JUDGMENT D.H. Waghela, C.J. 1. This petition, by way of Public Interest Litigation, is filed on the basis that the respondent State Government had acquired lands of the agriculturists for the development of Hubli Airport to the extent of 707 acres and 4 guntas. After such acquisition under the provision of Section 28 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (‘the Act’ for short), the land developed for the Airport was restricted to 599 acres and 21 guntas and the remaining land, instead of being returned to the agriculturists, was allotted to other private parties joined herein as Respondent Nos. 4 to 6. Petitioner No.1 is stated to be an R.T.I. activist and Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are stated to be the persons whose lands also were acquired for the purpose of the Airport as aforesaid. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners could not point out violation of any provisions of the Act and only harped upon the fact that the alienation of excess land to Respondent Nos.4 to 6 was not for public purpose and hence the court must interfere to ensure return of such land to the agriculturists like petitioner Nos. 2 and 3. No Provision of law of precedent was cited in support of such submission and prayer. 3. The Act makes a special provision for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries. “Industrial area“ is defined in sub-section (6) of Section 2 to mean any area declared to be an industrial area by the State Government by notification which is to be developed and where industries are to be accommodated; and industrial infrastructural facilities and amenities are to be provided and includes, an industrial estate. Subsection (7) of Section 2 defines an “industrial estate” to mean any site selected by the State Government where factories and other buildings are built for use by industries or class of industries. Sub- section 7(a) defines “industrial infrastructural facilities” to mean facilities which contribute to the development of industries established in industrial area such as research and development, communication, transport, Banking, Marketing, Technology parks and Townships for the purpose of establishing trade and tourism centres; and any other facility as the State Government may, by notification, specify to be an industrial infrastructural facility for the purposes of the Act. “Amenity” is defined in sub-section (1) of section 2 to include roads, supply of water or electricity, street lighting, drainage, sewerage, conservancy, and such other convenience as the State Government may, by notification, specify to be an amenity for the purposes of the Act. 4. In the instant case, acquisition of land has not been assailed by the petitioners. But, Annexures-C, D and E dated 11.2.2013, 16.2.2013 and 28.1.2013 respectively, allotting various extents of land which were initially acquired for the purpose of Hubli Airport to Respondent Nos.4 to 6 are assailed. Under Annexure-C, 50 acres of land is allotted to Respondent No. 4 for the establishment of “IT SEZ Project”. For the purpose of establishment of “Skill Training Centre and Incubation Space to promote entrepreneurship”, allotment of 12 acres 26 guntas is made in favour of Respondent No.5 under Annexure-D Similarly, an extent of 2 acres has been allotted to Respondent No.6 to establish a hotel with Multi Cuisine Restaurants with other facilities including Board Rooms, Exhibition Halls, etc. These allotments have been assailed by the petitioners. 5. At the outset, we observe that the purpose of allotment of land to Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 is not contrary to the provisions and purpose of the Act. The allotment of lands made to these respondents are for establishing industrial infrastructural facilities in an industrial estate forming part of industrial area. Though acquisition of 707 acres and 4 guntas of land was made for setting up of the Hubli Airport, the state Government, in its wisdom, decided to restrict the Airport area to 599 acres and 21 guntas only. A portion of the remaining area has been allotted to Respondent Nos.4 to 6 for the aforesaid purposes. 6. On the issuance of a declaration under sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Act and publication thereof in the official gazette, the land vests absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The declaration has to be made only after the State Government is satisfied that any land which is sought to be acquired is for the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 28. The declaration has to be made only after the State Government is satisfied that any land which is sought to be acquired is for the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 28. Subsection (1) of Section 28 states that the land can be acquired for two purposes viz (i) the land is required for the purposes of development of the Board constituted under the Act as an industrial area, and (ii) for any other purposes in furtherance of the objects of the Act. The state Government has to first form an opinion that the land is required for any of the aforesaid purposes and then may notify its intention to acquire the land. 7. Therefore, the express provision of Section 28(5) makes it clear that, on the publication in the official gazette of the declaration under sub-section (4), the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The expression “the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances” found in sub-section (5) of section 28 of the Act is commonly found in other enactments pertaining to acquisition. Delineating the said provision in the context of tenancy laws and also Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the case of Sulochana Chandrakant Galande Vs. Pune Municipal Transport, [ (2010) 8 SCC 467 ] by following Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union Vs. Delhi Improvement Trust ( AIR 1957 SC 344 ) that the expression “Vesting” means that the property acquired becomes the property of the Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. Vesting of the land is not for any limited purpose or any limited duration. It is also settled legal proposition that once the land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances, there cannot be any rider on the part of the State Government to change user of the land in the manner it chooses. How the State Government uses the excess land is no concern to the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. The original land owners cannot seek restoration of possession on the ground that either the original public purpose has ceased to be in operation or that the land could not be used for any other purpose. 8. In Bhagat Singh Vs. The original land owners cannot seek restoration of possession on the ground that either the original public purpose has ceased to be in operation or that the land could not be used for any other purpose. 8. In Bhagat Singh Vs. State of U.P. [ (1999)2 SCC 384 ] and Northern Indian Glass industries Vs. Jaswant Singh [ (2003) 1 SCC 335 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the land user can be changed by the statutory authority after the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances. It is reiterated that, in the instant case, the allotment of the excess land to Respondent Nos.4 to 6 is in consonance with the object and purpose of the Act and not for a user not contemplated under the provision of the Act. 9. The only obligation on the part of the Government under Section 29, after the acquisition, is that of paying compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is further provided under Section 321 of the Act that, in furtherance of the objects of the Act, the State Government may, upon such conditions as may be agreed upon between the State Government and the Board, place at the disposal of the Board any land vested in the State Government. It is also provided under Section 4 of the Act that the State Government may, at any time, by notification, exclude from any industrial area, any area or include therein any additional area, as may be specified in such notification. 10. In view of the aforesaid scheme of the Act, the petition does not find support from any legal provision or precedent on the basis of which it could be argued that the petitioners are entitled to any relief, even as the lands in question are duly acquired and the compensation therefore is admittedly already determined and paid. There is no evidence about the original acquisition of land being based on any illegal or arbitrary decision and no malafide could be attributed in the successive decision of the respondents for acquiring the land and allocating to the other respondents the lands which turned out to be in excess of the requirements for the airport. There is no evidence about the original acquisition of land being based on any illegal or arbitrary decision and no malafide could be attributed in the successive decision of the respondents for acquiring the land and allocating to the other respondents the lands which turned out to be in excess of the requirements for the airport. If petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are the original owners of the lands acquired for the Hubli Airport, they certainly cannot maintain this Writ Petition in public interest as it would be abuse of the process of this court. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.