Paramjit Singh Patwalia, J. 1. Instant writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the order dated 16.04.1985 (Annexure P-5) passed by the Collector under Section 4 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973 (in short "the Act") whereby eviction of the petitioner has been ordered and the order dated 08.01.1988 (Annexure P-7) passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), Patiala and Ferozepur Divisions, Patiala whereby appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts relevant for disposal of the present petition are to the effect that respondent-Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana filed a petition against the petitioner under Section 4 of the Act for ejectment from the land measuring 36 kanals 8 marlas comprised of khasra No. 18//5, 6, 19//1/1, 1/2, 1/3/1, 10, 11/1, 19/1 on the ground of ownership and alleging that petitioner is an unauthorized occupant of the land in question. Darshan Singh, who was a big landlord, was the original owner in possession of the land in question. The land in question along with other land situated in village Partapsinghwala was declared surplus, since 1980 the land was lying un-utilised. The petitioner being a landless agricultural worker, came into possession in a part of the land in question in the year 1965. At that point of time, the land in dispute was lying baron and uncultivated. Thereafter, the petitioner made the land in dispute cultivable by dint of his hard work and by spending huge amount. The petitioner also installed a tubewell and also constructed the rooms in the year 1971 for his residence. It is further averred that jamabandis for the years 1972-73, 1977-78 and 1982-83 clearly indicates the possession of the petitioner as tenant paying 1/3rd 'batai' As per the provisions of the Punjab Utilization of Surplus Area Scheme, 1973 (in short "the Scheme"), the petitioner became an "eligible person" being in occupation as a tenant and in any case as a landless agricultural worker. Para No. 2(c) of the Scheme defines the term "eligible person" which reads as under: 2(c) - "eligible person" means a major person who has been residing in the State of Punjab for a period of five years before the commencement of this Scheme and is primarily engaged in agriculture as his occupation and who is - (i) a tenant, or a member of Scheduled Caste or Backward Class and does not own or hold any land or owns or hold land less than two hectares of the first quality or its equivalent area, or (ii) a landless agricultural worker. It is further averred that the petitioner applied to the Prescribed Authority for allotment of the land declared surplus in the hands of Darshan Singh for utilization in view of the provisions of the Scheme. Darshan Singh with a view to grab the surplus area, got manipulated the revenue entries and it was shown that respondent No. 4-Surinderjit Singh is in possession of the land in question. In the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority, Darshan Singh admitted the false claim of Surinderjit Singh and the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 21.05.1974 ordered the transfer of the land measuring 93 kanals 15 marlas on payment of paltry sum of `23712.50/-. Respondent No. 4- Surinderjit Singh with a view to further complicate the matter orally exchanged the land so transferred with respondents No. 5 to 7, who are his brothers. Respondents No. 5 to 7 further sold the land so received in exchange to Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana. Some of the land was also sold directly to Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana. The allotment of land to Surinderjit Singh was illegal, without jurisdiction and void ab initio, as neither Surinderjit Singh was eligible, nor he was ever given possession of the land in question. Surinderjit Singh and his parents were already having huge quantity of agricultural land in different villages including the village Ladian Kalan. It is the case of the petitioner that he has remained in continuous possession since 1965. Surinderjit Singh and his parents were already having huge quantity of agricultural land in different villages including the village Ladian Kalan. It is the case of the petitioner that he has remained in continuous possession since 1965. It was only in the year 1984, when the attempt was made to forcibly and illegally dispossess the petitioner, then the petitioner had to file a civil suit for permanent injunction restraining the respondents from forcibly and illegally dispossessing him from the very same land for which the Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana, on the basis of alleged sales, alleged that the land in question is a public premises and initiated proceedings against the petitioner under Section 4 of the Act. The Collector vide order dated 16.04.1985 (Annexure P-5) ordered eviction of the petitioner. Being dissatisfied with the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Commissioner which has also been dismissed vide impugned order dated 08.01.1988 (Annexure P-7). Hence, this writ petition. 2. In pursuance to notices, the respondents have put in appearance. Respondent No. 3 filed reply alleging that Lachhman Singh filed civil suit in 1982 for the relief of declaration besides permanent injunction against the defendants of the suit which included the Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana. The said suit was dismissed as withdrawn as far back as in the year 1983. The petitioner has not disclosed about the said suit in the instant writ petition. It is further averred that the petitioner also filed civil suit which was also dismissed, being not maintainable and without jurisdiction. The averments of para No. 2 of writ petition have not been denied. It is specifically mentioned that the petitioner is currently in possession of the land in dispute and for that reason, proceedings under the provisions of the Act have been initiated. The averments as to who was in possession since 1950 and ownership of Darshan Singh have also not been denied. Even the averments in the petition that the petitioner, being a landless agricultural worker has been in continuous possession of the land in question since 1965 have been denied for want of knowledge. In other words, respondent No. 3 has admitted the possession of the petitioner on the land in dispute. Even the averments in the petition that the petitioner, being a landless agricultural worker has been in continuous possession of the land in question since 1965 have been denied for want of knowledge. In other words, respondent No. 3 has admitted the possession of the petitioner on the land in dispute. The averments made in para No. 6 of the writ petition with regard to manipulation of entries in revenue record by Darshan Singh showing Surinderjit Singh in possession have been denied in entirety. It is averred that there is no verdict of authority saying that the petitioner is not entitled to claim the land in dispute on the basis of facts mentioned in para No. 6 of the petition, meaning thereby that respondent No. 3 has admitted the averments of that para. Respondent No. 3 has also admitted the contents of para No. 7 of the writ petition. Para No. 7 of the writ petition reads as under: 7. That Surinderjit Singh, respondent, with a view to further complicate the matter orally exchanged the land so transferred with respondents No. 5 to 7, who are none else but his brothers. Respondents 5 to 7 further sold the land so received in exchange to Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana, the predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 3. Surinderjit Singh also sold the part of the land in question directly to the Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana. These sales were allegedly made in the year 1976. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the possession of the petitioner has been shown in khasra No. 18/15/2, 19//1/1, 1/3/1, 10 and 11/1 as per jamabandi for the year 1972-73. The entry in the jamabandi has been taken from the previous five years and this entry continues in favour of the petitioner upto the jamabandi for the year 1982-83. The learned counsel has further contended that it has been admitted by respondent No. 3-Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana that it had exchanged and purchased the property from other persons. Surinderjit Singh was allotted the land illegally vide order dated 21.05.1974 (Annexure P-4). These averments have been specifically made in para No. 10 of the writ petition which have not been denied by the Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana, meaning thereby it has admitted the fact of allotment in favour of Surinderjit Singh. Surinderjit Singh was allotted the land illegally vide order dated 21.05.1974 (Annexure P-4). These averments have been specifically made in para No. 10 of the writ petition which have not been denied by the Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana, meaning thereby it has admitted the fact of allotment in favour of Surinderjit Singh. The right to the Corporation only flows from Surinderjit Singh. Since the petitioner has been in possession since 1965 much prior to the purchase of land by the Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana and also allotment to Surinderjit Singh, he cannot be termed in unauthorized possession of the land in question. To buttress his arguments, the learned counsel has relied upon Raj Kumar Devindra Singh and another v. The State of Punjab and others : 1972 (*) R.C.R. (Rent) 780 : 1972 P.L.J 592, Punjab Digital Inds. System Ltd. Mohali v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patiala 2004 (1) R.C.R. (Civil) 758, State of and others v. Vinod Kumar and others, : 1987 (*) R.R.R. 81 : [LXXXIX (1986 1)] PLR 222 and Sarupa (died) through L.Rs. and others v. The Panchayati Akhara and others 2010 (5) RCR (Civil) 751. 5. On the other hand, learned State counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 and learned counsel for respondent No. 7 have jointly contended that the impugned orders dated 16.04.1985 (Annexure P-5) and 08.01.1988 (Annexure P-7) are legal and valid. The petitioner is in unauthorized possession in the land in dispute which has been purchased by the Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana from the original owner. The possession of the petitioner in the land in dispute is unauthorized and he has been rightly evicted. Reference to the earlier civil suit has been made which was got dismissed as withdrawn. 6. I have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Firstly so far as the civil suits are concerned, the same were for permanent injunction. The regular second appeal No. 2735 of 2002 arising from a suit which was dismissed by the trial Court on the grounds of jurisdiction and maintainability has been decided by this Court today, itself by affirming the findings of courts below. 8. The crucial question before this Court is whether the petitioner is in unauthorized occupation of the public premises as defined under the Act and can be evicted in the proceedings initiated under the Act. 8. The crucial question before this Court is whether the petitioner is in unauthorized occupation of the public premises as defined under the Act and can be evicted in the proceedings initiated under the Act. Before I deal with the contentions of learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to reproduce Sections 2(e), 3and 4(1) of the Act which read as under: 2 (a) xxx to (d) xxx (e) "public premises" means any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the State Government and includes any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by or on behalf of- (i) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof; (ii) any company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), in which not less than fifty - one percent of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government [and omitted in H.P.] (iii) any Corporation [not being a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or a local authority] established by or under a Central Act as defined in clause (7) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, or a Punjab Act owned or controlled by the State Government. 3. Unauthorised occupation of public premises- For the purposes of this Act. A person shall be deemed to be in unauthorized occupation of any public premises. (a) Where he has whether before or after the commencement of this Act entered into possession thereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant; or (b) Where he being an allottee, lessee or grantee, has, by reason of the determination or cancellation of his allotment, lease or grant in accordance with the terms in that behalf therein contained, ceased, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, to be entitled to occupy or hold such public premises; or (c) Where any person authorized to occupy any public premises has, whether before or after of the commencement of this Act. - (i) sub-let, in contravention of the terms of allotment, lease or grant, without the permission of the State Government or of any other authority competent to permit such sub-letting, the whole or any part of such public premises, or (ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms, express or implied, under which he is authorized to occupy such public premises. Explanation :- For the purpose of clause (a), a person shall not merely by reason of the fact that he has paid any rent be deemed to have entered into possession as allottee, lessee or grantee. 4. Issue of notice to show cause against order of eviction. (1) if the Collector is of opinion that any persons are in unauthorized occupation of any public premises situate within his jurisdiction and that they should be evicted, the Collector shall issue, in the manner hereinafter provided, a noticee in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. (2) The notice shall - (a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made; and (b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons who are, or may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in, the public premises, to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or before such date as is specified in the notice, being a date not earlier than ten days from the date of issue thereof. (3) The Collector shall cause the notice to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part, of the public premises, or of the estate in which the public premises are situate, and in such other manner as may be prescribed where upon the notice shall be deemed to have been duty given to all persons concerned. (4) Where the Collector knows or has reasons to believe that any persons are in occupation of the public premises, then without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), he shall cause a copy of the notice to be served on every such person by post or by delivering or tendering it to that person or in such other manner as may be prescribed. 9. 9. Section 4(1) of the Act provides that if the Collector is of the opinion that any person/persons are in unauthorized occupation of any public premises situate within his jurisdiction, he/they can be evicted by the Collector in the manner provided in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 4 of the Act. A notice in writing calling upon such persons to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made is to be issued. 10. From the perusal of above provisions, it is clear that a person shall be deemed to be in unauthorized occupation of public premises for the purpose of Section 3(a) where he has, before or after the commencement of the Act, entered into possession thereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant. The word 'thereof makes it clear that the persons must have entered into possession of a public premises before or after the commencement of the Act without any allotment, lease or grant in order to deem him to be in unauthorized occupation. 11. Admittedly, in the present case, the Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana has purchased and exchanged the property in question. The Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana alleges that it came into possession in the year 1978 and the mutation was sanctioned in the name of Corporation on 06.02.1978, but the ownership of the respondent has been reflected in jamabandi for the year 1982-83, meaning thereby that the Corporation has come into possession later on. The fact that the petitioner was in possession of the land in dispute in 1965, is proved from the revenue records i.e. jamabandi for the year. 1972-73. He was in possession in the land in dispute five years prior to the jamabandi for the year 1972-73 as in the jamabandi entries of previous five years are reflected, meaning thereby the entries from at least 1967 till 15th June of 1972 when the preparation of jamabandi for the year 1972-73 commenced have been reflected in that which clearly indicate the possession of the petitioner in khasra Nos. 19//1/1, 1/3/1, 10 and 11/1 at least since 1967 onwards. In this manner, since 1967 onwards, the possession of petitioner khasra Nos. 19//1/1, 1/3/1,10 and 11/1 is clearly reflected in the revenue record. Darshan Singh has been shown as owner in the column of ownership of the jamabandi for the year 1972-73 (Annexure P-1). 19//1/1, 1/3/1, 10 and 11/1 at least since 1967 onwards. In this manner, since 1967 onwards, the possession of petitioner khasra Nos. 19//1/1, 1/3/1,10 and 11/1 is clearly reflected in the revenue record. Darshan Singh has been shown as owner in the column of ownership of the jamabandi for the year 1972-73 (Annexure P-1). It is also clearly mentioned that the ownership of these khasra numbers and others was of Darshan Singh son of Mahender Singh, meaning thereby the Municipal Corporation is subsequent purchaser and the petitioner was in possession of the property before it was sold to the Municipal Corporation. It could not be said that the petitioner entered into the possession of the public premises before or after the commencement of the Act, otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant. Section 3(a) of the Act obviously applies and the petitioner is not in unauthorized occupation of the public premises within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the Act. Admittedly, the petitioner is in possession of the land in dispute prior to the purchase by the Municipal Corporation. It is not the case of the respondent-Municipal Corporation that the petitioner entered into possession of the property after being purchased by the Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana. Herein, the title is not relevant under which the petitioner is in possession. The point relevant for this case is whether the petitioner was in possession of the property before the date of sale to Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana. 12. In view of the revenue record i.e. Jamabandis for the years 1972-73 to 1982-83 (Annexure P-1 to P-3) wherein the possession of the petitioner has been shown in the column of cultivation. I hold that the petitioner was in possession much prior to the purchase by the Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana. Clause (b) of Section 3 of the Act speaks of an allottee, lessee, grantee, who has, by determination or cancellation of his allotment, lease or grant, in accordance with the law in that behalf, ceased, whether before or after the commencement of the Act to be entitled to occupy or hold such public premises. It is clear that for this clause to apply, the person must be an allottee, lessee or grantee from the Corporation. The petitioner is not an allottee, lessee or grantee of the Corporation and his possession was independent prior to purchase by the Municipal Corporation. It is clear that for this clause to apply, the person must be an allottee, lessee or grantee from the Corporation. The petitioner is not an allottee, lessee or grantee of the Corporation and his possession was independent prior to purchase by the Municipal Corporation. In view of this, clause (c) of Section 3 of the Act can obviously have no application to the case. 13. In Raj Kumar Devindra Singh and another (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the identical provisions of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 which are pari materia with the Act of 1973. This judgment (supra) also applies to the facts of the present case. 14. In the light of all these facts, it can be held that the petitioner was not in unauthorized occupation of the premises within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act. It is only if the petitioner was in unauthorized occupation of the public premises that the Collector would get jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 4(1) of the Act. I, therefore, hold that the notice issued was without jurisdiction, hence, quashed. In view of above discussion, since notice has been quashed being without jurisdiction, the impugned orders dated 16.04.1985 (Annexure P-5) and 08.01.1988 (Annexure P-7) are also set aside and the instant petition is allowed to the extent that the petitioner shall not be evicted from khasra Nos. 19//1/1, 1/3/1, 10 and 11/1 in which his possession has been shown in the revenue records except in due course of law. The writ petition is allowed as above.