JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner prays for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order passed by the Director of School Education, Chennai in rejecting the application of the petitioner for grant of pay scale of Rs.9100-275-14050 with one increment for the post of DEO in the light of G.O.Ms.No.590, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 01.08.1992. 2. The petitioner passed M.A., M.Ed., and was appointed as School Assistant Grade-II/Deputy Inspector of Schools/Headmaster Grade-II in the year 1965. The petitioner was promoted as High School Headmaster on 21.12.1985 and thereafter, was promoted as Headmaster of Government Higher Secondary School, Kadayal in the year 1996. 3. The petitioner was further promoted as District Educational Officer, Devakottai on 3.4.1998 where he worked till the date of superannuation and retired from service on 30.4.1999. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that while working as Headmaster of Higher Secondary School, he was drawing the salary in the scale of pay of Rs.9,100-275-14050. The petitioner on promotion to the post of District Educational Officer, Devokottai was placed in the pay scale of R.8,000-275-13500, which was lower than that of the pay scale drawn by the petitioner as Higher Secondary School Headmaster. 5. It is submitted that the petitioner on promotion to higher post, should have been placed in higher scale in accordance in terms of G.O.Ms.No.590, Finance (Pay Cell) Department, dated 1.8.1992, which stipulates that when an employee is promoted to a higher post carrying lower scale of pay than that of the selection grade/special grade pay of lower post, fixation of pay made after granting one increment in the scale of pay applicable to the selection grade/special grade of lower post. 6. In other words, the petitioner was entitled to get the very same salary, which he was receiving as Head master of Higher Secondary school with one increment. 7. It is the case of the petitioner that the third respondent did not fix the pay scale in accordance with the G.O and the petitioner was only paid a lower scale of pay though the second respondent issued eligibility certificate dated 1.4.1998 to fix the pay of the petitioner in the post of District Educational Officer with effect from 3.4.1998. 8. 8. It is the case of the petitioner that since 5.8.1998, the petitioner has been continuously making representation one after another, requesting for fixation of pay as per G.O.Ms.No.590 dated 1.8.1992, but the third respondent refused to fix the pay of the petitioner by stating that the post of District Educational Officer was not a promotional post and that the scale of pay of the Higher Secondary School Headmaster and the District Educational Officer were one and the same. 9. It is the further case of the petitioner that the order of the third respondent was contrary to G.O.Ms.No.105, School Education Department, dated 1.4.1998 as well as the proceedings of the Director of School Education dated 1.4.1998, wherein, it is stated that the scale of pay of District Educational Officer and Head Master was not to be treated as one and the same, in view of G.O.Ms.No.590 dated 1.8.1992. 10. The petitioner filed a appeal to challenge the correctness of the order passed by the third respondent, but till date, the second respondent did not pass any order on the petitioner's appeal. Therefore, the petitioner was forced to file further representations requesting the respondents fix his scale of pay in the post of District Educational Officer with one increment. 11. Finding no response to his representations, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.29097 of 2007 in this Court seeking a direction to the respondents 1 and 2 to fix the petitioner scale of pay as Rs.9,100-275-14050 with one increment, in light of G.O.Ms.No.590 dated 1.8.1992. by considering the petitioner's representation dated 27.4.2007. 12. This Court, disposed of the writ petition on 5.9.2007 directing the respondents 1 and 2, to consider the grievance of the petitioner and pass order within six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order. 13. It is the case of the petitioner that the third respondent vide order Na.Ka.No.3952/A1/07 dated 9.10.2007 rejected the claim of the petitioner on an erroneous view that the appointment of the petitioner as District Educational Officer was not by way of promotion but by way of transfer. This order is challenged being outcome of non application of mind and having been passed without considering G.O.Ms.No.590 dated 1.8.1992. 14. It is also the submission of the petitioner that he was not heard before passing the order on the representation filed by the petitioner. This order is challenged being outcome of non application of mind and having been passed without considering G.O.Ms.No.590 dated 1.8.1992. 14. It is also the submission of the petitioner that he was not heard before passing the order on the representation filed by the petitioner. The impugned order is further challenged on the ground that the order is totally erroneous, unreasonable and against law and facts. 15. It is also submitted that the respondents 2 and 3 failed to note that the petitioner's claim was squarely covered under G.O.Ms.No.590 dated 1.8.1992, wherein it was made clear that when an employee is promoted to higher post carrying low scale of pay than the Selection Grade/Special Grade scale of pay of lower post, fixation of pay be made after granting one increment in the scale of pay applicable to the selection grade/special grade of lower post. 16. That third respondent erred in holding that the petitioner was only promoted and not transferred to the post of District Educational Officer from the post of Headmaster. Further more, it was not open to the respondents to treat the pay scale of the District Educational Officer and the Headmaster are to be one and the same. 17. The plea of discrimination is also raised on the ground that many other Headmasters who were promoted as District Educational Officers were given benefit of one increment in the scale of pay they are drawing. 18. This writ petition suffers from vice of delay and laches. It is the admitted case of the petitioner that the petitioner retired from services on 30.4.1999 and that his claim for fixation of salary in terms of G.O.Ms.No.590 dated 1.8.1992 was rejected by the third respondent in the year 1998. The mere making of representations could not justify long delay in approaching the Court. The principle of Law laid down by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd etc., (1874) 5 P.C. 221 has been approved by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs Balwant Regular Motor Service ( AIR 1969 SC 329 ). “Now, the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. “Now, the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy”. 19. It is the admitted case of the petitioner that he had preferred an appeal to the second respondent in the year 2005 to challenge the correctness of the order passed by the third respondent. However, the petitioner has not shown any rule or regulation or a provision of law under which, the second respondent was competent to hear the appeal against the order passed by the third respondent refusing to accept the prayer of the petitioner. The appeal being creation of statute cannot be entertained in absence of any appeal being competent. 20. In view of settled law the repeated representations having no statutory force of law nor the order passed in pursuance of the direction issued by this court, could give fresh cause of action to reopen stale claims. The grievance of the petitioner is for fixation of salary for which cause of action arose to the petitioner in the year 1998, when he was promoted as District Educational Officer and was not given benefit in terms of G.O.Ms.No.590 dated 1.8.1992,and thereafter when the request was declined. The petitioner approached this Court only in the year 2007 that too after 9 years of rejection of his claim. 21. The petitioner approached this Court only in the year 2007 that too after 9 years of rejection of his claim. 21. Consequently, this writ petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. No costs.