JUDGMENT (B.R. Gavai, J) By this appeal, the appellants are assailing the Judgment and order passed by the learned trial Judge thereby convicting the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with 498A of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to suffer R.I. for life for the offence punishable under Section 302 and R.I. for two years for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that deceased Pushpabai had marred Omprakash Dhavle, who is original accused no.3, prior to about seven years from the date of incident. It is the prosecution case that on 21st March, 2002, quarrel took place between the deceased and her mother-in-law i.e. appellant no.2 and in that incident accused no.2 Sau. Nirmala poured kerosene on the person of Pushpabai and accused Deepak set her on fire. Deceased Pushpabai was taken to the Government Hospital and thereafter was transferred to the General Hospital, Akola. In the Hospital, statement of Pushpabai was recorded by the Executive Magistrate on two occasions i.e. on 21st March, 2002 and on 22nd March, 2002. Third dying declaration also came to be recorded on 24th March, 2002 by police officer. Initially, charges were framed against four accused i.e. husband of the deceased, grand mother-in-law of the deceased and the present appellants, who are the brother-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased respectively. However, at the conclusion of the trial, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted accused nos. 3 and 4 and convicted the present appellants for the charges aforesaid. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal. 3. Shri Daga, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, submits that there is inconsistency between the three dying declarations. He further submits that the prosecution has attempted to improve the versions in the dying declarations which are subsequently recorded. The learned counsel further submits that from the evidence of P.W.5 Noor Ahmadkhan, it could be seen that he does not state that the statement was read over to Pushpabai. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that in view of the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Abdul Riyaz Abdul Bashir vs. State of Maharashtra ( 2012 ALL MR (Cri) 2188), the fact, as to whether the deceased was mentally and physically in sound position to give statement, has not been proved. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that in view of the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Abdul Riyaz Abdul Bashir vs. State of Maharashtra ( 2012 ALL MR (Cri) 2188), the fact, as to whether the deceased was mentally and physically in sound position to give statement, has not been proved. The learned counsel further submits that the Doctor, who is alleged to have examined the deceased, has also not been examined and as such the certificate of fitness would be of no use to the prosecution case. The learned counsel relying upon the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manik Vanaji Gawali vs. The State of Maharashtra, (2013 ALL MR (Cri.) 1766, submits that since the medical expert has not been examined, the prosecution has failed to prove that the deceased was in mentally and physically sound state to give statement. The learned counsel further submits that the evidence of P.W.7 Ramratan Dhanwar brother of the deceased, is also contradictory to the First Information Report. The learned counsel submits that P.W.7 Ramratan states that he has not made any complaint to the police authorities. However, perusal of the First Information Report would reveal that second dying declaration was recorded at the instance of P.W.7 Ramratan. The learned counsel further submits that the prosecution has also not sent the clothes of the accused for chemical analysis. The learned counsel further submits that the spot panchanama would also corroborate the first dying declaration given by the deceased. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that in totality of the circumstances, the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and as such the accused/appellants deserve to be acquitted. 4. Shri Nayak, learned A.P.P., on the contrary, submitted that it is a settled law that the conviction can be based only on the basis of the dying declaration. He submits that the second dying declaration, which was recorded by the Executive Magistrate on 22nd March, 2002, is of such a nature which would inspire confidence in the mind of the court and said conviction based on the basis of the dying declarations would warrant no interference by this court. 5. Undisputedly, the present case basically rests on dying declarations of the deceased, three written and two oral. 5. Undisputedly, the present case basically rests on dying declarations of the deceased, three written and two oral. No doubt that the conviction can be based solely on the basis of the dying declaration of the deceased. However, by now, it is a settled principle of law that for resting conviction only on the basis of the dying declaration, the court must come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was recorded in trustworthy and reliable manner and that the dying declaration depicts the true statement of the deceased. In the present case, there are five dying declarations, two recorded by the Executive Magistrate, one by police officer and two oral statements made by the deceased to her sister and brother. 6. Insofar as the first dying declaration is concerned, it is at Exh.46 and is also recorded by the Executive Magistrate. In the said dying declaration, deceased states that on the date of incident at about 1.30 p.m. she was making tea. She states that the stove was having heater and due to its blast she received one injury. She further states that at that time her mother-in-law, grand mother-in-law, brother-in-law and husband were at home. All of them poured water on her and brought Dr. Wankhede. She further states that thereafter she was taken to the Hospital but was not aware who had taken her to the Hospital. The recording of the statement had commenced at 9.10 p.m. on 21.3.2002. 7. The second dying declaration is recorded on 22nd March, 2002, which is at Exh. 57. Perusal of the said dying declaration would reveal that in the said dying declaration deceased states that on the date of incident she had quarrel with her mother-in-law and her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her. She further states that her brother-in-law ignited fire by matchstick. She further states that she had become unconscious due to burn injuries. She further states that the report given by her on 21.3.2002 was a false report. The said dying declaration was recorded on 22.3.2002 between 1.20 p.m. to 1.40 p.m.. No doubt that the said dying declaration has endorsement of the Medical Officer stating that deceased was conscious oriented and able to give dying declaration and also subsequent endorsement of fully oriented while recording the dying declaration. The said dying declaration was recorded on 22.3.2002 between 1.20 p.m. to 1.40 p.m.. No doubt that the said dying declaration has endorsement of the Medical Officer stating that deceased was conscious oriented and able to give dying declaration and also subsequent endorsement of fully oriented while recording the dying declaration. However, it is to be noted that in the said dying declaration there is no endorsement of the Executive Magistrate to the effect that the said dying declaration was read over to the deceased and she confirms making said statement. 8. Insofar as the third dying declaration is concerned, it is recorded by the police officer. Same is at Exh.67. The said dying declaration does not have endorsement of Medical Officer. In the said dying declaration, the deceased states that on 21.3.2002 there was a quarrel between her husband and her brother-in-law Deepak. She further states that she also had quarrel with her mother-in-law on account of household work. She further states that at around 2.00 p.m. when she was alone in the last room, her mother-in-law came in the room and poured kerosene on her person and her brother-in-law Deepak ignited fire with the help of match-stick. She further states that thereafter her husband came and poured water on her person and thereafter she became unconscious. She further states that thereafter she was brought to the Hospital. At that point of time, she narrated the incident to her relatives. She states that she was ill-treated by her mother-in-law, her husband and also defamed. The said dying declaration is recorded by the P.W.8 Prakash Raut, who was the investigating officer. 9. Insofar as the oral dying declarations are concerned, one is made to P.W.2 Sushilabai, who is elder sister of the deceased. From the evidence of P.W.2 Sushilabai, it would appear that the statement, which was made to P.W.2 Sushilabai, was that the quarrel between husband and brother-in-law of the deceased was on the ground of filling up the bullock-cart of the dung. It would further appear that deceased said to Sushilabai that her mother-in-law intervened in the quarrel to settle it. Thereafter, mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and Deepak set her on fire. The evidence of the said witness would reveal that the second dying declaration was recorded after the deceased had talk with this witness. It would further appear that deceased said to Sushilabai that her mother-in-law intervened in the quarrel to settle it. Thereafter, mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and Deepak set her on fire. The evidence of the said witness would reveal that the second dying declaration was recorded after the deceased had talk with this witness. It would reveal from further evidence that this witness has stated that Ramratan, who is the brother of deceased, had made complaint to the police and on the basis of his complaint, second dying declaration was recorded. It is further to be noted that this witness has stated that she, her brother Ramratan and her sister Nirmalabai, who went to the Hospital to meet Pushpabai, were in the hospital till her death. 10. Insofar as the evidence of P.W.7 Ramratan is concerned, the same is at Exh.60. It is to be noted that though in the evidence of Sushilabai she states that she was told by the deceased that kerosene was poured by mother-in-law and Deepak set her on fire, in the evidence of this witness he states that he was told that Deepak had poured kerosene and mother-in-law ignited the fire with match-stick. Though Sushilabai states that second dying declaration was recorded at the instance of Ramratan, he denied to have lodged report in the police station. However, perusal of the First Information Report would reveal that second dying declaration was recorded at the instance of this witness. It can, thus, clearly be seen that the prosecution has tried to improve the case from one dying declaration to other. Though in the first dying declaration no one has been implicated, in the said second dying declaration the present appellants have been implicated. However, in the third dying declaration recorded by the police, entire new version has been given. In the said dying declaration, for the first time, there is a reference to quarrel between the husband and brother-in-law of the deceased. It is to be noted that in the second dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate there is only reference to the quarrel between the deceased and her mother-in-law. It can, thus, clearly be seen that the prosecution has tried to improve the story. It is to be noted that in the second dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate there is only reference to the quarrel between the deceased and her mother-in-law. It can, thus, clearly be seen that the prosecution has tried to improve the story. It is further to be noted that in the first oral dying declaration, which is alleged to be made to P.W.2 Sushilabai, there is further improvement regarding the quarrel on the issue of filling up the dung in the bullock-cart. 11. The evidence of P.W.2 Sushilabai, so also the evidence of P.W.5 Noor Ahmadkhan, who was an Executive Magistrate and recorded the dying declaration would reveal that second dying declaration was recorded in presence of the relatives of the deceased i.e. P.W.2 Sushilabai, P.W.7 Ramratan and other relatives. P.W.5 Noor Ahmadkhan categorically states that when he had reached near the patient, her relatives were present there. In that view of the matter, the possibility of the subsequent dying declarations being tutored at the instance of the relatives cannot be ruled out. 12. It is further to be noted that the deceased in the first dying declaration specifically states that after she received burn injuries, one Dr. Wankhede was immediately called to treat her. However, the evidence of the Investigation Officer-Prakash Raut (P.W.8) would reveal that he has not recorded the statement of the said Dr. Wankhede. It is further to be noted that the Investigating Officer fairly admitted that though he has recorded the statements of the neighours residing in the surrounding area, he has not placed the said statements on record. Thus, it can clearly be seen that the Investigating Officer has not come to the court with clean hands. The Investigation Officer has, for the best reasons known to him, not examined the best witness which was available viz. Dr. Wankhede, who could have thrown light on the true story and has further suppressed the statements of the neighbours who would have thrown light on the real instance. 13. The Division Bench of this court in the case of Abdul Riyaz Abdul Bashir (supra) has clearly held that subsequent dying declaration which could be subjected to tutoring by the relatives cannot be a sole basis for resting the order of conviction. 14. 13. The Division Bench of this court in the case of Abdul Riyaz Abdul Bashir (supra) has clearly held that subsequent dying declaration which could be subjected to tutoring by the relatives cannot be a sole basis for resting the order of conviction. 14. Another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manik Gawali (supra) relying on the Judgment of the Apex Court has held that if the medical expert who certifies the fitness of the deceased to give statement is not examined, then the certificate issued by the said doctor cannot be said to be proved. In this respect, it would be relevant to refer to the portion of the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Jai Lal, (1999 ALL MR (Cri) 1790 (S.C.) which is as under: “18. An expert is not a witness of fact. His evidence is really of an advisory character. The duty of an expert witness is to furnish the Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of the conclusions so as to enable the Judge to form his independent judgment by the application of this criteria to the facts proved by the evidence of the case. The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convicting and tested becomes a factor and often an important factor for consideration along with the other evidence of the case. The credibility of such a witness depends on the reasons stated in support of his conclusions and the date and material furnished which from the basis of his conclusions. 19. The report submitted by an expert does not go in evidence automatically. He is to be examined as a witness in court and has to face cross-examination. This Court in Haji Mohammad Ekramul Haq vs. State of W.B. (2003) 8 SCC 752 concurred with the finding of the High Court in not placing any reliance upon the evidence of an expert witness on the ground that his evidence was merely an opinion unsupported by any reasons.” 15. In the present case, P.W.5 Noor Ahmadkhan nowhere states that the dying declaration as recorded by him was read over to the deceased and she confirmed of making the dying declaration. Though he states that the deceased was medically and physically in sound position to give statement, the doctor, who is alleged to have examined her, has not been examined. In the present case, P.W.5 Noor Ahmadkhan nowhere states that the dying declaration as recorded by him was read over to the deceased and she confirmed of making the dying declaration. Though he states that the deceased was medically and physically in sound position to give statement, the doctor, who is alleged to have examined her, has not been examined. In that view, in view of the Judgment of the Apex Court cited supra, the said certificate would not be of any assistance to the prosecution case. 16. It is further to be noted that there are material contradictions in the evidence of the relatives of the deceased herself i.e. P.W.2 Shushilabai and P.W.7 Ramratan. Whereas the P.W.2 Sushilabai has stated that the second dying declaration was recorded at the instance of Ramratan (P.W.7), he denies the same. 17. In that view, we are of the considered view that the dying declarations which are recorded at Exhs. 57 and 67 and the alleged oral dying declarations made to P.W.2 Sushilabai and P.W.7 Ramratan cannot be said to be of such a nature which would inspire confidence in the mind of the court to rest the order of conviction. In that view, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and as such the order of conviction as recorded by the learned trial Judge is not sustainable. 18. In the result, the Appeal is allowed. The order of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Judge is quashed and set aside. The appellants are directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other crime.