there was no reason, whatsoever, for him to implicate the appellant & others falsely. Another thing also important in this case is proper identification of the miscreants because one area of creminal jurisprudence is susceptible to miscarriage of justice is error in identification. Therefore, court, in such a case , should approach very cautiously. 7. Mr. Iman, Ld. counsel for the appellant contended that charges against the appellant were framed incorrectly and, as a result, the appellant was highly prejudiced. The appellant Sk. Razu was arrayed to face charges under sections-395, 397 & 412 of the I.P.C. Mr. Iman contended that when the number of miscreants was less than five (5), charge under section-395 of the I.P.C. should not have been framed. Secondly, he contended, that no charge under section -34 of I.P.C. was framed thereby not indicating that the miscreants allegedly acted jointly. It was further contended by Mr. Iman that when the appellant was charged under section-395 & 397 0f the I.P.C., he should not have been charged again under section 412 of I.P.C. and convicted for both the offences. It was contended by Mr. Iman that Test identification parade was not done in accordance with the provisions of law and the Ld. trial court failed to consider that the accused/suspects were shown to the witness before holding of the test parade. Mr. Iman also argued that the story of recovery of the stolen mobile phone was not supported by any independent witness and the Ld. tyrial ought not have believed that story of the prosecution. 8. Mr. Ghosh, Ld. trial court failed to consider that the accused/suspects were shown to the witness before holding of the test parade. Mr. Iman also argued that the story of recovery of the stolen mobile phone was not supported by any independent witness and the Ld. tyrial ought not have believed that story of the prosecution. 8. Mr. Ghosh, Ld. Counsel for the respondent, State of West Bengal fairly conceded to the submission of Mr. Iman that the appellant should not have been convicted for both the offences under section 395/397 and 412 of the I.P.C. But, Mr. Ghosh contended that mere irregularity in framing of charges neither vitiated the trial nor resulted in acquittal of the accused unless and until that wrong framing of the charges caused serious prejudice to the accused. He, however, did not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Iman that the T.I.P. was not held in accordance with the provisions laid down by the law and that the suspects were shown to the witnesses prior to holding of the T.I.P. Mr. Ghosh contended further that the seizure of the articles which were produced in the court might not have been supported by the independent witnesses but merely on that ground, the evidence of the police officials can not be disbelieved and discarded specially when the seized articles were identified in court by the witnesses. Mr. Ghosh in reply to the contention of Mr. Iman submitted that the statement of the accused which was connected with the fact of discovery is admissible in law and there was no mistake on the part of the Ld. trial court to admit those statements into evidence. According to Mr. Ghosh, the case was proved beyond doubt and the judgment being well reasoned is not required to be upset in this appeal. 9. At the Bar, the following decisions have been referred:--- [a] State of Kerala Vs. Tomas alias Boby--1986 SCC(cri) 176; [b] Kamaraj Gounder & others --CRLJ 1952 819; [c] Chatru vs. The State-AIR 1953 Bilaspur-3; [d] State of Kerala vs.Abdul Rasheem-- 2006 CRLJ 3169 ; [e] Sidha Dehury vs. State-1882 CRI.L.J--500; [f] State of A.P. vs. Thakidiram Reddy-1998(6) SCC-554; [g] Sanichar Sahni vs. State of Bihar- AIR 2010 SC 3786 ; [h] Ravindra Shantaram Sawant vs.State of Maharastha-- 2002(5) SCC 604 ; [i] Lal Singh & others vs. St. Of U.P.-2003(12) SCC-554 and [j] a decision of this High court reported in (2011) Cr.L.J. 1249 Cal. 10. Mr.Iman, Ld. Counsel for the appellant contended that the alleged offence was committed by four[4] persons & charges were also framed against four[4] persons. Therefore, it was not a case of dacoity but, at best, a case of robbery. So, framing charge under section 395 of the IPC caused serious prejudice to the appellant. On careful scrutiny of the case record shows that charge-sheet was filed against five persons including one Sambhu Pramanik. on 7.7.2008 ,the Ld. Magistrate found that said Sambhu Pramanik was a juvenile and , accordingly, he was placed before Juvenile Justice Board for trial separately. So, it is not correct to say that the offence alleged was committed by four [4] persons. Simply because one of the accused was found juvenile & tried separately, the offence of dacoity was not changed into an offence of robbery. The trial court was supposed to inform the accused about the offences they were to be tried & accordingly, framed the charges. Therefore, the Ld.trial court made no mistake in framing charge against the appellant under section-395 of IPC. It is true that no charge under section 34 of the IPC was framed against the accused but, they were found guilty of offence for having common intention to commit dacoity. The accused persons were tried jointly. The trial court also did not put any question to any accused over such a common intention in course of their examination under section-313 of the code but, came to a decision that the accused, in furtherance of their common intention, committed the offence. Now, the question is how fatal this omission would be for the prosecution? In State of Karnataka vs. Abdul Rashmeem (supra), the Honourable single judge of Karnataka High court observed that there was a grave lapse on the part of the trial court in not invoking section-34 for holding joint trial because absence of section 34n in the charge could enable each the accused to disclaim possession throwing blame on the others and thus ultimately making the case of the prosecution vulnerable in the trial. It was further observed that the trial judges should always bear in mind that unless the provisions of law relating to common intention, common knowledge, conspiracy and common object are invoked in the charge, it is not permissible to hold joint trial of two or more accused be it for the offences under IPC or any special enactment. With due respect to the observation of the Ld. Single Judge, this court is of opinion that the Ld. Single Judge did not consider whether that grave omission on the part of the trial court caused any prejudice to the accused. Sub-section (1) of section 464 of the code of criminal procedure expressly provides that no finding, sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charge, unless a failure of justice has, in fact, been occasioned thereby. In this context, the decision of the Apex court in State of A.P. vs. Thakkidiram Reddy (supra) can well be referred to. It is trite law that in judging a question of prejudice, as of guilt, court must act with a broad vision and look to the substance and not to technicalities and its main concern should be to see whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained fairly and clearly and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself. In the instant case, the accused persons including the appellant had a fair trial, had full opportunity to defend themselves, the substratum of the prosecution case was explained to them clearly and fairly. Therefore, this court is unable to hold that the appellant was in any way prejudiced due to the omission on the part of the trial court in not framing charge under section-34 and framing charge under section -412 of the IPC. However, Mr. Iman has correctly pointed out that when the appellant was convicted under section-395 of the IPC, he could not be convicted for the offence under section -412 of IPC. One can not be convicted for both theft and for receiving or retaining of the stolen properties. However, Mr. Iman has correctly pointed out that when the appellant was convicted under section-395 of the IPC, he could not be convicted for the offence under section -412 of IPC. One can not be convicted for both theft and for receiving or retaining of the stolen properties. It is established principle of law that simultaneous conviction for dacoity and receiving or retaining stolen property transferred by commission of dacoity is not permissible. Mr. Ghosh, Ld. counsel for the State of West Bengal fairly conceded to the proposition of law advanced by Mr. Iman on this issue. Therefore, on the face of the judgment impugned, it is found that the Ld. trial court has made a mistake in convicting the appellant for both the offences under section-395 and 412 of the IPC. 11. Since no other convict but only Sk. Raju preferred this appeal challenging the judgment impugned, this Court thinks it proper to restrict its discussion only to what is related to the appellant. In this case, the victim Melvyn Gomes was the most important and vital witness because no other person witnessed the alleged incident. Melvyn Gomes was examined as P.W. 2. His evidence relating to the incident is reproduced below:- “I was moving towards D.L. Khan crossing through A.J.C. Bose Road. I saw the time at my mobile phone that it was 1.25 a.m. At that time a white colour Tata Indica crossed me with slow motion and stopped in front of me. On that day my mother was at our flat near Ruby Hospital. I thought that the vehicle was shuttle car and I asked the driver whether he would give me lift towards Ruby Hospital or not? The driver agreed to give me lift up to Ruby Hospital. When I was about to board the vehicle through the 2nd gate of the vehicle, a man got down from the vehicle and asked me to occupy the middle seat. Then I boarded the vehicle and the vehicle and moving towards the fly over on A.J.C. Bose Road. After entering into the vehicle I saw that there are four other persons in the vehicle except the driver. Two persons sat by my right side one sat by my left side and another sat by the left side of the driver. Then I boarded the vehicle and the vehicle and moving towards the fly over on A.J.C. Bose Road. After entering into the vehicle I saw that there are four other persons in the vehicle except the driver. Two persons sat by my right side one sat by my left side and another sat by the left side of the driver. I suspected a foul play when I saw that the man sitting by the left side of the driver was operating the sound system of the vehicle. It is my impression that passengers of a shuttle car can not operate sound system of the shuttle car. When the vehicle crossed the 7 point crossing at part circus. I saw that the vehicle was moving straight towards lady Brabourne College by leaving my route towards south from the 7 point crossing. Then I asked the driver to stop the vehicle but the driver accelerated his speed and the persons who sat by the side of the windows, closed the window panes and the persons who sat by the left side of the driver asked the driver to switch on the A.C. of the car. Out of the five miscreants four are present in Court today. (The witness identifies the accused persons. The witness identifies accused Hyder Ali as the person who sat by his right side just by the side of the window. There is another person between the accused Hyder ali me by my right side. The said person is not present in Court today. (The witness identifies the accused Binod Kumar Yadav as the driver of the vehicle. The witness identifies the accused Abas Ali as miscreant who sat by the left side of the witness. The witness identifies the accuse Sk. Raju as the miscreant who sat by the left side of the driver of the vehicle. Then two miscreants took out two razors. Then one of them (identifying the accused Abbas Ali) asked me my address, otherwise he would kill me, he showed his razor. Another miscreant (identifying the accused Hyder Ali) showed me his razor from his seat. The miscreant who sat by my left side began to search me. Then the miscreant who sat by my left side took away a black colour small bag (school bag type) from me. Another miscreant (identifying the accused Hyder Ali) showed me his razor from his seat. The miscreant who sat by my left side began to search me. Then the miscreant who sat by my left side took away a black colour small bag (school bag type) from me. Someone of the miscreant asked another “cell Nikal” then the miscreant who sat by my left side took out my wallet and my cell phone from my two pockets of my jeans pant. Then says,” the person who sat by my right side took out my wallet from my jeans pant pocket, and the person who sat by my left side took out my cell phone from my pocket.” In the meantime the vehicle came up to Sundari Mohan Avenue. The vehicle took a ‘U’ turn and was moving towards Chittaranjan Hospital. Then the person who sat by my left side came to my right side and asked me to go to the left side. When the vehicle came near hotel ‘Marina’ the miscreants stopped the car and got me down from the vehicle.” 12. The P.W. 2 was cross-examined extensively but upon careful scrutiny of his evidence in cross-examination, I find that the defense failed to discredit his statement regarding the alleged incident. Not only the P.W. 2 identified all the four convicts including the appellant in Court but also identified the mobile phone, the purse, the credit and debit card and his signatures on various seizure lists placed before him in course of his examination. The facts narrated by the P.W. 2 corroborated the facts stated by him in the exhibit 2 i.e. the F.I.R. lodged by him. The P.W. 2 Melvyn Gomes made no mistake in identifying the appellant who was sitting by the side of the driver of the car. He stated that the person who was sitting between him and convict Hyder Ali was not present in Court. In fact, that man who was not found in Court by the P.W. 2 was none but Sambhu Pramanik who was placed before Juvenile Justice Board for trial separately. The P.W. 2 Melvyn Gomes had made no mistake by stating that there was four persons other than the driver inside the car. He also stated categorically about the role played by each of them. This appellant Sk. The P.W. 2 Melvyn Gomes had made no mistake by stating that there was four persons other than the driver inside the car. He also stated categorically about the role played by each of them. This appellant Sk. Raju was sitting by the side of the driver and that he switched on the sound system of the car when it reached 7 point crossing at park circus. He also directed the driver to switch on the A.C. of the car. The mobile phone was recovered from a wooden wall rack of the house of the appellant at 41H/1 Tiljala Road. That recovery was made pursuant to the statement of Sk. Raju, the appellant (Exhibit 37) by the P.W. 5 S.I. Md. Allarrakhha, who also arrested the appellant Sk. Raju. The P.W. 5 stated that he assisted the police of Anti dacoity section on 3.6.2008 in arresting the appellant Sk. Raju and recovery of mobile phone from his house leading to the statement of the appellant. He was present all along and witnessed the recovery. He identified his signatures on the seizure list, the recovered mobile phone as well as his signatures on the labels. The mobile phone which was recovered from the room the appellant was placed before the Court, identified by Melvyn Gomes, the P.W. 5 and other witnesses. The same was admitted into evidence and marked material exhibit II. The Nokia Mobile set bearing I.M.E.I. no. 351116021083537 was found without the SIM card from the room of the appellant. The number tallied with the number sated by Melvyn Gomes when he was examined in Court. The purchase bill of mobile set bearing same number in the name of Melvyn Gomes was also seized by police from Melvyn Gomes and admitted into evidence. It was marked exhibit 5/A. The P.W. 9, Mohan Thapa, and employee of Vodaphone also came forward and supported the prosecution case so far as it was related to the mobile phone which was taken away from Melvyn Gomes and recovered from the appellant Sk. Raju. The learned Trial Court while discussing this point had gone deep into the matter which is to be appreciated. The learned Trial Court left no issue behind in this matter and came to a definite findings that the seized mobile phone was the stolen mobile set of Melvyn Gomes. Raju. The learned Trial Court while discussing this point had gone deep into the matter which is to be appreciated. The learned Trial Court left no issue behind in this matter and came to a definite findings that the seized mobile phone was the stolen mobile set of Melvyn Gomes. There is no reason to upset that conclusion of learned Trial Court. Therefore, from the facts above this Court finds that the appellant Sk. Raju was one of the members of the dacoits who, in the pretext of giving a lift to Melvyn Gomes by a car driven by convict Binod Jadab, took active part in committing the dacoity, identified by Melvyn Gomes and others in Court during trial, made statement leading to discovery of the mobile phone stolen in course of dacoity and which was found kept in wooden wall rack in his room. As far as the appellant is concerned I must say that the above facts have been established to the hilt and the learned Trial Court appreciated the evidence properly taking everything into consideration. The statement leading the discovery which was marked as exhibit 37 was admitted into the evidence without any objection from the side of the defense. Therefore, the trial Court made no mistake in accepting the said statement as a piece of evidence. To be stated preciously, the statement leading to discovery was a vital and important piece of document which supported the prosecution case against the appellant besides his identification in Court and T.I.P. by Melvyn Gomes. Therefore, the contention Mr. Iman that the learned trial Court did not appreciate the evidence in his proper and true perspective cannot be accepted. 13. Mr. Iman, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that seizure of the subject mobile phone from the possession of the appellant was not supported by the private/independent witness. He had taken this Court to the deposition of P.W. 16 Md. Afsar and submitted that he did not support the prosecution case of seizure. On careful perusal of the deposition of P.W. 16 Md. Afsar, it appears that he stated that he put his signature when the accused persons were arrested. He also identified his signatures on the lebels put on material exhibit VI to VII which were marked exhibit 33 and 34. On careful perusal of the deposition of P.W. 16 Md. Afsar, it appears that he stated that he put his signature when the accused persons were arrested. He also identified his signatures on the lebels put on material exhibit VI to VII which were marked exhibit 33 and 34. He stated that his signatures on the above documents were taken near the premises at 55/1, 42E and 41/H Tiljala Road. The P.W. 16 also identified his signatures on the seizure list marked exhibit 13/A and 14/A. He, however, stated he had no idea about anything excepting putting signatures. P.W. 16 was declared hostile and in his cross examination by the prosecution he admitted that he was standing in front of the premises no. 41/H/1 Tiljala Road on the relevant date and time. He denied that mobile phone was recovered in his presence from the wooden rack fitted on a wall of the appellant. In his cross-examination by defense he stated that he put his signatures on blank papers. Mr. Iman contended that the learned Trial Court ought to have believed the statement of P.W. 16 and disbelieved the prosecution case of seizure of the subject mobile set from the house of the appellant. I do not like to put much importance on this contention of Mr. Iman. Besides the P.W. 16, two other witnesses i.e. P.W. 5 and P.W. 17 stated categorically that the subject mobile set was recovered from the wooden wall rack of the room of the appellant pursuant to statement of the appellant leading to discovery. Both the P.W. 5 and P.W. 17 were police officers and the P.W. 17 should have been in charge of the investigation of the case. In view of Mr. Iman, the testimonies of P.W. 5 and P.W. 17 was discarded in view of the fact that the independent witness P.W. 16 did not support their statements. There is no rule of law that evidence of police witnesses is to be disbelieved simply because they belonged to police department and connected with the investigation of the case. Amongst them, the P.W. 5 was not directly attached to the investigation of the case. There is no rule of law that evidence of police witnesses is to be disbelieved simply because they belonged to police department and connected with the investigation of the case. Amongst them, the P.W. 5 was not directly attached to the investigation of the case. He was told by his higher official to assist the P.W. 17 in the matter of arrest of the appellant and recover the stolen article i.e. the mobile phone and two razors in pursuant to statement of accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Neither the P.W. 5 nor the P.W. 17 had any reason to make false statement in the Court. The statement leading to the discovery was admitted into evidence and marked exhibit without any objection. The recovered mobile set was shown to the P.W. 2 Melvyn Gomes during trial which he identified. The P.W. 5 and P.W. 17 also identified the same in Court. The seizure list was also admitted into evidence after being duly proved in accordance with law and marked exhibit. The signatures of the P.W. 5, P.W. 16 and P.W. 17 were also proved and identified. The P.W. 16 was a local man of the area where the appellant was a resident. He could not deny his signatures on the seizure list and lebels but could easily deny that the seizure was done in his presence. He had reason to do so being a local man. Therefore, the learned Court made no mistake in accepting the prosecution case that the subject mobile set was recovered from the room of appellant and was duly seized under a seizure list. 14. Mr. Iman raised propriety of the identification of the appellant in the T.I.P. He stated that the suspects including the appellant reported the learned Magistrate (P.W. 8) who held the T.I.P and prepared the report (exhibit 21) that they were shown to the P.W. 2 by police prior to holding of T.I.P. The P.W. 8 had also taken a note of such reporting of the suspects in his report. That being the fact, the identification of the T.I.P of the appellant by the P.W. 2 cannot be relied on. In support of his contention Mr. Iman, referred to the decision in Sidha Dehury & Ors. Vs. State (Supra). That being the fact, the identification of the T.I.P of the appellant by the P.W. 2 cannot be relied on. In support of his contention Mr. Iman, referred to the decision in Sidha Dehury & Ors. Vs. State (Supra). In that case, the Honourable single judge of Orrissa High Court observed that the power to identify varies according to the power of observation and memory of the person identifying and each case depends on its own facts. But there are two factors which seem to be of basic importance in the evolution of identification evidence. The persons required to identify an accused should have had no opportunity of seeing him after the commission of the crime and before the identification and no mistakes are made by them or the mistakes made are negligible. The Honourable Judge, while observing the above view relied on a decision of the Honourable Apex Court in Chander Singh Vs. State of U.P. reported in 1973 Cr.L.J. 926. Mr. Iman also relied on another decision of Madras High Court in Kamraj Goundar & Ors. (Supra) in support his contention. 15. In the case of Kamraj Goundar, the witness had the opportunity of seeing the miscreants for a short time and the T.I. parade was held 15 months after the date of occurrence. In Sidha Dehury (Supra), the T.I.P. was a delayed one and was not at all properly conducted but stage managed by the I.O. In that case, one of the suspects was wearing a mask and one or two of them had painted limbs with black colour and two of them had put on napkin on their heads like turbans. The fact situation of above two cases and the case in hand were quite different. In the instant case, Melvyn Gomes (P.W. 2) had spent a considerable time with the suspects in the car. He could identify the appellant as the person sitting by the side of the driver and as the person who switched on the music system of the car. Not only he identified the appellant in Court but prior to that identified him in the T.I.P. The T.I.P was conducted by the P.W. 8. P.W. 8 stated that Melvyn Gomes identified all the suspects in the T.I.P. by touching the heads of the suspects. He further stated that the T.I.P. was held inside Presidency Correctional Home. Not only he identified the appellant in Court but prior to that identified him in the T.I.P. The T.I.P was conducted by the P.W. 8. P.W. 8 stated that Melvyn Gomes identified all the suspects in the T.I.P. by touching the heads of the suspects. He further stated that the T.I.P. was held inside Presidency Correctional Home. He identified the report of T.I.P. dated 21.6.2008 which was marked as exhibit 21. He stated that he observed all the formalities necessary for holding T.I. parade. In his cross-examination he stated that the suspect were mixed up with 50 others U.T.Ps. He had also taken note of the fact the other U.T.Ps who were mixed up with the suspects were similar to their age, dresses, appearance, complexion etc. as far as practicable. However, he stated, the witness did not tell him which suspect played what role. He also taken note that after completion of T.I.P., the suspects informed him that they were identified by the I.O. to the witness when they were detained in the police custody. The exhibit 21 i.e. report of the T.I.P reflected what the P.W. 8 had stated. Mr. Iman contended that the learned Court ought to have accepted what the suspects informed the P.W. 8 after holding of T.I.P. There was every possibility of the P.W. 2 to see the suspects in the police custody prior to holding of the T.I.P. Therefore, according to him, the possibility of showing the suspects to the witness (P.W. 2) by the I.O. before the T.I.P. cannot be ruled out and in that case, the report of the T.I.P and identification of the suspect by the P.W. 2 became useless. I find no substance in the contention of Mr. Iman. It is true that when a dacoity committed the victim was in a state of extreme excitement with heavy sense of fear and evidence of identification of such person required closed scrutiny before the same is accepted. In the instant case, the T.I.P. was held on 21.6.2008. The appellant and others were arrested and produced on 1.6.2008 in Court. The T.I.P was held within 20 days thereafter. In the instant case, the T.I.P. was held on 21.6.2008. The appellant and others were arrested and produced on 1.6.2008 in Court. The T.I.P was held within 20 days thereafter. The learned Trial Court discussed the issue of delay in holding T.I.P. elaborately and came to a finding that there was no unusual delay in making prayer for holding T.I.P. On careful perusal of the case record it appears that the I.O. of the case prayed for police custody of the appellant and others till 14.6.2008. The learned Magistrate allowed police custody till 7.6.2008. The period of P.C. was extended till 12.6.2008 and thereafter, it was extended till 16.6.2008. On 16.6.2008, the I.O. prayed for T.I.P. The record was placed before the learned Magistrate, 3rd Court for holding T.I.P on 12.6.2008 and the learned Magistrate fixed the date of holding of T.I.P on 21.6.2008. Therefore, there was no delayed prayer for T.I.P. of the appellant and other suspects. The T.I.P. was held on the date as fixed by the learned Magistrate. The I.O. had no hand in fixing the date of T.I.P. immediately after production of the appellant and others before the Court on expiry of the period in police custody. As such there was no delay in holding T.I.P. because of any latches on the part of the I.O. It is to be noted here that nowhere within the length and breath of the prosecution case as depicted in the F.I.R., it was stated that the miscreants had covered their faces either by any cloth or mask or by paint. It is already started that P.W. 2 spent considerable time with the miscreants in the small car. It is already started that P.W. 2 spent considerable time with the miscreants in the small car. There was no evidence, whatsoever, to the effect that the P.W. 2 was called on in the police station by the I.O. or any police official while the appellant and others were in police custody excepting the information given by them to the Magistrate (P.W. 8) after holding of the T.I.P. The appellant while examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. stated that he was identified to the witness by the police before T.I.P. It is pertinent to take note of the fact that such information was not given by the suspects including the appellant to the P.W. 8 before holding of the T.I.P. or at the moment when the witness appeared in front of them inside the correction home for the purpose of T.I.P. They waited till holding of the T.I.P and made a statement of like nature to the Magistrate. That was because they waited to know the result of the T.I.P. Had they been not identified by the P.W. 2, they would not have stated that fact to the Magistrate. If the appellant was shown to the witness while he was in police custody, he obviously had known the witness beforehand and could have informed the Magistrate that the said witness came to the police station and the I.O. shown the appellant to him. Therefore, this belated statement of the appellant, in fact and in substance, has no value at all. This was a general alibi usually taken in almost all cases of dacoity when a witness identified the suspect. In the instant case, the P.W. 2 identified the appellant in Court and stated categorically what role the appellant played while the incident had taken place. Learned Trial Court, as it appears from the judgment impugned, discussed the entire matter elaborately and came to a findings that the appellant was properly identified as a member of dacoits who allegedly committed the offence. When the P.W. 2 had ample opportunity to see the appellant at the time of dacoity and identified him in the T.I.P as well as in the Court, conviction can be recorded basing on such identification especially when booty was recovered from the possession of the appellant. In this context the decision of Honourable Apex Court in Lal Singh and Ors. Vs. In this context the decision of Honourable Apex Court in Lal Singh and Ors. Vs. State of U.P, reported in (2003) 12 SCC 554 (Supra) can well be referred to. It was held by Hon’ble Court that where the prosecution case was based on evidence of identification and same was corroborated by evidence of recovery of looted articles, evidence has to be considered in its entirety. In view of the facts above, this court finds that the learned Trial Court made no mistake in coming to a conclusion that the appellant was properly identified both in T.I.P and in Court by the witnesses. This Court also finds that there is nothing to question the propriety of the T.I.P. It was done after observing all the formalities and in presence of Officer of the Correctional Home. Nowhere it is found that any police official was present within sight and hearing of the place of T.I.P. at the relevant time or prior to holding of the T.I.P. There is no evidence excepting the alibi of the appellant that he was shown to the P.W. 2 by the I.O. prior to T.I.P while he was in police custody. The looted booty i.e. mobile phone was found and recovered from his possession immediately after his arrest pursuant to his statement leading to discovery. The prosecution case proved to the hilt. No further corroboration, in such a case, was required. Therefore, this Court finds no reason to upset the judgement of conviction of the appellant. 16. In the Conspectus of the facts and circumstances above as well as evidence recorded by the learned Trial Court, it appears to this Court that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court convicting the appellant for committing offence under Section 395 of the I.P.C. is not required to be interfered with. The judgement to that extent is affirmed. 17. However, the conviction and sentence for committing offence under Section 412 of IPC is set aside. 18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part. The appellant is acquitted from the charge under Section 412 of IPC but, he is found guilty of offence under Section 395 of IPC and should undergo the term of imprisonment as imposed by the learned Court in respect of offence under Section 395 of IPC. The appeal, thus, is disposed of.