JUDGMENT This appeal is by the tenant, which was admitted by a Bench of this Court on following substantial question of law:-- “Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the admission of the plaintiff/respondent Dr. Ghanshyam Jaiswal that the shop let out to Swamisaran was available to him, a decree under section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act could be legally granted?” 2. Facts giving rise to filing of the appeal briefly stated are that the plaintiff filed the suit inter alia on the ground that the suit shop was let out to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 80/-. It was further pleaded that the suit house was allotted to the plaintiff in partition in the year 1977 and the same is in dilapidated condition. The plaintiff requires the suit shop bona fide for reconstruction and after re-construction needs the same for running his clinic. It was further pleaded that plaintiff has got the plan and estimates of such reconstruction ready and has necessary funds. It was further pleaded that plaintiff has no reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. Accordingly, the decree for eviction under section 12(1)(f), (g) and (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was filed. 3. The defendant filed the written statement in which inter alia it was denied that the suit shop was in dilapidated condition. It was further pleaded that infact the plaintiff is damaging the suit shop and the plaintiff does not require the suit shop bona fide. He also has suitable alternative accommodation. 4. The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 15-7-1993 relying on the statement of plaintiff (PW-1) and the statement of PW-2 Omkar Prasad Rai, held that the suit shop was constructed 60-70 years ago and either the plaintiff or his father did not get the same repaired. The trial Court on the basis of evidence of the Civil Engineer Omkar Prasad Rai (PW-2) and the report prepared by him (Ex. P/8) held that the suit shop is in dilapidated condition and the same requires re-construction. It was further held that the plaintiff has got the plans and estimates ready and he is in possession of the funds. The trial Court on the basis of evidence of the Civil Engineer Omkar Prasad Rai (PW-2) and the report prepared by him (Ex. P/8) held that the suit shop is in dilapidated condition and the same requires re-construction. It was further held that the plaintiff has got the plans and estimates ready and he is in possession of the funds. The trial Court on meticulous appreciation of evidence on record further held that the plaintiff bona fide needs the suit shop and he has reasonably alternative suitable accommodation. Accordingly, the suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed under section 12(1)(f) and 12(1)(h) of the Act. The aforesaid decree was affirmed in appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Courts below have not properly construed the pleading of the plaintiff. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellant has invited the attention of this Court to averments contained in para 4 of the plaint. It is further submitted that on account of noncompliance of the provisions of section18 of the Act, the decree is vitiated in law. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondent has supported the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below. 6. I have considered the respective submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. Section 12(1)(h) and section 18 of the Act, which are relevant for the purpose of controversy involved in the instant appeal are reproduced below:-- “12(1)(h) That the accommodation is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of building or re-building or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or re-building or alterations cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated.” “Section 18 - Recovery of possession for repairs and re-building and re-entry-- (1) In making any order on the grounds specified in clause (g) or clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 12, the Court shall ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be placed in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof from which he is to be evicted and, if the tenant so elects, shall record the fact of the election in the order and specify therein the date on or before which he shall deliver possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work of repairs or building or re-building, as the case may be. (2) If the tenant delivers possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord shall, on the completion of the work of repairs or building or re-building place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof, as the case may be, within one month of the completion of such work. (3) If, after the tenant has delivered possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord fails to commence the work of repairs or building or re-building within one month of the specified date or fails to complete the work in a reasonable time or having completed the work, fails to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation in accordance with subsection (2), the Court may, on an application made to it in this behalf by the tenant within such time as may be prescribed, order the landlord to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof or to pay to the tenant such compensation as the Court thinks fit. 7. It is no doubt true that section 18 casts a duty on the Court to ascertain from the tenant whether he would choose to re-enter the premises. The aforesaid provision is mandatory in nature. However, it is well settled in law that even a mandatory provision which is enacted for the benefit of an individual can be waived by him. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh Mathura Singh and another vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and others, 1992 1 Supplement SCC 5. In General Cycle Stores and Painting Works Raipur and others vs. Manohar Rao, 1976 JLJ SN 71, it has been held that if a tenant does not take a ground with regard to non-compliance of section 18 of the Act in the appeal, the same is deemed to have been waived. 8. In the instant case, from perusal of para 4 of the plaint, it is evident that essential ingredients with regard to grounds under section 12(1)(h) of the Act have been pleaded by the plaintiff. From perusal of the memo of appeal filed under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is evident that the defendant has failed to take any ground with regard to non-compliance of section 18 of the Act. From perusal of the memo of appeal filed under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is evident that the defendant has failed to take any ground with regard to non-compliance of section 18 of the Act. Thus, the option which is provided to him under the law as contained in section 18 of the Act has been waived by the defendant. For yet another reason, the contention with regard to non-compliance of section 18 of the Act cannot be accepted. It is pertinent to mention here that in this case, both the Courts on the basis of meticulous appreciation of evidence on record have recorded a finding that the plaintiff bona fide needs the suit shop and, therefore, the decree for eviction has been passed under section 12(1)(f) and 12(1)(h) of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of section 18 of the Act does not apply to the facts of the case. See: Radheshyam vs. Durga Bai, AIR 1985 SC 139 . 9. In view of preceding analysis, the substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered against the appellant. 10. In the result, the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are affirmed. However, since the appellant is carrying on the business in the suit shop, therefore, he is permitted to occupy the suit shop up to 31st January, 2014, subject to following conditions:-- (a) That the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within a period of four weeks from today before the trial Court that he shall hand over the possession to the respondent in a peaceful manner on or before 31st January, 2014 and shall not create any third party interest. In case such an undertaking is furnished, the appellant shall be permitted to occupy the accommodation up to 31st January, 2014. (b) That the appellant shall deposit the entire arrears of rent within a period of one month from today and shall continue to comply with the provisions under section 13(1) of the Act during the period for which the accommodation remains in his possession. (c) In case of violation of any of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid directions, the decree of eviction shall become executable forthwith. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of.