JUDGMENT : RAJ MANI CHAUHAN, J. (Chairperson) 1. This Miscellaneous Appeal under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred as "RDDBFI Act") has been directed by the Auction Purchasers against the judgment and order dated 23rd December, 2009 passed by the learned Presiding Officer (learned P.O.), D.R.T., Hyderabad, (Andhra Pradesh) in R.A. No. 3/2009 arising out of the Miscellaneous Petition (M.P.) No. 11/2006 in Recovery Proceeding (R.P.) No. 33/2002, whereby the learned. P.O. has allowed the Appeal filed by respondent No. 1 under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act against the order dated 5th June, 2009 passed by the then Recovery Officer in M.P. No. 11/2006 in R.P. No. 33/2002, whereby he had dismissed petition filed by the Applicant/respondent No. 1 under Rules 57 and 58 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 for setting aside the auction sale dated 9th January, 2003 conducted by him in R.P. No. 33/2002 in which the appellant, Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family were declared as successful purchasers. The relevant facts giving rise to the present Appeal may be summarized as under: 2. The respondent No. 2, Auriferous Aqua Farms Ltd., a Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, having its Registered Office at 10.1.27/1, Masab Tank, Hyderabad, A.P., involved in carrying on business of shrimp culture, availed Working Capital Loan Facility (WCLF) of Rs. 3,79,00,000/- (Rupees three crores seventy-nine lacs only) sanctioned by respondent No. 6, the State Bank of India with the following sub-limits: 3. The respondent No. 1, Shri Madhukar R. Bhangay; respondent No. 3, Mr. J. Sridhar Reddy; respondent No. 4, Mr. M. Sreedhar; and respondent No. 5, Mr. J. Gopal Reddy who were the directors of respondent No. 2, stood as guarantors to the credit facilities availed by the respondent No. 2, the borrower. 4. The respondent No. 1, Shri Madhukar R. Bhangay and respondent No. 3, Mr. J. Sridhar Reddy created equitable mortgage of their following immovable properties in favour of respondent No. 6 to secure the amount of loan availed by respondent No. 2 by depositing the title deeds: (1) Description of the mortgaged property created by respondent No. 1, Shri Madhukar R. Bhangay: Plot No. 623/3, 1593 sq. yards (1332 sq. J. Sridhar Reddy created equitable mortgage of their following immovable properties in favour of respondent No. 6 to secure the amount of loan availed by respondent No. 2 by depositing the title deeds: (1) Description of the mortgaged property created by respondent No. 1, Shri Madhukar R. Bhangay: Plot No. 623/3, 1593 sq. yards (1332 sq. mtrs.) in Survey No. 40/1 (New 120) of Sheikpet Village and Survey No. 102/1 of Hakimpet Village, within the limits of Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, A.P., personally known as "Jubilee Hills", Hyderabad bounded by as under: North: Plot No. 623/4 South: Plot No. 622/A East: Plot No. 621 West: Plot No. 30 feet, Road No. 34. (2) Description of the mortgaged property ordered by respondent No. 3, Shri J. Sridhar Reddy: House bearing Plot No. 747, admeasuring 1884 sq. yards (1577 sq. metres) in Survey No. (Old) 403/1 (New-120) of Sheikpet and Survey No. 102/1 of Hakimpet Village, within the limits of Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad with Ward No. 2, Block No. 8, presently known as "Jubilee Hills", Hyderabad, A.P. bounded by as under: North: Plot No. 50 feet wide Road No. 38 South: Plot Nos. 766, 767-A, 767-A East: Plot No. 748 West: Plot No. 746. (hereinafter referred as the 'suit property'). 5. Admittedly, the respondent No. 2 could not repay the amount of credit facilities availed by it within the stipulated time as provided in the Credit Facility Agreement. Consequently, respondent No. 6 had filed O.A. No. 123/1997 against the borrowers/guarantors in D.R.T. Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh at Bangalore for recovery of its outstanding dues of Rs. 1,78,48,687.80 (Rupees one crore seventy-eight lakh forty-eight thousand six hundred eighty-seven and paise eighty only) together with pendente lite and future interest @ 18.75% per annum with quarterly rests till full and final realization of the claimed amount. 6. The defendants despite service of summons, did not appear to contest the O.A. Consequently, the learned P.O., D.R.T. vide judgment and order dated 14th May, 1999 allowed the O.A. ex parte and ordered for issuance of Recovery Certificate for realization of the amount claimed by respondent No. 6. The learned P.O. accordingly, vide order dated 20th March, 2003 issued Recovery Certificate to recover the decretal amount which gave rise to R.P. No. 33/2002. 7. The learned P.O. accordingly, vide order dated 20th March, 2003 issued Recovery Certificate to recover the decretal amount which gave rise to R.P. No. 33/2002. 7. The Recovery Officer during pending R.P., proceeded to recover the decretal amount under the Recovery Certificate by way of attachment and sale of the following mortgaged immovable properties. The Recovery Officer vide order dated 27th November, 2002 issued Proclamation of Sale, fixing the reserve price indicated against each of the property based on the Valuation Report of the Valuer. The date of auction sale was fixed as 9th January, 2003. 8. The Recovery Officer conducted the auction sale of the aforesaid properties on the schedule date i.e. on 9th January, 2003. The auction sale of the suit property described at Sr. No. 1 was knocked down by the Recovery Officer in favour of Shri Mohammed Iftekar Hussain, who has offered the highest price of Rs. 1,60,00,000/- (Rupees one crore sixty lacs only). The auction sale of the property described at Sr. No. 2 in the aforesaid Proclamation of Sale knocked down by the Recovery Officer in favour of the appellant, Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family, who has made the highest offer of Rs. 82,00,000/- (Rupees eighty-two lacs only). The successful purchasers as per the direction of the Recovery Officer deposited 25% of the sale consideration immediately on the date of the auction sale along with poundage fee @ 1 %. The Recovery Officer directed them to deposit balance 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the auction sale i.e. up to 24th January, 2003. 9. The appellants on 15th January, 2003 wrote a letter to the Recovery Officer, D.R.T., Hyderabad, informing him that when they visited the Suit property and found a board installed thereon, wherein it was notified that the plot is under dispute, as a Land Grabbing Case No. 01/2003 is pending in the Special Court dealing with the Land Grabbing Case. The aforesaid case has been filed by the District Collector, Hyderabad against the Jubilee Hills Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Hyderabad. The above information as mentioned on the board was creating cloud on the title of the Suit property. The auction purchasers requested the Recovery Officer to clarify the above facts, so that they can pay the balance amount of the sale consideration. The Recovery Officer did not reply to the letter sent by the appellant. The above information as mentioned on the board was creating cloud on the title of the Suit property. The auction purchasers requested the Recovery Officer to clarify the above facts, so that they can pay the balance amount of the sale consideration. The Recovery Officer did not reply to the letter sent by the appellant. The auction purchasers again vide their letter dated 23rd May, 2003, wrote to the Recovery Officer that they did not receive any reply in response to their letter dated 15th January, from his level. They requested the Recovery Officer to look into the matter and do the needful in order to enable them to make payment of the balance 75% of the sale consideration. 10. The respondent No. 6 Bank on 1st August, 2003 moved an application before the Recovery Officer raising its grievance that the auction purchasers had not deposited the balance amount of the sale consideration in compliance of his order dated 9th January, 2003. The Bank therefore, requested the Recovery Officer to re-auction the Suit property. 11. The Recovery Officer on the application of respondent No. 6 issued notice to the appellants informing them that matter has been posted to 18th September, 2003 for hearing. The Recovery Officer directed the appellants to appear in person before him, as they had failed to pay the balance amount of the sale consideration with the stipulated time. The Recovery Officer however, in the aforesaid notice directed the appellants to deposit the balance 75% of the sale consideration immediately and further warned them that in case of failure to deposit the balance amount of sale considerations, the sale will be cancelled. 12. The matter was taken up by the learned Recovery Officer on 18th September, 2003. The Recovery Officer on that date passed an order, directing the appellants to pay the balance amount of sale consideration i.e. Rs. 61,50,000/- on or before 16th October, 2003. He further warned them in case they fail to pay the amount within the time allowed by him, the amount already deposited by them will be returned and the sale will be cancelled. The appellants, thereafter, deposited the balance amount of Rs. 61,50,000/- on 13th October, 2003 with the Recovery Officer. 13. 61,50,000/- on or before 16th October, 2003. He further warned them in case they fail to pay the amount within the time allowed by him, the amount already deposited by them will be returned and the sale will be cancelled. The appellants, thereafter, deposited the balance amount of Rs. 61,50,000/- on 13th October, 2003 with the Recovery Officer. 13. The appellants thereafter filed a WPMP No. 375/2005 in the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the Land Grabbing Case relating to the Suit property in which the Hon'ble Court vide order dated 11th April, 2005 was pleased to stay the proceeding of the Land Grabbing Case. The Recovery Officer on the request of the appellant vide order dated 23rd June, 2004, permitted them to keep their own security guards on the Suit property and they are admittedly in possession of the said property since then. 14. The respondent No. 1 moved M.A.I.R. Application No. 92/2004 before the learned P.O., D.R.T., Hyderabad, for setting aside the ex parte judgment and order dated 14th May, 1999 passed by him in O.A. No. 123/2007 which was delayed by 1790 days. The respondent No. 1, therefore, filed application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay in filing the aforesaid M.A.I.R. application. The applications were opposed by respondent No. 6, but the learned P.O. vide order dated 26th April, 2006 allowed the application for condonation of delay. 15. The respondent No. 6 being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the learned P.O., allowing the application for condonation of delay, filed Review Application (R.A.) No. 02/2006 before the learned P.O. which was rejected by him. 16. The respondent No. 6 feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, filed an Appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (in short "DRAT"). But these facts are not relevant for disposal of the present Appeal. 17. The respondent No. 1 thereafter filed Miscellaneous Petition (M.P.) No. 11/2006 under Rules 57 and 58 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act before the learned P.O. for cancellation of the auction sale conducted by him, selling the Suit property in favour of the appellant. The application was supported with the affidavit filed by respondent No. 1. 17. The respondent No. 1 thereafter filed Miscellaneous Petition (M.P.) No. 11/2006 under Rules 57 and 58 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act before the learned P.O. for cancellation of the auction sale conducted by him, selling the Suit property in favour of the appellant. The application was supported with the affidavit filed by respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 sought for cancellation of the auction sale, mainly on the ground that appellant had not deposited the balance 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the auction sale. The Recovery Officer while declaring the appellants as successful bidder on the date of the auction sale i.e. 9th January, 2003, directed them to deposit 25% of the sale consideration along with poundage fee immediately after the sale was knocked down in their favour and to deposit the balance amount of 75% of the sale consideration on or before 24th January, 2003. The Proclamation of Sale also provided that the successful purchaser has to deposit 25% of the sale consideration along with poundage fee @ 1% of the sale consideration immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour and he will have to deposit the balance 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the auction sale. The Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, also lays down the same provision. The compliance of the aforesaid provision is mandatory. Since the appellant has failed to deposit the entire sale consideration within the time provided in the auction sale notice as well as provided under Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, therefore, the auction sale is nullity and non-est in the eyes of law and therefore, the sale is liable to be cancelled. 18. The respondent No. 6 opposing the aforesaid M.P. No. 11/2006 filed by the respondent No. 1, filed affidavit in reply of one Mr. Mohd. Shafiulla Khan, Chief Manager, State Bank of India, Stressed Assets Management Branch, Near HPO, Secunderabad, A.P. The Deponent has stated that respondent No. 6 Bank had filed O.A. No. 123/1997 against the borrower and guarantor before the D.R.T. for recovery of its dues which was allowed by the learned P.O., D.R.T., vide order dated 14th May, 1999. The learned P.O. thereafter issued Recovery Certificate on 20th March, 2002 for recovery of the decretal amount. The learned P.O. thereafter issued Recovery Certificate on 20th March, 2002 for recovery of the decretal amount. The respondent No. 1 thereafter filed an application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and order along with Interim Application (I.A.) No. 525/2004 i.e. application for condonation of delay before the D.R.T. The application was opposed by respondent No. 6, but the learned P.O. vide order dated 26th April, 2006 allowed the aforesaid I.A. No. 525/2004 and condoned the delay of 1790 days. The respondent-Bank aggrieved by the aforesaid order, filed R.A. No. 02/2006 before the learned P.O. to review the order dated 26th April, 2006, which was dismissed by the learned P.O. vide order dated 31st July, 2008. The respondent-Bank aggrieved by the aforesaid order, has filed Misc. Appeal No. 228/2008 before the D.R.A.T., Chennai, which is pending for disposal. 19. The deponent has further stated that the Recovery Officer proceeded with R.P. in accordance with the Rules. The Recovery Officer conducted the auction sale of the Suit property on 9th January, 2003. The appellants were found to be the highest bidder of the Suit property at the auction sale. The appellant as per the terms and conditions provided in the Proclamation of Sale, deposited 25% of the sale consideration on the same day. The Recovery Officer allowed the auction purchaser to pay the balance amount of 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days, as provided in the Proclamation of Sale. The auction purchaser could not deposit the balance amount of 75% of the sale consideration within the stipulated time, on the ground that a Land Grabbing Case No. 1/2003 was pending in the Special Court dealing with Land Grabbing Cases. The Recovery Officer extended time for payment of the balance amount of the sale consideration. He vide order dated 18th September, 2003, directed the auction purchaser to deposit the balance amount of 75% of the sale consideration i.e. Rs. 61,50,000/- up to 16th October, 2003. The auction purchaser in pursuant to the aforesaid order, deposited the aforesaid balance amount of the sale consideration on 13th October, 2003 with the Recovery Officer. Since the auction purchaser has deposited the entire sale consideration within the time allowed by the Recovery Officer, the sale in favour of the auction purchaser has become absolute. The impugned auction sale conducted by the Recovery Officer cannot be cancelled. 20. The appellant opposing the aforesaid Misc. Since the auction purchaser has deposited the entire sale consideration within the time allowed by the Recovery Officer, the sale in favour of the auction purchaser has become absolute. The impugned auction sale conducted by the Recovery Officer cannot be cancelled. 20. The appellant opposing the aforesaid Misc. Petition filed by respondent No. 1, filed his affidavit. The appellant has stated that he along with family members had purchased the Suit property at the auction sale conducted by the Recovery Officer on 9th January, 2003. He as per the terms and conditions provided in the Proclamation of Sale had deposited 25% of the sale consideration along with the poundage fee @ 1%, totalling to Rs. 21,32,000/- with the Recovery Officer on the same day. The balance amount of the sale consideration was to be paid by them within 15 days from the date of the auction sale i.e. on or before 24th January, 2003. The Deponent has further stated that he thereafter, came to know that a Land Grabbing Case regarding the Suit property was pending before the Special Court established under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (P) Act. He therefore, vide letter dated 15th January, 2003, brought this fact to the notice of the Recovery Officer and sought for his clarification. The Recovery Officer vide order dated 18th September, 2003, directed him to deposit the balance amount of 75% of the sale consideration i.e. an amount of Rs. 61,50,000/- on or before 16th October, 2003. The Recovery Officer further ordered that the sale confirmation letter will be issued soon after the Land Grabbing Case is disposed of by the Special Court. They in compliance to the aforesaid order passed by the Recovery Officer had deposited the balance amount of the sale consideration of Rs. 61,50,000/- with the Recovery Officer on 13th October, 2003. The Recovery Officer in view of the facts of the case, extended time to deposit the balance amount of 75% of the sale consideration which was within his jurisdiction. The Recovery Officer after accepting the entire sale consideration vide order dated 23rd June, 2004, permitted the appellant to keep his security guards at their costs for watching over the safety and security of the Suit property. 21. The Recovery Officer after accepting the entire sale consideration vide order dated 23rd June, 2004, permitted the appellant to keep his security guards at their costs for watching over the safety and security of the Suit property. 21. The Deponent has further stated that the O.A. filed by respondent No. 6 was allowed by the learned P.O. vide judgment and order dated 14th May, 1999 and the Suit property was sold by Recovery Officer in Recovery Proceeding (R.P.) on 9th January, 2003 in favour of the appellant and his family members. The respondent No. 1 has filed Misc. Petition for setting aside the sale in the year 2004 which was highly barred by limitation. Admittedly, the Applicant/respondent vide his letter dated 4th January, 2003 had requested the Recovery Officer not to proceed with the auction sale of the Suit property to be conducted on 9th January, 2003. In this way, the Applicant was well aware of the R.P. since January, 2003, but he did not challenge the auction sale earlier. He along with his family has paid the entire sale consideration of the Suit property to the Recovery Officer, only the Sale Certificate is to be issued by the Recovery Officer which has been withheld by him, on the ground that the Land Grabbing Case is pending in the Special Court. The Recovery Officer has assured him that he will issue Sale Confirmation letter after the Land Grabbing Case is disposed of the Special Court. The Deponent has sought for dismissal of the Misc. Petition No. 11/2003 filed by the Applicant (respondent No. 1). 22. The Recovery Officer after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties rejected the aforesaid Misc. Petition No. 11/2003 filed by respondent No. 1 vide order dated 5th June, 2009, mainly on the ground that the petition filed by the Applicant was barred by limitation, as per Rules 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act. 23. The applicant/respondent No. 1 being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Recovery Officer, filed Appeal under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act before D.R.T., Hyderabad, A.P. The learned P.O., D.R.T. after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties vide impugned judgment and order dated 23rd December, 2009, allowed the Appeal filed by the applicant/respondent No. 1 and set aside order dated 5th June, 2009 passed by the learned Recovery Officer in Misc. Petition No. 11/2006 in R.P. No. 33/2002 in O.A. 123/2007. The learned P.O. consequently, allowed the M.P. No. 11/2006 and set aside the auction sale of the Suit property conducted by the Recovery Officer on 9th January, 2003. 24. The auction purchaser feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned P.O., has filed the present Appeal under Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act before Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai which has been transferred to this Appellate Tribunal for disposal. 25. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. From a perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the learned P.O., it appears that the learned P.O. has set aside the impugned auction sale conducted by the Recovery Officer on 9th January, 2003 mainly on the following grounds: (i) The respondent No. 1 vide his letter dated 4th January, 2003 had brought this fact to the notice of the Recovery Officer that he had not mortgaged Plot No. 623/3, admeasuring 1593 sq. yards situated at Jubilee Hill, Hyderabad. In fact, the Government of Andhra Pradesh through Collector, Hyderabad has filed Land Grabbing Case No. 105/1988 in the Special Court for Land Grabbing Case at Hyderabad. The Government has claimed the mortgaged Plot No. 623/3 to be its own. Moreover, the said plot is mortgaged with Dena Bank, Damoli Branch, Hyderabad, towards the loan he had taken from the Bank. In this way, the Recovery Officer before conducting the sale was well aware of the fact the title deeds of the Suit property to be sold, was not clear. Therefore, the Recovery Officer should not have conducted the sale of the said plot. (ii) The appellants as per the terms and conditions provided in the auction sale notice as well as the Rules 57 and 58 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act were required to deposit 25% of the sale consideration on the date of the auction sale immediately, the sale was knocked down in their favour. They were required to deposit balance 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the auction sale. But the appellant failed to deposit the balance 75% of the sale consideration within the stipulated time of 15 days from the date of the auction sale. They were required to deposit balance 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the auction sale. But the appellant failed to deposit the balance 75% of the sale consideration within the stipulated time of 15 days from the date of the auction sale. Therefore, the impugned auction sale conducted by the Recovery Officer was nullity as well as non-est in the eyes of law. (iii) The learned Recovery Officer observed that from a perusal of record, it appears that the auction sale was knocked down in favour of the individual name of Mr. Ramakanth Inani, whereas the order of the Recovery Officer dated 23rd June, 2004 shows that the auction sale was knocked down in favour of Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family; (iv) The learned P.O. has observed that the learned Recovery Officer has dismissed the petition filed by respondent No. 1, mainly on the ground that it was barred by time. But respondent No. 1 was not seeking to set aside the sale on the ground of material irregularity as contemplated under Rule 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, rather he is seeking cancellation of the auction sale conducted by the Recovery Officer in favour of the appellants, on ground that it was null and void as well as non est in the eyes of law. Therefore, no period of limitation will come in the way to set aside the sale which was null and void and non-est in the eyes of law. 26. The learned Counsel for the appellant in his argument has dealt with all the above four grounds. The learned Counsel contended that as regards the first, the said plot was not sold by the Recovery Officer by way of auction on "as is where is basis". In fact, the auction notice published by the Recovery Officer clearly indicated that the liabilities and claims attached to the property are given in the schedule, but the schedule attached to the Proclamation of Sale does not refer to any claim or liability with regard to the Suit property. The Recovery Officer did not disclose to the appellant about the pendency of the Land Grabbing Case, relating to the Suit property. Moreover, the pendency of the Land Grabbing Case was not a bar to the transfer of the Suit property by way of auction sale. The Recovery Officer did not disclose to the appellant about the pendency of the Land Grabbing Case, relating to the Suit property. Moreover, the pendency of the Land Grabbing Case was not a bar to the transfer of the Suit property by way of auction sale. The Recovery Officer vide order dated 23rd June, 2004 has specifically ordered that the sale will be effective, only after the disposal of the said Land Grabbing Case. In the Land Grabbing Case, there was no ad interim injunction, restraining any person to sell the said plot. The auction purchaser has purchased the plot which will he subject to the outcome of the Land Grabbing Case. The impugned auction sale of the Suit property therefore, cannot be set aside on account of pending of Land Grabbing Case. 27. As regards the second ground, the learned Counsel contended that the learned P.O. relying on cases Himadri Coke & Petro Ltd. v. Soneko Developers Pvt. Ltd., (2006) 132 Com. Cas. 696 (SC) and 259050, decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the auction purchasers had not paid the balance amount of 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the auction sale, while it was mandatory for them to make payment of the same within 15 days from the date of the auction sale. The auction purchasers had paid balance amount of 75% of the sale consideration on 13th October, 2003 in pursuance of the order passed by the Recovery Officer, which was in clear violation of Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act as well as the terms and conditions provided in the proclamation of the auction sale. The Recovery Officer had no power to extend time for payment of the balance amount of the sale consideration from his level. The P.O., therefore, has held that the impugned auction sale conducted by the Recovery Officer is null and void as well as non est in the eyes of law. 28. The learned Counsel contended that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above cited cases, will not be applicable to the present case. The P.O., therefore, has held that the impugned auction sale conducted by the Recovery Officer is null and void as well as non est in the eyes of law. 28. The learned Counsel contended that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above cited cases, will not be applicable to the present case. In the above cited cases, the Hon'ble Court has dealt with the provision under Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short the "Code"), which provide that the successful auction purchasers has to deposit 25% of the sale consideration immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour and he shall deposit the balance amount of 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the auction sale. But in the instant case, the impugned sale has not been conducted under Order 21, Rules 84 and 85 of the Code in execution of a decree, rather the impugned auction sale is a commercial sale conducted by the Recovery Officer under the RDDBFI Act, wherein the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act has been made applicable as far as possible as provided under Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act. 29. The learned Counsel contended that Sections 25 and 28 of RDDBFI Act provides modes for execution of Recovery Certificate. One of the modes provided for execution of the Recovery Certificate under Section 25 of the Act is by way of attachment and sale of the movable and immovable properties of the Certificate Debtor. But RDDBFI Act and the rules framed thereunder, do not provide the procedure for conducting the sale, rather the procedure for conducting the sale as provided in the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 has been made applicable to the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer under the RDDBFI Act as provided under Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act. 30. The learned Counsel contended that Section 29 of the Act provides that the provisions of Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) and the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962 as in force from time-to-time shall, as far as possible apply with necessary modifications, as if the said provision and rules referred to the amount of debt due under this Act, instead of the Income-tax Act. 31. 31. The learned Counsel argued that the words "as far as possible" used under Section 29 of the Act carries a significant meaning which means that the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act will not apply in their entirety to the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer under the RDDBFI Act, rather the discretion is left with the Recovery Officer to make deviation from the above rules in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. In case of 956894, the Hon'ble High Court of A.P. has held that the words "as far as possible" used under Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act can be interpreted in various ways, keeping in view of the intent and objection of the Act. The words "as far as possible" does not impose an obligation on the Recovery Officer to meticulously follow the provisions of Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, rather it gives liberty to the Recovery Officer to follow the provisions of Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act "as far as possible" with necessary modifications. The Recovery Officer in view of the provisions under Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act, has got discretion to follow the provisions of Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act as far as possible. Therefore, he can make deviations or modifications in the following above rules. 32. The learned Counsel contended that Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act provides that on every sale of the immovable property, the person declared as successful purchaser, shall pay immediately after such declaration 25% amount of the sale consideration to the officer conducting the sale and in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be resold. It is also provided that the full amount of purchase money payable under the auction sale, shall be paid by the purchasers to the Tax Recovery Officer (TRO) on or before the 15th day from the date of the sale of the property. A similar provision is there under Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 of the Code. Almost similar provisions as provided under Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 of the Code are also provided in the other Act too. A similar provision is there under Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 of the Code. Almost similar provisions as provided under Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 of the Code are also provided in the other Act too. But there are no provisions like Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act, wherein the words "as far as possible" has been specifically used, which gives a discretion to the Recovery Officer to deviate from Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, keeping in view of the facts and circumstance of the case. 33. The learned Counsel argued that in this case, the appellants who were successful bidders had deposited 25% of the sale consideration on the date of the auction sale immediately after the sale was knocked down in their favour. They were ready and willing to deposit the balance 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the auction sale i.e. on or before 24th January, 2003. But when they visited the Suit property, they found a board installed there, having a notice that a Land Grabbing Case in respect of the Suit property is pending in the Special Court, Hyderabad, constituted under the Land Grabbing Case Act and the land belongs to the Government. They found the above information as cloud on the title of the Suit property. The Recovery Officer in this case had not conducted the sale on "as is, where is and as is what is" basis. The proclamation of sale published by the Recovery Officer indicated that the liability and claim attached to the properties to be sold in the auction are given in the schedule, but the schedule attached to the proclamation of sale did not refer to any claim or liability with regard to the Suit property. It did not refer any Land Grabbing Case. Therefore, the auction purchaser on 15th January, 2003 wrote a letter to the Recovery Officer to clarify the correct position, so that they can deposit the balance 75% of the sale consideration within the stipulated time. But the Recovery Officer did not reply to their letter. The auction purchasers vide their subsequent letter dated 23rd May, 2003 again asked the Recovery Officer to clarify the position regarding the Suit property so that they can deposit the balance amount. But the Recovery Officer did not reply to their letter. The auction purchasers vide their subsequent letter dated 23rd May, 2003 again asked the Recovery Officer to clarify the position regarding the Suit property so that they can deposit the balance amount. But he did not reply to their letter. The appellant had purchased the Suit property without any information that the Land Grabbing Case in respect of the same was pending in the Special Court. The appellant after getting information about the Land Grabbing case pending in the Special Court could not deposit the balance amount of the sale consideration, as there was a cloud on the title of the Suit property, while they were ready and willing to deposit the same. 34. The Certificate Holder (C.H.) Bank on 1st August, 2003 wrote a letter to the Recovery Officer, requesting him to resell the Suit property, on the ground that the appellants had failed to deposit the balance amount of the sale consideration within the stipulated period. The Recovery Officer thereafter issued a notice to the appellant to appear on 18th September, 2003. The Recovery Officer on that date after hearing the learned Counsels for the appellants and the Bank was pleased to allow the appellants to deposit the balance of the sale consideration up to 16th October, 2003. The appellants in pursuant to the order passed by the Recovery Officer, deposited the balance amount of the sale consideration on 13th October, 2003. The Recovery Officer under Section 29 of the said Act, had got discretion to allow the appellants to deposit balance amount of sale consideration, even after expiry of 15 days from the date of the sale. Had the auction purchasers committed any willful default in non-payment of the balance amount of sale consideration, the sale could be set aside. But in the instant case, the appellant had not committed any willful default in payment of the balance amount of sale consideration. The Recovery Officer using his discretion had accepted the payment of the balance amount of sale consideration from the appellant. The impugned sale conducted by the Recovery Officer therefore, cannot be cancelled on the ground that the appellant had failed to deposit the balance amount of sale consideration within the stipulated time. The learned Counsel contended that otherwise the finding of the learned P.O. is contrary to law which is liable to be quashed. The impugned sale conducted by the Recovery Officer therefore, cannot be cancelled on the ground that the appellant had failed to deposit the balance amount of sale consideration within the stipulated time. The learned Counsel contended that otherwise the finding of the learned P.O. is contrary to law which is liable to be quashed. The learned Counsel in support of his arguments, has placed reliance on the following cases: (a) 479865 decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay. (b) 938554 decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh. (c) 904668 decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Patna. (d) 166509 (Order dated 30th September, 2009 decided by the Hon'ble Madras High Court). (e) 663287 decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh. (f) P. Mohanreddy v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (supra). (g) Hyderabad Lamps Ltd. v. I.C.I.C.I. Bank Ltd., (2007) 1 BC 86 (DRAT/DRT) decided by DRAT, Chennai. (h) 939680 decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. 35. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that as regards the finding of the learned P.O. that the impugned auction sale was knocked down by the Recovery Officer in the individual name of "Mr. Ramakanth Inani", whereas the order dated 3rd July, 2004 passed by the learned Recovery Officer shows that the sale was knocked down in favour of "Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family". The learned Counsel argued that this observation of the learned P.O. is factually incorrect. The documentary evidence available on record shows that the Recovery Officer knocked down the auction sale of the Suit property in favour of "Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family" and not in his individual name "Mr. Ramakanth Inani". The receipts of payment available on record shows that Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family had paid the said consideration and not Mr. Ramakanth Inani in his individual capacity. Moreover, respondent No. 1 in its Misc. Petition No. 11/2006 had never raised any such objection that the sale was knocked down in favour of individual name of Mr. Ramakanth Inani, while the payments were made by Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family. It has also not been challenged by respondent No. 1 that the learned Recovery Officer had wrongly mentioned the auction purchasers as Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family. Therefore, the finding of the learned P.O. on the point that the auction was knocked down by the Recovery Officer in favour of Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family. It has also not been challenged by respondent No. 1 that the learned Recovery Officer had wrongly mentioned the auction purchasers as Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family. Therefore, the finding of the learned P.O. on the point that the auction was knocked down by the Recovery Officer in favour of Mr. Ramakanth Inani alone, while the order passed by the Recovery Officer shows that Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family were the auction purchasers is erroneous and uncalled for. The impugned sale could not be cancelled by the learned P.O. on this ground. 36. The learned Counsel further contended that as regards the finding of the learned P.O., that the petition is not barred by time, is against Rules 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Rule 60 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides that where immovable property has been sold in execution of Recovery Certificate, the defaulter or any person whose interest are affected by the sale, may at any time within 30 days from the date of the sale, apply to the TRO to set aside the sale on depositing the amount specified in Proclamation of Sale, for which the sale was ordered with interest thereon @ 15% per annum, calculated from the date of the Proclamation of Sale to the date when the deposit is made and for payment to the purchaser as penalty a sum equal to 5% of the purchase money, but not less than Rupee One. 37. The other provisions for setting aside the impugned sale is under Rule 61, where respondent No. 1 could challenge the sale on the ground of material irregularity committed by the Recovery Officer while conducting the impugned auction sale, but such application could be moved by the defaulter or any person whose interest are affected by the sale, within 30 days from the date of the sale. In the instant case, the petition filed by respondent No. 1 could be covered under Rule 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 and not under Rule 60. The respondent No. 1 filed the petition for setting aside the sale long after 30 days from the date of the sale. The petition filed by respondent No. 1 was, therefore, clearly barred by time. The respondent No. 1 filed the petition for setting aside the sale long after 30 days from the date of the sale. The petition filed by respondent No. 1 was, therefore, clearly barred by time. There is no other provisions in the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 to get the impugned sale set aside, but the learned P.O. over-looking the above provisions, allowed the application filed by respondent No. 1 for setting aide the sale, on the ground that the impugned sale was nullity and non est in the eyes of law. The respondent No. 1 has not sought cancellation of the sale, on the ground of material irregularity committed by the Recovery Officer while conducting the sale, as provided under Rule 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, rather it could be cancelled at any time, as being void and non est in the eyes of law. The finding of the learned P.O. that the application filed by respondent No. 1 is not barred by time, is contrary to the provisions of Rules 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 which is liable to be set aside. 38. Per contra, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 supporting the impugned order passed by the learned P.O. firstly, contended that Suit property was sold by the Recovery Officer through auction sale. The Recovery Officer before conducting the sale had published the auction sale notice providing detailed terms and conditions for auction sale. It was provided therein that the liabilities and claims attached to the property are given in the schedule. Although the schedule to the Proclamation of Sale did not disclose about the Land Grabbing Case pending in the Special Court, but the appellant purchased the Suit property with open eyes at his own risk. The auction purchasers in ordinary course were required to ascertain the title of the Suit property on the principle of 'caveat emptor' before purchasing the same. If they did not ascertain the title of the Suit property before they had purchased the property, they cannot complain about the title of the Suit property after they had purchased the same. They will be presumed to have purchased the property with all claims and liability attached to the same. 39. If they did not ascertain the title of the Suit property before they had purchased the property, they cannot complain about the title of the Suit property after they had purchased the same. They will be presumed to have purchased the property with all claims and liability attached to the same. 39. The learned Counsel contended that respondent No. 1 through his letter dated 4th January, 2003 had informed the Recovery Officer that the Andhra Pradesh Government is claiming ownership of the Suit property. Moreover, the property was mortgaged to Dena Bank also. The Recovery Officer was therefore well informed by the respondent No. 1 that the title of the Suit property was under dispute before the sale was conducted and moreover, there was charge of Dena Bank too on the said property. Therefore, the Recovery Officer was not expected to conduct the sale of the Suit property on the scheduled date of auction sale. The Recovery Officer despite of the information of the fact that the title of the Suit property was not clear, had conducted the auction sale of the Suit property which is liable to be cancelled on this ground and the same has been rightly cancelled by the learned P.O., DRT. 40. The second contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 is that the learned Counsel for the appellant has given much stress on the words "as far as possible" used under Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act and he has contended that although the provisions of Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 is applicable to the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer under RDDBFI Act, but the Recovery Officer has to follow the rules as far as possible, not meticulously. The Recovery Officer has got discretion to deviate from the rules. The learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant is not based on proper appreciation of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Courts in the cases cited above by him. The learned Counsel for the respondent contended the learned Counsel for the appellant in support of his arguments, has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in case P. Mohan Reddy v. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai (supra). The learned Counsel for the respondent contended the learned Counsel for the appellant in support of his arguments, has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in case P. Mohan Reddy v. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai (supra). In the above cited case, the Hon'ble Court has explained the words "as far as possible" used under Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act to mean that the Recovery Officer is not bound to follow the rules provided under Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 meticulously. He can deviate from the rules and while doing so, he can fix the time for payment of 25% or balance 75% of the sale price by the successful purchaser, other than the time provided under Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the Sale Proclamation, The Hon'ble Court has not laid down any law that the Recovery Officer can extend the time for payment of 25% or 75% of the sale consideration as the case may be, beyond the time mentioned in the Proclamation of Sale. 41. The learned Counsel further contended that the Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 of the Code provide that the successful auction purchaser shall deposit 1/4th of the sale consideration on the date immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour and thereafter, he shall deposit the balance amount of the sale consideration i.e. 3/4th of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the sale. Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 is pari materia to Order 21, Rules 84 and 85 of the Code. As per the above rules, if the auction purchaser fails to deposit 25% of the sale consideration immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour, the property has to be resold by the Recovery Officer and if he deposits 25% of the sale consideration immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour and thereafter fails to deposit the balance 75% amount of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the sale, the sale will be cancelled. No discretion vests with the Recovery Officer to extend the time to the auction purchaser, either to deposit 25% of the sale consideration or the remaining 75% of the sale consideration, beyond the period provided under Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 or the time provided in the Proclamation of Sale. 42. The learned Counsel contended that in the present case, the Proclamation of Sale specifically provides that the sale will be conducted in accordance with Rules 57 and 58 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Proclamation of sale also provides that the auction purchaser shall deposit 25% of the sale price immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour and he shall deposit the balance amount of 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the sale. The Recovery Officer, therefore, had got no power to extend the time to deposit the aforesaid amount beyond the period provided in the Proclamation of Sale. Although the appellants had deposited 25% of the sale consideration immediately after the sale was knocked down in their favour, but they could not deposit the balance 75% amount of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the sale. The Recovery Officer too did not extend the time to the appellant to make deposit of the balance amount of the sale consideration, rather when the C.H. Bank moved an application before the Recovery Officer on 1st August, 2003, requesting him to resell the property, on the ground that the auction purchasers had failed to deposit the balance amount of the sale consideration within the stipulated time. The Recovery Officer thereafter, issued notice to the appellant fixing 18th September, 2003 for hearing and on that date, he allowed the appellants to deposit the balance amount of the sale consideration by 16th October, 2003. The Recovery Officer vide order dated 23rd June, 2004 clarified that the sale will be confirmed, subject to the final outcome of the Land Grabbing Case. The impugned sale has not yet been confirmed by the Recovery Officer. The situation which was prevailing before 24th January, 2003 i.e. on the date of the auction sale remained the same when the appellant paid the balance amount of the sale consideration. The impugned sale has not yet been confirmed by the Recovery Officer. The situation which was prevailing before 24th January, 2003 i.e. on the date of the auction sale remained the same when the appellant paid the balance amount of the sale consideration. The appellant therefore, cannot take shelter that they were ready and willing to deposit the balance amount of the sale consideration. If they could deposit 75% of the amount of sale consideration on 13th October, 2003, they could deposit the same on or before 24th January, 2003 too. Therefore, the appellants cannot take shelter that they were not willful defaulter in making payment of the amount of the sale consideration, on the ground that on account of pending Land Grabbing Case, there was cloud on the title of the Suit property, when they were required to pay the balance amount of the sale consideration. 43. The learned Counsel contended that the learned P.O., DRT has held that if the appellant had failed to deposit the balance amount of the sale consideration within the stipulated time as provided in the auction sale notice and under Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, the sale will be nullity and non est in the eyes of law. The finding of the learned P.O. is based on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Himadri Coke & Petro Ltd. v. Soneko Developers Pvt. Ltd. and Balram s/o Bhasa Ram v. Ilam Singh (supra) which does not suffer from any illegality, as such the same does not call for any interference. The learned Counsel in support of his arguments, has placed reliance on the following cases: (a) 271365, decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. (b) 943873, decided by the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court. (c) P. Mohan Reddy v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai (supra). (d) Himadri Coke & Petro Ltd. v. Soneko Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra). (e) Samir K. Shah v. Union of India, VI (2004) SLT 165 : AIR 2005 SC 4011, 4114 decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. (f) 228614, decided by the Hon'ble Madras High Court. (g) Kumar Housing & Land Development Ltd. v. Indian Bank, IV (2008) BC 119 : 2008 (2) D.R.T.C. 392, decided by the Hon'ble DRAT, Mumbai. 44. (e) Samir K. Shah v. Union of India, VI (2004) SLT 165 : AIR 2005 SC 4011, 4114 decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. (f) 228614, decided by the Hon'ble Madras High Court. (g) Kumar Housing & Land Development Ltd. v. Indian Bank, IV (2008) BC 119 : 2008 (2) D.R.T.C. 392, decided by the Hon'ble DRAT, Mumbai. 44. The third contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 is that although Rule 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides that the defaulter or any person whose interest are affected by the sale, may at any time within 30 days from the date of the sale, apply for setting aside the sale, on the ground of material irregularity for conducting the sale. But in this case, the limitation provided under Rule 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 will not be attracted, as respondent No. 1 was not seeking cancellation of the impugned sale on the ground of material irregularity, rather he sought for cancellation of the impugned sale, on the ground that the same was nullity and non est in eyes of law. The learned P.O. has held that since the impugned sale is nullity and non est in the eyes of law, therefore, the law of limitation as provided under Rule 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 will not apply. The finding of the learned P.O. is supported with the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case 281789 and Balram son of Bhasa Ram v. Ham Singh (supra). Therefore, the finding of the learned P.O. does not call for any interference. 45. The fourth contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the learned P.O. on the basis of documentary evidence available on record has found that the sale was knocked down in favour of the individual name of "Mr. Ramakanth Inani". But in the order dated 23rd June, 2004 passed by the Recovery Officer, it appears that the sale was knocked down in favour of "Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family". The learned Counsel argued that the Proclamation of Sale does not provide for benami sale. The documentary evidence available on record shows that the Mr. Ramakanth Inani". But in the order dated 23rd June, 2004 passed by the Recovery Officer, it appears that the sale was knocked down in favour of "Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family". The learned Counsel argued that the Proclamation of Sale does not provide for benami sale. The documentary evidence available on record shows that the Mr. Ramakanth Inani had participated in the bid and the auction was knocked down in his favour, but the payments of sale consideration were made by Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family, which is not valid payment in the eyes of law. The auction sale in the name of Mr. Ramakanth Inani and family cannot be said to be valid sale. The impugned auction sale, therefore, has rightly been cancel led by the learned P.O., DRT. 46. I have given active consideration to the rival submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties. 47. Sections 25 and 28 of the RDDBFI Act provides for mode of execution of the Recovery Certificate issued by DRT under Sub-section (7) of Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act. One of the modes for execution of the Recovery Certificate is by way of attachment and sale of the movable and immovable properties of the Defendants Certificate Debtors, as provided under Section 25(a) of the Act. But the RDDBFI Act or the rules framed thereunder, does not provide the procedure for attachment and sale of the movable and immovable properties of the Certificate Debtor, rather the procedure for execution of Recovery Certificate by way of attachment and sale of the movable and immovable properties of the Certificate Debtors is to be followed by the Recovery Officer, as provided under the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961, which have been made applicable with the aid of Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act. At this stage, it will be relevant to go through the provision under Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act which reads as under: 29. At this stage, it will be relevant to go through the provision under Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act which reads as under: 29. Application of certain provisions of Income-tax Act--The provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) and the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, as in force from time-to-time shall, as far as possible, apply with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and the rule referred to the amount of debt due under this Act instead of to the Income-tax: Provided that any reference under the said provisions and the rules to the "assessee" shall be construed as a reference to the Defendant under this Act. 48. Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides that on every sale of movable and immovable properties, the person, declared to be purchaser shall immediately after such declaration, deposit 25% amount of sale price to the officer conducting the sale and in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be resold. It is further provided that the full amount of sale price payable, shall be paid by the purchaser to the TRO on or before 15th day from date of the sale. The aforesaid provision is identical to the provision under Order 21, Rules 84 and 85 of the Code. In this case, admittedly, the Recovery Officer conducted the sale of the Suit property along with another property on 9th January, 2003. The Recovery Officer before conducting the sale of the Suit property had published the sale notice, providing therein the detailed terms and conditions of the sale. The sale notice provided that the successful auction purchaser shall deposit 25% of the sale price on the same day immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour. He shall deposit balance amount of the sale price within 15 days from the date of sale. Admittedly, the appellants were declared as successful purchasers of the property. Admittedly, they had deposited 25% of the consideration with the Recovery Officer on the same day after they were declared as successful purchasers. He shall deposit balance amount of the sale price within 15 days from the date of sale. Admittedly, the appellants were declared as successful purchasers of the property. Admittedly, they had deposited 25% of the consideration with the Recovery Officer on the same day after they were declared as successful purchasers. As provided in the terms and conditions of the sale notice as well as Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, the purchasers were required to deposit balance 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the sale i.e. up to 24th January, 2003. 49. The Recovery Officer conducting the sale also directed the appellant to deposit the balance 75% of the sale consideration up to 24th January, 2003. Admittedly, the appellants had failed to deposit the balance amount of sale consideration within the stipulated time, rather they in pursuant to the order passed by the Recovery Officer had deposited the said amount on 13th October, 2003. 50. It was no where mentioned in the schedule attached to the Auction sale notice that the Suit property was the subject-matter of the Land Grabbing Case pending in the Special Court, trying the cases under Land Grabbing Act. When the appellants visited the Suit property, they found board installed thereon, informing the public at large that the Suit property is the subject matter of the Land Grabbing Case which is pending in the Special Court, trying cases under the Land Grabbing Act. The appellants apprehended cloud over the title of the Suit property. Therefore, they on 15th January, 2003 wrote a letter to the Recovery Officer to make clarification about the Land Grabbing Case as well as the title of the Suit property. But the Recovery Officer did not reply to their letter. The appellants again vide their subsequent letter dated 23rd May, 2003 wrote to the Recovery Officer asking him for clarification. The Recovery Officer even then did not reply to their letter. The Recovery Officer on the application of the Bank dated 1st August, 2003 issued a notice to the appellant to appear before him on 18th September, 2003. Consequently, they appeared before him on that date. The Recovery Officer directed them to deposit the balance 75% amount of the sale consideration up to 16th October, 2003. The Recovery Officer on the application of the Bank dated 1st August, 2003 issued a notice to the appellant to appear before him on 18th September, 2003. Consequently, they appeared before him on that date. The Recovery Officer directed them to deposit the balance 75% amount of the sale consideration up to 16th October, 2003. Accordingly, they deposited the balance amount of 75% of the sale consideration on 13th October, 2003. 51. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that although Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies to the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer under RDDBFI Act, but the rules under Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 are not required to be strictly followed by the Recovery Officer. The words "as far as possible" used under Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act, gives the Recovery Officer a discretion to make deviation from the rules provided under Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Recovery Officer, therefore, using his discretion, allowed the appellants to deposit the balance amount of the sale consideration after a lapse of the stipulated time. The Recovery Officer was within his jurisdiction to use his discretion in favour of the appellants, allowing them to deposit the balance amount of sale consideration. The impugned sale, therefore, could not be cancelled on the ground that the appellant had failed to deposit the balance 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the sale. 52. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that the Recovery Officer had got no discretion to allow the appellant to deposit the balance amount of the sale consideration after expiry of 15 days from the date of the auction sale. On failure of the appellants to deposit the balance amount of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the sale, the sale automatically stood cancelled and such sale became nullity and non est in the eyes of law. 53. Now the rival arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties are being considered in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as the Hon'ble High Courts in the cases cited by them. 54. 53. Now the rival arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties are being considered in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as the Hon'ble High Courts in the cases cited by them. 54. In case of Keshrimal Jivji Shah v. Bank of Maharashtra, (supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay has interpreted Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act, specially with reference to the words "as far as possible" used therein. The Hon'ble Court has held as follows: Section 29 of RDDBFI Act, 1993 in clearest terms states that the provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act and the 1962 Rules, as in force from time-to-time, shall as far as possible, apply with necessary modifications as if, the said provisions and rules refer to the amount of debt due under this Act instead of the Income-tax Act. Whenever the Legislature uses words such as "as far as possible", "as far as practicable", etc., the intent is not to apply the provision in their entirety. The provisions do not get themselves incorporated completely. They have to be read into as far as possible and subject to such modifications, as the context as well as the object and purpose of the Act require. Whenever, the Legislature says as far as practicable, as far as possible, it conveys one and the same meaning. If the purpose of the RDDBFI Act is to expediently recover public monies in a summary manner, then an interpretation which would advance this purpose should be placed on Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act. So interpreted and considered, it will not be possible to read the provisions of the Second Schedule and more particularly Rule 11 in their entirety in Section 29. They will have to be read as far as possible and with such modification as the facts and circumstances of a case and the nature of an investigation require. Though it is not possible or advisable to lay down a general rule in this behalf, however, Rule 11 need not be completely adhered to by the Recovery Officer always Parliament does not make it mandatory nor compulsory for the Recovery Officer to apply the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act and the 1962 Rules, advisedly because the Legislature has provided safeguards after investigation of claims and objections by the Recovery Officer. It is not obligatory to apply the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act and the 1962 Rules while investigating a claim or objection to attachment and sale during the course of execution of recovery certificate under the RDDBFI Act. 55. In case of Fashion Apparels (represented by its Partners, S. Balachander and B. Annapoorani) v. Central Bank of India and P. Sathyavathy, (supra), the Hon'ble Madras High Court has interpreted the words "as far as possible" as used under Section 29 of the Act in Para No. 11 of the judgment which reads as under: 11. On a reading of this section it is clear that this section authorizes the Debts Recovery Officer to follow the Second and Third Schedules of the Income-tax Act, "as far as possible" and apply with necessary modifications. Therefore, under this section, no obligation has been created on the Recovery Officer to scrupulously follow the Second and Third Schedules of the Income-tax Act and on the other hand, it has given a freehand to the Recovery Officer to apply them, with necessary modifications. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Recovery Officer is bereft of any power to extend the time for payment of the sale amount or anything of that sort, since under Section 29 of the RDDBFI, which has been enacted with an object of expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions, he is required to camouflage to the circumstances of the case and act judiciously, to achieve the objects of the Act. 56. In case of P. Mohanreddy v. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai (supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh has dealt with the provisions contained under Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act, authorizing DRT Recovery Officer to follow the Second Schedule to the Income-Tax Act, 1961 "as far as possible". The Hon'ble Court has held that the words "as far as possible" used under Section 29 of the Act can be interpreted in various ways, keeping in view the intent and object of the Act. Section 29 provides liberty to the Recovery Officer to follow the provisions under Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 with necessary modifications. The provision under Section 29 of the Act, does not impose an obligation on the Recovery Officer to meticulously follow the provision of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961. Section 29 provides liberty to the Recovery Officer to follow the provisions under Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 with necessary modifications. The provision under Section 29 of the Act, does not impose an obligation on the Recovery Officer to meticulously follow the provision of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961. The relevant observation of the Hon'ble Court finds place in Para 28 of the judgment which reads as under: 28. Aforementioned provision in the Act makes the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962 as in force from time-to-time applicable to the extent possible with necessary modifications, as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the amount of the debt due instead of amount of Income-tax. Section 29 of the Act, thus authorizes the Debt Recovery Officer to follow the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 as far as possible with necessary modifications. The phrase "as far as possible" can be interpreted in various ways. Keeping in view the intent and object of the Act, in our view, use of this phraseology "as far as possible" in Section 29 does not impose an obligation on the Recovery Officer to meticulously follow the provisions of Second and Third Schedules. Section 29 does provide liberty to Recovery Officer to follow the provisions of Second and Third Schedules with necessary modifications. It gives him enough discretion that he has to follow the provisions of Second and Third Schedules as far as possible and may make necessary modifications. The language employed is such that there is flexibility and not mandate to follow the rules as they are. The rules no doubt have to be followed but as far and possible with necessary modifications. Section 29 clarifies that said rules may be followed with necessary modification and wherever it refers to recovery of tax, the same be read as amount of debt due. Therefore, the amount due under the Act has to be recovered by the Recovery Officer by sale of the property for which he would follow the provisions of Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 as far as possible with necessary modifications wherever necessary. It nowhere enjoins upon the Recovery Officer to follow the provisions of Second and Third Schedules as they stand but as far as possible. It nowhere enjoins upon the Recovery Officer to follow the provisions of Second and Third Schedules as they stand but as far as possible. 57. In case of Fashion Apparels (represented by its partners, S. Balachander, and B. Annapoorani) v. Central Bank of India and P. Sathyavathy (supra), the sale was conducted by the Recovery Officer on 24th January, 2006 on the basis of the auction sale notice which provided number of conditions. As per the terms and conditions of the sale, the successful auction purchaser was required to deposit 25% of the bid amount less than the HMD immediately on the sale being knocked down in his favour and the balance amount within 15 days from the date of the sale. Although the successful purchaser had deposited 25% of the sale consideration immediately on the date of the sale, when the sale was knocked down in his favour and he was required to deposit the remaining 75% of the bid amount up to 7th February, 2006, but he had deposited the balance amount on 24th February, 2006. The Hon'ble Court relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh's case, P. Mohanreddy v. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai (supra), and keeping in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, held that the learned Recovery Officer could accept the balance amount even after expiry of 15 days from the date of the sale. 58. In case, Hyderabad Lamps Ltd. v. ICICI Bank Ltd. (supra), the DRAT, Chennai, relying on the case of P. Mohan Reddy v. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai (supra) observed that the Recovery Officer did not commit any illegality in allowing the auction purchaser to deposit balance of 5% of the EMD and also balance of sale consideration beyond 15 days as provided under Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961. 59. But in case, Gangabai Gopaldas Mohata v. Fulchand (supra), the auction sale was conducted by the Municipal Council on 27th February, 1984 as per the Maharashtra Municipalities (Sale of Distained or Attached Movable and Immovable Property) Rules, 1967 framed under Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965. Rule 8(2) of the said Rules provided that if the sale pertains to immovable property, the person who is declared to be the purchaser shall deposit 25% of the said price immediately after his bid is accepted by the Recovery Officer conducting the sale. Rule 8(2) of the said Rules provided that if the sale pertains to immovable property, the person who is declared to be the purchaser shall deposit 25% of the said price immediately after his bid is accepted by the Recovery Officer conducting the sale. The rule further provided that the balance of sale price will be paid by the purchaser within 15 days from the date of the sale. Sub-rule (3) of the aforesaid Rule 8 provided the consequence of non-payment of the sale price within the stipulated time. It was provided therein that on failure to deposit the amount of sale price by the auction purchaser, the property shall be resold. The Hon'ble Apex Court in view of the aforesaid rule held that in case the auction purchaser fails to deposit the balance of the sale price within 15 days from the date of the sale, the sale shall be void. The relevant observation of the Hon'ble Court finds place in Para Nos. 14 and 15 of the said judgment which is being extracted below: 14. A reading of Rule 8(2) in association with Sub-rule (3) and Rule 13 would unmistakably show that the requirement to pay the balance 75% within 15 days is mandatory. The consequence of non-payment of the balance amount within the fixed period must peremptorily visit the purchaser. Neither the Chief Officer nor even the Municipal Council has power to relax or even condone the delay and accept delayed payment. If any officer accepted the money after the period fixed under Sub-rule (2) the action of the officer has no support of law and no legal effect would flow therefrom. The sale consequently becomes void. 15. Rules relating to Court sale provided in Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 are analogous. They require the purchaser to make deposit of 1/4th of the purchase money immediately after sale and the balance shall be deposited within 15 days. This Court held in 281789 , that noncompliance with Rules 84 and 85 of Order 21 would render the sale void in the eye of law. The contention in the said case, that non-compliance with the aforesaid rule only render the sale irregular, was repelled by this Court. The same principle would apply to the sale regulations contained in the above quoted Maharashtra Rules. 60. The contention in the said case, that non-compliance with the aforesaid rule only render the sale irregular, was repelled by this Court. The same principle would apply to the sale regulations contained in the above quoted Maharashtra Rules. 60. In case, Balram Son of Bhasa Ram v. Ilam Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows: Having examined the language of the relevant rules and the judicial decisions bearing upon the subject we are of opinion that the provisions of the rules requiring the deposit of 25 per cent, of the purchase money immediately on the person being declared as a purchaser and the payment of the balance within 15 days of the sale are mandatory and upon non-compliance with these provisions there is no sale at all. The rules do not contemplate that there can be any sale in favour of a purchaser without depositing 25% of the purchase money in the first instance and the balance within 15 days. When there is no sale within the contemplation of these rules, there can be no question of material irregularity in the conduct of the sale. Non-payment of the price on the part of the defaulting purchaser renders the sale proceedings as a complete nullity. The very fact that the Court is bound to resell the property in the event of a default shows that the previous proceedings for sale are completely wiped out as if they do not exist in the eye of law. We hold, therefore, that in the circumstances of the present case there was no sale and the purchasers acquired no rights at all. 61. In case of Kumar Housing & Land Development Ltd. v. Indian Bank (supra), the DRAT, Mumbai has followed the same view as expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment. 62. In case of C.N. Paramasivam v. Sunrise Plaza represented by its Partner (supra), the Hon'ble Madras High Court after considering so many case laws decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as by other Hon'ble High Courts cited therein has held, that the auction purchaser as per Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 has to deposit 25% of the sale consideration on the date of the auction sale immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour. He is further required to deposit balance 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the sale, failing which the sale will be treated as "nullity". The Hon'ble Court has gone to the extent to hold that the amount of 25% of the sale price deposited by the auction purchaser through cheque, will not be a valid deposit, as contemplated under Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961. 63. In case of Himadri Coke & Petro Ltd. v. Soneko Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that when the terms and conditions provided in the auction sale notice provides payment of the 25% of the sale consideration by successful auction purchaser on the date immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour and the balance 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the auction sale, the authority conducting the sale cannot accept the payment beyond the period provided in the auction sale notice. 64. In case of P. Mohan Reddy v. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai (supra), decided by the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court, the facts were that the Recovery Officer published the auction sale notice to sell the attached property wherein it was provided that the auction-purchaser has to deposit 25% of the sale price within seven days from the date of the sale, which was deviation from the time schedule provided under Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 for payment of the 25% of the sale price, wherein it is provided that the auction purchaser has to deposit 25% of the sale price immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour and he shall deposit the balance 75% of the sale price within 15 days from the date of the sale. The Hon'ble Court has held that the Recovery Officer has got discretion in making deviation for payment of the 25% of the sale price from the time frame provided under Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to Income-tax Act, 1961 for such payment. The Hon'ble Court has interpreted the words "as far as possible" used under Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act to mean that the Recovery Officer has to follow the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 "as far as possible" with necessary modification. 65. The Hon'ble Court has interpreted the words "as far as possible" used under Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act to mean that the Recovery Officer has to follow the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 "as far as possible" with necessary modification. 65. The Hon'ble Court has taken a view that the Recovery Officer while conducting the sale under RDDBFI Act has to follow the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 "as far as possible" which gives him a discretion to deviate from the rules. The Recovery Officer in doing so, may fix time for payment of the sale price in the sale notice, other than the time frame provided under Rule 57 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961. 66. From a perusal of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as Hon'ble High Courts in the above cited cases, it is clear that the Recovery Officer while conducting the sale under RDDBFI Act has to follow the rules provided under the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 "as far as possible". The Recovery Officer is not required to strictly follow the Rules, rather he has got discretion to make deviation from the aforesaid Rules. While doing so, he can provide the terms and conditions of the auction sale which are not strictly in conformity with the Rules 57 and 58 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961. But such terms and conditions cannot be inconsistent with the terms and conditions provided in the aforesaid rules. He can provide different time schedule for payment of 25% or 75% of the sale price by the auction purchaser, other than the time schedule for such payment provided in the aforesaid rules, But the Recovery Officer cannot go beyond the terms and conditions provided in the auction sale notice. 67. In the instant case, the notice of sale specifically provides that the auction purchaser shall deposit 25% of the sale price immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour. 67. In the instant case, the notice of sale specifically provides that the auction purchaser shall deposit 25% of the sale price immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour. He shall deposit the remaining 75% of the sale price within 15 days from the date of the sale, the Recovery Officer after conducting the impugned sale on 9th January, 2003 had directed the appellant to deposit 25% of the sale price on the same date and remaining 75% of the sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the sale. He, therefore, had no discretion to extend time for payment of the balance amount of the sale price beyond the time provided in the auction sale notice as well as beyond his own order dated 9th January, 2005. 68. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that when the appellant visited the Suit premises after the sale, they found a board installed thereon, having a notice that the Suit property was under Land Grabbing Case pending in the Special Court, trying Land Grabbing Case. Therefore, they vide their letter dated 15th February, 2003, wrote to the Recovery Officer to clarify the position. But he did not respond to their letter. The Bank on 1st August, 2003 moved an application before the Recovery Officer to re-auction the Suit property on the ground that the auction purchasers had failed to deposit the balance amount of the sale price within 15 days from the date of the auction sale. On the application of the Bank, the Recovery Officer issued notice to the appellant to appear before him on 18th September, 2003. On 18th September, 2003 the Recovery Officer directed the appellant to deposit balance 75% of the sale price by 16th October, 2003. The appellant in pursuant to the above direction given by the Recovery Officer, deposited the balance amount of sale price on 13th October, 2003. The learned Counsel contended that the appellant did not commit any willful default in payment of the balance amount of the sale price, rather they were always willing and ready to pay the same. The appellants apprehended cloud on the title of the Suit property. Therefore, they wanted clarification from the Recovery Officer. The learned Counsel contended that the appellant did not commit any willful default in payment of the balance amount of the sale price, rather they were always willing and ready to pay the same. The appellants apprehended cloud on the title of the Suit property. Therefore, they wanted clarification from the Recovery Officer. The Recovery Officer extended time to the appellant for payment of the balance amount of the sale price which under the facts and circumstances of the case as well as in view of the provision under Section 29 of the said RDDBFI Act was well within his power. 69. But I do not agree with the aforesaid submission of the learned Counsel. 70. The relevant facts in this case that the Recovery Officer vide order dated 23rd June, 2004 had clarified that the sale will be confirmed subject to the final outcome of the Land Grabbing Case. In this way, the appellant had deposited the balance 75% of the sale price without there being any change in the earlier situation, rather the situation which was prevailing as on the date of the auction sale continued to prevail on the date when the appellant deposited the balance amount of the sale price. The appellant, therefore, cannot claim any extension of time in depositing the balance sale price beyond 15 days from the date of the auction sale, on the ground that they were apprehending cloud on the title of the Suit property on account of pending Land Grabbing Case. If they were apprehending cloud on the title of the Suit property, at that time they were required to deposit the balance 75% of the sale price, the cloud was still there when they deposited the balance amount of the sale price, on 13th October, 2003. The appellant may not be willful defaulter, but they as per the terms and conditions provided in the auction sale notice as well as in pursuant to the order dated 9th January, 2003 passed by the Recovery Officer declaring them as successful purchaser, were required to deposit the balance amount of the sale price within 15 days from the date of the auction sale. Since, the appellant had failed to deposit the balance of the sale price within 15 days from the date of sale, therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as the Hon'ble High Courts in the above cited cases, there will be no sale in the eyes of law. The impugned sale is nothing, but nullity and non est in the eyes of law. The learned P.O. in my considered view has rightly held that the impugned sale was nullity and non est in the eyes of law which does not suffer from illegality. 71. As regards the point of limitation, from a perusal of the order dated 5th June, 2009 passed by the Recovery Officer, it appears that he had dismissed the Misc. Petition No. 11/2003 filed by respondent No. 1, on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The learned P.O. has held that respondent No. 1 was not seeking cancellation of the auction sale under Rule 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, on the ground of material irregularity, wherein it is provided that the defaulter or any person affected by the sale, may move an application for setting aside the impugned sale before the Recovery Officer, on the ground of material irregularity within 30 days from the date of the auction sale. But in this case, there was no question of material irregularity, as the auction purchaser has failed to deposit the balance amount of sale consideration within 15 days from the date of the auction sale. Therefore, the sale was nullity and non est in the eyes of law. The limitation as provided under Rule 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 will not apply to the application moved by respondent No. I for setting aside the impugned sale. 72. In case of Manilal Mohanlal Shah v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mohamad (supra) and Balaram Son of Bhasa Ram v. Ilam Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that where the auction purchaser has failed to deposit 25% of the sale price on the date immediately after the sale is knocked down in his favour and further fails to deposit 75% of the sale price within 15 days from the date of auction sale, there will be no sale. The rule does not contemplates that there can be any sale in favour of the purchaser without depositing 25% of the sale price in the first instance and balance amount within 15 days thereafter. The Hon'ble Court has further held, that when there is no sale within the contemplation of the rules, there can be no question of material irregularity in conducting the sale. Non-payment of the sale price on the part of the defaulting purchaser is complete nullity. The Hon'ble Court has further held that the Officer conducting the sale is bound to resell the property in the event of default in payment of 25% immediately on the person being declared as purchaser. 73. In view of the law laid down in the above cited cases, I am of the considered view that the learned P.O. has rightly held that since, the sale is nullity and non est in the eyes of law, therefore, no period of limitation of 30 days as provided under Rule 61 of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 will be applicable. As observed above, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the learned P.O. which does not call for interference. The Appeal is devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed. ORDER The M.A. No. 142/2010 is dismissed with no order as to costs.