Judgment : 1. The petitioner before this Court is a public limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act having its registered office at Motahaldu, Haldwani, district Nainital. It is covered under the provisions of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (from hereinafter referred to as 1952 Act. 2. The petitioner has challenged before this Court the proceedings initiated by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner –II, Haldwani, district Nainital for recovery of such amount which the respondent claims to be dues against provident fund contribution. Since the amount has not been paid, a recovery has been initiated by the respondent against the petitioner which has presently been challenged by means of the present petitions. The petitioner neither denies the dues payable to the respondent nor is there any contest as to the amount being charged by the respondent as such dues. The petitioner has only raised a legal question before this Court which is that since the company had already moved an application before the Board for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction (from hereinafter referred to as the Board) which is a Board constituted under Section 4 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (from hereinafter referred to as 1985 Act) and though his claims stand rejected by the Board yet he has preferred an appeal under Section 25 of the 1985 Act before the appellate authority which is still pending. In short, his matter is pending before the appellate authority under Section 25 of the 1985 Act. He, therefore, claims that the dues which the petitioner was liable to be given to the respondent under the 1952 Act and presently has failed to deposit cannot be recovered from the petitioner, as he has a protection under Section 22 of the 1985 Act. Section 22 (1) of 1985 Act on which such a heavy reliance has been placed by the petitioner reads as under :- “22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. Section 22 (1) of 1985 Act on which such a heavy reliance has been placed by the petitioner reads as under :- “22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. – (1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof [and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company] shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. (2)…..” 3. The Employees’ Provident Fund Organization is being represented by its counsel Mr. D.S. Patni, who submits that the protection as claimed by the petitioner is not available to him and what is being claimed by the respondent is not a recovery of loan or any other similar dues but the respondent is rather claiming what is just and rightful dues of the workmen which the petitioner is liable to deposit under 1952 Act. He further relies upon a Full Bench judgment of Madras High Court in M/s Gowri Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Salem & another reported in [2006] 4 MLJ 1261 wherein it has been held that the dues which are payable under the provisions of 1952 Act are payable by a company inspite of the fact that the proceedings regarding the said company are pending under the 1985 Act. In other words, the amount which is for the benefit of the workmen has been given a greater importance than the protection which has been given to an ostensibly sick company under Section 22 of the 1985 Act. Paragraph Nos. In other words, the amount which is for the benefit of the workmen has been given a greater importance than the protection which has been given to an ostensibly sick company under Section 22 of the 1985 Act. Paragraph Nos. 14 and 15 of the said judgment which are relevant for our purposes read as under :- “14. Both the statutes are special statutes. Whereas the object of enactment of the SICA was to provide for the revival and rehabilitation of sick industrial companies, the object of the EPF Act, as indicated herein before, was a measure to provide social security to the employees. The contribution of the employees as well as the employer towards provident fund is not a tax due. It is also not an amount recoverable under a contract. The moneys, which have been deducted from the wages of the employees as well as the amounts, which the employer is required to pay as its contribution, belong to the employees, and constitute their rightful and just entitlement for the eventual payment of provident fund benefits. 15. In our opinion, the provision of Section 22(1) of the SICA has no application to the provident fund dues and the provisions of the EPF Act would not come within the purview thereof. The provident fund and other dues payable under the EPF Act are part of the legitimate statutory settlements of the workers. The employer is obligated to pay the contribution of the employees as well as his contribution to the Fund, which is set up under the Act, and the Scheme framed there under. The employees contribution together with the employers contribution is required to be paid into the Fund by the employer within the stipulated period. These amounts whether by way of contribution of the employee or the contribution of the employer, are moneys which belong to the employee. An account which is required to be maintained in the name of each member of the provident fund, contains contribution of the employee, the employer as well as the interest which has been credited. Provident Fund is the foundation of an important measure of social security provided to employees of those establishments to whom the Act applies. An account which is required to be maintained in the name of each member of the provident fund, contains contribution of the employee, the employer as well as the interest which has been credited. Provident Fund is the foundation of an important measure of social security provided to employees of those establishments to whom the Act applies. In the aforesaid situation, an employer cannot refuse to comply with the statutory mandate to pay the contribution made by the employees as also his share, which was by way of social security scheme. Although the object of the SICA is laudable, but, in our view, the same should not deprive the hard earnings of the employees. It does not and cannot stay the recovery proceedings for recovery of money to which employees are entitled by way of social security scheme. The money does not belong to the company it belongs to the employees. These moneys can be withdrawn by the employees in certain eventualities even prior to the attainment of age of superannuation. The Scheme makes provision for withdrawal from the Fund and for the grant of advances from the Fund in special cases. 4. A similar decision was taken by a learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in Baburao P. Tawade & Ors. vs. Hes Ltd. Bombay & Ors. reported in (1997) III LLJ 265 Bom wherein it was held that notwithstanding that the company has been either declared sick and being revived in a scheme or its matter is pending before the Board or before the appellate authority, yet the money is liable to be recovered under the 1952 Act against the said company and the company will not get protection under Section 22 of 1985 Act. 5. Similar view has again been held by a learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Modi Industries Ltd. v. Additional Labour Commissioner reported in (1994) I LLJ 482 All. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon two judgments in support of his case, namely, Tata Motors Limited v. Pharmaceutical products of India Limited and another (2008) 7 SCC 619 and Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and another (1993) SCC 144. 7. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon two judgments in support of his case, namely, Tata Motors Limited v. Pharmaceutical products of India Limited and another (2008) 7 SCC 619 and Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and another (1993) SCC 144. 7. The counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Section 32 of the Act and submits that Section 32 contains a non-obstante clause which states that the provisions of the Special Act i.e. 1985 Act will have an overriding effect over any other provision of the law. The exact language of Section 32 of the 1985 Act as relied upon by the petitioner reads as under :- “32. Effect of the Act on other laws. – (1) The provisions of this Act and of any rules or schemes made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law except the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973) and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (33 of 1976) for the time being in force or in the Memorandum or Articles of Association of an industrial company or in any other instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. (2) ……” 8. It is indeed true that both the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 are special Acts and further the submission of the petitioner is also correct to the extent that a special Act being later in time i.e. 1985 Act, also contains a non-obstante clause, would be given a precedence over any other provision of law provided it is inconsistent with the Act. The precise language of Section 32 states that “provisions of this Act and of any rules or schemes made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law”. The provision is therefore absolutely clear which means that the provisions of later Act i.e. 1985 Act will have proceedings provided there is anything inconsistent between 1985 Act and 1952 Act. However, a bare reading of Section 22 of 1985 Act, a reference of which has already been made above, clearly shows that the provision is only there to protect a sick company from the nagging dues and its liabilities such as loan, etc. However, a bare reading of Section 22 of 1985 Act, a reference of which has already been made above, clearly shows that the provision is only there to protect a sick company from the nagging dues and its liabilities such as loan, etc. from various quarters and was never meant to protect a sick company from rightful claim of its workers. The other argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 22 of 1985 in any case is an absolute bar and a recovery can be made provided an approval is taken by the Board or the appellate authority, as the case may be. This argument of the petitioner is liable to be rejected at the very threshold for the simple reason that it was not the intention of the legislature that the workers for their legitimate right should run to appellate authority or any other forum for redressal of their grievance once 1952 Act itself protects their claim. Although the Madras High Court, Bombay High Court and the Allahabad High Court in the judgments, reference of which has already been given above, have not specifically dealt with Section 32 of 1985 Act while deciding the controversy, yet by implication all these judgments imply that a non-obstante clause as contained in 1985 Act will not protect a sick industry qua the legitimate claim of the workmen under 1952 Act. 9. Lastly the petitioner has argued that under Section 32 of 1985 Act in the non-obstante clause the Legislature has specifically mentioned two Acts i.e. Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 from the purview of non-obstante clause. In other words, only if there is anything inconsistent with these two Acts, the 1985 Act shall not prevail. Notwithstanding this, the very fact of the matter and as has already been held by this Court that Section 32 of 1985 Act would only come into play if there is anything inconsistent with any other provision of law. Since it has already been held by this Court that there is nothing inconsistent between 1952 Act and 1985 Act, and there is no apparent conflict. Consequently this argument of the learned counsel also has no weight. 10. That being the position of law, both the writ petitions are dismissed. Interim order, if any, also stands vacated. 11. No order as to costs.