JUDGMENT Mr. Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.: (Oral) - This writ petition is directed against the order dated 11.11.1993 (Annexure P-2) passed by Financial Commissioner, Haryana, exercising his powers under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (for short ‘the Act’), thereby remanding the matter back to prescribed authority, Narwana but for a limited purpose of identifying the permissible area of the samadh and treating the balance area as surplus. 2. Facts first. Great grand father of petitioner-Pritam Dass, namely late Shri Mohan Das, was the owner of the land measuring 541 Kanal 12 Marla in the year 1903. On the death of late Shri Mohan Das in the year 1923, the land was mutated in favour of Shri Badri Dass, grand father of petitioner-Pritam Dass. On the death of late Shri Badri Dass, the land was mutated in the name of Shri Kahan Dass (father of petitioner-Pritam Dass and another). Shri Kahan Dass died in the year 1961. The land was mutated on 11.10.1961 in the name of the petitioner and other LRs of Shri Kahan Dass. After coming into force the Act, the surplus area case was decided by prescribed authoritycum- sub-Divisional Officer(civil), Narwana, vide order dated 05.12.1983 (Annexure P-1). 3. It was held that since mutation of the land was sanctioned on 11.10.1961 in favour of Pritam Dass, Chandan Dass, Mollar, Banarsi Dass, Rameshwar and Chander Bhan in equal shares, they all were found to be small land owners. Thus, no land was found surplus in the hand of legal heirs of Shri Kahan Dass. No party felt aggrieved against this order dated 05.12.1983 (Annexure P-1). 4. However, after expiry of about five years, the Financial Commissioner, Narwana took suo moto notice under Section 18(6) of the Act. During the course of suo moto proceedings before him, the Financial Commissioner called the Patwari Halka and got recorded his statement. He misread the statement of Patwari and treated the Samadh as a juristic person. Accordingly, he remanded the matter back to the Prescribed Authority, Narwana, for the limited purpose directing him to identiy the permissible area of the Samadh and balance area was directed to be treated as surplus area. Hence, this writ petition. 5. He misread the statement of Patwari and treated the Samadh as a juristic person. Accordingly, he remanded the matter back to the Prescribed Authority, Narwana, for the limited purpose directing him to identiy the permissible area of the Samadh and balance area was directed to be treated as surplus area. Hence, this writ petition. 5. Notice of motion was issued staying the dispossession and pursuant thereto written statement was filed on behalf of respondents No. 1, 2 and 3, controverting the allegations levelled by the petitioners. The case was admitted for regular hearing, vide order dated 18.08.1994. That is how, this Court is seized of the matter. 6. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that exercising the suo-moto powers under Section 18(6) of the Act, after a gap of about five years was not warranted in the present case, particularly when there was a provision for filing an appeal and revision against the orders dated 05.12.1983 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Prescribed Authority, Narwana. On this point he relies upon a judgment of this Court in Vijay Singh Vs. State of Haryana etc., [2012(5) Law Herald (P&H) 168] : 2012(3) RCR (Civil) 103. He further submits that summoning Patwari Halka and collecting the evidence, at the hands of the Financial Commissioner, was beyond the scope of his suo-moto powers under Section 18(6) of the Act. The Financial Commissioner misread and misunderstood the true import of the statement made by Patwari, who has clearly stated that there was no basis for changing the ownership of land from Shri Kahan Dass to the Samadh in the year 1947. The Financial Commissioner further committed the serious error of law while treating the Samadh as a juristic person. Relying upon the provisions of Section 5(A) of the Act, learned senior counsel would contend that if the Samadh was a public place, then it was exempted from the provisions of the Act. If Samadh was to be treated as private, then it was the property of the petitioners. Further, only a company registered under the Companies Act, would be a juristic person and not the Samadh, which has been illegally so held in the present case. So far as the mutation vide which the land was allegedly changed from Shri Kahan Dass to Samadh, would neither create nor extinguish any title. The mutation has no presumptive value on title. So far as the mutation vide which the land was allegedly changed from Shri Kahan Dass to Samadh, would neither create nor extinguish any title. The mutation has no presumptive value on title. He concluded by submitting that even after exercising suo-moto powers under Section 18(6) of the Act, the Financial Commissioner was under legal obligation to remand the matter in toto leaving it open to the Prescribed Authority to decide the case afresh on merits. Relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Sawarni Versus Smt. Inder Kaur 1997(1) RCR(Civil) 41 and judgment of this Court in Bhagwan Singh Versus Madan Lal and another 1997(1) RCR (Civil) 297, he finally prays for setting aside the impugned order dated 11.11.1993 (Annexure P-2), by allowing the present writ petition. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submits that Financial Commissioner did not commit any error of law while passing the impugned order. Impugned order was self speaking and based on record, which deserves to be upheld. The judgments relied upon by learned senior counsel for the petitioners were not applicable in the present case. He also contended that in view of the material change which took place in the year 1947, when the Samadh became the owner of the land, legal representatives of Shri Kahan Dass were not entitled for any relief under the Act. He prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, after careful perusal of the record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that present writ petition deserves to be allowed. The impugned order, being patently illegal, cannot be sustained. To say so, reasons are more than one, which are recorded hereinafter. 9. Following are the three questions of law that arise for consideration of this Court: (i) Whether the words “at any time” used in Section 18(6) of the Act would mean indefinite period or the suo-moto power is to be exercised within reasonable time; (ii) Whether the mutation of a property in the revenue record creates or extinguishes the title; (iii) Whether an unregistered and privately managed Samadh comes within the ambit of a juristic person. 10. Taking the first question first, Section 18 is provided under Chapter III of the Act, which is the miscellaneous chapter. 10. Taking the first question first, Section 18 is provided under Chapter III of the Act, which is the miscellaneous chapter. Section 18(6) of the Act, reads as under: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-sections, the Financial Commissioner may suo moto at any time call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such proceedings or order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he may deem fit.” 11. Section 18 of the Act also contains the provisions for filing appeal and revision. Under section 18(1) an appeal is provided before the Collector against the order passed by the Prescribed Authority. Collector is further empowered to entertain the appeal even after expiry of the period of limitation, on showing the sufficient cause. Thereafter, Section 18(4) provides revision before the Commissioner, against the order passed by the Collector. 12. In the present case, there is not even a passing reference as to why the remedy of appeal and/or revision was not availed by the State, if it was aggrieved against the order dated 05.12.1983 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Prescribed Authority. Further, no explanation, even worth the name, has been given as to why the remedy of appeal and/or revision could not be availed, at the appropriate time. Since the statutory remedy of appeal and revision are provided under Section 18 itself, it would always be obligatory on the part of the aggrieved party, to avail the statutory remedy, before invoking the suo-moto powers under Section 18(6) of the Act. If the statutory remedy is not availed, the party shall show as to why the remedy of appeal and/or revision could not be availed at the appropriate time, despite exercise of due diligence in that regard. A reasonable explanation for not availing the remedy of appeal and/or revision on behalf of the aggrieved party, would be the relevant factor for invoking and exercising the suo-moto powers under Section 18(6) of the Act. In the present case, no such explanation is available on the record of the case. 13. A reasonable explanation for not availing the remedy of appeal and/or revision on behalf of the aggrieved party, would be the relevant factor for invoking and exercising the suo-moto powers under Section 18(6) of the Act. In the present case, no such explanation is available on the record of the case. 13. In view of the above said background, was it reasonable and justified to invoke the suo-moto powers by the respondents-State and was it appropriate and reasonable at the hands of the Financial Commissioner to exercise his suo-moto powers under Section 18(6) of the Act and that too after a completely unexplained and inordinate long delay of about five years. The Financial Commissioner has failed to address himself on the above said relevant factors before exercising his suo-moto powers. The words “at any time” used in Section 18 (6) of the Act would never mean an indefinite period. It has to be a reasonable period. That seems to be the only harmonious construction and purposeful interpretation. Any contrary interpretation would run counter to the established principles of interpretation. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that the words “at any time” would mean only a reasonable time and not an indefinite period. The first question, posed above, is answered accordingly. 14. The view taken by this Court also finds support from the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujrat Vs. P. Raghav AIR (1969) SC 1297 and Loku Ram Vs. State of Haryana 1999(3) PLR 590. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Loku Ram’s case was also followed by this Court in Vijay Singh’s case (supra). 15. Mutation, though a material entry in the revenue record pertaining to the property so recorded, yet it neither creates nor extinguishes any title. It is recorded only for the fiscal purposes. Mutation also does not have any presumptive value on title. Entry of mutation only enables the persons, in whose favour it is recorded, to pay the land revenue. In the present case, Financial Commissioner arrived at an erroneous conclusion that the mutation recorded in favour of Samadh, would make it the owner of the land. This is crucial mistake committed by the Financial Commissioner while passing the impugned order, which has vitiated the order. Thus, while answering the second question, it is held that neither the mutation creates nor it extinguishes the title. This is crucial mistake committed by the Financial Commissioner while passing the impugned order, which has vitiated the order. Thus, while answering the second question, it is held that neither the mutation creates nor it extinguishes the title. Although, truth is attached to the revenue entry but it is rebuttable. This view is also fortified by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Sawarni’s case (supra). 16. A bare reading of the impugned order passed by the Financial Commissioner would show that he misdirected himself on all the material aspects of the matter. He misunderstood the Samadh as owner only on the basis of mutation of 1947. Relevant part of the order, reads as under: “The Prescribed Authority in his capacity as revenue officer went beyond his jurisdiction in disregarding the entries of the Jamabandi and in accepting the so-called mutation order dated 11.10.1961 without properly verifying the same. It is, therefore, clear that the land owner is Smadh Baba Bhagwan Dass and 6 respondents are only managers and not members in equal shares. It is also clear that the Smadh Baba Bhagwan Dass owns land to the extent of 541 kanals 12 marlas ordinary, equivalent to 849.82 kanals of ‘C’ category land, while the Smadh as an institution can only retain 432 kanals of ‘C’ category land. It is, therefore, hold that the Smadh Baba Bhagwan Dass is a big land owner and that 417 kanals 16 marlas of ‘C’ category land in its holding should be considered as surplus land available to the State for utilization according to the provisions of the Act and the rules. The case is remanded to the Prescribed Authority, Narwana for the limited purpose of identifying the permissible area of the Smadh. The Prescribed Authority, Narwana will give notice to the managers of the Smadh to identify the permissible area which the Smadh would like to retain and the balance area would be treated as the surplus pool available for utilization under the Act.” 17. Coming to the third question, a Samadh, like the one in the present case, cannot be said to be a juristic person, by any stretch of imagination. It is nowhere recorded that it was a religious place of public nature and/ or it was registered. Admittedly, it was not a Company incorporated under the Companies Act 1956. Coming to the third question, a Samadh, like the one in the present case, cannot be said to be a juristic person, by any stretch of imagination. It is nowhere recorded that it was a religious place of public nature and/ or it was registered. Admittedly, it was not a Company incorporated under the Companies Act 1956. It was also not a religious place of public nature. If at all it was a religious place, it was of private nature meant only for the family of the petitioners. This kind of a Samadh can be compared with the small size of a temple, in any form, which is invariably found in residential houses. However, that does not mean that such a religious place becomes of a public nature. 18. In this factual background, there was no scope for the Financial Commissioner to bring the Samadh located in the fields of the petitioners, within the ambit of a juristic person. If an individual put some bricks in his field giving them shape of a small temple, for the purpose of worship by the members of the family, such a samadh will not have any separate legal entity nor it can be called to be a juristic person. In this view of the matter, it is unhesitatingly held that any such small temple, place of worship or samadh, which is meant for the members of the family, would not come within the ambit of a juristic person. 19. This Court has found force in the contention raised by learned Senior counsel for the petitioners that the Financial Commissioner was not competent to summon the Patwari Halka and record his evidence. In fact, this procedure adopted by the Financial Commissioner was unknown to law and beyond the scope of the Act. Further, by passing the impugned order, he virtually sealed the fate of the petitioners deciding the matter conclusively. Thereafter, the remand order passed by him would serve no purpose because the Prescribed Authority, being the competent authority in the matter, was left with no other option for deciding the matter afresh, except to identify the permissible area. Such a conclusion arrived at and direction issued by the Financial Commissioner was beyond the scheme of the Act. 20. Thereafter, the remand order passed by him would serve no purpose because the Prescribed Authority, being the competent authority in the matter, was left with no other option for deciding the matter afresh, except to identify the permissible area. Such a conclusion arrived at and direction issued by the Financial Commissioner was beyond the scheme of the Act. 20. The Halka Patwari, when appeared before the Financial Commissioner suffered a statement to the effect that the basis for changing the mutation from Kahan Dass to the Samadh was not recorded. Once no basis, as such was recorded, it was all the more obligatory on the part of the Financial Commissioner not to pass the final order himself. Even if he was satisfied that some irregularity has taken place, still it was expected from him that he would remand the total case leaving it open to the competent authority i.e. Prescribed Authority to apply its mind, reconsider the matter and decide it afresh, after granting due opportunity of being heard to both the parties and then passing an appropriate order, in accordance with law. However, the Financial Commissioner committed a patent illegality while leaving no scope for the Prescribed Authority to exercise its jurisdiction. 21. Another serious prejudice that would be caused to the petitioners was that even their statutory right of appeal against the fresh order passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as their right of revision, would be taken away. It is so said because if the Financial Commissioner would have remanded the matter to the Prescribed Authority deciding the case on merits, petitioners would have been entitled to avail their remedy of statutory appeal, if the order passed by the Prescribed Authority would have gone against them. Even against the appellate order, they would have another remedy of revision before the Commissioner and thereafter before the Financial Commissioner. In this view of the matter, it is held that the Financial Commissioner acted without jurisdiction, while finally deciding the case. 22. There was nothing on record before the Financial Commissioner to substantiate his view taken by him against the petitioners, on the basis of the change recorded in the mutation of 1947 from Kahan Dass to Samadh. It was the sole statement of the Patwari Halka, who also stated that there was no basis for recording the change from Kahan Dass to Samadh. It was the sole statement of the Patwari Halka, who also stated that there was no basis for recording the change from Kahan Dass to Samadh. Since there was no plausible explanation forthcoming, it would have been safe for the Financial Commissioner not to place heavy reliance on the mutation entries. At any rate, the mutation would never confer any title in favour of Samadh, as already held hereinabove. 23. Finally, if the Samadh was to be taken as religious place of public nature, it would be exempted from the operation of the Act, as provided under Section 5(A) of the Act. If it was to be treated as a private Samadh, then it would be the private property of the petitioners and they would be entitled for the protection available under the Act. The relevant part of Section 5(A) of the Act is extracted as under: “5A. Exemption of lands belongings to religious or charitable institutions. Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or authority, the provisions of this Act shall not apply to land belongings to any religious or charitable institution of a public nature in existence immediately before the day of commencement of this Act, but not belonging to the Mahant, Mohtamim or manager thereof:” xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx “Explanation- For the purposes of this section, ‘religious or charitable institution’ means- (i) a temple; (ii) a Gurdwara (iii) A Gowshala (iv) a Waqf as defined in clause (ii) of Section 3 of the Waqf Act, 954(Parliament Act 29 of 1954); or (v) any other religious place of public nature.” 24. A bare perusal of the abovesaid provisions of law in the context of the present case, would show that neither the Samadh of the petitioners was a religious place of public nature nor it was a charitable institution. It was a private property of the petitioners. Admittedly, the Samadh in question was not a registered body. At the most, it could be said to be only a part of family affairs of the petitioners. Thus, the Samadh in question, in either of the two situations discussed hereinabove, was beyond the scope of the Act. 25. Learned counsel for the State failed to substantiate any of his arguments so as to convince this Court to take on different view than the one expressed in the foregoing paragraphs. 26. No other argument was raised. 27. Thus, the Samadh in question, in either of the two situations discussed hereinabove, was beyond the scope of the Act. 25. Learned counsel for the State failed to substantiate any of his arguments so as to convince this Court to take on different view than the one expressed in the foregoing paragraphs. 26. No other argument was raised. 27. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order dated 11.11.1993 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Financial Commissioner, Haryana, is illegal and the same cannot be sustained. Thus, the impugned order dated 11.11.1993 (Annexure P-2) is hereby ordered to be set aside. 28. Consequently, the matter is remanded back to the Prescribed Authority, Narwana for fresh decision on merits. The Prescribed Authority shall decide the case on merits, by passing an appropriate order thereon, in accordance with law, and after granting due opportunity of hearing to both the parties. Endeavour shall be made to decide the case at an early date. 29. Resultantly, with the observations made and directions issued, as hereinabove, the instant writ petition stands allowed, however, with no order as to costs.