Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 1048 (MP)

Pragati Petrol Pump v. Indian Oil Corporation

2013-09-03

SANJAY YADAV

body2013
JUDGMENT Sanjay Yadav, J. 1. Heard. In spite of repeated efforts to reconcile through mediation but with no positive result in the offing, the matter is being heard on merit. 2. Petitioner No. 1, a registered partnership firm under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 and petitioner No. 2 its partner, hold a dealership for retail outlet at plot No. II-B, Zone II, M.P. Nagar, Scheme. 3. Plot in question admeasures 9639 square feet and is being owned by the Bhopal Development Authority given on lease to the Indian Oil Corporation which initially was on temporary lease on a yearly rent for the period from 1st January, 1977 to 31st December, 1981 vide lease deed dated 22-2-1977. The plot is earmarked for petrol pump. 4. The temporary lease has been extended from time to time. The last extension was 21-12-2006 for a period from 1st January, 2007 to 31st December, 2011 on a yearly rent of Rs. 75,756/-. 5. The petitioner operates as dealer of the respondent No. 1-Indian Oil Corporation and holds no title in the land in question. The temporary lease dated 21-12-2006 does not acknowledge the petitioner even a sub-lessee. 6. That on 23-12-2011, Officer on Special Duty, Bhopal Development Authority entered into a correspondence with the respondent No. 1 informing him about the lease expiring on 31-12-2011 and that the Development Authority has decided that since it is not economically viable to lease out the land/plot in question on temporary lease on annual rent asked the respondent No. 1 to vacate the premises on the expiry of lease period vide said communication an offer was also tendered to respondent No. 1 of their willingness to purchase the plot. 7. Various correspondence were entered into between the respondent No. 1 and respondent Nos. 2 and 3, with no concrete outcome, as the respondent No. 1 did not show its willingness to purchase the plot on the terms by the Bhopal Development Authority which in turn being based on market forces. 8. 7. Various correspondence were entered into between the respondent No. 1 and respondent Nos. 2 and 3, with no concrete outcome, as the respondent No. 1 did not show its willingness to purchase the plot on the terms by the Bhopal Development Authority which in turn being based on market forces. 8. When the matter stood thus, instead of respondent No. 1, the petitioner who otherwise has no locus, qua, the Bhopal Development Authority filed this petition seeking quashment of communication dated 23-12-2011 and a public notice dated 12-3-2012 whereby offer has been invited from the public in respect of the subject plot, by claiming himself to be a sub-lessee (in Paragraph 6.6 of the petition, it is stated that the petitioner has been a sub-lessee of the said plot for about 35 years and he has acquired a right of claiming preference and priority for allotment and purchase of the said property). 9. Furthermore, in order to establish a locus to question the action of respondent Nos. 2 and 3, the petitioner in Paragraph 5.4 has made the following statement:-- 5.4. That, the petitioner firm had applied for dealership for retail outlet at Bhopal on the plot in question. The respondent No. 1 selected the petitioner firm for allotment of retail outlet on the said plot and communicated vide letter dated 30-8-1976. Copy of letter dated 30-8-1976 is filed herewith as Annexure P-4. The Chairman of the respondent No. 2 had granted sanction to the respondent No. 1 to transfer his right for running a petrol pump on the said plot. 10. No such sanction however, is brought on record. On the contrary, Clause 10 of temporary lease executed on 22-2-1977, 30-6-2004 and 21-12-2006 which are on record clearly stipulates that:-- 10. The lessee shall not transfer in any manner whatsoever the said land on or any part thereof or any of his right under this lease without the previous sanction of the Chairman, Bhopal Development Authority. 11. Even the respondent No. 1 in its return acknowledges the petitioner only as a dealer and not a sub-lessee. A copy of an offer of appointment as dealer for retail outlet is filed by respondent as Annexure R-1-1, wherein it stipulated that the petitioner shall be appointed as dealer to operate the outlet on the standard and terms settled. 11. Even the respondent No. 1 in its return acknowledges the petitioner only as a dealer and not a sub-lessee. A copy of an offer of appointment as dealer for retail outlet is filed by respondent as Annexure R-1-1, wherein it stipulated that the petitioner shall be appointed as dealer to operate the outlet on the standard and terms settled. There is no document with the reply of respondent No. 1, indicating the petitioner as sub-lessee, merely because Paragraph (7) of communication dated 30-8-1976 between respondent No. 1 and the petitioner says that the respondent No. 1 will sub-lease the land, ipso facto, will not automatically make the petitioner a sub-lessee. 12. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have categorically raised an objection as to maintainability of the petition at the instance of the petitioner firm and its partner in the following terms:-- 2. The answering respondents respectfully submit that the nature of relief which has been claimed by the petitioner is misconceived and the same cannot be granted. It is submitted that neither the quashment of the order dated 23-12-2011 nor the quashment of the public notice will confer any legal or vested right in favour of petitioner to continue in possession of the plot in question. 3. That, the petitioner has not brought on record the correct facts and has suppressed the material information and on account of aforesaid conduct of the petitioner, the said writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. The answering respondents submit that Para 5.3 of the writ petition makes it clear that the lease of plot No. 11-B, Zone-II, M.P. Nagar, Scheme Area 9639 sq. ft. has expired on 31-12-2011 and the said lease was executed in favour of the Indian Oil Corporation. No lease has been executed in favour of petitioner by the answering respondent and, therefore, the petitioner does not have any right to claim the extension of the lease. The Indian Oil Corporation has not filed any petition and the communication dated 23-12-2011 was also made to the Deputy Manager of the Indian Oil Corporation and in absence of any cause of action, the petitioner does not have any right to file the instant writ petition against the answering respondents. 13. The Indian Oil Corporation has not filed any petition and the communication dated 23-12-2011 was also made to the Deputy Manager of the Indian Oil Corporation and in absence of any cause of action, the petitioner does not have any right to file the instant writ petition against the answering respondents. 13. That, the answering respondent respectfully submit that there is no legal rights in favour of the petitioner to file the instant writ petition neither the petitioner was the party to the lease nor it had any transaction with the answering respondent and, therefore, the instant writ petition does not have any substance and the same deserves to be dismissed. It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that when there is no lease existing as on today, the petitioner does not have any legal right to remain in possession of the land in question. The possession of the petitioner is illegal and improper and by interim order dated 29-2-2012, the petitioner enjoys the benefit of possession without any legal right. 13. There is no denial by the petitioners of these contentions raised by respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 14. Thus, clear it is from the material on record that the petitioners have sought indulgence under Article 226 of the Constitution by projecting wrong fact that they are sub-lessee; whereas the fact is that the petitioner is only a dealer of respondent No. 1 selling their products. On these incorrect facts, the petitioner also sought an interim order on 29-2-2012, wherein the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners has been noted in following terms:-- It is the contention of the petitioners that the land has been allotted on a lease to the petitioners for the purpose of establishing a petrol pump and for a long period, the petitioners are running the petrol pump on the said land. Now the respondent No. 2 has taken a decision to convert the lease by transferring the land on ownership. In view of this, it is contended that there is every likelihood that the lease of the petitioner would be terminated. 15. Taking into consideration these submissions, it was ordered that "till the next date of listing, the lease of petitioners will not be treated as terminated and no proceedings for action of the said plot will be taken. The petitioners are permitted to continue their business on the said land". 16. 15. Taking into consideration these submissions, it was ordered that "till the next date of listing, the lease of petitioners will not be treated as terminated and no proceedings for action of the said plot will be taken. The petitioners are permitted to continue their business on the said land". 16. Apparently, on the premise of incorrect facts, the petitioners not only seeks indulgence but sought an interim injunction. 17. The act of petitioners is not fair. The petitioners have not come with clear hands as would entitle them for any relief. In this context, reference can be had of the decision in Hari Narain Vs. Badri Das, AIR 1963 SC 1558 , it is held:-- It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave, care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally take's statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material statements made by the appellant in his application for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterises as misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for such a case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked. 18. In Dalip Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2010) 2 SCC 114 , it is held:-- For many centuries, Indian Society cherished two basic values of life, i.e., 'Satya' (truth) and 'ahimsa' (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of justice delivery system which was in vogue in pre-Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the Courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has been drastic changes in our value system. Truth constituted an integral part of justice delivery system which was in vogue in pre-Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the Courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has been drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has over-shadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the Court proceedings. In last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the Courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well-established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final. 19. In Ramjas Foundation Vs. Union of India, (2010) 14 SCC 38 , it is held:-- 21. The principle that a person who does not come to the Court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in other Courts and Judicial Forums. The object underlying the principle is that every Court is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have a bearing on adjudication of the issues arising in the case. In view of the given facts of present case and the pronouncement of law, no relief can be granted to petitioners. The petition is dismissed with cost of Rupees Twenty five thousand.