JUDGMENT 1. This Revision is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dt.21.07.2011 in IA.No.3542 of 2010 in OS.No.309 of 2010 on the file of III Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. 2. The petitioner herein is the defendant in the above suit. The respondents herein filed the above suit on 15.06.2010 against the petitioner alleging that they are owners of the plaint schedule property; that the petitioner initially took the above premises on lease under a registered lease deed dt.09.11.2006 for a period of two years commencing from 01.12.2006; the said lease provided that after the expiry of the said period of two years, a fresh agreement is to be executed for every two years up to a maximum period of six years; that the rent payable to the respondents by the petitioner was to be enhanced by 10% at the end of every twelve months from the date of commencement of the lease; that another agreement of lease dt.10.11.2006 was also executed between the parties in respect of furniture, fixtures and amenities in respect of the property leased; but after the expiry of first two years covered by the above lease, no fresh lease deed was executed and the lease was from month to month; that the petitioner was not paying the rent from December, 2009 to June, 2010 @ Rs.1,79,700/- amounting to Rs.12,57,900/-; he also caused damage to the leased premises to the tune of Rs.15,00,000/-; that he is also liable to pay municipal taxes but did not do so and he is entitled to reimburse the respondents an amount of Rs.2,97,579/- towards municipal taxes; after adjusting the security deposit of Rs.8,00,000/-, the petitioner is liable to pay Rs.22,55,479/-; that the respondents by a legal notice dt.11.02.2010 terminated the tenancy of the petitioner but he did not vacate the leased premises; and therefore, the following reliefs be granted:- “(a) Eviction of the Defendant from premises bearing No.8-2-684/3/45 and 8-2-684/3/40, Road No.12, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad, the suit schedule property. (b) Rs.22,32,679/- with interest @9% from the date of suit till date of full payment. (c) Mesne profits for unlawful use and occupation @Rs.1,79,700/- per month from the date of suit till date of delivery of possession of the scheduled property. (d) Costs of the suit. (b) Rs.22,32,679/- with interest @9% from the date of suit till date of full payment. (c) Mesne profits for unlawful use and occupation @Rs.1,79,700/- per month from the date of suit till date of delivery of possession of the scheduled property. (d) Costs of the suit. (e) Such other relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper to account.” 3. The petitioner herein then filed I.A.No.3542 of 2010 to refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with Clause 30 of the lease deed dt.09.11.2006 and Clause 17 of the agreement dt.10.11.2006 (which are identical) contending that he was granted lease by the respondents for a period of six years commencing from 01.12.2006; as per the above Clauses in the said lease deeds, any dispute between the parties with regard to the said agreements or the subject matter thereof, including existence and validity of the agreements would be settled by arbitrators as per the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the Act’); that the suit was filed without disclosing this fact; and therefore, the suit be dismissed as not maintainable by referring the parties to arbitration. 4. A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondents opposing this plea. The respondents contended that the lease agreement dt.09.11.2006 and the agreement dt.10.11.2006 were only for a period of two years and expired on 30.11.2008; subsequently, the tenancy is from month to month terminable by issue of 15 days notice as per Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; that the suit does not involve any issue/disputes with regard to the lease deed dt.09.11.2006 and agreement dt.10.11.2006; and therefore, the arbitration clause contained therein cannot be invoked by the petitioner. It was contended that the issues arising in the suit relate to the period after the expiry of the lease periods; that the petitioner never sought execution of any fresh agreement pursuant to the lease dt.09.11.2006; that this application is filed only to drag on the proceedings and delay the suit; and therefore, it may be dismissed. 5. By order dt.21.07.2011, IA.No.3542 of 2010 was dismissed by the trial court with costs. It held that the period of lease under the lease agreement dt.09.11.2006 and the agreement dt.10.11.2006 expired on 01.12.2008 and no fresh agreement was executed after the expiry of the lease period between the parties. 5. By order dt.21.07.2011, IA.No.3542 of 2010 was dismissed by the trial court with costs. It held that the period of lease under the lease agreement dt.09.11.2006 and the agreement dt.10.11.2006 expired on 01.12.2008 and no fresh agreement was executed after the expiry of the lease period between the parties. Therefore, it held that the agreements including the arbitration clauses therein came to an end by 01.12.2008; thereafter, the tenancy was only on a month to month basis terminable by issue of 15 days’ notice as per Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; with the expiry of the lease period stipulated in the lease deeds, the agreements came to an end and the arbitration clause ceased to operate. So the proceedings in the suit cannot be stalled by petitioner invoking S.8 of the Act. 6. Challenging the same, the present Revision is filed. 7. Heard Sri B. Nalin Kumar, counsel for the petitioner and Sri B. Vijaysen Reddy counsel for the GPA Holder of respondents. 8. The Counsel for the petitioner contended that the order passed by the Trial Court is contrary to law and is unsustainable; where arbitration clause exists, court has a mandatory duty to refer dispute arising between the contracting parties to arbitrator; it has no jurisdiction to continue the suit once an application under Section 8 of the Act has been filed; it is not open to the Court to go into the merits of the claim made by the petitioner and only the arbitrator can go into the same. He further contended that the lease agreement dt.09.11.2006 contemplated a lease for a period of six years and although Clause 1 thereof stated that the lease shall be in force for a period of two years from 01.12.2006, even thereafter since it contemplated that a fresh agreement is to be executed for every two years up to a maximum period of six years, it has to be accepted that there is a lease for six years. He contended that the tenancy, after the expiry of two years from 01.12.2006, i.e., from 01.12.2008 is not a monthly tenancy, but is a tenancy covered by the lease deed dt.09.11.2006. He placed reliance upon the decisions in HindustanPetroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums ( (2003) 6 SCC 503 ) and LoyolaSchool, Hyderabad v. Megha Kumar and another ( 2010 (1) ALD 399 (DB)). 9. He placed reliance upon the decisions in HindustanPetroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums ( (2003) 6 SCC 503 ) and LoyolaSchool, Hyderabad v. Megha Kumar and another ( 2010 (1) ALD 399 (DB)). 9. The counsel for the respondents however contended that the order passed by the Court below is valid and correct and did not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. I have noted the submissions of both sides. 11. Section 8 of the Act reads thus:- “8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement:- (1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. (2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. (3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.” 12. In Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. ( (2011) 5 SCC 532 ), the Supreme Court held:- “19. Where a suit is filed by one of the parties to an arbitration agreement against the other parties to the arbitration agreement, and if the defendants file an application under Section 8 stating that the parties should be referred to arbitration, the court (judicial authority) will have to decide:- (i) Whether there is an arbitration agreement among the parties. (ii) Whether all the parties to the suit are parties to the arbitration agreement. (iii) Whether the disputes which are the subject-matter of the suit fall within the scope of arbitration agreement. (iv) Whether the defendant had applied under Section 8 of the Act before submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute. (v) Whether the reliefs sought in the suit are those that can be adjudicated and granted in an arbitration. 32. (iv) Whether the defendant had applied under Section 8 of the Act before submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute. (v) Whether the reliefs sought in the suit are those that can be adjudicated and granted in an arbitration. 32. But where the issue of “arbitrability” arises in the context of an application under Section 8 of the Act in a pending suit, all aspects of arbitrability will have to be decided by the court seized of the suit, and cannot be left to the decision of the arbitrator. Even if there is an arbitration agreement between the parties, and even if the dispute is covered by the arbitration agreement, the court where the civil suit is pending, will refuse an application under Section 8 of the Act, to refer the parties to arbitration, if the subject-matter of the suit is capable of adjudication only by a public forum or the relief claimed can only be granted by a special court or Tribunal.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Magma Leasing & Finance Ltd. v. Potluri Madhavilata ( (2009) 10 SCC 103 ), the Supreme Court declared:- “An analysis of Section 8 would show that for its applicability, the following conditions must be satisfied:- (a) That there exists an arbitration agreement. (b) That action has been brought to the court by one party to the arbitration agreement against the other party. (c) That the subject-matter of the suit is same as the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement. (d) That the other party before he submits his first statement of the substance of the dispute, moves the court for referring the parties to arbitration. (e) That along with the application the other party tenders the original arbitration agreement or duly certified copy thereof.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. From the above two decisions, it is clear that where an application under Section 8 seeking reference to arbitration is moved by a defendant in a suit, the Civil Court has to consider whether the disputes which are the subject-matter of the suit fall within the scope of arbitration agreement and whether the subject matter of the suit is the subject matter of the arbitration agreement. 15. In order to decide whether the petitioner can invoke Section 8 of the Act, this point has to be decided. Clause 1 and Clause 30 of the lease deed states:- “Clause 1. 15. In order to decide whether the petitioner can invoke Section 8 of the Act, this point has to be decided. Clause 1 and Clause 30 of the lease deed states:- “Clause 1. The lease shall commence on and from 1st December 2006 and shall be in force for a period of two (2) years and after the expiry of said period of two years a fresh agreement is to be executed for every two years up to a maximum period of six (6) years.” Clause 30 : This agreement will be governed by Indian Law. Any dispute between the parties with regard to this agreement or the subject matter thereof, including existence and validity of the agreement will be settled by arbitrators under the provision of the Indian Arbitration & Conciliations Act, 1996. The Arbitration will be conducted in the city of Hyderabad and each party will be entitled to nominate one Arbitrator each. The two Arbitrators will choose an umpire for the Arbitration Proceedings. The proceedings shall be conducted in English. The Arbitration award is final & binding on both the parties.” 16. From Clause 1 extracted above, it is clear that the duration of lease under the lease deed dt.09.11.2006 is for two years from 01.12.2006 i.e., up to 30.11.2008. Although the parties contemplated execution of a fresh lease deed for every two years up to a maximum of six years, the fact remains that after 30.11.2008, there has been no execution of any such fresh lease deed between the parties. 17. The counsel for the petitioner contended that it is not necessary to execute such a lease deed and that the terms and conditions of the lease deed dt.09.11.2006 would continue for a period of six years from 01.12.2006 as Clause 1 contemplates it. I am unable to agree. The lease in question was only up to 30.11.2008 and unless there is a fresh registered lease agreement executed between the parties thereafter, the terms of the lease deed dt.09.11.2006 would not operate after 30.11.2008. This flows from Clause 1 of the lease deed dt.9.11.2006. 18. Lease deeds sometimes provide for renewal after expiry of the term fixed thereunder. It has been held that such renewal does not take place automatically by mere exercise of option by a party to it and a fresh lease deed has got to be executed. This flows from Clause 1 of the lease deed dt.9.11.2006. 18. Lease deeds sometimes provide for renewal after expiry of the term fixed thereunder. It has been held that such renewal does not take place automatically by mere exercise of option by a party to it and a fresh lease deed has got to be executed. In Hardesh ores (P) Ltd. v. Hede and Company ( (2007) 5 SCC 614 ), the Supreme Court held:- “31. We must hold that in order to give effect to the renewal of a lease, a document has to be executed evidencing the renewal of the agreement or lease, as the case may be, and there is no concept of automatic renewal of lease by mere exercise of option by the lessee. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission urged on behalf of the appellant-plaintiffs that by mere exercise of option claiming renewal, the lease stood renewed automatically and there was no need for executing a document evidencing renewal of the lease.” 19. It is not disputed that the petitioner did not file any suit for specific performance for execution of a fresh lease agreement by the respondents after 30.11.2008. Therefore, in the absence of a fresh agreement as contemplated under the lease deed date 09.11.2006, the said deed operates only up to 30.11.2008 and not thereafter. No doubt, the petitioner continued in possession and enjoyment of the property thereafter, but such enjoyment would only be as a tenant from month to month governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The arbitration clause (clause 30) contained in the lease deed dt.09.11.2006 or the lease agreement dt.10.11.2006 cannot be applied to the month to month tenancy which came into effect after 30.11.2008. This is because the said clause would apply only to disputes in relation to the lease or subject matter of the lease i.e., leased property, which arose during the subsistence of the lease agreements dt.9.11.2006 and 10.11.2006. So I am of the opinion that an arbitration clause in a prior lease deed cannot be used to decide the rights of the parties after the expiry of the lease tenure. Under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the arbitration clause for the period after 30.11.2008 is required to be in writing and there is no such clause because there is no such agreement. Under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the arbitration clause for the period after 30.11.2008 is required to be in writing and there is no such clause because there is no such agreement. An arbitration clause in respect of disputes between the parties which arose long after the expiry of the agreements dt.9.11.2006 and 10.11.2006 cannot be implied. [See Section 7(3) of the said Act]. 20. There is no dispute that in March, 2011, the petitioner had delivered possession of the plaint schedule property to the respondents. 21. The relief in the suit as to eviction of the petitioner is therefore not necessary. The other reliefs as to rent/damages, municipal taxes are for the period commencing from December, 2009 long after the expiry of the term of the lease deed dt.09.11.2006 i.e., long after 30.11.2008. Since the arbitration clause in the lease deed dt.09.11.2006 and the agreement dt.10.11.2006 would no longer operate for the above causes of action, it has to be held that the subject matter of the suit is not covered by the arbitration clause in the above agreements. This is the view taken by the trial court also. 22. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (1 supra), the Supreme Court held:- “14. This Court in the case of P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju has held that the language of Section 8 is peremptory in nature. Therefore, in cases where there is an arbitration clause in the agreement, it is obligatory for the court to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of their arbitration agreement and nothing remains to be decided in the original action after such an application is made except to refer the dispute to an arbitrator. Therefore, it is clear that if, as contended by a party in an agreement between the parties before the civil court, there is a clause for arbitration, it is mandatory for the civil court to refer the dispute to an arbitrator. In the instant case the existence of an arbitral clause in the Agreement is accepted by both the parties as also by the courts below but the applicability thereof is disputed by the respondent and the said dispute is accepted by the courts below. Be that as it may, at the cost of repetition, we may again state that the existence of the arbitration clause is admitted. Be that as it may, at the cost of repetition, we may again state that the existence of the arbitration clause is admitted. If that be so, in view of the mandatory language of Section 8 of the Act, the courts below ought to have referred the dispute to arbitration.” 23. While this principle is unexceptionable, it would apply only if the conditions laid down in Booz Allen and Hamilton (3 supra) and Magma Leasing Finance Ltd. (4 supra) are satisfied. 24. The counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the decision in Loyola School, Hyderabad (2 supra). The facts in the said case are somewhat similar to the case on hand. In this case, the Division Bench of this Court held that the arbitration clause in a rental agreement dt.27.06.1994 would continue to apply to the suit in question filed in 2009, even though the duration of the lease under the above agreement is only for eleven months, extendable by mutual consent up to five years ending 30.06.1999. 25. In my opinion, the lease agreement in the said case having ended on 31.05.1995 and there being no fresh agreement thereafter, the arbitration clause contained in it cannot be held to operate as a bar to a suit filed in the year 2009. So the arbitration clause did not cover the subject matter of the suit. But the Division Bench has not considered at all whether the disputes which are the subject-matter of the suit fall within the scope of arbitration agreement i.e., whether the arbitration clause in the lease agreement dt.27.6.1994 would apply to a suit filed in 2009 when the period of lease covered by the said lease agreement ended 31.5.1995. So I am of the view that in the light of the decisions of the apex court in Booz Allen and Hamilton (3 supra) and Magma Leasing Finance Ltd. (4 supra) that the Court, while dealing with an application under S.8 has to see whether the subject matter of the suit is covered by the subject matter of the agreement containing the arbitration clause, the decision of the Division bench in Loyola School, Hyderabad (2 supra) cannot be taken as good law. 26. 26. A learned Judge of this Court in Smt. Penumalli Sulochana v. Harish Rawtani (2013 (3) Law Summary 121) has also held that the subsistence of a lease under a lease deed would only be up to the period specified therein and once the lease deed became redundant, any clause such as an arbitration clause contained in it also ceases to apply and S.8 cannot be invoked by a defendant in a suit for recovery of possession filed against a tenant. 27. In a fact situation identical to the present case, Ravinder Nath and Anr. v. Best Entertainment (P) Ltd., the Delhi High Court held:- “7. The Plaintiff in its reply to the present application has submitted that the clause referred to by the Defendant actually pertains to the lease tenure from 01.07.2003 to 30.06.2008 and therefore, the said clause has no nexus with the present suit. An arbitration clause in a prior lease deed cannot be used to decide the rights of the parties after the expiry of the lease tenure. 8. Admittedly there was neither a fresh lease nor any registered extension of the earlier lease between the parties, and as per the law of the land, an arbitration clause has to be in writing, therefore, the said arbitration clause cannot be relied upon by the Defendant in the circumstances of the present suit. 12. In view of the above said facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the arbitration clause referred to by the Defendant in a prior lease deed, which has already expired on 30.06.2008, cannot be used to decide the rights of the parties after expiry of the lease tenure and under these circumstances, the rights being sought to be enforced do not relate to the said lease deed or tenure but to a period later in time.” (Emphasis supplied) 28. In Vinton Healthcare Ltd. and ors. v. Balbir Kumar Malhotra and Ors (2009 (2) Arbitration Law Reporter 292) , another case on similar facts, the Punjab and Haryana High Court held:- “15. With the expiry of the lease period stipulated in the lease deed the agreement itself came to an end and thus arbitration clause also ceased to operate and, therefore, learned trial court was fully justified in rejecting the application. With the expiry of the lease period stipulated in the lease deed the agreement itself came to an end and thus arbitration clause also ceased to operate and, therefore, learned trial court was fully justified in rejecting the application. Though it is settled law that it cannot be laid as abstract proposition that whenever the contract is completed all the rights and obligation of the parties under the contract ipso facto come to an end and the arbitration agreement also perishes with the contract. Each case is required to be considered on its own facts. The settled law, therefore, is that the arbitrator can decide the matter arising out of the contract even after expiry thereof, if reference is to be made to the said contract to determine the claim raised. However, in case no reference is required to be made to the contract and the plaintiff claims no right under the said contract with the expiry of lease in the present case arbitration clause also comes to an end and thus there exists no arbitration agreement between the parties. 23. There is no force in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The dispute has to be one, which is covered under the terms of lease agreement. 24. The arbitrator is a creation of the arbitration agreement, therefore, the arbitrator can determine only the matters which are covered under the said contract and cannot determine the dispute which does not fall under the agreement. 25. In the present case, the suit is for possession after expiry of lease period and for damages on account of use and occupation, for which lease is not required to be looked into.” (Emphasis supplied) 26. These judgments apply on all fours to the present case. In view of the above, I hold that the dispute in the suit is not covered by the arbitration clause in the lease agreement dt.9.11.2006 and 10.11.2006 as the lease agreements themselves did not survive after 30.11.2008. 27. Therefore I hold that there is no error of jurisdiction in the order passed by the trial court dismissing IA.No.3542 of 2010 in OS.No.309 of 2010. Consequently, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. 28. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand disclosed.