JUDGMENT K.J. Sengupta, J. This matter is taken up for admission hearing. An interesting point has arisen because of the submissions made by the Mr. P.Wilson, Additional Solicitor General of India, that the impugned order is an appealable one, if one reads Sec.35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (for brevity the Act) which has been adopted in the present statute for providing a mechanism for resolution of disputes between the assessee and the Revenue. He has drawn our attention to the aforesaid section, which is setout hereunder:- 35G. Appeal to High Court.-(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal on or after the 1st day of July, 2003 (not being an order relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment), if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. In support of his submission he has stated that recently Madras High Court has held in an unreported decision that this sort of an order is an appealable order and writ petition is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner replies that this order was passed on an application for dispensation of pre-deposit and it was not an order passed in the appeal. Reading the language plainly, of the aforesaid section, it will appear that the appealable order contemplated therein are orders passed in appeal and not on application of pre-deposit. He has not gone to the extent while arguing, that final order in appeal is an appealable order. In the context of the aforesaid contentions and rival contentions, this court is called upon to decide at the first instance whether the order of this nature is appealable within the meaning of Sec.35G of the Act. This decision requires adjudication at the first instance because ordinarily, statutory remedy is not ignored by the writ court in exercise of discretion under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It is settled position of the law that High Court imposes self-restriction in entertaining application in public law field without requiring litigant to resort to alternative remedy, wherever available. This decision requires adjudication at the first instance because ordinarily, statutory remedy is not ignored by the writ court in exercise of discretion under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It is settled position of the law that High Court imposes self-restriction in entertaining application in public law field without requiring litigant to resort to alternative remedy, wherever available. The nature and extent of power of High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution has been firmly established and explained by the Apex Court umpteen number of times and no one can dispute that power is always there. It is also settled that the High Court in case of breach of fundamental right of a private individual, constitutional right of private individual of public importance, violation of principles of natural justice and action taken without having any jurisdiction or total failure of exercise of jurisdiction entertains writ petition overlooking alternative remedy. Applying the said tests we have gone through the entire judgment and order which is impugned before us, we find the impugned order does not suffer from any of the defects as above. Here the question is whether Section 35G of the said Act affords alternative remedy or not. While reading carefully the language of the aforesaid section, we notice from the words "every order passed in appeal". It contemplates number of orders, not one or singular, and passing of the same is possible on several issues and problems in connection with appeal. Obviously interlocutory proceedings are contemplated to be filed. This is why Legisture has used the word "in appeal" not "on appeal". If it were so then in our opinion it would have been one order meaning final order. But that is not the intention of the Legislature because unless there is appeal, there cannot be any application for dispensation of pre-deposit, as the application of this nature is not independent one unlike when the application is made for dispensation of service of notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure at the time of filing of the suit against amongst other Government, as this application is an independent of suit not in the suit. Here the scheme of the provision is that one has to prefer an appeal first and then in connection therewith application for pre-deposit is to be made. Here the scheme of the provision is that one has to prefer an appeal first and then in connection therewith application for pre-deposit is to be made. Pre-condition of hearing of appeal is either pre-deposit or dispensation thereof either whole or part thereof. Under the circumstances we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the orders passed on the application for pre-deposit is not covered by Section 35G. We are fortified in our view by the judgment of the Madras High Court in case of M/s. Metal Weld Electrodes, Chennai Vs. M/s. Ellan Industries, Coimbatore, in W.P. No.24615 of 2012 and Batch, decided on 30.10.2013. We quote relevant paragraph No.39 of the said decision:- "We do not agree with the above contentions. We have already discussed in detail about the scope and ambit of section 35G and 130 of the respective Acts. We have also found that sub-section (2) of Section 35G and 130 of respective Acts enlarged the scope of appeal before the High Court with a specific intention of providing appeal against any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. Whether the phrase "any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal" would include even an interim order is the question, which, the petitioner seeks this Court to answer in negative." It is further held in paragraph No.40 as follows:- "We are unable to appreciate their contentions for the simple reason that the phrase "any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal" has to have the same meaning as given by the Apex Court in Raj Kumar Shivhare's case." In paragraph No.80, the Bench concluded as follows:- "Thus, by considering all the above facts and circumstances, we answer the reference as follows." The order passed by the CESTAT in terms of Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or Section 129-E of the Customs Act, 1962 is appealable in terms of Section 35G of the Excise Act, 1944 or Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962." We, therefore, hold this order is an appealable one. After the decision is rendered, learned counsel for the petitioner upon instructions submits that his client will avail of the alternative remedy. In view of the submission, we dispose of the writ petition by the following order:- The petitioner would be entitled to prefer appeal if advised in accordance with law. After the decision is rendered, learned counsel for the petitioner upon instructions submits that his client will avail of the alternative remedy. In view of the submission, we dispose of the writ petition by the following order:- The petitioner would be entitled to prefer appeal if advised in accordance with law. Accordingly, we allow the interim order passed already to operate for a period of ten days from date. After expiry of ten days, this interim order will stand vacated automatically unless upheld by the appellate forum or does not pass any order. We make it clear that our observation directing the order to be continued, should not be treated to be an influencing factor and it will be open for the appropriate authority to pass any order. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs. As a sequel to the dismissal of the writ petition, all the interim applications shall stand dismissed.