ORDER 1. The instant writ petition is filed by the petitioner, Smt. Pratima Saha, wife of deceased Bikash Saha who was brutally beaten by the extremists on 16.8.2011, subsequently died on 17.8.2011 and on which incident, a case was registered being Airport police station case No. 70 of 2011, for directing the State respondents for further investigation of the aforesaid police case, as the Investigating Officer (I.O) did not examine one Sri. Bidhan Datta, son of late Arun Datta, who was admittedly an eye-witness of the incident of beating/killing the deceased Bikash Saha though he personally met with the I.O and narrated the said incident what he had actually seen. 2. Heard Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P who appears for and on behalf of the respondents and also filed affidavit in opposition on behalf of the respondents. 3. The background facts of the case are as follows: In the night of 16.8.2011, the husband of the petitioner deceased Bikash Saha had been brutally beaten by the extremists and as he was injured due to such assault, he was shifted to Narsingarh PHC for his treatment and from there, he was referred and brought to AGMC & GBP Hospital, but ultimately he succumbed to his injuries there on the following day i.e. 17.8.2011. 4. One Nikhil Ghosh of Bagadi village lodged a written complaint on 17.8.2011 with the Officer In-charge, Airport P.S. before the death of the husband of the petitioner which was treated as FIR and the said police case was registered under Section 326 IPC. 5. As the husband of the petitioner ultimately succumbed to the injuries, Section 302 of the IPC was added and finally, the I.O. filed the charge-sheet against one Tapan Sen as accused. 6. After filing the charge-sheet, the case was committed in the court of the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala who thereafter transferred the same before the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, for trial. 7. The petitioner being the wife of the deceased is the real victim as she lost her husband and interested in the case to see that the actual culprit should be punished under the law of the land after proper trial. But fact remains that the police submitted the charge-sheet under Section 302 IPC without examining the eye-witness Sri. 7. The petitioner being the wife of the deceased is the real victim as she lost her husband and interested in the case to see that the actual culprit should be punished under the law of the land after proper trial. But fact remains that the police submitted the charge-sheet under Section 302 IPC without examining the eye-witness Sri. Bidhan Dutta who himself allegedly disclosed the matter to the I.O. of the case and not only that the petitioner and her mother in law also met with the I.O. of the case along with eye-witness Bidhan Datta. Thus, in absence of such eyewitness, if the trial is completed, then the real culprit would not be punished, rather he would get the benefit of such non-examination and non-citation of the eye-witness as witness in the charge-sheet. Hence, according to the petitioner, for fair trial, further investigation is necessary. 8. It is also stated by the petitioner that even after filing of the charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Cr. P.C., further investigation is not debarred in view of the decisions of the Apex Court as well as the Gauhati High Court of the State of Tripura since establishment of High Court of Tripura. 9. The respondents filed their affidavits in opposition stating that neither the complainant nor the alleged eye-witness Sri. Bidhan Datta approached the concerned officer In-charge of the Airport Police Station or the Sub-divisional Officer stating that the said Datta had seen the incident of beating/killing the petitioner’s husband before filing of the charge-sheet which was done within one month from the date of registration of the case. 10. After filing of the writ petition, this Court on 30.4.2013, taking note of the paragraphs-7, 8 & 9 of the writ petition directed Sri. Bidhan Datta son of late Arun Datta resident of village-Bhagalpur, P.S. Airport, West Tripura for filing an affidavit on the aforesaid paragraphs of the writ petition wherein it has been stated that after few days of the murder of her husband, he contacted the petitioner and her family and he informed the petitioner that he was the eye-witness of the incident on 16.8.2011 in which the husband of the petitioner was beaten to death by extremists. He also informed the petitioner and Smt. Ratna Saha, mother-in-law of the petitioner, mother of the deceased that on that night of 16.8.2011, he witnessed Gautam Datta village Narsingharh, Nandalal Bahadur alias Jhutan Bahadur son of late Hiramol Bahadur of village Narsinghar Natunpally, Airport P.S. to beat the deceased Bikash Saha by wooden file mercilessly and after such merciless beating, Bikash Saha was left abandoned on the road and he further informed the petitioner and her mother-in-law that besides him, there were other witnesses and the petitioner and her mother-in-law along with one Swapan Datta met with the respondent No. 4, the Officer In-charge of the Airport police station and they were also accompanied by Bidhan Datta, the eye-witness. 11. In terms of the order of this Court, said Bidhan Datta also filed an affidavit before this Court stating as under: “2. That, on 16.8.2011, I was returning home at about 10 p.m. when I was passing through the Narsingarh Bazar towards my home, I saw Goutam Datta of Narayanpur, P.S. - Airport and Nandalal Bahadur alias Jutan Bahadur, S/o Lt. Hiramol Bahadur, Narsinghar, Natun Palli, P.S. Airport to strike Bikash Saha of Narsingarh Bazar by wooden file. After giving him many strikes they left Bikash Saha lying on the Road. 3. That, about a week after I informed Pratima Saha W/o Bikash Saha what I saw on 16.8.2011. I told her that I saw Goutam Datta and Nandalal alias Jutan Bahadur to strike her husband Bikash Saha by wooden files in the night of 16.8.2011 at Narsingarh Bazar as at that time I was proceeding through the Narsingarh Bazar to my home. 4. That, after few days myself, Smt. Pratima Saha W/o Bikash Saha, mother-in-law of Pratima Saha and Swapan Datta, Upapradhan of Narsingarh Gram Panchayat went to Airport P.S. There I told Sri. Babul Das, who was the O.C. of the Narsingarh P.S. at that time, what I witnessed in the night of 16.8.2011 at Narsingarh Bazar while I was returning home. I informed the O.C. in front of the above named persons, that, I witnessed Goutam Datta and Nandalal Bahadur alias Jutan Bahadur to hit Bikash Saha by wooden files several times. 5. That, Babul Das, the then O.C. of the Narsinghar P.S. became furious and he was very much annoyed. He abused and threat­ened me in front of those persons. 6. 5. That, Babul Das, the then O.C. of the Narsinghar P.S. became furious and he was very much annoyed. He abused and threat­ened me in front of those persons. 6. That, what I stated to Babul Das, the then O.C of the Narsingarh P.S. in front of Smt. Pratima Saha, mother-in-law of Pratima Saha and Swapan Datta, Upapradhan of Narsingarh Gram Panchayat, in connection with incident of 16.8.2011, which took place in the night at Narsinghar Bazar in respect to the attack on Bikash Saha, was not reduced into writing by Babul Das, O.C. of Airport P.S. in my presence and in presence of above named other persons.” 12. Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner while urging for relief sought for would contend that further investigation in a case is even permissible after taking cognizance of the offence if the police received any information which would help the trial and in that case, no formal permission from the Magistrate is even required though the trial Court cannot suo motu direct for further investigation having taken cognizance of an offence and upon appearance of the accused. 13. He further submits that there is distinction between further investigation and reinvestigation. Reinvestigation of a case is a new and fresh investigation wiping out the earlier investigation. But further investigation is nothing but continuation of an earlier investigation. In the instant case, the petitioner is not asking for reinvestigation of the case, but for further investigation and further investigation is permissible even after submission of police report in view of the decisions of the Apex Court which have been followed in Rana Sinha alias Sujit Sinha v. State of Tripura & Ors. (2011) 5 GLR 388. 14. He also submits that the law relating to further investigation is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Apex Court as well as the decision rendered by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in Rana Sinha (supra), wherein a Division Bench also discussed as and when a direction can be issued for further investigation by the High Court exercising its power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. and ultimately held that ‘there was and there is, however, no limitation, on the part of the High Court, to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 when the appellant, who stands in the position of a victim, has approached this court seeking to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, because it is this power, which is befittingly available to the High Court to undo the wrong and take the wholly indispensable step to direct further investigation in order to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice and there is no denial of the victim’s right to demand a fair investigation, which is as much guaranteed under Article 21 as in the case of an accused and ultimately allowed the prayer for further investigation.’ 15. He again submits that in the instant case also, unless eye-witness Bidhan Datta is examined by the investigating agency and also some other persons whose names are known to Sri. Datta are examined, then the present petitioner, the victim wife of the deceased and her family members would not get justice. More so, the trial, if any, held in absence of those witnesses, then the real truth would not come out and the petitioner and her family members would not get substantial justice. 16. Mr. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P submits that the contention of the petitioner that she and her mother-in-law along with alleged eye-witness Sri. Bidhan Datta met with the Officer In-charge of the Airport police station before filing of the charge-sheet is not correct. He further submits that even after filing of the charge sheet, further investigation can be ordered by the Court for the interest of justice but in that case, the Court has to see as to whether the investigating agency willfully withheld the witness or not. He again submitted that the alleged eye-witness Bidhan Datta has admittedly filed one affidavit stating, inter alia, that he had met with the I.O. prior to the filing of the charge-sheet along with the petitioner and his mother-in-law and stated regarding the inci­dent, but their statements being not recorded by the I.O of the case cannot be considered as final one. He finally contended that if the court considering the facts and circumstances involved in the case passes an order of fur­ther investigation, then the State would act accordingly. 17. He finally contended that if the court considering the facts and circumstances involved in the case passes an order of fur­ther investigation, then the State would act accordingly. 17. This Court has given anxious thought to the submission of the learned counsel of the parties and also gone through the con­tention made in their respective pleadings. The respondents in their affidavit in opposi­tion though did not deny the facts that the petitioner and her mother-in-law along with Upapradhan of the village and alleged eye­witness Bidhan Datta appeared before the I.O. of the case, but their contention is that prior to filing of the charge-sheet, they did not meet the I.O. 18. The affidavit filed by the alleged eye­witness supports the contention of the peti­tioner regarding the meeting of the I.O of the case, the relevant portion of which has al­ready been reproduced in the preceding para­graph of this order. 19. After going through the statement and the counter-statement of the parties and the affidavit of the alleged eye-witness Bidhan Datta, this Court is of considered opinion that even when the criminal case is pending for trial, then also an order of further investiga­tion can be passed for the interest of justice, but the Court cannot pass order either for re-investigation or for a fresh investigation unless such investigation and reinvestigation is called for in the interest of justice in a extra­ordinary circumstances considering the con­stitutional right to fair trial. 20. In Samaj Parivartan Samudaya & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., AIR 2012 SC 2326 , the Apex Court held : “18. Once the investigation is conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cr. P.C., a police officer is bound to file a report before the Court of competent jurisdiction, as contemplated under Section 173, Cr. P.C., upon which the Magistrate can proceed to try the offence, if the same were triable by such Court or commit the case to the Court of Session. It is significant to note that the provisions of Section 173(8), Cr. P.C. open with non obstante language that nothing in the provisions of Section 173(1) to 173(7) shall be deemed to preclude further investi­gation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate. Thus, under Section 173(8), where charge-sheet has been filed, that Court also enjoys the jurisdiction to direct further investigation into the offence. Thus, under Section 173(8), where charge-sheet has been filed, that Court also enjoys the jurisdiction to direct further investigation into the offence. [Ref. Hemant Dhasmana v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (2001) 7 SCC 536 ) : ( AIR 2001 SC 2721 )]. This power cannot have any inhibi­tion including such requirement as being obliged to hear the accused before any such direction is made. It has been held in Shri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwandha Maharaj v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., JT 1999 (4) SC 537: ( AIR 1999 SC 2332 ) that the casting of any such obligation on the Court would only result in encumbering the Court with the bur­den of searching for all potential accused to be afforded with the opportunity of being heard.” xxx xxx xxx xxx “26. We have referred to these provisions and the scope of the power of the criminal court, in view of the argument extended that there are certain complaints filed by private persons or that the matters are pending be­fore the court and resultantly this Court would be not competent in law to direct the CBI to conduct investigation of those aspects. We may notice that the investigation of a case or filing charge-sheet in a case does not by itself bring the absolute end to exercise of power by the investigating agency or by the Court. Sometimes and particularly in the matters of the present kind, the investigating agency has to keep its options open to con­tinue with the investigation, as certain other relevant facts, incriminating materials and even persons, other than the persons stated in the FIR as accused, might be involved in the commission of the crime. The basic pur­pose of an investigation is to bring out the truth by conducting fair and proper investi­gation, in accordance with law and ensure that the guilty are punished. At this stage, we may appropriately refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2009) 1 SCC 441 : ( AIR 2009 SC 984 ) wherein an investigation was being conducted into wrongful appointments to Panchayat and other posts by the Police Department of the State. However, later on, these were con­verted into a public interest litigation regard­ing larger corruption charges. (2009) 1 SCC 441 : ( AIR 2009 SC 984 ) wherein an investigation was being conducted into wrongful appointments to Panchayat and other posts by the Police Department of the State. However, later on, these were con­verted into a public interest litigation regard­ing larger corruption charges. The matter was sought to be referred for investigation to a specialised agency like CBI. The plea taken was that the Special Judge was already seized of the case as charge-sheet had been filed before that Court, and the question of refer­ring the matter for investigation did not arise. The High Court in directing investigation by the CBI had exceeded its jurisdiction and as­sumed the jurisdiction of the Special Judge. The plea of prejudice was also raised. While rejecting these arguments, the appeals were dismissed and this Court issued a direction to the CBI to investigate and file the charge-sheet before the Court having appropriate jurisdiction over the investigation. The rea­soning of the Court can be examined from paragraphs 63 to 65 of the said judgment, which reads as under:-- “63. The High Court in this case was not monitoring any investigation. It only desired that the investigation should be carried out by an independent agency. Its anxiety, as is evident from the order dated 3-4-2002, was to see that the officers of the State do not get away. If that be so, the submission of Mr. Rao that the monitoring of an investigation comes to an end after the charge-sheet is filed, as has been held by this Court in Vineet Narain ( AIR 1998 SC 889 ) and M.C. Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam) v. Union of India ( AIR 2007 SC 1087 ) loses all significance. 64. Moreover, it was not a case where the High Court had assumed a jurisdiction in regard to the same offence in respect whereof the Special Judge had taken cognizance pur­suant to the charge-sheet filed. The charge-sheet was not filed in the FIR which was lodged on the intervention of the High Court. 65. As the offences were distinct and dif­ferent, the High Court never assumed the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to direct reinvestigation as was urged or otherwise.” xxx xxx xxx “36. The charge-sheet was not filed in the FIR which was lodged on the intervention of the High Court. 65. As the offences were distinct and dif­ferent, the High Court never assumed the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to direct reinvestigation as was urged or otherwise.” xxx xxx xxx “36. Now, we shall proceed on the assump­tion that the illegalities, irregularities and offences alleged to have been committed by the affected parties are the subject-matter, even in their entirety, of previous investiga­tion cases, sub judice before various Courts including the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It is a settled position of law that an investigating agency is empowered to con­duct further investigation after institution of a charge-sheet before the Court of compe­tent jurisdiction. A Magistrate is competent to direct further investigation in terms of Sec­tion 173(8), Cr.P.C. in the case instituted on a police report. Similarly, the Magistrate has powers under Section 202. Cr.P.C. to direct police investigation while keeping the trial pending before him instituted on the basis of a private complaint in terms of that Section. The provisions of Section 210, Cr.P.C. use the expression ‘shall’ requiring the Magis­trate to stay the proceedings of inquiry and trial before him in the event in a similar sub­ject-matter, an investigation is found to be in progress. All these provisions clearly in­dicate the legislative scheme under the Cr.P.C. that initiation of an investigation and filing of a charge-sheet do not completely debar further or wider investigation by the investigating agency or police, or even by a specialized investigation agency. Signifi­cantly, it requires to be noticed that when the court is to ensure fair and proper investiga­tion in an adversarial system of criminal ad­ministration, the jurisdiction of the Court is of a much higher degree than it is in an in­quisitorial system. It is clearly contemplated under the Indian Criminal Jurisprudence that an investigation should be fair, in accordance with law and should not be tainted. But, at the same time, the Court has to take precau­tion that interested or influential persons are not able to misdirect or hijack the investiga­tion so as to throttle a fair investigation re­sulting in the offenders escaping the punitive course of law. It is the inherent duty of the Court and any lapse in this regard would tantamount to error of jurisdiction. 37. It is the inherent duty of the Court and any lapse in this regard would tantamount to error of jurisdiction. 37. In the case of Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar (2009) 6 SCC 346 : ( AIR 2009 SC 2308 ) this Court was considering the scope of Sections 173(8), 173(2) and 319 of the CrPC in relation to directing further investi­gation. The accused raised a contention that in that case, report had been filed, charges had been framed and nearly 21 witnesses had been examined and at that stage, in furtherance to investigation taken thereafter, if a supplementary charge-sheet is filed and wit­nesses are permitted to be summoned, it will cause serious prejudice to the rights of the accused. It was contended that the Court has no jurisdiction to do so. The Trial Court per­mitted summoning and examination of the summoned witnesses in furtherance to the supplementary report. The order of the Trial Court was upheld by the High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, a Bench of this Court observed : “14. Sub-section (1) of Section 173, CrPC makes it clear that every investigation shall be completed without unnecessary delay. Sub-section (2) mandates that as soon as the investigation is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government mentioning the name of the parties, nature of information, name of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circum­stances of the case and further particulars such as the name of the offences that have been committed, arrest of the accused and about his release with or without sureties. 15. 15. Among the other sub-sections, we are very much concerned about sub-section (8) of Section 173 which reads as under: “173.(8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-­section (2) has been forwarded to the Mag­istrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documen­tary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a fur­ther report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2).” A mere reading of the above provision makes it clear that irrespective of the report under sub-section (2) forwarded to the Mag­istrate, if the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, it is incum­bent on his part to forward the same to the Magistrate with a further report with regard to such evidence in the form prescribed. The abovesaid provision also makes it clear that further investigation is permissible, however, reinvestigation is prohibited. 16. The law does not mandate taking of prior permission from the Magistrate for fur­ther investigation. Carrying out a further in­vestigation even after filing of the charge-sheet is a statutory right of the police. Rein­vestigation without prior permission is pro­hibited. On the other hand, further investi­gation is permissible. xxx xxx xxx 18. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 clearly envisages that on completion of further in­vestigation, the investigating agency has to forward to the Magistrate a “further” report and not a fresh report regarding the “further” evidence obtained during such investigation. 19. As observed in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat, ( AIR 2004 SC 2078 ) the prime consideration for further in­vestigation is to arrive at the truth and do real and substantial justice. The hands of the investigating agency for further investigation should not be tied down on the ground of mere delay. In other words “[t]he mere fact that there may be further delay in conclud­ing the trial should not stand in the way of further investigation if that would help the court in arriving at the truth and do real and substantial as well as effective justice.” 21. In other words “[t]he mere fact that there may be further delay in conclud­ing the trial should not stand in the way of further investigation if that would help the court in arriving at the truth and do real and substantial as well as effective justice.” 21. In Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar, AIR 2008 SC 3102 as relied upon by Mr. Roy Barman, the Apex Court while dealing with Section 173 of the Cr. P.C. observed that “7. At this juncture it would be necessary to take note of section 173 of the Code. From a plain reading of the above section it is evi­dent that even after completion of investigation under sub-section (2) of section 173 of the Code, the police has right to further in­vestigate under sub-section (8), but not fresh investigation or reinvestigation. This was highlighted by this court in K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala, ( AIR 1998 SC 2001 ). It was, inter alia, observed as follows (SCC p.237, para 24) : (P. 2009, Para 25 of AIR) 24. The dictionary meaning of ‘further’ (when used as an adjective) is ‘additional; more; supplemental’. ‘Further’ investigation, therefore, is the continuation of the earlier investigation and not afresh investigation or reinvestigation altogether. In drawing this conclusion we have also drawn inspiration from the fact that sub-section (8) clearly en­visages that on completion of ‘further inves­tigation’ the investigating agency has to for­ward to the Magistrate a ‘further’ report or reports -- and not fresh report or reports -- regarding the ‘further’ evidence obtained during such investigation.” (Emphasis added) 22. In the case of Ramachandran ( AIR 2008 SC 3102 ) (supra), though the High Court directed fresh investigation, but the Apex Court held that the said direction is not permissible and ultimately directed for fur­ther investigation instead of fresh investiga­tion if required. As in the case of Rana Sinha (supra), the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court discussed all aspects relating to further investigation and in what circum­stances a further investigation can be directed by the Court, it would not be necessary to re-agitate the same thing in this judgment when this Court has relied the case of Rana Sinha (supra). 23. The case of Ramchandran ( AIR 2008 SC 3102 ), (supra) was subsequently approved by the Apex Court in Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel & Ors. 23. The case of Ramchandran ( AIR 2008 SC 3102 ), (supra) was subsequently approved by the Apex Court in Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1658, regarding the point of further investigation and reinvesti­gation, and held in para-17 of the said Re­port as under: “17. It is, however, beyond any cavil that ‘further investigation’ and ‘re-investigation’ stand on different footing. It may be that in a given situation a superior court in exercise of its constitutional power, namely under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India could direct a ‘State’ to get an offence investigated and/or further investigated by a different agency. Direction of a re-investi­gation, however, being forbidden in law, no superior Court would ordinarily issue such a direction. Pasayat, J. in Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar, (2008) 5 SCC 413 : ( AIR 2008 SC 3102 ), opined as under:-- “7. At this juncture it would be necessary to take note of Section 173 of the Code. From a plain reading of the above section it is evi­dent that even after completion of investiga­tion under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, the police has right to further in­vestigate under sub-section (8), but not fresh investigation or reinvestigation...” 24. In Kishan Lal v. Dharmendra Bafna & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 2932 , a question arose before the Apex Court as to whether a Magis­trate has a jurisdiction to direct reinvestiga­tion of a case from time to time as laid down under sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Cr. P.C. and the Apex Court while consider­ing the aforesaid question taking note of its earlier decisions held that the Magistrate can also take cognizance on the basis of the ma­terials placed on record by the investigating agency and it is also permissible for the learned Magistrate to direct further investi­gation. In the said judgment, the Apex Court also held that further investigation can be made at various stages including the stage of trial, even after taking cognizance of the offence which will be evident from para­graphs 9 and 10 of the said Report which are as under: “9. In the said judgment, the Apex Court also held that further investigation can be made at various stages including the stage of trial, even after taking cognizance of the offence which will be evident from para­graphs 9 and 10 of the said Report which are as under: “9. It is now a well settled principle of law that when a final form is filed by any Investigating Officer in exercise of his power under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, the first informant has to be given no­tice. He may file a protest petition which in a given case may be treated to be a complaint petition, on the basis whereof after fulfilling the other statutory requirements cognizance may be taken. The learned Magistrate can also take cognizance on the basis of the materials placed on record by the investigating agency. It is also permissible for a learned Magistrate to direct further investigation. The Investigating Officer when an FIR is lodged in respect of a cognizable offence, upon completion of the investigation would file a police report. The power of investiga­tion is a statutory one and ordinarily and save and except some exceptional situations, no interference therewith by any court is per­missible. In Naresh Kavarchand Khatri v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [ (2008) 8 SCC 300 ] : ( AIR 2008 SC 2180 ), this Court held: “6. The power of the court to interfere with an investigation is limited. The police au­thorities, in terms of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, exercise a statutory power. The Code of Criminal Procedure has conferred power on the statutory authorities to direct transfer of an investigation from one Police Station to another in the event it is found that they do not have any jurisdiction in the matter. The Court should not interfere in the matter at an initial stage in regard thereto. If it is found that the investigation has been conducted by an Investigating Of­ficer who did not have any territorial juris­diction in the matter, the same should be transferred by him to the police station hav­ing the requisite jurisdiction. In Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [ 2009 (7) SCALE 214 ] : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1446), this Court held: “9. In Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [ 2009 (7) SCALE 214 ] : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1446), this Court held: “9. Interference in the exercise of the statutory power of investigation by the Police by the Magistrate far less direction for with­drawal of any investigation which is sought to be carried out is not envisaged under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magis­trate’s power in this regard is limited. Even otherwise, he does not have any inherent power. Ordinarily, he has no power to recall his order. This aspect of the matter has been consid­ered by this Court in S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari & Ors. [ (1970) 1 SCC 653 ] : ( AIR 1970 SC 786 ), wherein the law has been stated as under: “6. Without the use of the expression “if he thinks fit”, the second alternative could have been held to be independent of the first; but the use of this expression, in our opin­ion, makes it plain that the power conferred by the second clause of this section is only an alternative to the power given by the first clause and can, therefore, be exercised only in those cases in which the first clause is ap­plicable. 7. It may also be further noticed that, even in sub-section (3) of Section 156, the only power given to the Magistrate, who can take cognizance of an offence under Section 190, is to order an investigation; there is no men­tion of any power to stop an investigation by the police. The scheme of these sections, thus, clearly is that the power of the police to investigate any cognizable offence is un­controlled by the Magistrate, and it is only in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can in­tervene and either direct an investigation, or, in the alternative, himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to enquire into the case. The power of the police to investigate has been made indepen­dent of any control by the Magistrate.” Interpreting the aforementioned provi­sions vis-a-vis the lack of inherent power in die Magistrate in terms of Section 561-A of die old Criminal Procedure Code (equivalent to Section 482 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure), it was held: “10. The power of the police to investigate has been made indepen­dent of any control by the Magistrate.” Interpreting the aforementioned provi­sions vis-a-vis the lack of inherent power in die Magistrate in terms of Section 561-A of die old Criminal Procedure Code (equivalent to Section 482 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure), it was held: “10. This interpretation, to some extent, supports the view that the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code is that the power of the police to investigate a cognizable of­fence is not to be interfered with by the judi­ciary. Their Lordships of the Privy Council were, of course, concerned only with the powers of the High Court under Sec. 561-A, Cr.P.C., while we have to interpret Section 159 of the Code which defines the powers of a Magistrate which he can exercise on re­ceiving a report from the police of the cog­nizable offence under Section 157 of the Code. In our opinion, Section 159 was re­ally intended to give a limited power to the Magistrate to ensure that the police investi­gate all cognizable offences and do not refuse to do so by abusing the right granted for cer­tain limited cases of not proceeding with the investigation of the offence.” Yet again in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors. v. V. Narayana Reddy & Ors. [ (1976) 3 SCC 252 ] : ( AIR 1976 SC 1672 ), this Court, upon comparison of the provision of the old Code and the new Code, held as ­under: “7. Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption: “Information to the Po­lice and their powers to investigate”; while Section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears” the heading: “Of complaints to Magistrates”. The power to order police investigation un­der Section 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by Section 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commis­sion of a cognizable offence, the power un­der Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commis­sion of a cognizable offence, the power un­der Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3). It may be noted further that an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their ple­nary powers of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or charge-sheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceed­ings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empow­ered under Section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section an in­vestigation “for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding”. Thus the object of an investigation under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings al­ready instituted upon a complaint before him.” We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that recently a Division Bench of this Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [ (2008) 2 SCC 409 ] : ( AIR 2008 SC 907 ) while dealing with the power of the court to direct the police officer to record an FIR in exercise of power under Section 156(3) of the Code observed that the Magis­trate had also a duty to see that the investi­gation is carried out in a fair manner (cor­rectness whereof is open to question). 10. An order of further investigation can be made at various stages including the stage of the trial, that is, after taking cognizance of the offence. 10. An order of further investigation can be made at various stages including the stage of the trial, that is, after taking cognizance of the offence. Although some decisions have been re­ferred to us, we need not dilate thereupon as the matter has recently been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat [ 2009 (7) SCALE 559 ] : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1658) in the following terms: “16. This Court while passing the order in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32 of Constitution of India did not direct re-investigation. This court exercised its juris­diction which was within the realm of the Code. Indisputably the investigating agency in terms of sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code can pray before the Court and may be granted permission to investigate into the matter further. There are, however, certain situations, where such a formal request may not be insisted upon. 17. It is, however, beyond any cavil that ‘further investigation’ and ‘re-investigation’ stand on different footing. It may be that in a given situation a superior court in exercise of its constitutional power, namely under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India could direct a ‘State’ to get an offence investigated and/or further investigated by a different agency. Direction of a re-investi­gation, however, being forbidden in law, no superior court would ordinarily issue such a direction. Pasayat, J. in Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar, [ (2008) 5 SCC 413 ] : ( AIR 2008 SC 3102 ), opined as under:-- “7. At this juncture it would be necessary to take note of Section 173 of the Code. From a plain reading of the above section it is evi­dent that even after completion of investiga­tion under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, the police has right to further in­vestigate under sub-section (8), but not fresh investigation or reinvestigation...” 25. In Rana Sinha (supra), the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court taking note of various decisions of the Apex Court as discussed about the power of the High Court under Article 226/227 and held as under: “219. In Rana Sinha (supra), the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court taking note of various decisions of the Apex Court as discussed about the power of the High Court under Article 226/227 and held as under: “219. Since the learned single Judge has opted not to exercise, suo motu the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under the Code or its supervisory jurisdiction, under Article 227, as against that part of the impugned order, passed by the learned trial Court, whereby the learned trial Court had declined the learned Additional Public Prosecutor’s prayer for directing the police to conduct further investigation in order to overcome manipulation of the investigation by the ear­lier investigating officer, this Court would not, and cannot, now, pass any order in exer­cise of its either revisional jurisdiction un­der the Code or its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 as if this Court is, now, sitting as an appellate or revisional Court over the refusal to exercise jurisdiction, under Article 227, by the learned single Judge. 220. What logically follows from the above discussion is that, though styled as an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the writ application, which has, eventually, given rise to this writ appeal, was, in the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, an application under Article 226 and not 227. Since the learned single Judge has not exercised the power under Article 226, this Court is, now, required to determine if the learned single Judge, in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, ought to have directed ‘further investigation’. 221. While considering the above aspect of the case, one has to bear in mind that a fair investigation is concomitant of a fair trial. Without fair investigation, there can be no fair trial. It is, therefore, necessary for this Court to determine if the application, which the writ appellant had made in the learned Trial Court, deserved a direction for ‘further investigation’ or re-investigation and, simi­larly, this Court is also required to determine whether the application, which the Additional Public Prosecutor, had made was an appli­cation, which ought to have been allowed by the Court. Ordinarily, when a power can be exercised under Article 227, the court would not take resort to Article 226, because Ar­ticle 226 would, generally, be invoked, when there is no other alternative efficacious remedy. Ordinarily, when a power can be exercised under Article 227, the court would not take resort to Article 226, because Ar­ticle 226 would, generally, be invoked, when there is no other alternative efficacious remedy. On this principle, where a remedy can be provided under Article 227, the question of taking resort to Article 226 does not le­gitimately arise. xxx xxx xxx 230. The Supreme Court has made it clear, in MMTC Ltd. v. CCT, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 8 : ( AIR 2009 SC 1349 ), that when the cause title of an application mentions both Article 226 as well as Article 227, a single Judge is required to determine, according to the facts of each particular case, whether the application ought to be dealt with under Ar­ticle 226 or under Article 227. Had the learned single Judge exercised power under Article 227, the present letter patent appeal would not have been available. When an ap­plication is made under Article 226 as well as Article 227, the appellate court may con­sider whether the facts alleged warranted fil­ing of an application under Article 226 or 227. [See MMTC Ltd. (supra)] 231. Necessary it is, therefore, that when an application made does not warrant exercise of power under Article 227, the Court has to nevertheless decide if Article 226 is required to be invoked. In fact, in the case of Umaji Keshao Meshram and Ors. v. Radhikabai and Anr., reported in 1986 (Supp) SCC 401 : ( AIR 1986 SC 1272 ), the facts justified a party filing application under Article 226 as well as 227. Dealing with such a fact situa­tion, the Supreme Court took the view that the High Court, in order not to deprive the applicant of his valuable right to appeal, ought to treat the application under Article 226. 232. What surfaces from the above dis­cussion, held as a whole, may be summed up as under: Scope of Article 226 vis-a-vis Article 227 233. The power of superintendence under Article 227, though wide, is supervisory in nature. The power under Article 227 cannot, therefore, be exercised to interfere with an order if the order, made by a subordinate court or tribunal, is within the bounds of, or in conformity with, law. The power of superintendence under Article 227, though wide, is supervisory in nature. The power under Article 227 cannot, therefore, be exercised to interfere with an order if the order, made by a subordinate court or tribunal, is within the bounds of, or in conformity with, law. What is, however, extremely important to note is that while ex­ercising supervisory jurisdiction under Ar­ticle 227, the High Court not only acts as a court of law, but also as a court of equity. 234. It is, therefore, not only the power, but also the duty of the court to ensure that the power of superintendence is exercised in order to advance the cause of justice and uproot injustice. This power cannot, however, be exercised to interfere with an order of a subordinate court or tribunal if the order, made by the subordinate court or the tribu­nal, is, otherwise, within the bounds of law. If, therefore, a subordinate court or tribunal does not have a particular power and refuses, therefore, to pass an order, such an order can­not be interfered with by invoking Article 227, though such an order, if otherwise un­just, may be interfered with, in an appropri­ate case, by the High Court under Article 226. [Ramesh Chandra Sankla and others v. Vikram Cement and others, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 58 : ( AIR 2009 SC 713 )]. 235. Very wide powers have been given to the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 to advance the cause of justice and it is, there­fore, within the constitutional power of the High Court to ensure that no man is subjected to injustice by violation of law. If, therefore, an investigation is manipulated and/or un­fair, there would be no impediment, on the part of the High Court, to invoke, in an appropriate case, its extra-ordinary jurisdiction, under Article 226, at the instance of the in­formant, de facto complainant, aggrieved person or the victim. [See Ramesh Chandra Sankla and others v. Vikram Cement and oth­ers, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 58 : ( AIR 2009 SC 713 )].” 26. In the aforesaid judgment, the Divi­sion Bench has also discussed in detail about Article 21 of the Constitution which guaran­tees fair trial and also noted that a fair trial is impossible if there is no fair investigation. In the aforesaid judgment, the Divi­sion Bench has also discussed in detail about Article 21 of the Constitution which guaran­tees fair trial and also noted that a fair trial is impossible if there is no fair investigation. In order to make fair investigation, the in­vestigation must be conducted thoroughly without bias or prejudice, without any ulte­rior motive and every fact, surfacing during the course of investigation and eventually, on the trial must be recorded contemporane­ously by the Investigating Officer at the time of investigation. 27. By this time, it is settled that the I.O. should conduct the further investigation if he gets some new light regarding the crime which he could not get at the time of filing the charge-sheet and if such information can help to bring the truth as well as trial, in that case, even the I.O. can proceed for further investigation in the interest of justice, as the first and foremost duty of the I.O is to find out the true fact relating to crime and book the real culprit so that he can be punished by the Court of law for the offence committed by him and justice seeker can get the sub­stantial justice. If new facts brought to his notice by any witness, then in that case, he should not even wait for court’s order, as the statutes itself give him the power of further investigation and he shall submit the supple­mentary report which in this case, the inves­tigating officer, respondent No. 4, failed to do. The aforesaid view of this Court also gets support from Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali alias Deepak and Ors. (2013) 5 SCC 762 : (AIR 2013 SC (Cri) 292), wherein the Apex Court taking note of its earlier decision again con­sidered regarding the power of the investi­gating agency as well as judicial Magistrate regarding further investigation under Section 173(8), Cr. P.C. as well as power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. While discussing regarding initial investigation and further investigation as well as power of the investigating agency and the Magistrate un­der Section 173(8) has held: “15. A very wide power is vested in the investigating agency to conduct further in­vestigation after it has filed the report in terms of Section 173(2). P.C. While discussing regarding initial investigation and further investigation as well as power of the investigating agency and the Magistrate un­der Section 173(8) has held: “15. A very wide power is vested in the investigating agency to conduct further in­vestigation after it has filed the report in terms of Section 173(2). The legislature has spe­cifically used the expression ‘nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under Section 173(2) has been for­warded to the Magistrate’, which unambiguously indicates the legislative intent that even after filing of a report before the court of competent jurisdiction, the Investigating Officer can still conduct further investiga­tion and where, upon such investigation, the officer in charge of a police station gets fur­ther evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the pre­scribed form. In other words, the investigat­ing agency is competent to file a supplemen­tary report to its primary report in terms of Section 173(8). The supplementary report has to be treated by the Court in continua­tion of the primary report and the same pro­visions of law, i.e., sub-section (2) to sub­-section (6) of Section 173 shall apply when the Court deals with such report. xxx xxx xxx 21. The ‘initial investigation’ is the one which the empowered police officer shall conduct in furtherance of registration of an FIR. Such investigation itself can lead to fil­ing of a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code and shall take within its ambit the investigation which the empowered officer shall conduct in furtherance of an order for investigation passed by the court of compe­tent jurisdiction in terms of Section 156(3) of the Code. 22. ‘Further investigation’ is where the Investigating Officer obtains further oral or documentary evidence after the final report has been filed before the Court in terms of Section 173(8). This power is vested with the Executive. It is the continuation of a pre­vious investigation and, therefore, is under­stood and described as ‘further investiga­tion’. The scope of such investigation is re­stricted to the discovery of further oral and documentary evidence. Its purpose is to bring the true facts before the Court even if they are discovered at a subsequent stage to the primary investigation. It is commonly described as ‘supplementary report’. The scope of such investigation is re­stricted to the discovery of further oral and documentary evidence. Its purpose is to bring the true facts before the Court even if they are discovered at a subsequent stage to the primary investigation. It is commonly described as ‘supplementary report’. ‘Supple­mentary report’ would be the correct expres­sion as the subsequent investigation is meant and intended to supplement the primary in­vestigation conducted by the empowered police officer. Another significant feature of further investigation is that it does not have the effect of wiping out directly or impliedly the initial investigation conducted by the in­vestigating agency. This is a kind of continu­ation of the previous investigation. The ba­sis is discovery of fresh evidence and in con­tinuation of the same offence and chain of events relating to the same occurrence inci­dental thereto. In other words, it has to be understood in complete contradistinction to a ‘reinvestigation’, ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo’ investigation.” 28. From the Law Reports cited above, it can be said that power of further investi­gation is a significant power and the said power has to be exercised sparingly in ex­ceptional cases, but to achieve the ends of justice, fair and proper investigation in a criminal case is sine qua non and also an obligation of the investigating agency and for providing proper justice, Court should not hesitate to exercise its power either under Section 482 of the Code or even under Ar­ticle 226 of the Constitution, as the superior Court are vested with such power to do jus­tice to a victim like the petitioner herein and also to the society. 29. In the instant case, the victim peti­tioner is in apprehension that there would not be fair trial relating to the death of her de­ceased husband in absence of examination of alleged eye-witness Sri Bidhan Datta and the persons whom he had seen at the relevant time of incident. It is the duty of the State as well as the court of law to remove the doubt of the victim from his/her mind that she would not get justice either for the fault of the State investigating authority or by the court of law being the right of justice is a fundamental right of a justice seeker citizen. 30. It is the duty of the State as well as the court of law to remove the doubt of the victim from his/her mind that she would not get justice either for the fault of the State investigating authority or by the court of law being the right of justice is a fundamental right of a justice seeker citizen. 30. In view of the above, this Court is of further opinion that this is a fit case where an order of further investigation is to be passed. Accordingly, the respondents are di­rected to cause further investigation of Airport P.S. Case No. 70 of 2011 and submit necessary supplementary or additional police report in terms of Section 173 (2) of the Cr. P.C. as earlier a charge-sheet has already been submitted. The Investigating Authority is also directed to complete further investigation as expeditiously as possible preferably within six months and such further investigation shall be supervised and monitored by the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura. Till further investigation is com­pleted and police report is submitted, further, proceeding of the trial pending before the court below shall remain stayed. 31. With the above observation and direc­tion, the instant writ petition is disposed of. Petition allowed.