JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anurag Kumar, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 2.11.1999 rendered by Special Chief Judicial Magistrate Lucknow (Customs) in Complaint Case No. 1227/97. 2. Relevant facts for disposal of this appeal are as under : 3. The appellant is a sole proprietor firm and Ashwani Kapoor Proprietor being the proprietor of the firm is dealing in the business of Pace Battery. Respondent No. 1 purchased 10 peaces of new pace setter batteries costing Rs. 21,219 and issued a cheque No. 268297 dated 1.8.1996 drawn by the bank of Baroda Hewett Road Branch Lucknow in favur of the appellant. The appellant presented the cheque on 1.8.1996 in its bank that is Indian Overseas Bank, Main Branch Lucknow. On 3.8.1996 he was informed by the bank that the said cheque was received back unpaid with a note for want of sufficient fund. The appellant then contacted the respondent and informed him about non-payment of cheque, on which, respondent stated to produce the cheque again after some time and assured that now the cheque will be cleared. The appellant again produced the cheque, but it was again not cleared by the bank then the appellant vide letter dated 29.11.1996 asked the respondent to pay the amount of cheque. After receiving of the said letter. The respondent again stated to appellant that now the cheque will be cleared and requested him to deposit it again. On 29.1.1997, the appellant again despoited the cheque in its Overseas Bank, but again the cheque was received back with the note “Refund to drawer insufficient fund” cheque was received back to the appellant on 31.1.1997. appellant sent a registered notice on 8.2.1997 which was received by respondent on 20.2.1997, but even after expiry of 15 days time no payment was made by the respondent, appellant has no remedy except to file the complaint and he filed the present complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (in short “Act”). Learned lower Court after recording the evidence of the complainant and statement of respondent accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and hearing the parties by impugned judgment dated 2.11.1999 acquitted the respondent A.K. Singh on the ground that appellant has given notice to accused on 29.11.1996 and filed the complaint on 18.3.1997 after the limit prescribed under the Negotiable Instrument Act. 4. 4. Aggrieved from the said judgment, appellant/complainant filed the present appeal on the ground that the finding of the lower Court is based on the wrong interpretation of the evidence on record. The trial Court has failed to consider the fact that the respondent himself after receiving the letter asked to present the cheque again and promised to make arrangement for getting the cheque to be honoured. The appellant has presented the cheque only on the request of the respondent and as the cheque was presented on the request of the respondent, fresh cause of action occurred to him. The cheque can be presented for encashment any number of time within the period of its validity and its dishonour at every occasion will give rise to a fresh cause of action within the meaning of Clause (b) of Section 142 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. 5. Heard learned counsel for the respondent and learned A.G.A. for the State. None is present on behalf of the appellant on the date of argument and on previous date i.e. 9.11.2012. 6. The only point to be considered in this appeal is whether the time prescribed under the Act starts from the date of the first notice or it starts after the last notice; whether a new cause of action arises if on the request of respondent cheque was presented on second time. In the present case, there is no dispute that the cheque first time was presented in the bank on 1.8.1996 and was dishonoured on the ground of insufficient fund on 3.8.1996, on which, first request for payment within 15 days after receiving of request was made on 29.11.1996. The contention in the appeal of the appellant in this regard is that after 29.11.1996 respondent again made request for presenting the cheque for payment and on his request only appellant again presented the cheque on 29.1.1997 which was received back on 31.1.1997 unpaid and legal notice was sent on 8.2.1997 which was received on 20.2.1997 and from this second notice the complaint is well within time. The respondent’s counsel submits that cause of action arises from the first notice and it cannot be extended by second notice. Once the appellant gives a notice for payment, the cause of action accrued to him and it cannot be extended. 7. The respondent’s counsel submits that cause of action arises from the first notice and it cannot be extended by second notice. Once the appellant gives a notice for payment, the cause of action accrued to him and it cannot be extended. 7. From Section 142 of the Act, it is clear that the Court can take cognisance only on complaint made within one month of the date, on which the cause of action arises. The cause of action arises when a notice was served for payment of the cheque amount within 15 days of receipt of notice. In the present case, first notice was issued on 29.11.1996 though, it was said by the appellant that it was only a complainant’s request letter, but it is clear from the record and statement of the complainant that in that letter he has specifically written that the payment of the cheque amount was to be made within 15 days from the receipt of the notice and hence it amounts to a notice. 8. Hon’ble Apex Court in Tameeshwar Vaishnav v. Ramvishal Gupta, (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1033, held that cause of action for complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act arises only on with issuance of notice after dishonour of cheque and received thereof by drawer. 9. On a careful analysis of Section 138 of the Act, it is clear that for an offence under Section 138 of the Act, the conditions required are (i) the cheque should have been presented to the bank within six months of its issue or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier; (ii) payee should have made a demand for payment by registered notice after the cheque is returned unpaid; and (iii) that the drawer should have failed to pay the amount within 15 days of the receipt of notice. it is only when all the above three conditions are satisfied that a prosecution can be launched for the offence under Section 138. So far as the first condition is concerned clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 does not put any embargo upon the payee to successively present a dishonoured cheque during the period of its validity. it is only when all the above three conditions are satisfied that a prosecution can be launched for the offence under Section 138. So far as the first condition is concerned clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 does not put any embargo upon the payee to successively present a dishonoured cheque during the period of its validity. This apart, in course of business transactions it is not uncommon for a cheque being returned due to insufficient funds or similar such reasons and being presented again by the payee after sometime, on his own volition or at the request of the drawer, in expectation that it would be encashed. The primary interest of the payee is to get his money and not prosecution of the drawer, recourse to which normally, is taken out of compulsion and not choice. 10. From the above, it is clear that a cheque can be presented any number of time during the period of its validity. 11. Now it is to be seen that whether dishonour of the cheque on each occasion of its presentation gives rise to a fresh cause of action within the meaning of Section 142B of the Act. Section 142 reads as under: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- (a) no Court shall take congnisance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138; [Provided that the cognisance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period] (c) no Court inferior to that of a metropolitan magistrate or a Judicial magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138.” 12. From a plain reading of the above Section it is manifest that in normal circumstance a competent Court can take cognizance of a written complaint of an offence under Section 138 if it is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 and after the prescribed period of one month only in the exceptional circumstances when Court is satisfied about reason of late filing. 13. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) ‘cause of action’ means every fact which it is necessary to establish to support a right or obtain a judgment. Viewed in that context, the following facts are required to be proved to successfully prosecute the drawer for an offence under Section 138 of the Act : (a) that the cheque was drawn for payment of an amount of money for discharge of a debt/liability and the cheque was dishonoured; (b) that the cheque was presented within the prescribed period; (c) that the payee made a demand for payment of the money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer within the stipulated period; and (d) that the drawer failed to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. 14. If I had to proceed on the basis of the generic meaning of the term ‘cause of action’ certainly each of the above facts would constitute a part of the cause of action but then it is significant to note that clause (b) of Section 142 gives it a restrictive meaning, in that, it refers to only one fact which will give rise to the cause of action and that is the failure to make the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The reason behind giving such a restrictive meaning is not far to seek. Consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days as envisaged under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arises, and the period of one month for filing the complaint under Section 142 is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section 142 (c) arises and can arise only once. 15. Besides the language of Sections 138 and 142 which clearly postulates only one cause of action there are other formidable impediments which negates the concept of successive causes of action. One of them is that for dishonour of one cheque there can be only one offence and such offence is committed by the drawer immediately in his failure to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice served in accordance with clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138. That necessarily means that for similar failure after service of fresh notice on subsequent dishonour the drawer cannot be liable for any offence nor can the first offence be treated as non-est so as to give the payee a right to file a complaint treating the second offence as the first one. At that stage it will not be a question of waiver of the right of the payee to prosecute the drawer but of absolution of the drawer of an offence, which stands already committed by him and which cannot be committed by him again. 16. The other impediment to the acceptance of the concept of successive causes of action is that it will make the period of limitation under clause (c) of Section 142 otiose, for, a payee who failed to file his complaint within one month and thereby forfeited his right to prosecute the drawer, can circumvent the above limitative clause by filing a complaint on the basis of a fresh presentation of the cheque and its dishonour. Since in the interpretation of statutes the Court always presumes that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that the very part should have effect the above conclusion cannot be drawn for, that will make the provision for limiting the period of making the complaint nugatory. 17. Now, the question is how the apparently conflicting provisions of the Act, one enabling the payee to repeatedly present the cheque and the other giving him only one opportunity to file a complaint for its dishonour, and that too within one month from the date the cause of action arises, can be reconciled. 17. Now, the question is how the apparently conflicting provisions of the Act, one enabling the payee to repeatedly present the cheque and the other giving him only one opportunity to file a complaint for its dishonour, and that too within one month from the date the cause of action arises, can be reconciled. Having given my anxious consideration to this question, I am of the opinion that the above two provisions can be harmonised, with the interpretation that on each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour a fresh right - and not cause of action - accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of this such right under clause (b) of Section 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But, once he gives a notice under clause (b) of Section 138 he forfeits such right for in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. Needless to say, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer, expires. 18. From the above discussion, it is clear that as in the instant case, the first notice for demand was made on 29.11.1996 and complaint was filed on 18.3.1997, therefore, it must therefore be held that the complaints were filed beyond the period of limit and the learned Magistrate committed no error of law in rejecting the complaint. I find no illegality or irregularity in the impugned order. This appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. ——————