JUDGMENT : The respondent herein filed WP No. 28064 of 2011 seeking a writ of mandamus to declare that the action of the official respondents therein in not releasing the payments pursuant to successful completion of contract as arbitrary and unjust. 2. Learned single Judge, on consideration of the writ petition, came to the conclusion that out of the total amount claimed by the writ petitioner, a sum of Rs.3,95,47,986.50 is undisputed amount. Consequently the learned single Judge disposed of the writ petition by directing the respondent No.2 to make payment of the aforesaid amount to the writ petitioner on ad hoc basis and by further directing both the parties to refer the disputed four items for arbitration. 3. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondents 1 to 3 in the writ petition filed WA No. 48 of 2013 inter alia contending that the writ petition was not maintainable as it was primarily for recovery of the amounts and also that the writ petition could not be entertained when there are disputed questions of facts. 4. During the hearing before us, the learned counsel appearing for the parties almost reached a consensus for referring the matter for arbitration and the consensus was reported to us when we took up the matter for further hearing on 24.1.2013. We accordingly recorded that the learned Advocate General admitted that the amount payable by the appellant to the writ petitioner (respondent in the writ appeal) is Rs.2,65,59,407-00 and with respect to the other disputed amount, the parties agreed to abide by the award of the Arbitrator. We have, accordingly disposed of the writ appeal with the following order. “This writ appeal is directed against the order, dated 09.02.2012, in W.P.No.28064 of 2011 passed by the learned Single Judge, On 22.01.2013 when the appeal came up for hearing, on the consent given by the learned counsel for the parties for referring the matter to an Arbitrator for resolving the disputes between the parties, this Court for passing of an order as to appointment of an Arbitrator, adjourned the matter to today. Today, when the matter is called, the learned Advocate General agreed and admitted that the amount payable by the appellant authorities to the respondent is Rs.2,65,59,407=00. Today, when the matter is called, the learned Advocate General agreed and admitted that the amount payable by the appellant authorities to the respondent is Rs.2,65,59,407=00. In these circumstances, the authorities are also agreeable to pay the said amount to the respondent subject to the respondent raising an invoice and transferring the total assets to the IT & C Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh. However, the learned counsel for the respondent disputes the condition proposed for payment of admitted amount as above. Under the circumstances, with the consent of the parties, this Court appoints Justice Sri G.V. Seethapathy, retired judge of this Court, as an Arbitrator in the matter for resolving all the disputes between the parties, including any payment made by the respondent to petitioner. We however make it clear that the remuneration of the learned Arbitrator should be fixed by the learned Arbitrator himself in a meeting to be held with the parties. The costs, charges and expenses to be borne by the parties equally and the remuneration also to be shared equally. The appeal is disposed of. No costs.” 5. After disposing of the writ appeal, the learned Advocate General has filed WAMP No. 423 of 2013 requesting this Court to modify the order dated 24.1.2013, in the circumstances, as stated in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit. It is appropriate to extract the same. “5. I further submit that in the meanwhile the contempt proceedings before the learned Single Judge which stood posted for our appearance on 23.1.2013 was posted to 30.1.2013, in view of the present writ appeal being posted to 24.1.2013. 6. I further submit that on 30.1.2013, the fact of passing of Final Orders by this Hon’ble Court was brought to the notice of the Learned Single Judge. As the order copy in the writ appeal was not received, the Learned Single Judge posted the C.C. 946/2012, to 06.2.2013, by issuing NBWs against the 3rd respondent and myself, since we were a bit late to attend the Court when the matter was called. Later the same were recalled on 06.02.2013 upon the applications made by us. The Learned Single Judge posted the C.C. No.946/2012 to 08.02.2013 ‘For Compliance’, stating that we have to comply with his orders dated 09.02.2012 passed in WP No. 28064/2011, even though the Orders in Writ Appeal was placed before the Learned Single Judge. 7. Later the same were recalled on 06.02.2013 upon the applications made by us. The Learned Single Judge posted the C.C. No.946/2012 to 08.02.2013 ‘For Compliance’, stating that we have to comply with his orders dated 09.02.2012 passed in WP No. 28064/2011, even though the Orders in Writ Appeal was placed before the Learned Single Judge. 7. I respectfully submit that on 08.02.2013, while hearing the contempt case the Learned Single Judge opined that since his orders in the W.P. No.28064/2011 were not set aside or modified in the writ appeal, the orders in writ petition will survive and have to be implemented. The Learned Sinlge Judge opined that the orders in the writ appeal and the orders in the writ petition are different and therefore the proceedings in the contempt case shall continue, unless time was sought for in the contempt case to seek clarification from this Hon’ble Court in the Writ Appeal.” 6. A request for clarification/modification of the main order was accordingly made by the learned Advocate General. 7. As mentioned above, by the said order, we have disposed of the writ appeal filed by the Government appointing Justice Sri G.V. Seethapathy, a retired judge of this Court as an Arbitrator to resolve the disputes between the parties, including any payment made by respondent-petitioner. 8. Now, the Government filed the present application seeking to modify the said order on the ground that when the contempt case, being C.C. No. 946 of 2012 was listed before the Hon’ble Single Judge, the Hon’ble Single Judge posted the said contempt case under the caption ‘for compliance’ and is insisting upon them to comply with the order dated 9.2.2012 passed by the His Lordship in Writ Petition No. 28064 of 2011. 9. Admittedly, the order dated 9.2.2012 passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 28064 of 2011 has merged in the order dated 24.1.2013 passed by us in W.A. No. 48 of 2012. Therefore, the order of the Hon’ble Single Judge does not subsist in view of the order dated 24.1.2013 passed by us in the writ appeal disposing of the said appeal and our order is the only order which is subsisting. In fact the order of the Hon’ble Single Judge was superseded by our order by virtue of doctrine of merger. The following decisions are, therefore, appropriate to be noted for this proposition. 10. In fact the order of the Hon’ble Single Judge was superseded by our order by virtue of doctrine of merger. The following decisions are, therefore, appropriate to be noted for this proposition. 10. In Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar vs Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat ( AIR 1970 SC 1 ), the Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 6,7 and 8, as follows: 6. Now when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the court below. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. We do not, therefore, consider that the principle of merger of orders of inferior Courts in those of superior Courts would be affected or would become inapplicable by making a distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal. 7. It may be useful to refer to certain other decisions which by analogy can be of some assistance in deciding the point before us. In U.J.S. Chopra v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1955 SC 633 ) theprincipal of merger was considered with reference to Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code which confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. In the majority judgment it was held, inter alia, that a judgment pronounced by the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction after issue of a notice and a full hearing, in the presence of both the parties would replace the judgment of the lower court thus constituting the judgment of the High. Court-the only final judgment to be executed in accordance with law by the court below. Court-the only final judgment to be executed in accordance with law by the court below. In Chandi Prasad Chokhani v. The State of Bihar[ (1962) 2 SCR 276 = ( AIR 1961 SC 1708 )] it was said that save in exceptional and special circumstances this Court would not exercise its power under Article 136 in such a way as to bypass the High Court and ignore the latter's decision which had become final and binding by entertaining an appeal directly from orders of a Tribunal. Such exercise of power would be particularly inadvisable in a case where the result might lead to a conflict of decisions of two courts of competent jurisdiction. In our opinion the course which was followed by the High Court, in the present case, is certainly one which leads to a conflict of decisions of the same court. 8. Even on the assumption that the order of the appellate court had not merged in the order of the single Judge who had disposed of the revision petition we are of the view that a writ petition ought not to have been entertained by the High Court when the respondent had already chosen the remedy under Section 115 of the CPC. If there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the subordinate court. The refusal to grant relief in such circumstances would be in consonance with the anxiety of the court to prevent abuse of process as also to respect and accord finality to its own decisions. 11. In Kunhayammed & Others vs. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph-34 thus: “The doctrine of merger and the right of review are concepts which are closely interlinked. If the judgment of the High Court has come up to this Court by way of a special leave, and special leave is granted and the appeal is disposed of with or without reasons, by affirmance or otherwise, the judgment of the High Court merges with that of this Court. If the judgment of the High Court has come up to this Court by way of a special leave, and special leave is granted and the appeal is disposed of with or without reasons, by affirmance or otherwise, the judgment of the High Court merges with that of this Court. In that event, it is not permissible to move the High Court by review because the judgment of the High Court has merged with the judgment of this Court. But where the special leave petition is dismissed there being no merger, the aggrieved party is not deprived of any statutory right of review, if it was available and he can pursue it. It may be that the review court may interfere, or it may not interfere depending upon the law and principles applicable to interference in the review. But the High Court, if it exercises a power of review or deals with a review application on merits in a case where the High Court’s order had not merged with an order passed by this Court after grant of special leave the High Court could not, in law, be said to be wrong in exercising statutory jurisdiction or power vested in it. 12. Further, in Chandi Prasad vs. Jagdish Prasad & Others (2004) 8 SCC 724 ), in paragraph-24 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed thus: “It is trite that when an appellate court passes a decree, the decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the appellate court and even if and subject to any modification that may be made in the appellate decree, the decree of the appellate court supersedes the decree of the trial court. In other words, merger of a decree takes place irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellate court affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by the trial court. When a special leave petition is dismissed summarily, doctrine of merger does not apply but when an appeal is dismissed, it does.” 13. In other words, merger of a decree takes place irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellate court affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by the trial court. When a special leave petition is dismissed summarily, doctrine of merger does not apply but when an appeal is dismissed, it does.” 13. In Omprakash Verma vs. State of A.P. & Others (2010) 13 SCC 158 ) the Supreme Court observed in paragraph-73 thus: “Regarding the doctrine of merger, once the appeal of the State was allowed in Audikesava Reddy case[ (2002) 1 SCC 227 ], the net result was that the High Court judgment which held that the proceedings under the ULC Act were vitiated stood merged in the decision of this Court in Audikesava Reddy case. The logical sequitur of this is that the writ petitions filed by the appellants are deemed to be dismissed.” 14. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments with regard to doctrine of merger, we are of the view that it is not necessary for us to issue any clarification to our order dated 24.1.2013. 15. The application is accordingly dismissed.