Judgment :- A.P. Lavande, J. Heard Mr. D. Khambatta, Mr. D. Mehta, Mr. N. Sardessai, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. C. A. Ferreira, learned Asst. Solicitor General and Mr. A. N. S. Nadkarni, learned Advocate General for the respondents. 2. All the four writ petitions are being disposed of by common judgment since the issues involved in all these petitions are almost identical. 3. For the sake of convenience, we shall deal with the facts in Writ Petition No.685/2012 since the arguments which have been advanced in this petition by learned Senior Advocate Mr. D. Khambatta, have been adopted by learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in other writ petitions. 4. The petitioners, in Writ Petition No. 685/2012, are engaged in mining activities. It is the case of the petitioners that the mine is situated at a distance of about 1.22 kms. from Bhagwan Mahaveer Wildlife Sanctuary. On 15th December, 1995, respondent No.1 granted permission for diversion of forest land for mining lease under Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, which was extended from time to time. On 3rd September, 2007, respondent No.1 granted environmental clearance for the mining, subject to certain conditions. On 17th October, 2007, the petitioner applied for clearance under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 with respondent No.1, which according to the petitioner, was the competent authority under the Wildlife Act. The petitioner submitted the compliance report on 19th January, 2008 with respondent No.1 stating that clearance under the Wildlife Act has been sought from respondent No.3 on 17th October, 2007. In February, 2008, the petitioner obtained consent under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, which have been renewed from time to time. 5. On 19th February, 2008, respondent No.1 inspected the petitioner's mine for monitoring under the environment clearance. Thereafter on 15th July, 2008, respondent No.3 granted permission under the Wildlife Act and on 21st August, 2009, the petitioner filed compliance report with respondent No.1 stating, inter alia, that clearance under the Wildlife Act has been obtained from respondent No.3, on 5th July, 2008. In so far as drawal of ground water is concerned, prior permission would be obtained from the competent authority, if required, to draw the ground water. Similar compliance reports were also filed with respondent No.1 on 18.11.2010, and 15.6.2011. 6. In so far as drawal of ground water is concerned, prior permission would be obtained from the competent authority, if required, to draw the ground water. Similar compliance reports were also filed with respondent No.1 on 18.11.2010, and 15.6.2011. 6. On 26th September, 2011, respondent No.1 again inspected the petitioner's mine and on 15th December, 2011, inspection report dated 26.9.2011 was sent to the petitioner, inter alia, stating that in view of the Supreme Court Order dated 4th December, 2006, the environment clearance be kept in abeyance since final approval of the Wildlife Board and prior permission for drawal of ground water had not been obtained. The petitioner sent its response to respondent No.1, disputing the contentions raised in the report. 7. Thereafter, on 23rd April, 2012, respondent No.1 issued show cause notice to the petitioner calling upon the petitioner as to why the environmental clearance should not be revoked, primarily on the following two grounds : (I) approval from the Standing Committee of Wildlife Board, was not obtained; and (II) permission for drawal of the ground water was not obtained. 8. On 15th May, 2012, the petitioner gave reply to the show cause notice, inter alia, stating that no Eco-sensitive Zone has been delineated till date. Thereafter, by impugned order dated 13 th September, 2012, respondent No.1 directed closure of the mine and suspension of the environmental clearance under Section 5 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 for violation of the conditions. In the operative part of the order, it has been stated that (1) the petitioner has not obtained the requisite clearance from the Standing Committee for National Board for Wildlife (NBWL), as was required to be obtained pursuant to the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 4th December, 2006 in Writ Petition No.460 of 2004 (Goa Foundation Vs. Union of India) since the said mine is located within 10 kms. of Bhagwan Mahaveer Wildlife Sanctuary and Bagwan Mahaveer National Park and (2) approval has not been obtained from the concerned authority for drawal of ground water. The said order had been passed in exercise of powers vested in respondent No.1 under Section 5 of Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. 9. In Writ Petition No. 624/2012, the impugned order dated 13th August, 2012 stopping the mining activities has been passed on the same grounds. The said order had been passed in exercise of powers vested in respondent No.1 under Section 5 of Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. 9. In Writ Petition No. 624/2012, the impugned order dated 13th August, 2012 stopping the mining activities has been passed on the same grounds. Similarly, in Writ Petition No. 625/2012, the impugned order has been passed on 13th August, 2012. Whereas, in Writ Petition No.730/2012, the impugned order is dated 13th September, 2012. 10. On behalf of respondents No.1 and 2, preliminary objection was raised to the maintainability of all the petitions, relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan and others v/s. Union of India and others (2012) 8 SCC 326 . Mr. Ferreira, learned Asst. Solicitor General, submitted that in terms of the said judgment, all the petitioners are bound to approach the National Green Tribunal constituted under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, by filing an appeal under Section 16 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010. Mr. Ferreira further submitted that in so far as challenge to the impugned order is concerned, the appeal is maintainable and in so far as challenge to the Office Memorandum dated 2nd December, 2009 and Guidelines dated 19th August, 2010 issued by respondent No.1, the petition may be maintainable. 11. Without prejudice to the contentions of respondent No.1, Mr. Ferreira made submissions on merits as well, to which we will make reference hereinafter. 12. Mr. Khambatta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.685/2012, submitted that the mere fact that an appeal is provided under Section 16 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, does not bar the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain a writ petition. In any case, this court will have to consider the challenge to OM dated 2nd December, 2009 and the Guidelines dated 19th August, 2010, since challenge to both of them would not lie before the Tribunal and in such a case, it would lead to anomalous situation, resulting in miscarriage of justice. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in any case, in the present case, there is total violation of principles of natural justice and as such, availability of alternate remedy is no bar in entertaining the writ petition. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in any case, in the present case, there is total violation of principles of natural justice and as such, availability of alternate remedy is no bar in entertaining the writ petition. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the impugned order visits the petitioner with adverse civil consequences, and the same has been passed without affording personal hearing to the petitioner, and, as such, is void on account of gross violation of principles of natural justice and fair play. It was further urged that unless the statute expressly or impliedly excludes the obligation to afford personal hearing, the duty to afford personal hearing has to be read into the statute, and Section 5 of the Environment (Protection) Act and the Rules framed thereunder, do not exclude the duty to afford a personal hearing. According to learned Senior Counsel, stoppage of the petitioner's mine has resulted in loss of public exchequer and has rendered over 2500 persons unemployed. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in the impugned order, reference is made to order dated 4th December, 2006 in Writ Petition No.460 of 2004 passed by the Apex Court, to which no reference was made in the show cause notice and, as such, the impugned order travels beyond the show cause notice and on this count also the impugned order is liable to be set aside. It was further urged that had respondent No.1 given personal hearing to the petitioner, the petitioner would have pointed out to respondent No.1 that the order dated 4.12.2006 in W.P.No.460/2004 is not applicable to the case of the petitioner and as such, the petitioner has been deprived of such an opportunity by not giving personal hearing. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it was imperative on the part of respondent no.1 to afford personal hearing before passing the impugned order, having adverse civil consequences qua the petitioner. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that it was mandatory for respondent No. 1 to give personal hearing to the petitioner before passing the impugned order of suspending the mining activities of the petitioner, having adverse civil consequences. 13. Mr. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that it was mandatory for respondent No. 1 to give personal hearing to the petitioner before passing the impugned order of suspending the mining activities of the petitioner, having adverse civil consequences. 13. Mr. Khambatta fairly submitted that in the event this court is inclined to set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to respondent No.1, respondent No.1 be directed to take a decision in the matter within a reasonable time and till the order is passed by respondent No.1, the petitioners are agreeable not to undertake any mining activity in the mine in question. 14. In support of his submissions, Mr. Khambatta placed reliance upon the following judgments: (1) Nawabkhan Abbaskhan V/s. The State of Gujarat (1974) 2 SCC 121 ; (2) State of Haryana V/s. Ram Kishan and others (1988) 3 SCC 416 (3) Assam Sillimanite Limited and Another V/s. Union of India and others (1990) 3 SCC 182 ; (4) Whirlpool Corporation V/s. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others (1998) 8 SCC 1 ; (5) Kunwar Pal Singh (Dead) by L.R's V. State of U.P. and Ors. With Somendra Singh and Anr. V. State of U.P. And Ors. And Jagdish Pal Singh V. State of U.P. And Ors. AIR 2007 SC 1675 ; (6) Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association V/s. Designated Authority and others (2011) 2 SCC 258 ; (7) P.N. Eswara Iyer and others V/s. Registrar, Supreme Court of India (1980) 4 SCC 680 ; (8) State of U.P. And others V. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh etc. and Lucknow Development Authority and others V. Maharani Rajlaxmi Kumari Devi and others etc. AIR 1989 SC 997 (9) Canara Bank and others V/s. Debasis Das and others (2003) 4 SCC 557 ; and (10) Oriental Bank of Commerce and another V/s. R.K. Uppal (2011) 8 SCC 695 15. Mr. Mehta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 624/2012 and Mr. Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petitions No.625/2012 and 730/2012 adopted the submissions made by Mr. Khambatta, appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.685/2012. 16. Mr. Mr. Mehta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 624/2012 and Mr. Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ Petitions No.625/2012 and 730/2012 adopted the submissions made by Mr. Khambatta, appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.685/2012. 16. Mr. A.N.S. Nadkarni, learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Goa in all the writ petitions, submitted that the petitioners are entitled to personal hearing, considering the adverse civil consequences emanating from the impugned orders, having regard to the provisions of the Environment (Protection) Act and the Rules framed thereunder. 17. We have carefully considered the rival submissions, perused the record and the judgments relied upon. 18. We have heard learned Asst. Solicitor General on merits also. Mr. Ferreira submitted that in the present case, the question of giving personal hearing does not arise inasmuch as at no point of time, the petitioners demanded personal hearing and it is not the law that in every case personal hearing has to be given. According to learned Assistant Solicitor General, there is a difference between not giving opportunity and not giving adequate opportunity and in the present case, no prejudice is caused to the petitioners by not giving personal hearing inasmuch as the petitioners were informed about the grounds on which the action was sought to be taken and adequate opportunity was given to the petitioners for placing before respondent No.1 their replies to the deficiencies/violations observed by respondent No.1 and, as such, the question of giving personal hearing to the petitioners does not arise. According to Mr. Ferreira, the principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae and these principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket and their applicability depends upon the context and facts and circumstances of each case. Ultimately, the objective is to ensure a fair hearing, and a fair deal to the person whose rights are going to be affected. In support of his submissions, Mr. Ferreira has placed reliance upon the following judgments: (1) Oral order in M/s. Alpine Minmetals India Pvt. Ltd. Rep. By petitioner no.2. Ultimately, the objective is to ensure a fair hearing, and a fair deal to the person whose rights are going to be affected. In support of his submissions, Mr. Ferreira has placed reliance upon the following judgments: (1) Oral order in M/s. Alpine Minmetals India Pvt. Ltd. Rep. By petitioner no.2. v/s. Union of India , through its Secretary and 3 others (Writ Petition No. 317 of 2012); (2) Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan and others v/s. Union of India and others (2012) 8 SCC 326 (3) Union of India V/s. Jesus Sales Corporation, 1996(4) SCC 69 (4) State Bank of Patiala and Ors V/s. S.K. Sharma, 1996 (3) SCC 364 (5) Patel Engineering Ltd. V/s. Union of India and Anr., 2012 (11) SCC 257 (6) Madhav Ramchandra Nanivadekar and anr Vs. SLAO and Ors 1998(3) ALL MR 465. 19. We shall first deal with the preliminary objection taken on behalf of respondent No.1 regarding maintainability of the present petitions. In all these petitions, the challenge is to the impugned orders, suspending operations of mining activities, as well as to the Office Memorandum dated 2.12.2009 and the Guidelines dated 19.8.2010, issued by respondent No.1. In our view, the petitioners would not be entitled to challenge these guidelines before the Tribunal constituted under the Act and, therefore, it will be for this court to deal with the challenge to the said OM and the Guidelines. We also find merit in the submission of Mr. Khambatta that the petitioners cannot be relegated to two remedies, one before the Tribunal and another before this Court, when there is composite challenge to the impugned orders passed by respondent No.1 and the said OM and the Guidelines. 20. There is one more reason which appeals to us to entertain these writ petitions. In the show cause notice issued to the petitioners, there is no reference to the Order dated 4.12.2006 passed in Writ Petition No.460/2004, by the Apex Court on which reliance has been placed by respondent No.1 in the impugned orders. 20. There is one more reason which appeals to us to entertain these writ petitions. In the show cause notice issued to the petitioners, there is no reference to the Order dated 4.12.2006 passed in Writ Petition No.460/2004, by the Apex Court on which reliance has been placed by respondent No.1 in the impugned orders. No doubt, in the replies, the petitioners had made reference to the said Order and submitted that the same was not applicable to the case of the petitioners, but, this fact, by itself, would not be sufficient to hold that respondent No.1 is entitled to rely upon the said order for suspending the mining activities of the petitioners, without putting the petitioners to notice that mining activities carried on by the petitioners are in violation of the said order of the Supreme Court. Thus, the necessary sequitur is that the impugned orders have been passed in clear breach of the principles of natural justice and, therefore, in our view, the petitions deserve to be admitted notwithstanding the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan and others (supra). Moreover in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra), the Apex Court has held that existence of alternative statutory remedies would not operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. Hence, Rule. 21. Since the parties were heard on merits with the consent of the learned Counsel for the petitioners and learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, we proceed to deal with the matter on merits. 22. In the case of Nawabkhan Abbaskhan (supra), relied upon by Mr. Khambatta, the Apex Court has held that where hearing is obliged by a statute which affects the fundamental right of a citizen, the duty to give the hearing sounds in constitutional requirement and failure to comply with such a duty is fatal. The Apex Court further held that an order of an administrative authority charged with the duty of complying with natural justice in exercise of power before restricting the fundamental right of a citizen is void and abinitio and of no legal efficacy. 23. The Apex Court further held that an order of an administrative authority charged with the duty of complying with natural justice in exercise of power before restricting the fundamental right of a citizen is void and abinitio and of no legal efficacy. 23. In the case of Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh etc. (supra), the Apex Court held that an order of a statutory body cancelling a lease without giving a personal hearing was liable to be quashed. The Apex Court further held that in matters of importance where the stakes were heavy, large investments had been made and factual matters of some complexity had to be determined, a personal hearing had to be given. More over, as already stated above, in the show cause notices issued to the petitioners, there was no reference to the Order dated 4.12.2006 passed by the Apex Court in Writ Petition No.460/2004, on which reliance has been placed in the impugned orders. 24. In the case of Canara Bank and others (supra), it has been held that if a party is not given unambiguous notice of the case it has to meet, the party cannot be said to have got a reasonable opportunity to represent its case, and the same results in breach of principles of natural justice and hence the order passed is liable to be set side. In the present case, as already stated above, reliance has been placed by respondent No.1 on the Order dated 4.12.2006 passed by the Apex Court in Writ Petition No.460/2004. Had respondent No.1 given an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners, the petitioners could have pointed out that the said order is not applicable to their case. By not giving personal hearing to the petitioners, the petitioners have been deprived of reasonable opportunity of putting up their case before respondent No.1. 25. We shall now deal with the judgments relied upon by Mr. Ferreira, appearing on behalf of respondent No.1. In the case of Jesus Sales Corporation (supra), the issue was whether the request of dispensation with the deposit of the penalty could be rejected without hearing the applicant. The Apex Court held that the third proviso to Section 4-M(1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, vests discretion in the authority to dispense with such deposit. In the case of Jesus Sales Corporation (supra), the issue was whether the request of dispensation with the deposit of the penalty could be rejected without hearing the applicant. The Apex Court held that the third proviso to Section 4-M(1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, vests discretion in the authority to dispense with such deposit. The Apex Court further noted that Section 4(M)2 provided for an opportunity of being heard before final order is passed and, as such, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that neither express nor implied requirement of affording personal hearing was found in the third proviso to Section 4M(1) of the Act. 26. In the case of State Bank of Patiala (supra), the Apex Court was dealing with a case of an inquiry against delinquent officer who was advised to peruse the statements of the witnesses and make notes thereform. In this factual background, the issue was whether there was substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of the State Bank of Patiala (Officers') Service Regulations, 1979. The Apex Court held that the delinquent officer did not raise any objection during the inquiry that non-furnishing of the copies of the statements was disabling him or had disabled him from effectively cross examining the witnesses or to defend himself. In this factual background, the Apex Court held that there was no breach of natural justice. 27. In the case of Patel Engineering Limited (supra), the issue was regarding refusal of the appellant to enter into contract with the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) despite acceptance of the bid of the appellant. The Apex Court, considering the facts, and more particularly the fact that it was a commercial decision of the State, held that reasonable opportunity was given to the appellant, though a personal hearing was not given. The said decision was rendered in the context of contractual commercial decision of the State. 28. In the case of Madhav Ramchandra Nanivadekar (supra), the Division Bench of this Court held that it was not obligatory on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer to give personal hearing in an inquiry under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, when the citizen did not demand such a personal hearing, although such an opportunity was offered to him. 29. 29. In our view, the judgments relied upon on behalf of respondent No.1 do not advance the case of respondent No.1. The impugned orders passed by respondent No.1 deserve to be quashed and set aside on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. 30. In the result, we pass the following:-ORDER (I) Impugned orders dated 13th September, 2012, 13th August, 2012, 13th August, 2012 and 13th September, 2012, passed by respondent No.1 are quashed and set aside; (II) Respondent No.1 is directed to give personal hearing to the petitioners in respect of the show cause notices issued to them and pass appropriate orders, in accordance with law; (III) Respondent No.1 is at liberty to give fresh show cause notices, if it so desires, and in such an eventuality, the petitioners shall be entitled to reply to the show cause notices and respondent No.1 will give personal hearing to the petitioners. (IV) Respondent No.1 shall complete the entire exercise expeditiously and, in any case, on or before 30th October, 2013. (V) Although the impugned orders are quashed, the petitioners shall not carry on any mining activity in the mines in question, till the orders are passed by respondent No.1 and further subject to the orders that may be passed by the Apex Court in the pending Writ Petition (Civil) No. 435/2012. 31. All the writ petitions are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs.