JUDGMENT Alok Aradhe, J.:- This appeal is by the defendants which was initially admitted by a Bench of this Court on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the finding of the two Courts below that the land in dispute is part of Khasra No. 431/8 belonging to the plaintiff, is perverse ? 2. Whether the land in dispute is of the ownership of the Police Department of State of Madhya Pradesh ?” Thereafter vide order dated 29-8-2013 following additional substantial questions of law were framed: “3. Whether suit suffers from the defect of non-joinder of necessary party as the State Government was not impleaded as defendant in the suit ? 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable, under Order 23, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the previous suit was withdrawn without seeking leave to file a fresh suit ? 5. Whether the suit is barred by limitation ?” 2. This appeal arises from a suit for declaration and Permanent Injunction instituted by respondent plaintiff. The claim in the suit is based on the ground that Mrs. Lalita James was the owner of Sub-Plots No. 16 and 18 which form part of Plots No. 431 and 432, sheet No. 273 admeasuring 3587 sg. ft. situate adjacent to Police Station Gorakhpur. The plaintiff purchased the suit plot vide registered sale deed dated 20-8-1982 from aforesaid Lalita James and she was placed in possession. The plaintiff got her name mutated in revenue records. On 20-3-1985 the plaintiff went to suit plot along with labourers to fence the suit plot, however Town Inspector of the police Station, Gorakhpur restrained the plaintiff from doing so and informed her that the suit plot belongs to police department. The plaintiff thereupon initiated proceeding for demarcation of the plot. The notices were issued to the defendants to remain present on 28-4-1985. However, none appeared on behalf of the defendants. The Sub-Engineer of Public Works Department was present on behalf of the defendant No. 6 who was satisfied with the demarcation. The plot No. 430 as well as the suit plot was demarcated. The demarcation report dated 11-5-1985 was submitted by the Revenue Inspector. However, defendants kept on interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit plot. 3. The plaintiff thereafter filed civil suit, namely, C.S. No. 3-A/1986 seeking the relief of declaration of title and permanent injunction. The plot No. 430 as well as the suit plot was demarcated. The demarcation report dated 11-5-1985 was submitted by the Revenue Inspector. However, defendants kept on interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit plot. 3. The plaintiff thereafter filed civil suit, namely, C.S. No. 3-A/1986 seeking the relief of declaration of title and permanent injunction. However, on the assurance of Deputy Inspector General of Police the suit was withdrawn on 18-11-1987. However, once again the police officials started interfering with plaintiffs possession over the suit plot. The plaintiff filed M.P. No. 3414/1989 which was decided by the Division Bench vide order dated 6-7-1989, with the liberty to the plaintiff to file an action in the civil Court and obtain proper relief as she may feel entitled to. The plaintiff once again filed an application before the Tahsildar for demarcation of plots. The Revenue Inspector on 5-6-1990 submitted report to Tahsildar that Town Inspector, Gorakhpur did not permit to demarcate the suit plot. The Tahsildar in ordersheet dated 10-6-1990 recorded the fact that officers of the police department are interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit plot. Accordingly, the plaintiff filed the suit seeking the relief of declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over the suit plot. The plaintiff also claimed damages to the tune of Rs. 2000/-. 4. The defendants filed the written statement in which inter alia, it was pleaded that the suit is barred under Order 23, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure as previous civil suit was withdrawn without seeking the leave to institute a fresh sail. It was further pleaded that the suit suffers from the vice of non-joinder of necessary party, namely, the State Government and the suit is barred by limitation as the suit plot is in possession of the police department since 1927. It was pointed out that vide Notification dated 21-12-1910 an area admeasuring 30,815 square feet was acquired of khasra number 719, plot No. 90/340 of sheet No. 273 for construction of Gorakhpur police post and quarters of constables. However, later on police department took possession of extra adjacent land admeasuring 33,800/- square feet. It was pleaded that the suit plot is a part of extra land of which possession was taken by the State Government in 1927. However, later on police department took possession of extra adjacent land admeasuring 33,800/- square feet. It was pleaded that the suit plot is a part of extra land of which possession was taken by the State Government in 1927. It has also been averred that extra land forms part of old khasra number 430 and 431/2. In paragraph 9 of the written statement it is again reiterated that defendants are in possession of the plot No. 430 and extra land of plot No. 431/2 since 1927. The title, if any of the owner, has been extinguished. 5. The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 29-10-1999 inter alia, held that the suit plot is not included in the land admeasuring 0.78 acres, which is in possession of police department and the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the suit plot. It was further held that in the knowledge of defendants, the plaintiffs name was recorded in the revenue records and the suit filed by the plaintiff is within limitation. The aforesaid decree was affirmed in appeal by the lower Appellate Court. 6. Learned Advocate General for the appellants submitted that from perusal of the sale deed (Exhibit P-1) it is evident that the plaintiff has purchased the subplots 16 and 18 which form the part of plot No. 439 of sheet No. 283 and in the demarcation proceeding held on 17-5-1985 (Exhibit P-8) it was disclosed that the suit plot bears number 431/8 therefore a correction deed dated 11-7-1985 (Exhibit P-9) was executed subsequently, which shows that the plaintiff had no knowledge about the property which she had purchased. It was further submitted that as per map (Exhibit P-2) the suit plot is shown to be in two different parts but in the sale deed it was not so described. The attention of this Court has been invited to paragraph 1 of evidence of plaintiff witness No. 1 and it has been contended that plaintiff witness No. 1 does not claim to have purchased portion marked with letters 'ka', 'kha' and 'ga' and in paragraph 11 he has stated that there is construction on the suit plot whereas suit plot is open land. Therefore the finding recorded by the Courts below that the plaintiff is owner of the suit plot, namely, 431/8, is perverse. Therefore the finding recorded by the Courts below that the plaintiff is owner of the suit plot, namely, 431/8, is perverse. It is also urged that since the State Government was not impleaded as party therefore the suit suffers from vice of non-joinder of necessary party in view of section 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the suit is barred by limitation. Lastly it is urged that the suit is non-maintainable in view of Order 23, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed in Collector v. Bagathi Krishna Rao, (2010) 6 SCC 427 , Kishorsingh Anarsingh v. Tej Singh Dhyansingh, 1966 MPLJ 1062 = AIR 1967 M.P. 120 , M/s Hulas Rai Baij Nath v. Firm K. B. Bass and Co., AIR 1968 SC 111 and Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 . 7. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted that from proceeding before Deputy Commissioner (Exhibit P-8) it is apparent that one Prita Bai Moris i.e. the mother of the vendor of the plaintiff was the owner of the suit plot. The vendor of the plaintiff, namely, Lalita James acquired suit plot under a Will dated 23-1-1945 and in subsequent partition dated 20-2-1955 effected between Lalita James and her younger sister. It was also urged that the house of Lalita James was recorded in revenue records (Exhibits P-5) and demarcation reports (Exhibits P-7 and P-8) reveal that the land of the plaintiff bears plot number 431/8 whereas the land of police department bears plot number 430. The plaintiff has acquired title in respect of the suit plot vide sale deed dated 20-8-1982 (Exhibit P-1) and correction deed dated 11-7-1985 (Exhibit P-9) and no documentary evidence was adduced by the defendants either to prove their title or possession. It is pointed out that on 18-8-1993, an application for impleadment of the State Government as defendant No. 7 was made which was allowed on 13-9-1994. However, correction was not carried out in cause title, therefore, the suit does not suffer from vice of non-joinder of necessary party and it is a mere case of mis-description. It is pointed out that on 18-8-1993, an application for impleadment of the State Government as defendant No. 7 was made which was allowed on 13-9-1994. However, correction was not carried out in cause title, therefore, the suit does not suffer from vice of non-joinder of necessary party and it is a mere case of mis-description. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reference has been made to the decisions in the cases of Patasibai and others v. Ratanlal, (1990) 2 SCC 42 , Secretary, Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of India and others v. Mohinder Singh Jagdev and others, (1996) 6 SCC 229 , Murari Mohan Deb v. Secretary to the Government of India and others, AIR 1985 SC 931 , Union of India v. M/s Harpal Dass Madhyani, AIR 1979 Patna 18 and M/s Frick India Ltd. v. Executive Engineer, Project Public Health Division, Chandigarh and another, AIR 1975 Punjab 39. It is also pointed out that in view of objections raised in the written statement with regard to maintainability of the suit, on the ground that the same suffers from vice of non-joinder of necessary party, and it is barred under Order 23, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, preliminary issues were framed which were answered in favour of the plaintiff vide order dated 20-10-1993 by the trial Court. The aforesaid order was upheld in C.R. No. 157/1993 vide order dated 26-2-1994 by the Additional District Judge. Therefore, the order passed in civil revision operates as res judicata. In this connection reliance has been placed on Shyamcharan Raghubar Prasad v. Sheojee Bhai Jairam Chhatri, 1964 MPLJ 502 and order dated 18-11-1997 passed in LPA No. 13/1992. It is also submitted that every threat or injury to the plaintiff furnishes a fresh cause of action and, therefore, the suit is within limitation. In this regard reference has been made to decision in Mohan Lal v. State of M.P. and others, 1979 MPLJ (F.B.) 801 = 1979 JLJ 714 . Alternatively it is submitted that in the facts of the case declaration of title is an ancillary relief and injunction is the substantive relief and therefore the suit is within limitation. In this regard reference has been made to decision in Mohan Lal v. State of M.P. and others, 1979 MPLJ (F.B.) 801 = 1979 JLJ 714 . Alternatively it is submitted that in the facts of the case declaration of title is an ancillary relief and injunction is the substantive relief and therefore the suit is within limitation. For the aforesaid proposition, reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and others, AIR 1961 SC 808 and Daya Singh and another v. Gurdev Singh, (2010) 2 SCC 194 . 8. I have considered the rival submissions advanced at the Bar and have perused the record. Before proceeding to answer the substantial questions of law, the scope of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is well defined by the catena of decisions of the Supreme Court may be noticed. The jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the findings of fact under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is limited to the cases where the finding is either perverse or based on no evidence. This Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact until or unless the same is perverse or contrary to material on record. It is equally well settled that this Court in exercise of power under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence. [See: Narayan Rajendran and anr. v. Lekshmy Sarojini and others, (2009) 5 SCC 264 , Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed and others, (2011) 7 SCC 189, Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 , D. R. Rathna Murthy v. Ramappa, 2011(2) MPLJ (S.C.) 507 = (2011) 1 SCC 158 and Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishnath Agrawal, 2012(4) MPLJ (S.C.) 265 = (2012) 7 SCC 288 .] 9. In Exhibit P-5 i.e. khasra of years 1979-80 to 1981-82 the name of vendor of plaintiff, namely, Lalita James was recorded as the owner in respect of the plot bearing khasra number 431/1 admeasuring 54,754 square feet. In the order dated 10-6-1990 passed by the Tahsildar (Exhibit P-6) it is recorded that plot bearing No. 431/8 admeasuring 3587 square feet situate adjoining to the police station, Gorakhpur is recorded in the name of the plaintiff. In the order dated 10-6-1990 passed by the Tahsildar (Exhibit P-6) it is recorded that plot bearing No. 431/8 admeasuring 3587 square feet situate adjoining to the police station, Gorakhpur is recorded in the name of the plaintiff. From demarcation report dated 11-5-1985 (Exhibit P-7) submitted by the revenue inspector it is evident that demarcation of plot numbers 430 and 431/1 was carried out and sub-engineer of Public Works Department who was present at the time of demarcation was satisfied with the demarcation. Similarly demarcation report (Exhibit P-8) shows that the land bearing plot No. 430 which admeasures 30185 square feet is recorded in the name of the State Government and plot number 431/8 admeasuring 3587 square feet is recorded in the name of the plaintiff. Thus, both the plots have separate existence. The plaintiff has acquired title in respect of the suit plot by registered sale deed dated 20-8-1982 and correction deed dated 11-7-1985. It is noteworthy that in the written statement defendants have pleaded that the suit plot forms part of khasra numbers 430 and 431/2. It is pertinent to mention here that defendants have not filed any documentary evidence either to prove their possession or title in respect of the suit plot. There is no material on record to indicate that suit plot was recorded in the revenue records in the name of the State Government and the same is not included in the lands described in the ordersheet (Exhibit P-8). The Courts below on meticulous appreciation of the evidence on record have held that the plaintiff is owner and is in possession of the suit plot and the same does not belong to police department. The aforesaid findings of fact which are concurrent in nature by no stretch of imagination can be said to be either perverse or based on no evidence. This Court in exercise of power under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, cannot re-appreciate the evidence, even if another view is possible. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law numbers (i) and (ii) are answered in the negative and against the appellants. 10. An application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the plaintiff on 18-8-1993 for impleadment of State of M.P. which was allowed by the trial Court vide order dated 13-9-1994. However, in compliance of aforesaid order, the cause title was not corrected. 10. An application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the plaintiff on 18-8-1993 for impleadment of State of M.P. which was allowed by the trial Court vide order dated 13-9-1994. However, in compliance of aforesaid order, the cause title was not corrected. In Patasibai (supra) it has been held that if an application for correction of cause title is allowed and the correction was not incorporated in the plaint and the parties were not misled in any manner it would be a case of mere mis-description in the cause title. Similar view has been taken in the cases of Secretary Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of India and others as well as Maria Mohan (supra). The objections that suit was barred under Order 23, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code and is not maintainable on account of non-impleadment of State Governments was rejected by the trial Court vide order dated 20-10-1993, which was upheld in revision vide order dated 26-2-1994 by the Additional District Judge. The aforesaid order admittedly has attained finality. It is well settled in law that if validity of an order passed during proceeding in the suit is agitated by a party in a higher forum, then the order passed by the higher forum operates as res judicata when the matter again comes before the High Court by way of Second Appeal. [See: Ashok Kumar Shrivastava v. National Insurance Company Ltd. and others, (1998) 4 SCC 361 . For the aforementioned reasons, third and forth substantial questions of law are answered in the negative and against the appellants. 11. In Jalandhar Thakur v. Jhamla Das, AIR 1914 PC 72 it has been held that where there are successive infringements of an existing right, each infringement gives right to a fresh cause of action. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of M. P., 1979 JLJ 714 has held that each infringement of right shall give rise to fresh cause of action. In Bolo v. Koklan, AIR 1930 PC 270 it has been held that right to sue does not accrue unless accrual of right is asserted in the suit and there is clear threat of infringement of right. In Bolo v. Koklan, AIR 1930 PC 270 it has been held that right to sue does not accrue unless accrual of right is asserted in the suit and there is clear threat of infringement of right. In paragraph 15 of the plaint, the plaintiff has stated that cause of action accrued on 5-6-1990 as on 5-6-1990, the town inspector did not permit demarcation of the suit plot and the suit has been filed on 9-7-1990, which is within limitation. Accordingly, the fifth substantial question of law is also answered in the negative and against the appellants. 12. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.