JUDGMENT Utpalendu Bikas Saha, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is the judgment dated 09.06.2004 passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Kailashahar, North Tripura in S.T. No. 28(NT/K) of 2003, whereby and whereunder the accused-respondent was acquitted from the charges levelled against him under Sections 457 and 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC'). Heard Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State-appellant and Mr. S. Sarkar, learned amicus curiae appearing for the accused-respondent. 2. The prosecution case, in short, is as follows: On 07.06.2001 at about 12-10 hours P.W. 1 lodged a written complaint to the Officer-in-charge, Kailashahar police station alleging that on 06.06.2001 at about 11-00 pm the accused-respondent committed rape upon her and subsequently fled away and afterwards in response to her hue and cry, villagers rushed to the spot and she narrated the occurrence to them. It is also mentioned in the Ejahar that the accused Riyaj Ullah left behind his three battery torchlight in her dwelling hut. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid information/Ejahar, Kailashahar police station registered a police case on 07.06.2001 being FIR No. 57/2001 under Sections 457/376 of the IPC against the accused-respondent. Thereafter, P.W. 10, being entrusted, investigated the case and finally submitted the charge sheet under the aforesaid sections, i.e., under Sections 457/376 of the IPC, against the accused-respondent. 4. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the same was committed to the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, North Tripura, Kailashahar. In due course, the learned Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar framed charge against the accused-respondent under Sections 457/376(1) of the IPC to which the accused-respondent pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Thereafter, the case was transferred to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Kailashahar, North Tripura for trial. 5. To substantiate the charges, as framed by the learned Sessions Judge, the prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses including the official witnesses, out of which P.W. 6, P.W. 7 and P.W. 8 were tendered by the prosecution. On completion of recording evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the learned Trial Court examined the accused-respondent under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., who had denied the incriminating evidence appeared against him and also declined to adduce any evidence in his defence. On completion of recording evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the learned Trial Court examined the accused-respondent under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., who had denied the incriminating evidence appeared against him and also declined to adduce any evidence in his defence. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused from all the charges levelled against him by the impugned judgment as noted earlier. Being aggrieved, the State has preferred this appeal. 6. Mr. Ghosh, learned Additional P.P. in support of the appeal urges inter alia that the State has challenged the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondent mainly on the ground that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence of the victim, P.W. 1, as well as P.W. 2, P.W. 4 and P.W. 5. He further submits that in a rape case always corroboration of the evidence of the victim is not necessary, as it is settled by the Apex Court that even on the basis of lone statement of the prosecutrix also an accused can be convicted subject to the evidence of the prosecutrix can be believed by reasonable person. He further contended that the learned Trial Court should not have disbelieved the deposition of the P.W. 1, victim, as well as P.W. 2, P.W. 4 and P.W. 5. 7. Per contra, Mr. Sarkar, learned amicus curiae appearing for the accused-respondent strenuously urges that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the accused-respondent under both the Sections 457/376(1) of the IPC and for such failure of the prosecution, the learned Trial Court rightly acquitted the accused-respondent from the charges levelled against him under those Sections. He again contended that there is no evidence on record that the accused-respondent forcibly entered into the premises of the informant-victim. Thus, no case under Section 457 of the IPC is made out. He further submits that the evidence of the victim, P.W. 1, is not corroborated by the P.W. 12, Medical Officer, rather P.W. 12 in his evidence specifically stated that he did not find any mark of blood or injury on the private parts of the accused, who was produced by the I/O of the case on 20.06.2001, i.e., about two weeks after the alleged incident. He further contended that the alleged eyewitness, namely, Maiya Darlong @ Juothar, son of the victim, who was allegedly present in the dwelling hut, the place of incident, was not examined, even though his statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. was recorded by the I/O and for such non-examination, no explanation had been given by the prosecution. Furthermore, the witness, Sri Laila Darlong, who came to the place of occurrence after hearing the alleged hue and cry of the victim, was also not examined. He finally contended that to set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court, the appellate Court should have come to a finding that the order of acquittal is totally perverse and on perusal of the impugned judgment it cannot be said that the judgment of acquittal is wholly perverse. Thus, the same should not be interfered with. He also stated that when from the evidence available on record two views are plausible, one is that the accused might commit offence for which charges have been levelled against him, another is that the accused might not commit the said offence for which charges have been levelled against him and he is totally innocent and victim of situation and in that circumstances, it would be proper for the appellate Court to take the views which favour the accused particularly when the present appeal is against the order of acquittal. 8. In support of his aforesaid contention he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in V. Venkata Subbarao Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, A.P., 2007 Cri LJ 758, particularly, para 29 and 30 of the said judgment, which are reproduced below: 29. In State through inspector of Police, A.P. v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCC 364 , this Court held that when two views are possible, a judgment of acquittal is to be justified. 30. In Kalyan Singh Vs. State of Maharashtra, [2006 (12) SCALE 577], this Court has held: The High Court while dealing with the matter, in out considered opinion, failed to apply the proper tests in deciding a case where a judgment of acquittal has been recorded. The views of the learned trial Judge cannot be said to be wholly unsustainable. It is now well known that if two views are possible, the appellate Court shall not ordinarily interfere with the judgment of acquittal. The views of the learned trial Judge cannot be said to be wholly unsustainable. It is now well known that if two views are possible, the appellate Court shall not ordinarily interfere with the judgment of acquittal. We do not, however, mean to lay down the law that the High Court, in a case where a judgment of acquittal is in question, would not go into the evidence brought on records by the prosecution or by the State but we would like to point out that even if the High Court reserved the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court, it is incumbent on the High Court to arrive at the conclusion that no two views are possible. 9. Mr. Sarkar further submits mat from the deposition of the P.W. 2 it would be evident that though the victim told the said witness that the accused had committed sexual intercourse with her on the night of 6th June 2001, but she did not say that the accused forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her. Even on that count also the said sexual intercourse is not come within the purview of rape as defined in Section 375 of the IPC. 10. Mr. Sarkar also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Ram Das Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1977) 2 SCC 124 : AIR 1977 SC 1164 ; Tota Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1083 and Narinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab; 2000 Cri. L.J. 3462, wherein the Apex Court noted that if the evaluation of the evidence by the trial Court does not suffer from manifest error or perversity and the main grounds on which it has passed its order are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal even if another view is possible. 11. To appreciate the submission of the leaned counsel for the parties, it would be proper on the part of this Court to discuss the evidence of P.W. 1, victim, P.W. 4, Smti. Rimpui Darlong, P.W. 5, Shri Abrus Ali, P.W. 9, Dr. Debasish Bhadra, P.W. 10, Sri Manik Lal Dey, I.O. of the case, P.W. 11, Sri Subhendu Dasgupta, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, who recorded the statement of the victim under Section 164 of the IPC as well as P.W. 12, Dr. Rimpui Darlong, P.W. 5, Shri Abrus Ali, P.W. 9, Dr. Debasish Bhadra, P.W. 10, Sri Manik Lal Dey, I.O. of the case, P.W. 11, Sri Subhendu Dasgupta, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, who recorded the statement of the victim under Section 164 of the IPC as well as P.W. 12, Dr. Rupamoy Waddader, who examined the victim in the hospital. 12. P.W. 1, in her evidence stated that on 06.06.2001 at about 11 p.m. while she was sleeping in her dwelling hut along with her minor son, Maiya Darlong @ Juothar, aged about 9 years, at that time the accused Riyaj Ullah trespassed into her dwelling hut and told her to give him a glass of water and accordingly, she complied with his request. But the said accused all on a sudden caught hold of her neck from back side and began to assault her and made her naked by tearing her wearing apparels. Thereafter the said accused committed sexual intercourse with her against her consent and she raised alarm. She also stated that she knew the accused since her birth, as a younger sister of the accused, Laila was her friend from boyhood. She further stated that hearing her alarm, one Laila Darlong came to the spot. In her cross she stated that one Jamsed Ali married her and subsequently she got divorced and Sri Juothan, her minor son, was born due to her wedlock with Jamsed Ali. In her 164 statement she also stated that Darluta Darlong is her husband and he deserted her 7 years ago. She further stated she resides in Deoracherra village along with her 7 years and 4 months old son, Juothan. In her cross she also specifically stated that she did not tell to the Darogababu that the accused after committing rape while leaving the house, she raised alarm. 13. P.W. 4, Smti. Rimpui Darlong, Chairperson of Panchayat, in her deposition before the trial Court stated that she came to learn about the incident from the victim and the victim told her that she was raped by the accused against her will and the victim also told her that the accused had torn her wearing apparels. This witness in her statement also stated that she accompanied the victim to Kailashahar police station. 14. This witness in her statement also stated that she accompanied the victim to Kailashahar police station. 14. P.W. 5, Sri Abrus Ali, in his deposition stated that the victim came to his house on the following day of the incident and informed him that on the previous night around 10/10-30 p.m. the accused Riyaj Ullah entered into her house and committed sexual intercourse with her against her will. He also stated that the victim told him that she was beaten up by the accused and he had seen the mark of inflammation in her neck. This witness was also the witness of seizure of the wearing apparels of the victim. 15. P.W. 9, Dr. Debasish Bhadra, who examined the victim on 07.06.2001 in RGM hospital, Kailashahar, in his evidence stated that the victim told him that on 06.06.2001 at about 11 p.m. one miscreant was knocking the door and told her to open the door and give him a glass of water and accordingly, she opened the door and the miscreant entered into her room. When she was going to fetch water, the miscreant caught hold of her from the back side and began to tear her wearing apparels and thereafter committed sexual intercourse with her against her will. She raised alarm and was crying for help. Then the people gathered and the miscreant left the place of occurrence. On examination of the victim, this witness found that under the garment of the victim was fresh one, but he also did not find injury mark externally on her private parts and other sexual organs like breast, lips, pubic hair, back of the body were found intact without injury. Vaginal swab was collected and sent for medical examination. The X-ray requisites were handed over to the accompanied police personnel Smti. Kalpana Roy, a woman constable. As at the relevant time there was no arrangement for examining the vaginal swab by experience pathology doctor, the vaginal swab was not examined. In his cross, he stated that no injury mark was found in the private parts of the victim and there was no injury mark in the vagina 16. Kalpana Roy, a woman constable. As at the relevant time there was no arrangement for examining the vaginal swab by experience pathology doctor, the vaginal swab was not examined. In his cross, he stated that no injury mark was found in the private parts of the victim and there was no injury mark in the vagina 16. P.W. 10, Sri Manikin Dey, I.O. of the case, in his deposition stated that he had taken up the investigation as entrusted to him and visited the place of occurrence, prepared the hand sketch map with index and also recorded the statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. He also stated that the victim was sent by him to RGM hospital for her medical examination and accordingly she was examined and he obtained the medical report subsequently. This witness further stated that the victim was also produced before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, North Tripura, Kailashahar for recording her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. and accordingly, she was examined and her statement under Section 164(5) of the Cr.P.C. was recorded. In his cross, he stated that the victim told him that as soon as the accused entered into her house (P.W. 1's house), she inflamed a light. But this witness did not mention whether it was a hurricane or kupi bati and also did not seize the said hurricane or kupi bati from the house of the alleged victim. 17. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the evidence on record as well as the law reports cited by the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that there might be an incident occurred on 06.06.2001 as alleged by the victim as well as P.W. 4 and P.W. 5, but the question is this, who caused the said incident of alleged rape and whether the present accused is responsible or somebody else. If the present accused-respondent is liable, then obviously the victim informant ought to have disclosed the name when she was examined by the doctor, P.W. 9, on the following day in RGM hospital, Kailashahar, but admittedly she did not disclose the name of the accused, rather she stated that a miscreant committed sexual intercourse with her against her will. If the present accused-respondent is liable, then obviously the victim informant ought to have disclosed the name when she was examined by the doctor, P.W. 9, on the following day in RGM hospital, Kailashahar, but admittedly she did not disclose the name of the accused, rather she stated that a miscreant committed sexual intercourse with her against her will. Moreso, the prosecution also admittedly neither examined nor produced Sri Laila Darlong, who came to the spot immediately after hearing the alarm of the victim and not only that one Dinga Darlong and another Muktia Darlong, who came to the house of the victim, as stated by the victim in her cross-examination, were also not examined and produced before the Court, who were the close neighbour of the victim. It also appears from the record that only eyewitness, i.e., the son of the victim, though examined, but not produced before the Court and for his non-production, the prosecution did not give any explanation before the learned Trial Court. 18. P.W. 2 in his evidence specifically stated that the accused had a tussle with the Gaon Panchayat members, Abrus Ali (P.W. 5) and others over the issue of deleting the name of his wife from the ration card and for that reason hostility was going on between the parties. 19. P.W. 6 also in his cross-examination stated that the name of the wife of accused was deleted from the ration card at the instance of Abrus Ali and Aziz and subsequently, it was rectified at the intervention of the S.D.O. 20. The victim, P.W. 1, in her deposition staled that the Ejahar was written by the village pradhan, namely, Thuoma Darlong as per her dictation, whereas P.W. 3, Sri Bijan Bihari Sarkar, deposed that he wrote the ejahar as per dictation of the victim. Thus, the learned Trial Court very rightly recorded that it is not clear which one of the complaints was written first, whether the Ejahar tagged in the case record or whether the Ejahar which one is traceless. 21. The learned Trial Court while acquitting the accused-respondent has considered the evidence recorded by him and came to the conclusion that: each and every case has got its own special facts and circumstances and each case has to be decided on its individual facts and circumstances. 21. The learned Trial Court while acquitting the accused-respondent has considered the evidence recorded by him and came to the conclusion that: each and every case has got its own special facts and circumstances and each case has to be decided on its individual facts and circumstances. It is fact that there can seldom be an independent witness to the commission of such offence of rape upon alleged victim as it alleged to have been occurred in a village at 11 p.m. But prosecution did not examine the minor son of the victim who was the only eyewitness of the alleged occurrence as revealed from the statement recorded in his name by the I.O. under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and no explanation was given for such non-examination. The learned Trial Court also stated in its judgment inter alia that: it is also known to us that the rule of corroboration is only a rule of prudence and not a rule of law and in a trial of the offence of rape, medical opinion simply a corroborative evidence. The trial of this case was not conducted by the prosecution on the basis of the F.I.R. written by Thauma Darlong as per dictation of the victim as deposed by the victim herself. The evidence of victim as to physical and sexual assault upon her is totally conflicting with the medical evidence. The learned Trial Court also recorded the fact that the animosity in between the accused and influential witnesses P.W. 2 and P.W. 5 is admitted by P.W. 2, P.W. 5 and P.W. 6. 22. It appears from the prosecution case that the evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 4 and P.W. 5 are merely hearsay evidence and when the animosity between P.W. 2, P.W. 5 and the accused is admitted, the learned Trial Court rightly disbelieved the evidence of those witnesses. 23. In a criminal case, degree of proof is the dictum than that what is required in a civil proceeding and if there is slightest doubt in the mind of the Court regarding involvement of the accused person, then the Court should not go for convicting the accused person with such a doubt, rather it would be proper for the Court to pass an order of acquittal in favour of the accused. When trial Court after proper appreciation of the evidence of the witnesses passed an order of acquittal, it would not be proper for the appellate Court to disturb the said order unless the said order of acquittal is unreasonable, even if two views are possible, then also, the appellate Court should not disturb the said order, rather, the Court should uphold the view favoured the accused. 24. According to this Court where two views are plausible regarding involvement of the accused, the view which favour the accused that should be accepted and the learned Trial Court has already acquitted the accused-respondent on benefit of doubt. Thus, it would not be proper for this Court to convict the accused setting aside the order of acquittal. In State of U.P. Vs. Pussu; AIR 1983 SC 867 at p.875, the Apex Court observed that: ...we are aware of the rule of practice that ordinarily this Court should not interfere with judgments of acquittal on a mere re-appreciation of evidence. But if these are glaring infirmities in the judgment of the High Court resulting in a gross miscarriage of justice, it is the duty of this Court to interfere. In the instant case we find that the approach of the High Court is basically erroneous and its judgment is founded on false assumptions, conjectures and surmises.... 25. In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, it can be said that ordinarily an appellate Court should not interfere with the judgment of acquittal unless a gross miscarriage of justice is committed by the learned trial Court. In the instant case it cannot be said that the learned trial Court committed any error while acquitting the accused after appreciating the evidence on record. In view of the above, the instant appeal is dismissed being devoid of merit and the order of the learned trial Court is maintained. Send down the lower Court record forthwith. Appeal dismissed